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Abstract 
The broad aim of this study is to investigate the discourse of ‘alibrāliyah’ in the 
Saudi socio-political context. ‘alibrāliyah’, corresponding to liberalism in English, is a 
loanword to Arabic that started to be contested recently amongst opposing groups who 
attempt to charge it with their own ideological meaning. Due to the lack of studies that 
investigate the ideological battles between the groups in contesting movements in Saudi 
context, it is found significant to examine the recent movement of ‘alibrāliyah’ as 
identified by different groups, mainly conservatives and progressives, in their battle to 
gain or maintain hegemony. This thesis designs a framework for examining the 
diachronic construction of ‘alibrāliyah’ at macro and micro levels. It combines Corpus 
Linguistics methods with Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) and Discourse Theory 
(DT). The thesis employed the developed model by examining the discourse of 
‘alibrāliyah’ in a corpus of Saudi newspaper articles that discuses mainly the issue of 
‘alibrāliyah’. The macro corpus analysis of 575 articles has revealed that ‘alibrāliyah’ is 
mainly associated with the discourse of religion and the discourse of human rights in 
which it shifts from being associated with the religious discourse to associating it with the 
discourse of freedom and human rights at the end of the period. The micro discourse 
analysis of a sample of texts shows in general that the construction of ‘alibrāliyah’ shifts 
from being secular and contradictory to Islam into being compatible to non-fundamental 
Islam in which ‘alibrāliyah’ can be adopted within Islam to guarantee the freedom of 
individuals. It is concluded that this shift in meaning represents the success of liberals to 
establish their identity and to have power in Saudi society. It is also concluded that the 
developed model for this thesis can help by intricately investigating the construction of 
ideological movements and the relation between the groups struggling for hegemony.  
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1 The Transliteration system 
The Arabic utterances throughout this thesis are transliterated using Latin scripts. 
The transliteration system follows The Library of Congress Transliteration system1. The 
following list presents firstly the Arabic consonants followed by the vowels.  
Arabic Consonants 
Arabic  Transliteration  Arabic Transliteration 
أ a ض ḍ 
ء ’ ط ṭ 
ب b ظ ẓ 
ت t ع ‘ 
ث th غ gh 
ج j ف f 
ح ḥ ق q 
خ kh ك k 
د d ل l 
ذ dh م m 
ر r ن n 
ز z ه h 
س s و w 
ش sh ي y 
ص ṣ   
                                               
1 http://www.loc.gov/catdir/cpso/romanization/arabic.pdf. 
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Arabic Vowels 
Arabic  Transliteration 
ا ā 
  َ  a 
ي ī 
  َ  i 
و ū 
  ُ  u 
  ُ  an 
  ُ  in 
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1.1 Rationale of the study 
The socio-political arena in Saudi Arabia is an area of limited detailed research. 
There has been restricted scope in studies of the clashing ideologies in the area and 
their power struggle to achieve hegemony in Saudi society. According to Alkhedr (2012), 
there is a lack of research examining the Saudi socio-political discourse. The clash of 
ideologies in the region started in the early 1980s during a period when the country’s 
development plans began implementation. This was a clash between religious 
conservatives and progressives over the discourse of modernism, at the time society 
was dominated by a religious group. The conflicts over modernisation have occurred in 
a series of movements namely ‘ḥadāthah’/ modernism, 'ilmāniyah' / secularism and 
alibrāliyah/ liberalism. Alkhedr stated that these conflicts take the form of the clash over 
ideological keywords in which each group attempts to discuss what it could mean from 
their own perspective (2012: 633-634). In this sense, the groups in the Saudi socio-
political field attempt to position themselves through charging these key terms with 
meanings, either positively or negatively, in order to obtain or maintain power. 
This is most definitely the case with the recent movement of ‘alibrāliyah’. In this 
scenario, the conflict over domination and supremacy have been characterised by the 
battle between different factions in line with the concept of ‘alibrāliyah’. This research is 
derived from this observation and aims to examine the construction of the keyword 
‘alibrāliyah’ and the means by which each group defines it to achieve hegemony. The 
study of the contestation of ‘alibrāliyah’ would contribute by clarifying the nature of the 
conflict between the groups in the Saudi socio-political field. In particular, the study of 
the discourse of ‘alibrāliyah’ would provide an insight into the general discourse of 
modernism in Saudi culture and the features of the recent dominant discourse.  
The study of the discourse of ‘alibrāliyah’ is conducted by developing a 
theoretical-methodological framework which traces the meaning of the keyword 
‘alibrāliyah’ at macro and micro levels. In particular, it aims to study diachronically the 
discourse of liberalism in terms of the way the keyword ‘alibrāliyah’ is articulated by 
different groups and weather its articulation shift over time. This is carried out through 
conducting a corpus analysis combined with a discourse analysis of newspaper texts 
written between 2007-2016. It is concluded that this theoretical framework can be used 
to study comprehensively the ideologically contested key terms by clashing groups in 
different contexts.  
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1.2 Aims and objectives  
The broad aim of this study is to investigate the discourse of liberalism in Saudi 
context with a focus on diachronically examining the construction and development of 
the discourse of ‘alibrāliyah’ and the identifications of any shift in its construction over 
time. It also aims to examine the mechanism by which ‘alibrāliyah’ is articulated by 
different groups and how the process of defining it is merely a struggle over hegemony. 
To identify the diachronic identification of ‘alibrāliyah’ and the struggle over power in 
identifying it, a theoretical- methodological framework is developed. This framework 
combines linguistic Corpus Analysis with Discourse Analysis. This framework integrates 
the corpus analysis of the discourse of ‘alibrāliyah’ at the macro level with discourse 
approaches of Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) and Discourse Theory (DT) at the 
micro level. This framework is based on the assumption that the contestation of 
‘alibrāliyah’ represents a power struggle between the groups that each aims to charge it 
with their own meaning. This assumption corresponds to Discourse Theory view that 
considers contested words such as ‘alibrāliyah’ as empty signifiers. In line with this, 
groups in conflict evolved personalised interpretations of the term in order to gain power. 
The objectives are summarised in the following key points: 
• To identify diachronically the construction of ‘alibrāliyah’ in the Saudi context. 
• To develop a comprehensive framework to examine the discourse of ‘alibrāliyah’ 
in Saudi society.  
• To examine the mechanism by which ‘alibrāliyah’ is identified including the 
relation between the groups in identifying it. 
The study of the discourse of ‘alibrāliyah’ is going to be conducted through the 
analysis of a corpus of newspaper articles that discuss mainly ‘alibrāliyah’. Initially, these 
articles will be analysed using Corpus Linguistics methods to identify the meanings 
associated with ‘alibrāliyah’ over time at the macro level. A qualitive analysis of a sample 
of articles using Discourse-Historical approach and Discourse Theory is then conducted. 
DHA will enable the researcher to look at the discursive strategies which are used to 
construct arguments about ‘alibrāliyah’. Discourse Theory also allows the researcher for 
interpreting the arguments on the basis of the semantic meanings used to fill ‘alibrāliyah’ 
and the construction of the groups in each article. Looking at these articles diachronically 
would enable the researcher to identify whether there is any shift in the construction of 
‘alibrāliyah’ or the groups involved in the debate. The evolution of the assessment 
relating to ‘alibrāliyah’ within newspapers is not necessarily a priority. However, the focus 
is to examine the composition of ‘alibrāliyah’ within the press platform. It is also worth 
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noting that as the context and data of this thesis is based on Arabic language, it is found 
necessary to transliterate some of the Arabic utterances using Latin scripts. This process 
of transliteration follows The Library of Congress Transliteration system2 
1.3 Content and structure of thesis 
In this study, a framework is gradually developed to investigate the meaning of 
discourse through examining the main ideological keyword contested amongst groups 
to define this discourse. Information of the contest for power between socio-political 
groups in Saudi Arabia forms the foundation for the evolution of this framework. This 
struggle over power in Saudi society is identified in terms of contesting ideological 
keywords in which each group aims to charge it with their own meaning. This was the 
case with the recent movement of ‘alibrāliyah’. Therefore, the aim of this study is to trace 
its meaning over time. The process of tracing the meaning of ‘alibrāliyah’ will be 
conducted through looking at it at the macro level using corpus analysis, plus examining 
it at the micro level through employing approaches of discourse analysis.    
Chapter 2 presents a socio-historical review of the discourse of modernisation 
and the conflicts surrounding it in Saudi society. It provides information about the 
establishment and structure of Saudi society, including the opposing sides in the conflict 
over modernisation and provides a chronological outline of the conflicts that have 
occurred in different periods. These include conflicts over modernism and secularism as 
well as a brief introduction of the emergence of the recent conflict over ‘alibrāliyah’. The 
review facilitates the realisation of the features of the historical battle for supremacy and 
power within the socio-political platform in Saudi Arabia. 
In chapter 3, a theoretical-methodological framework is developed to investigate 
the contested ideological word of ‘alibrāliyah’. It reviews and discusses several theories 
relevant to the study of the meaning of keywords and their shifts across time. Firstly, it 
presents a discussion on macro level approaches on the subject of keyword analysis 
which have been examined synchronically and diachronically in line with the 
connotations of cultural key terms in particular contexts using Corpus Linguistics. The 
discussion moves then to micro level approaches introducing the Discourse Theory (DT), 
which considers contested keywords as a case of struggle for gaining hegemony. 
Discourse-Historical Approach is also discussed as it offers an empirical discursive 
analysis of the strategies used in constructing discourse as part of the struggle to gain 
                                               
2The Library of Congress Transliteration system is available at:  
http://www.loc.gov/catdir/cpso/romanization/arabic.pdf. 
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power. The chapter concludes by proposing a framework that combines these macro 
and micro approaches in order to investigate comprehensively the construction and 
development of ideological keywords which is in the case of this study; the keyword 
‘alibrāliyah’. 
The corpus and methodology are discussed in chapter 4. Firstly, the criteria of 
the data selection and the process of the compilation of the corpus are discussed. In the 
second part of the chapter, the analytical methods are discussed. These represent a 
combination of macro approaches using corpus linguistics methods and micro 
approaches using historical-discourse approaches. I discuss in detail the methods that 
are employed for the data analysis providing examples from data that illustrate the 
application of these methods. 
Chapter 5 presents the macro analysis of the corpus of ‘alibrāliyah’. It starts with 
the analysis of the frequency of the usage of ‘alibrāliyah’ across the corpus of Saudi 
newspapers over time. This reveals any peaks or troughs in the discussion of 
‘alibrāliyah’. The results of the analysis of the wordlist and the collocations around 
‘alibrāliyah’ reveal the key discourses associated with ‘alibrāliyah’ and the shift in these 
discourses. The results provided by the corpus macro analysis serve as a basis for the 
qualitative micro analysis. This provides a general understanding of the discourse of 
‘alibrāliyah’ in Saudi society.  
Chapters 6 and 7 provide the results of the micro qualitative analysis of the 
construction of the discourse of ‘alibrāliyah’. They present an analysis of numerous 
articles which are selected with the assistance of the corpus analysis. The analysis of 
the articles follows a diachronic approach in which each article is analysed in terms of 
the discursive strategies following Discourse-Historical Approach. Thereafter, the 
semantics of the word ‘alibrāliyah’ and the groups involved within the debate are 
examined following the Discourse Theory. This analysis will reveal how ‘alibrāliyah’ as 
an empty signifier is charged with meanings over time and the way the different groups 
attempt to charge it in order to gain or maintain hegemony. 
Finally, chapter 8 summarizes the objectives and the methods of the macro and 
micro analysis, along with the main findings of the study. It also discusses the 
contribution of this thesis to study comprehensively contested ideologies in a site of 
power struggle. The imitations of the current study and future research will also be 
discussed. 
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2.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents a socio-historical review of the discourse of modernisation, 
and the conflicts surrounding it in Saudi society. It conveys information about the 
establishment and structure of Saudi society, outlining the opposing sides in the conflict 
over modernisation between the religious conservatives and the progressives, and 
providing a chronological outline of the conflicts that have occurred in different periods.  
This review addresses the discourse of modernisation in Saudi society, 
specifically in relation to the social or ideological terms used, which are an essential 
component of the modernisation debate, as apparent throughout this chapter. This 
review is not straightforward, as, according to Alkhedr, the Saudi social situation is 
particularly complex, even when compared to other Arab societies (2012: 23). This 
complexity comes to the fore when reading about Saudi social and intellectual 
transformations; the historical conflicts and the discourses that took place at each stage, 
and when comparing the transformations in other Arab countries with the Saudi situation. 
According to Alkhedr (2012: 23), The complexity of understanding the Saudi social 
situation results from the lack of a systematic and professional recording of the Saudi 
social case, specifically where no organisations or institutions exist with the purpose of 
recording the social situation in Saudi Arabia.   
Another major factor that complicates readings of the Saudi social situation is the 
country’s successive and accelerated development progress, the relatively recent 
unification of society, and the phenomenon of “the overlap of ages” when viewing it 
relative to other longer-established societies (Alkhedr 2012: 32). The overlap of ages is 
apparent in the disproportionate development of Saudi Arabia over a short time frame, 
and its fast-paced movement from a traditional society to a modern one, especially in the 
economic domain, which has driven rapid social development.  This overlap of ages 
makes the Saudi social case unique among the Arab and Islamic countries, which have 
been in contact with the West and gradually introduced to its approaches, lifestyle, and 
products over a period of more than a century and a half. The transformation in Saudi 
society only began after the 1960s, leading to enduring conflicts over modernisation, 
which first arose over the course of less than two decades.  Alkhedr (2012) also observed 
that the Saudi social situation is particularly difficult for foreign researchers to explore, 
because they have not been subject to this type of accelerated development. 
According to Alkhedr (2012), there is a dearth of studies addressing the Saudi 
social situation and its socio-political discourse. This prompted Alkhedr to write a 
historical biography of the Saudi state and society, which is the principle source for this 
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section. As will be seen in this review, foreign researchers started researching the Saudi 
case after the West, and specifically the U.S., began to notice the influence of Saudi 
society following the attacks of September 11th 2001. A foreign researcher known for 
examining the Saudi historical and socio-political context, specifically Islamist 
movements, is Lacroix, whose published PhD and the interviews reported within it form 
an important source for this review. Based on the literature found, this review will attempt 
to analyse and explain the Saudi social situation relative to the discourse of 
modernisation, as a way of providing the ideological context to the debate over 
‘alibrāliyah’ that provides the focus of the present thesis.  
2.2 Saudi Arabia: The State, the Society and the Dominant Discourse 
Saudi Arabia is a relatively recently established kingdom and consists of different 
regions that were unified over a thirty-year period (1902-1932) by King Abdul-Aziz Al-
Saud. To this day the country is governed by the Al-Saud royal family. It was established 
by an alliance between the religious institution of Wahhabism, led by Muhammad bin 
Abdulwahhab (Lacroix 2011; Moaddel 2013) and the House of Saud. Before the 
establishment of Saudi Arabia, the region comprised of different self-governing tribes 
and large families, who were autonomous in the different regions. In order to unite people 
from groups of relatively diverse traditions and identities, King Abdul-Aziz saw religion, 
Islam, as the key to constructing a shared identity as a single state (Vassiliev 2000; Al-
Farsy 2003). Undeniably, Wahhabism, as a religious institution, has played a crucial role 
in legitimising the political rule of the Al-Saud royal family by enforcing Al-Saud authority, 
and ensuring political rule in the kingdom abides by the true tenets of Islam (Moaddel 
2013). The ‘Wahhabists’ offered a religious justification for establishing the Saudi state, 
encouraging King Abdul-Aziz to launch several wars to unify the country. The unification 
of Saudi Arabia created a new identity for its inhabitants, i.e. Saudi national identity. This 
is in addition to individuals’ pre-unification tribal and family identities and subservient to 
their Islamic identity (Al-Farsy 2003).     
 Diversity in Saudi Arabia is complex, as the kingdom consists of five main 
regions, whose residents come from a range of tribes and religious groups and hold a 
variety of individual positions. The main regions are Najd (the central area), Hijaz (the 
western area in which the holy mosques are located), Alahsa (the eastern region), and 
the northern and southern regions. A number of tribes are located throughout these 
regions, and their local governors are members of the Saudi government. In addition, 
Saudi Arabia is home to people from the two main Islamic sects, the ‘Sunni’ and ‘Shia’. 
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Sunni Islam is the majority sect in Saudi Arabia, whilst the Shia sect is in the minority, 
but distributed across the regions.  
Despite the complexity and diversity in Saudi Arabia, the society is considered 
uniformly conservative (Fandy 1999; Raphaeli 2005; Alkhedr 2012; Moaddel 2013). In 
addition, Islam represents a prominent component of the culture in Saudi Arabia, 
especially as Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of Islam, and its Kings are the protectors of 
the holy mosques and rule according to Islamic law (Fandy 1999). This has been 
empirically investigated by Moaddel (2013), who concludes that Saudi society takes a 
significantly religious conservative stance when compared to other Islamic societies; 
specifically, in terms of their commitment to performing the daily prayers, and in that the 
population consider their religion as the most important aspect of their identity. One of 
the main factors that has led society to remain conservative religiously in contemporary 
times has been the routine exposure to a single dominant type of discourse; i.e. Wahhabi 
or Salafi discourse (Raphaeli 2005; Beranek 2009; Meijer 2010; Alkhedr 2012:481; 
Moaddel 2013).   
The dominance of Wahhabi religious discourse in Saudi society has taken many 
forms. For instance, Alkhedr, mentioned above, a Saudi historian who has tried to record 
the contemporary social history of Saudi Arabia, has stated that official Wahhabi religious 
dominant discourse does not allow for other kinds of religious teaching to coexist in Saudi 
Arabia (2012). In addition, religious discourse has dominated many official fields, 
including primary education and the legislative arena (Alkhedr 2012). Moreover, religious 
discourse dominates some forms of media, such as books, audio productions and 
leaflets (Lacroix 2011; Alkhedr 2012; Alghathami 2015). Book publishing and imports, 
for instance, are censored in Saudi Arabia; in particular, books that deal with social and 
religious non-Wahhabi subjects are banned. These books are confiscated when found, 
in accordance with Wahhabi standards (Alkhedr 2012: 481). This domination of religious 
discourse has been considered a hindrance to Saudi society’s communications with the 
outside world.   
Despite the dominance of conservative religious discourse, some forms of 
modern discourse have started to gain a foothold, having been introduced by a number 
of ‘intellectuals’ and progressives3. The first appearance of progressives in 1970 resulted 
from the rapid development the Saudi state was experiencing. In fact, in the early 1970s, 
                                               
3 I prefer to use the term ‘progressives’ which indicates the opposite meaning of conservatives 
and as the term is not only limited to ‘intellectuals’ but could involve other classifications as well, such as 
‘modernists’, ’secularists’, ‘reformists’ and ‘liberals’, as we will see in the following sections. 
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Saudi society witnessed a development revolution in many fields, transforming the whole 
of society to a great extent, from a simple society to a modern one, especially in the 
economic field (Clarke 2007; Lacroix 2011; Alkhedr 2012). This rapid development 
results in the need to evolve socially to modernise. These attempts have led to 
confrontation with the proponents of the dominant religious discourse, as they refute all 
the progressives’ attempts to modernise Saudi society (Fandy 1999; Raphaeli 2005; 
Lacroix 2011; Alkhedr 2012). Alkhedr (2012) added that religious discourse is the most 
powerful force counteracting change and modernisation in Saudi society, resulting in 
underdevelopment in the intellectual and social fields, at a time when the country is 
developing rapidly economically. Before reviewing the discourse of modernisation and 
the conflicts arising between the religious conservatives and progressives, a historical 
identification of these two groups, their emergence and their activities is necessary. This 
will undoubtedly lead to a greater understanding of the Saudi social situation and the 
intricate aspects associated with these disputes.      
2.3 The Sides of the Conflict 
2.3.1 The Religious Conservative Group  
The dominant religious conservative group in Saudi Arabia adheres to 
Wahhabism or Salafism teaching. Wahhabism, or Wahhabi Islam, is based on the 
Islamic teachings of Mohammad Ibn Abdulwahab, an 18th century Islamic scholar from 
Najd, the central region of today’s Saudi Arabia (Salama 2011; Lacroix 2011). Ibn 
Abdulwahhab called for a revival of what he viewed as the true Islam in the Najd area, 
as he believed some practices and innovations had ruined the creed, which could only 
be purified by the restoration of true Islam (Lacroix 2011: 11; Salama 2011).  
When distinguishing between referring to the religious dominant group as 
Wahhabi or Salafi, it should be noted that the difference is in the term, not the concept. 
Abdulwahhab and his companions prefer ‘Salafi’ over ‘Wahhabi’, due to the view that 
‘Wahhabism’ could be considered as a new form of religion, and because the ‘Salafi’ 
label indicates the meaning of purity of Islam, which serves to legitimise acceptance of 
them as a group (Alshoi’r 2000; Commins 2015). Wahhabism integrates several 
principles, which have contributed to the legitimising of the Wahhabis as a religious 
authority. One of the main principles is that of ‘alamr bilm'rūf w anahy 'an almunkar’, 
commanding right and forbidding wrong. This principle proceeds from the idea that 
Muslims should encourage each other to adhere to the true Islam, admonishing those 
who deviate from the right path (Lacroix 2011). Based on this principle, an official 
organisation was created in 1926 and is still running today which is'hay'at alamr bilm'rūf 
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wa anahy 'an almunkar', the committee for commanding right and forbidding the wrong 
which operates as a religious police force (Lacroix 2011: 12). Another principle 
Wahhabism has employed to authorise its teaching and to delegitimise other beliefs is 
the principle of ‘alwala’ wa albara’, ‘allegiance and rupture’. This principle entails that a 
true Muslim, following Wahhabism, must have complete loyalty to his co-religionists and 
break completely with infidels (Lacroix 2011: 13). It has been exploited by the religious 
group in their battles against change and modernity, as we will see throughout this 
chapter.   
Besides adopting particular Islamic principles to appear religiously legitimate, 
Wahhabism’s teaching and discourse are completely dependent on Quranic and 
prophetic texts, without recourse to reviewing or discussing them. According to Alkhedr, 
this dependence has made it difficult for traditional Wahhabis to review the texts on the 
basis of contemporary needs, especially since Saudi Arabia has started to develop in 
many fields (2012: 59). To fill this gap, and continue the religious dominance over Saudi 
society, a group of educated Wahhabis called the ‘Sahwa’ have emerged as opponents 
to the advocates of modernisation, offering some solutions to meet modern needs, such 
as those related to the economic field. 
     The ‘Sahwa’ ‘awakening Islam’ movement is part of Wahhabism’s doctrine, 
and it serves as an educational group, explaining the contemporary issues Saudis face 
in their modern lives by confronting modernisation and the new trends in society (Lacroix 
2015; Alkhedr 2012). In fact, ‘Sahwa’ members emerged in the 1980s, representing the 
educated religious in many fields who tried through education to dominate Saudi society 
(Lacroix 2011). Most are graduates of Saudi universities who later taught at these 
universities and also engage in other extracurricular activities, such as preaching and 
occupying offices at many official institutions, one of which is ‘the committee for 
commanding right and forbidding wrong’ (Lacroix 2011).  
‘Sahwa’, as a religious conservative movement, emerged with a strict practice of 
observing Islamic norms not only limited to clerics but applicable to everyone (Lacroix 
2011). Unlike its origin in Wahhabism, ‘Sahwa’ tried to impose its ideology at the social 
level. Educated ‘Sahwists’ main concern was to homogenise society under their ideology 
(Lacroix 2011: 78). Part of homogenising society in modern times involves imposing the 
belief that Islam as an overall system has an answer for every detail of daily life (Lacroix 
2011: 60). It is through this belief that ‘Sahwa’ has started addressing subjects relating 
to daily life, as well as preaching about afterlife issues (Alkhedr 2012: 78). Another main 
strategy that ‘Sahwa’ undertook in order to impose its ideology is charging the society 
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against what they consider the conspiracy of westernisation and intellectual invasion, 
which views any new unfamiliar conceptions as products of the foreign western culture 
(Alkhedr 2012:73). ‘Sahwa’ also prompted a new language, combining the language of 
the intelligentsia and the clerics (Lacroix 2011: 79). This ideology has resulted in what 
Lacroix (2011) called the rising presence of ‘Sahwa’ in the social field, leading to what 
has been called ‘Jī l Alsahwa’, the Saḥwa generation. As part of the emergence and 
growth of ‘Sahwa’, they have viewed intellectuals or progressives as the main group to 
encounter to test their ascendancy, resulting in many confrontations between the two 
groups (Lacroix 2011).   
When practising their dominance, Sahwis emphasise expressing a negative 
attitude towards other sources of knowledge; especially the media, such as satellite 
broadcasts and the internet (Alkhedr 2012). Although the Sahwa have warned against 
some media forms, their discourse has been communicated via cassettes, books and 
leaflets and also on satellite TV and the internet (Alghathami 2005; Lacroix 2011; Alkhedr 
2012). Indeed, at the beginning of the Sahwa movement, Sahwis relied mostly on 
cassettes to communicate their ideology (Lacroix 2011) and had a major effect on 
shaping public opinion and views in society on various subjects (Alkhedr 2012). One of 
the main concerns the Sahwa has sought to impose on society through the media is a 
warning against modernisation and the progressives, as will be discussed throughout 
this chapter.     
2.3.2 The Progressives group  
Unlike the Wahhabi conservatives, the influence of the progressives was felt later 
in the Saudi state, following the launch of development/ ’tanmiyah’ plans, driven by the 
necessity of modernisation to compete with neighbouring nations (Lacroix 2011: 14; 
Alkhedr 2012: 491). The emergence of this group is associated closely with scholarships 
for Saudi students to foreign schools and universities outside Saudi Arabia (Lacroix 
2011: 15; Alkhedr 2012). Lacroix (2011) indicates that Saudi scholars were initially sent 
to Arab countries in the 1940s and 1950s, mostly to Egypt, Lebanon and Iraq. Later, 
influenced by Arab movements, such as Arab nationalism and leftism, the government 
chose to alter scholarship destinations to Western universities, as it was wary of Arab 
movements promoting nationalism and leftism, as they had led to revolutions and coups 
against monarchies in the 1950s, creating political turmoil in the region. According to 
Lacroix (2011), Saudi students who were affected by the Arab political movements 
represented a disturbance in their political institutions and felt repressed by the 
government who sought to maintain political stability (2011: 16). Subsequently, in the 
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late 1960s, the government felt a need once more for educated people to push forward 
development plans, due to pressure from the United States to maintain development. 
When the scholarship programme resumed, sending students to Western countries 
(Alkhedr 2012: 499), it was notable that Saudi scholars returned to Saudi Arabia having 
adopted beliefs, such as nationalism, socialism and communism. Unlike previously, 
where changes focused on the political field, this time concerns related to social matters, 
specifically social values and attitudes. All these classifications contributed to Saudi 
society under one category, which was ‘muthaqaf’ or intellectuals, indicating the meaning 
of the educated group (Lacroix 2011: 17).     
Progressive discourse started to appear in the early 1970s, when some 
intellectuals started discussing literary theories in Saudi newspapers, such as Okaz, Al-
Riyadh and Al-Yawm (Lacroix 2011). These newspapers include allocated cultural 
attachments, where intellectuals can publish literary works and discuss literary theories; 
these are not censored in the same way as mainstream newspapers (Lacroix 2011). 
Although progressive discourse at first was confined to a literary context, Lacroix (2011) 
has indicated that progressives later started to imply a need for social change and 
openness.  
In 1975, the intellectuals gained some space to practice their literary activities 
when they were allowed to establish ‘literary clubs’ across the kingdom under the 
governmental institution of the General Directorate of Youth Affairs (Lacroix 2011: 19). 
Intellectuals were able to freely practise their literary activities until the mid-1980s without 
any interference from the proponents of the dominant religious discourse. Lacroix 
attributes this to many reasons, including that before that time the conservatives had 
lacked the kind of education that would enable them to debate with intellectual scholars 
(2011). Another reason Lacroix provides is that religious conservatives were not able to 
produce literary works as an alternative to those of intellectuals. Moreover, at that time, 
clerics and intellectuals spoke two different languages; whereas the Wahhabi clerics’ 
discourse dealt with issues of theology and law, the intellectuals were focusing on 
initiating concepts such as ‘ḥadāthah’, modernism and ’tanmiyah’, development (Lacroix 
2011: 24). This was until the late 1980s, when the ‘Sahwa’ emerged with a different 
discourse that, unlike the Wahhabi issues limited to creed, extended to include several 
arenas of particular interest in the social and intellectual fields (Alkhedr 2012). This led 
to multiple conflicts in the social arena, where the dominant ‘Sahwis’ opposed any other 
types of discourse, including that of modernisation headed by progressives. These 
conflicts have been reported mainly by the press, which recorded different points of view 
with regard to specific conflicts (Alkhedr 2012). However, it must be noted that the Saudi 
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press was censored, so it could not publish all the details and stances present in these 
conflicts. In recent years, the internet has also played a major role in addressing such 
conflicts, as it offers the privilege of being able to access information readily with no 
limitations (Alkhedr 2012). The confrontation between the conservatives and the 
progressives created the first notable conflict, the ‘Sahwa-ḥadāthah’ battle (Lacroix 
2011; Alkhedr 2012) dealt with in the following section. 
2.4 Conflicts over Modernisation  
This section presents the conflicts between the religious conservative group and 
the progressives in the Saudi socio-political site over two decades. It first discusses the 
initial conflict between both groups over the trend towards ‘ḥadāthah’, modernism in the 
1980s and how the religious group ‘Sahwa’ won this conflict. This was followed by the 
1990s conflict over 'ilmāniyah’, secularism, which ‘Sahwa’ used as an accusation against 
progressives as a strategy to keep in power and delegitimise progressives’ attempts at 
modernisation. A discourse of moderation was presented in the early 2000s after the 
decay of ‘Sahwa’ and the incident on the 11th of September, which concerns the call for 
moderate discourse and religious reform. These attempts at moderation led then to the 
contestation of alibrāliyah in 2007, which then led to a debate over its meaning and the 
way it can be employed in Saudi society, which the current research aims to investigate. 
Therefore, the presentation of these historical details of the conflicts between the 
religious and the progressives would help further understanding of the nature of the 
conflict over power between the groups in general, and in relation to the discourse of 
alibrāliyah in particular.     
2.4.1 Debate over Modernism  
In the late 1970s and early 1980s a new type of discourse was formulated, called 
‘ḥadāthah’, modernism by a group who viewed themselves as modernists “Hadathyon”. 
Their discourse was limited to literary criticism and writing. According to Lacroix, 
‘ḥadāthah’ was the first remarkable intellectual trend in Saudi society apparently actively 
criticised and produced modern literary works (2011: 134). Its emergence coincided with 
the time when the country’s development plans started to be distinctively fulfilled, and at 
that time the ‘Sahwa’ movement had not yet been completely formed. In fact, the modern 
literary work was commonly associated with modernising form, such as writing poetry in 
free verse. Modernist discourse in Saudi Arabia was based principally on writing literary 
works in a free style, whose meaning was indirect and based on involving many symbols, 
whose interpretation could be left to the reader (Alfifi 2005). By modernising content and 
using literary symbols, Fandy (1999) has argued that the Saudi modernists used literary 
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writing to disguise their protests against the dominant religious discourse. This was 
further emphasised by Lacroix, who stated that the modernists’ literary criticism implied 
social criticism, calling implicitly for social modernisation (2011: 134). Alkhedr also 
referenced the idea of modernists’ tendency for social modernisation, by arguing that 
modernist activities were limited to literary production and criticism, because there was 
limited freedom to discuss ideological trends in the media and the press (Alkhedr 2012: 
396). 
  ‘ḥadāthah’ as a term relates to modern meaning, and it is a translation of 
modernity indicating the meaning of development, and a translation of ‘modernism’ when 
using it as a concept to indicate a trend or a meaning for a movement (Almahmood 
2012). According to Lacroix (2011), the term ‘ḥadāthah’ was first used by Arab 
intellectuals outside Saudi Arabia in the early twentieth century to indicate the tendency 
of criticising the literary tradition and adopting new free literary styles. Therefore, it could 
be argued that Saudi modernists are to some extent influenced by the literary modernism 
of other Arab countries. Another point of importance is that ḥadāthah’ as a term was not 
used by modernists initially. It was only later that they explicitly described their literary 
criticism as under the concept of ‘ḥadāthah’ (Lacroix 2011: 135). This use of the 
‘ḥadāthah’ name was considered scandalous and exploited subsequently by the ‘Sahwi’ 
conservatives in their fight against modernism (Lacroix 2011). This impression of 
‘ḥadāthah’ as a term indicates how the use of terms, particularly ideological ones, creates 
a genuine problem in Saudi society. In fact, one of the main reasons the ‘ḥadāthah’ term 
has been considered problematic could be due to what Alkhedr has mentioned, i.e. that 
the ‘ḥadāthah’ term, as with other terms such as 'ilmāniyah'/ , secularism and 
’Qawmīyah’/ nationalism, is an ideological term that has raised the ire of traditional Sahwi 
conservatives who consider these ideologies as infidelity (2012: 409). Another factor 
leading to the announcement of the ‘ḥadāthah ’name being considered a scandal in 
conservative Saudi society may be the view, commonly held by conservatives in the Arab 
world about the ‘hadathah’ concept. Conservative Arabs view ‘ḥadāthah ’as led by 
pioneering Arab modernists influenced by Western modernists, citing it as a Western 
ideology that seeks to destroy Arabic and Islamic heritage and traditions (Almahmood 
2012).          
In fact, the emergence of the ‘ḥadāthah’ trend originally did not receive much 
attention or interference from the dominant religious discourse. According to Lacroix 
(2011), religious conservatives at that time lacked an appropriate level of education that 
would enable them to confront and fight modernists and modernism. He stated that the 
modernists were experiencing a rapid evolution and progress in the mid-1980s, and thus, 
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the ‘Sahwa’ religious movement appeared to oppose modernism as a movement and 
modernists. Thus, when the ‘Sahwis’ began to take on the intellectual modernists as their 
main opposition, they questioned them about their intention in stating that they are 
'ḥadāthywn' or modernists (Lacroix 2011: 137). The ‘Sahwis’ did this by imposing their 
presence where the modernists were, such as in literary clubs and in academic lectures 
(Lacroix 2011). Some of these ‘Sahwi’ conservatives fought the modernists, by asking 
the government to ban modernist columnists from writing in the newspapers (Fandy 
1999: 131). In addition, the ‘Sahwis’ extended their fight through multiple media 
channels, such as books, cassettes, leaflets and Jum'a' prayer speeches. In Jum'ah 
prayers, a campaign commenced targeting the modernists, accusing them personally, 
giving the example of Alghathami, a Saudi modernist and academic, who they called ‘’bd 
alshayṭan’, the son of Satan (Lacroix 2011: 140). In addition, a cassette by a ‘Sahwi’ 
named Saeed Alghamdi was widely distributed denouncing modernists and their 
inclinations (Fabdy 1999; Lacroix 2011). 
 The ‘Sahwa’ had a major influence in their fight against modernism when a 
Sahwi named Awad Alqarni published a book called 'alḥadāthah fī mīzan alislām',  
Modernism in the Scale of Islam (Alqarni 1988). This book was written in a dialogic style, 
speaking to society and trying to mobilize public opinion against the modernist trend. 
According to Alsamadani, modernism has been associated with concepts of “ilḥad”, 
“mārksīyah”, “dārwīnīyah”, “shiw’īyah”, in English atheism, Marxism, Darwinism and 
communism respectively (2013: 37). This association is a strategy used to relate Saudi 
modernism to Western modernism, which implicitly excludes modernists from being part 
of the in-group or members of Islamic conservative Saudi society. 'alwalā' wa albarā'', as 
a Wahhabi principle, has also been referred to. The author, Alqarni, has used it to state 
that Saudi modernists’ loyalty to Western and Arab modernists makes them 
representatives of a concept of otherness, whether they apply Western modernist 
principles or not (Alsamadani 2013). In addition, the book appeals to the authorities to 
legitimise the self by using Quranic and prophetic texts, and the grand mufti’s 
introduction. According to Alkhedr, since the 1980s the Sahwa have used the grand mufti 
to legitimise their spread as an official and religious authority in society (2012).  
After this conflict, the term ‘ḥadāthah’ was banned by the Ministry of Information 
in all forms of media (press, TV and radio), due to the major conflict that use of this 
terminology had caused (Alghathami 2005: 33: Lacroix 2011: 157; Alkhedr 2012: 675). 
Alghahthami (2005) indicated that the term ‘ḥadāthah’ was then replaced in the media 
by terms such as 'tajdīd'/renewal, 'tatwīr' / development and 'taqadum' / progress. In fact, 
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the ban was not upheld, as ‘ḥadāthah’was used once more, after people started to forget 
about the conflict, as there was no official outlawing of the term (Alghathami 2005: 32).   
After the publication of Alqarni’s book (1998), the modernists did not reply 
immediately to the Sahwa group, as they feared any response might worsen the 
situation, at a time when the majority of society was enraged about the new trend. 
Alghathami (2005) argues, as a modernist, that he did not offer any response to the book 
because its content and style were weak, and it had been written in a subjective, 
aggressive way. This was criticised by Alkhedr (2012), who stated that the modernist 
trend had no comprehensive method to base their defence on, and this weakness 
hindered them from explaining themselves, especially given the effect the book had 
caused (2012: 397). He adds that the modernists had failed to define what is meant by 
the term ‘ḥadāthah’ in the Saudi context, indicating that this is part of a larger problem in 
the Saudi case, which involves the difficulty of defining concepts and attitudes towards 
them in the conservative Saudi society (2012: 413). This failure has been exploited, as 
seen by the Sahwa, who defines ‘ḥadāthah’ as modernism in the Western context.        
 Alghathami sought to explain the ‘ḥadāthah’ story 17 years after the conflict in a 
book named The Story of Modernism in Saudi Arabia (2005). He opened his book by 
stating that modernism has no fixed meaning, but that it is an intellectual state that brings 
together intellectual ideas as well as management tools and lifestyles, and that its 
definition depends on the social situation. In his book he alternates between using 
‘ḥadāthah’ to mean modernism, indicating the meaning of the literary trend, and using it 
to mean modernity and the development of society, commenting that ‘ḥadāthah’ is an 
inevitable reality. Alghathami has indicated that the term “hadathah” is not limited to 
literary discourse but can be used to refer to other kinds of discourse. He adds that recent 
use of the “Hadathah” term in Saudi society to indicate the meaning of literary modernist 
theory does not mean it cannot be used to refer to earlier development plans the country 
adopted after its establishment (2005: 38). In fact, Alghathami has persisted in speaking 
about “Hadathah” in the context of development; citing in detail the various development 
plans the country has carried out, such as settling Bedouins, managing the oil boom, and 
implementing overseas scholarships. Referring to ‘ḥadāthah’ as a literary theory, 
Alghathami offers no clear explanation about what it could mean anything other than his 
personal conflict with anti-modernists. By blending concepts, it is apparent that the writer 
has attempted to deviate the reader away from explaining what ‘ḥadāthah’ as a trend 
actually means; especially as he has noted that the term can be used in the Saudi context 
to indicate the meaning of literary theory. It can be argued that, even though he blamed 
the Sahwa for not understanding the concept of ‘ḥadāthah’, he failed to define it in the 
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Saudi case. This indicates how modernism as a trend in Saudi Arabia has not been 
completely formulated, and the writer covered this methodological weakness by avoiding 
defining the ‘ḥadāthah’ trend by mentioning development plans. 
2.4.2 The Conflict over Secularism  
The modernisation debate was intensified at the time of the Gulf War, with the 
arrival of American troops in Saudi Arabia in 1990 (Fandy 1999). A group from the Sahwa 
movement also opposed the presence of American troops on Saudi soil, accusing Saudi 
supporters of the American presence of ‘ilmāniyah’, in English, secularism. In fact, the 
term ‘ilmāniyah’ was first used by the Sahwa to accuse progressives, before spreading 
as a label to all progressives. Secularism or ‘ilmāniyah’ as a trend had started before, in 
other Arab countries, as some Arab governments had started applying secularism 
derived from the West, to become modernised (Nikki 2004). Nikki (2004) stated that the 
Western colonisation of Arab countries did not affect Saudi Arabia, which has never been 
a colony and so was never introduced to secularisation and modernisation. The word 
‘ilmānī’/ secular was first used widely in Arab countries in the middle of 20th century, 
when secular nationalists with political power became leaders in the various Arab 
countries, adopting secular programmes as part of their practice of modernisation (Nikki 
2004). Nikki (2004) added that the secular trend in Arab countries is relatively socially 
weak, due to its association with Western colonial values and the fact that the majority 
of Arabs identify themselves with Islam, and thus, anti-secular trends have been 
exploited in their campaigns against secularism.  
However, Saudi Arabia has never been colonised, or undergone a secular 
programme. The Sahwa conservatives started using the term ‘ilmāniyah’/ secularism to 
accuse their opponents of being secularists, in their efforts to fight and exclude 
progressives. Alsolaiman (2011) tried to deconstruct the term ‘ilmāniyah’, concluding that 
in Arabic it denotes secularism, i.e. the separation between religion and society; whereas 
on a general ideological and political level, it means ‘laïcité’, the French term that 
indicates the separation of religious institutions from state institutions. In the Saudi case, 
the term ‘ilmāniyah’ is associated with ‘secularism’, since Saudi Arabia is far from 
adopting ‘laïcité’, especially given the fact that it was established on the basis of an 
Islamic state structure.  
The secularism conflict occurred in the early 1990s, when the ‘Sahwa’ started 
fighting against one of those who they believed was ‘ilmānī’, named Ghazi Algosaibi. 
Algosaibi was an effective and popular figure, working as a poet, a writer and an 
ambassador. At the time of the Gulf War, he started supporting fights against the 
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religious ‘Shawa’, discourse for their negative attitude regarding the use of American 
troops. Algosaibi also started writing articles in ‘Alsharq Alawsat’ newspaper, under the 
column heading ‘in the eye of the storm’, where he discussed ironically, issues relating 
to opponents of the war besides some social issues and their association in the religious 
field. His articles opposed the ‘Sahwa’ discourse, because the ‘Sahwa’ at that time were 
using cassettes to orient public opinion regarding the danger of using Western power in 
the war, questioning their interest in political subjects (Alkhedr 2012). He also opposed 
the ‘Sahwa’ for their involvement in social issues, such as the women driving, labelling 
them 'usūlyūn', fundamentalists, as he himself translated the word, and urging them to 
concentrate only on religious matters (Algosaibi 1991). The ‘Sahwa’ immediately fought 
back with cassettes, accusing him of being ‘ilmānī’, and speaking negatively about the 
official government for permitting Americans to participate in the war (Lacroix 2011: 161). 
Among the ‘Sahwa’ who accused Algosaibi of ‘ilmāniyah’ were Alawda, Alomar and 
Alqarni, who saw in Algosaibi’s articles a secular conspiracy designed to exclude religion 
from all other fields. Alawda, for example, countered Algosaibi on a cassette entitled 
‘Islamic cassette; its advantages and disadvantages’ (1990), where he tried to disprove 
Algosiabi’s views regarding the misuse of Islamic cassettes. Alawda started his speech 
by quoting Algosaibi’s statement that he wished clerics would stick to the religious field 
and not address political subjects. After that, using an interrogative style and 
exclamations, Alawda questions the quote, stating it is possible to separate politics from 
religion. Following this, he states that Islam is a complete system, of which politics is just 
a part which cannot be separated, as such separation is ‘ilmāniyah’. After that, Alawda 
started using the dialogic style, speaking personally to Algosaibi and asking him how he 
is able to serve as a poet, a politician and an administrator at the same time, while asking 
the clerics to stick to a single field (Alawda 1990).      
Unlike the conflict over modernism, when the modernists did not immediately 
reply to the ‘Sahwa’ conservatives, Algosaibi chose to reply to the ‘Sahwa’ with written 
letters, three were directed to three ‘Sahwa’ clerics; Alawda, Alomar and Alqarni, and 
two to Saudi society. Algosaibi chose to publish these letters in a book he 'ḥatta lā takūn 
fetnah', ‘For the prevention of dissension’. The title of this book is a Quranic verse, 
indicating his use of religious language throughout the book (Lacroix 2011: 161). He 
debated with them generally, by saying that he is not an ‘ilmānī’, as ‘ilmāniyah’ is defined 
by the World Assembly of Muslim Youth as a ‘call for separating the government 
institutions from religious institutions’ as based on this definition he stated that ‘ilmāniyah’ 
is infidelity. He further denied being ‘ilmānī’, since his writings are wholly unrelated to 
‘ilmainah’ (Algosaibi 1991). In particular in his reply to Alawda, his use of religious 
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language was clear from the beginning, where he uses a prophetic saying that indicates 
the importance of obeying one’s political leaders. He continued by explaining that the 
country’s establishment was based on religion, and its leaders’ rule with Islam, and, 
therefore, secularism does not exist. He added that what he was cautioning against were 
the kind of political clerics who disobeyed their leader’s commands, as had happened in 
their opposition to the Gulf War. Algosaibi replied to Alawda, switching between an 
impersonal third-person style and an involved first-person style, by first clarifying the 
nature of Islam in Saudi Arabia, besides the reality of political clerics, and then by 
speaking personally to Alawda to refute his claims.  
According to Alkhedr (2012: 420), Algosaibi used a similar discourse to that of 
his adversaries when dealing with the ‘ilmāniyah’ concept, on the basis of its meaning in 
religious discourse, rather than discussing other meanings of ‘ilmāniyah’ from alternate 
perspectives, showing that he did agree with them on the religious definition of 
‘ilmāniyah’. Arguably, Algosaibi was trying to speak with a similar discourse to that of the 
conservatives, discussing ‘ilmāniyah’ with them from their own perspective, especially 
given the fact that they had accused him of being ‘ilmānī’. The use of religious language 
can also be attributed to the realisation that religious discourse is largely effective in 
Saudi conservative society as it is dominant. After this conflict, Algosaibi’s popularity 
declined, since society was influenced by the accusation made by the members of the 
dominant religious discourse, especially their questioning of the validity of his religious 
faith. The label ‘ilmānī’ continued to be used by the Sahwa against progressives until the 
late 1990s, which coincided with what Alkhedr (2012) considers the decay of the 
dominance of the ‘Sahwa' discourse.   
2.4.3  Moderate discourse  
In the late 1990s and early 2000s,  the internet became available in Saudi Arabia, 
and Saudis started discussing the social situation they faced in blogs, forums and social 
networks, leading to a kind of plurality of thought, whereby the ‘Sahwa’ are no longer the 
dominant discourse in society (Alkhedr 2012; Otterbeck 2012; Algathami 2015: 10). The 
internet allows for this plurality of discourse through an accessible and impartial display 
of different subjects (Alkhedr 2012; Alghathami 2015). This open access to the internet 
has offered new sources of knowledge, undergoing no official censorship or religious 
control. In addition, this open access operates as an informational tool for Saudis that 
the local media has failed to provide (Alhargan 2012). Alkhedr (2012) specified that this 
plurality of thought agrees on one main thing, i.e. formulating a new kind of moderate 
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discourse that discusses problems with fundamental religious discourse and offers 
solutions to radicalisation (Alkhedr 2012).  
 This call for a moderate discourse and religious reform was also a result of 
external pressure, specifically from the United States, after the September 11th  2001 
terror attack (Lacroix 2005; Beranek 2009; Meijer 2010; Alkhedr 2012) and after several 
terror attacks occurred in 2003 inside Saudi Arabia (Lacroix 2005; Raphaeli 2005; Meijer 
2010; Alkhedr 2012). This trend towards moderation, or in Arabic 'wasaṭiyah' has been 
led by progressives or reformists who have called for revisions to Wahhabi religious 
doctrine, in particular on the matter of radicalisation (Lacroix 2005; 2011). This new call 
for moderation has not only been debated on the internet but has also been discussed 
in newspapers. To date, Alwatan newspaper has devoted the most coverage to the 
moderation discourse debate (Alkhedr 2012: 605).  
Within the climate of local and global pressure calling for a moderate discourse, 
the Saudi government has found an opportunity to establish social and religious reform. 
In 2003 around 100 Saudi intellectuals appealed to the government to establish social 
reform, by making demands that included acknowledging freedom of speech and 
establishing civil society institutions (Raphaeli 2005). The government responded to the 
demands for reform by establishing the National Dialogue Conference in February 2003 
(Gause 2004; Raphaeli 2005; Lacroix 2005). This National Dialogue Conference brought 
together clerics of different religious sects (Salafists and non-Salafist Sunnis, Sufis and 
Shiites) and concluded with some recommendations, one of which was the 
acknowledgement of intellectual and religious diversity in the Saudi nation, which clearly 
contradicts Wahhabi religious dominance (Lacroix 2005; Raphaeli 2005). According to 
Raphaeli (2005), promises of reform were not fulfilled immediately, and, therefore, in 
September 2003 a group of around 300 intellectuals signed a petition to the government, 
arguing that the late adoption of reform plans would lead religious groups to maintain 
their dominance. The political leadership responded to this argument by holding a 
second national dialogue conference in December 2003, entitled ‘Extremism and 
moderation: a pragmatic vision’ (Raphaeli 2005). This meeting proposed many 
recommendations, including ordering academic religious institutions to conform to 
defining the terms and concepts related to ‘extremism’, such as ‘terrorism’ and the ‘elite 
sector’, asking for a revision of the religious discourse in a manner that suits the 
contemporary situation with an understanding of the situation in the external world, 
calling for openness and communication as a means to improve the education curriculum 
in a manner that would invoke tolerance and moderation (King Abdulaziz Center of 
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National Dailogue 2003). Also, this conference discussed the issue of the ‘Alwala’ wa 
albara’ principle, and how it should be revised.  
In this same period, as part of the reform process and insistence on plurality in 
discourse, Meijer (2010) indicated that the Ministry of Islamic Affairs warned Imams 
about addressing their conflicts against progressives on mosques’ podiums. When the 
conservatives felt reformists or intellectuals were starting to gain some new power 
through reform policies, they started delegitimising reformists and their discourse by 
applying several labels (Mejier 2010). Reformists have been referred to as ‘intellectual 
terrorists’ and ‘corrupts on earth’, and of concealing their purpose under the devious 
terms of ‘reform’ and ‘nationalism’. Their discourse has been labelled as “decay”, 'inḥilāl' 
instead of “progress”,'taqadum', since, according to the conservatives, the reformists’ 
progress is based on the decay of religion (Mejier 2010). The progressive reformists 
responded in an outspoken way at this time, describing the conservatives as 
reactionaries opposing both reform and modernity. They also accused conservatives of 
destroying the country’s image by seeking to detach the country from the rest of the world 
(Mejier 2010). 
Raphaeli (2005) and Meijer (2010) have argued that many of the reform promises 
have probably failed to be achieved because Saudi Society remains too conservative to 
embrace full reform. Reformists have also failed to exert sufficient influence to drive 
change, as they, according to Meijer (2010), speak a language alien to Wahhabism and 
the majority of society. Alkhedr has another view of this failure; he indicates that, despite 
the flaws in moderation discourse, attempts at moderation have been genuine 
communicating objective critical views (2012: 652). Part of this failure can be attributed 
to a misunderstanding of the concepts of 'wasaṭiyah', moderation and 'iṣlāḥ', reform. 
Gause (2004) indicated that the 'iṣlāḥ', reform term, that the government committed to in 
its agenda, never specified clearly what it would include. This led to it having different 
meanings to different people. It is was also considered by Meijer (2010) as a buzzword 
in Saudi Arabia in 2005. Lacroix (2011) has further indicated that the term 'iṣlāḥ’ was an 
ambiguous word, which each person interprets as they choose, and religious 
conservatives interpret as bringing things closer to Islam. This failure seems to have 
been a disappointment to progressives and later on, they introduced a new term, which 
was contested in Saudi society, alibrāliyah. 
2.4.4 The contestation of ‘alibrāliyah’  
In 2006/2007, a call for new trend emerged; this was the call for alibrāliyah. It 
started as a desirable alternative for some people seeking moderate Islamic solutions 
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(Alkhedr 2012). The emergence of the trend was due to a number of factors, including 
its prior rise in Arab states and then neighbouring Gulf countries, along with the attempts 
at enlightenment following the September 11th attacks. According to Alghathami (2013), 
alibrāliyah first emerged in Arab countries in the 1960s and was resisted as 
representative of western colonisation. However, the concept in the Gulf countries, i.e. 
Kuwait, Bahrain and Dubai represented liberation from the British coloniser who was 
seen as having interfered with their internal affairs (Alrimizan 2009).  
As Saudi Arabia never underwent a period of colonization, alibrāliyah emerged 
later there than in the surrounding countries. It emerged after 11th of September 2001, 
when attention was being drawn to the practices of extreme Islam in Saudi Arabia and 
the dominance of the ‘Sahwa’ group in society. This afforded freedom of expression to 
the opponents of ‘Sahwa’, who agree upon the necessity of getting rid of ‘Sahwa’ who 
shift people’s attention from matters of daily life to focus on the afterlife, along with asking 
people to oppose the progressives (Alrimizan 2009). These factors combined led to the 
emergence of alibrāliyah, which liberals saw as an optimistic view to build success in 
Saudi society. Supporters of the liberal trend first used the internet to call for alibrāliyah, 
by establishing a number of online forums; one of the most prominent being ‘alshabaka 
allibraliah alsaudia’/ ‘Saudi liberal network’ (founded in 2006). At this time alibrāliyah was 
not a popular term in society; however, it was highly contested after a TV series called 
‘Tash’ broadcast an episode on alibrāliyah (Alkhedr 2012). ‘Tash’ was a sarcastic series 
that dealt with Saudi social issues and was broadcast daily in the month of Ramadan 
and seen by the majority of the society. It broadcast an episode in September 2007 
entitled ‘libralion wa laken…’ ‘Liberals but…’ portraying Saudi liberals as stray, devious 
people (Alkhedr 2012: 641). After this episode, the debate took to the newspapers, as 
columnists started discussing what alibrāliyah could mean and how it might be applied 
to Saudi society (Alkhedr 2012). This contestation of the meaning of alibrāliyah arose 
partly because the term is not of Arabic origin, which creates a difficulty identifying it.      
The religious conservatives showed a negative attitude towards the term 
alibrāliyah. When one of the clerics, named Saleh Alfawzan, was asked about alibrāliyah, 
he explained it is a collusion made by others without showing any understanding of the 
concept or discussing objectively what it means (Alkhedr 2012: 637). Alfawzan brought 
alibrāliyah into confrontation with Islam, stating that being liberal and Muslim at the same 
time is a contradiction (Alfawzan 2007). The fatwa prompted a reaction in newspaper 
column articles, where writers were divided in their attitude into opponents and 
proponents (Alkhedr 2012). However, in relation to the definition of alibrāliyah in the 
Saudi context, the writers stated that alibrāliyah cannot be defined. Alkhedr commented 
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that this can be justified in terms of avoidance, whereby liberals avoid defining alibrāliyah, 
as its real meaning could irritate conservative Saudi society (2012: 638). Despite Alkhedr 
(2012) discussing the alibrāliyah as an emergent contested term, he did not mention any 
of the liberals’ names, or what alibrāliyah could mean as he had done with secularism 
and modernism.  
2.5 Summary  
This review has examined the history of modernisation in Saudi Arabia. It has 
demonstrated the history of conflicts between the conservatives and progressives, in 
relation to aspects of the discourse of each period. Throughout the review, it was 
apparent that the conflicts centred on resistance among the dominant religious 
conservative group to the existence of other types of discourse. This was apparent 
through the opposition to new trends regarding the use of ideological terms, such as the 
‘ḥadāthah’, and through the use of ideological terms as a strategy to demolish 
progressives through a process of secularisation, using the term ‘ilmāniyah’. The 
appearance and use of the ideological term alibrāliyah is to some extent different, in that 
it has started to be used a lot and contested without any clear idea of what it might mean 
in the Saudi context. 
Alkhedr has paid attention to this issue in Saudi society which is the contestation 
of ideological terms. He states that this problem is an extension of the religious 
conservative’s misunderstanding of ideological concepts, as they contested the terms as 
a strategy in their fight against modernisation activities (2012: 633-634). He adds that 
the problem of using some concepts such as alibrāliyah appeared in an environment in 
which the concepts had not been fully formulated. In addition, the terms were only used 
widely with great reluctance by the majority of conservative society, which led to a 
broadly negative representation and misinterpretation. Furthermore, when the terms 
were introduced, they met with no objective investigation of their meaning, and little 
understanding of how they could be applied in a way that suited Saudi society. Thus, this 
study will investigate objectively, from a linguistic perspective, how alibrāliyah as a 
contested term has been represented in the Saudi context. This phenomenon needs to 
be investigated for an additional reason, which is the lack of Saudi discourse studies. 
Alkhedr has stated that there is a lack of research describing the social, religious and 
political discourse in Saudi Arabia. Saudi researchers have routinely failed to describe 
the Saudi situation objectively and independent foreign researchers have failed to 
describe it in sufficient depth or critically (Alkhedr 2012: 34). 
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3 Chapter 3: Theoretical framework  
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3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to review and discuss several selected theories 
known to be relevant to the study of the meaning of keywords in particular contexts. It 
aims to provide a theoretical framework to explain how socio-political keywords can be 
examined within the wider contexts in which they occur. Since the aim of this thesis is to 
examine the discursive representation of the key term ‘alibrāliyah’ in the Saudi socio-
political context, this research is necessarily related to more than one discipline. It is 
interdisciplinary, as it aims to analyse more than one layer of the context in which 
alibrāliyah is used; i.e. the immediate co-text, the intertextual context and the broader 
historical and socio-political contexts. Therefore, this chapter will combine various 
approaches including socio-historical approaches with approaches in linguistic analysis, 
CDA and Discourse Theory (DT).  
In the first part of this chapter, I review the central work of Raymond Williams 
Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society, which examines cultural keywords in 
society. The focus will be on the socio-historical model Williams (1983) established and 
the primary level of his analytical approach. The review then presents a discussion on 
macro level approaches on keywords analysis; i.e. Michael Stubbs’ (2001) linguistic 
approach to the meaning of social keywords and the relevant literature that has 
examined synchronically and diachronically the connotations of cultural key terms in 
particular contexts using corpus linguistics. The discussion moves then to micro level 
approaches introducing critical theories that examine the meaning of contested 
keywords within their ideological contexts. This includes a review of DT, which considers 
contested keywords as empty signifiers, constituted within the social struggle for gaining 
hegemony. In DT an empty signifier is a signifier without a particular signified and 
charging it with meaning is a hegemonic practice (Laclau 1996; 2007). Since DT does 
not provide a methodological guideline for a textual analysis of keywords, it was 
necessary to conduct a review of the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) approach, as this 
affords a textual-oriented approach that considers language use as a site of power 
struggle, and so combines with the theoretical concerns of DT. Special attention is given 
to reviewing the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) as it offers an empirical discursive 
analysis of texts taking into account the historical and the socio-political contexts. I 
conclude by proposing an empirical methodology to combine corpus-based analysis with 
CDA approach which can help in analysing the textual and the discursive construction of 
the keyword alibrāliyah in the Saudi context.  
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3.2 Williams’ cultural keywords 
In his book Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (1983), Raymond 
Williams provided a socio-historical analysis of the meanings of cultural keywords in a 
specified period in the English society. In it Williams attempts to understand and 
characterize the English culture in the post-war years, as he had noticed that it was 
undergoing a rapid transition. Williams chose to study English culture through the use of 
language, and in particular in reference to keywords that were frequently used and 
contested. Thus, he devised a list of around 130 keywords that he attempted to examine 
synchronically and diachronically. In particular, he undertook an analysis of their origin, 
how their meanings had changed and developed over time and their current meanings, 
as used in society. In addition, he explored the relations between these keywords and 
how their meanings interconnect over time on the basis of the social context.  
Williams observed that certain words’ usages had changed noticeably, 
commenting that “...meanings are offered, felt for, tested, confirmed, asserted, qualified 
and changed” (1983:12). Williams adds that he found himself preoccupied by a single 
word ‘culture’ that he was hearing more frequently, noting that “it was just a difficult word” 
to analyse (1983:13). Williams stared exploring the meanings of the word ‘culture’ linking 
it to four other keywords: ‘class’, ‘art’, ‘industry’ and ‘democracy’, perceiving of these “five 
words as a kind of structure”. This process of analysing keywords in association with 
others led Williams to identify 130 interrelated keywords. Each keyword in his work was 
analysed individually, listing the different meanings, and relationally in association with 
other keywords. These keywords were grouped under the label of keywords of culture 
and society. These are the keywords Williams identified as “a shared body of words and 
meanings in our most general discussions, in English, of the practices and institutions 
which we group as culture and society” (1983:15). In Williams view, they are keywords 
because of their significance within culture and society, and together they reflect how 
culture and society are seen and perceived (Williams 1983:15).  
To analyse the meaning of these keywords, Williams focused on examining the 
socio-historical meanings of the keywords. In order to examine the socio-historical 
dimensions of the meanings, he relied on the commentaries he wrote over a period of 
20 years; for each keyword he chose and considered it as a cultural keyword. These 
commentaries are supported by etymological data in the Oxford English Dictionary, 
which has been used as an evidence of historical shifts in meaning, based on his own 
extensive reading. These commentaries reveal Williams’ deliberate decision to analyse 
the meanings of cultural keywords. This was based on his intention that his main 
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emphasis would be on analysing the meanings of the keywords and historical shifts in 
meaning (1983: 23). This argument is made as a statement that his analysis was not 
intended to include looking at the factors surrounding the meanings, such as the 
categories or contexts of the chosen words, or the social controversies around the use 
of these key terms. This type of analysis includes some limitations that should be 
addressed in detail.  
It is apparent that Williams had attempted to provide an approach to studying 
keywords in their socio-historical context, but nevertheless the methods he employed 
had limitations, some of which Williams also admits. These include limitations of theory 
and limitations of methodology. At the theoretical level, there is an absence of a theory 
of meaning in Williams approach. Moreover, Williams himself could not identify the field 
of the approach he provided. However, he initially indicated that his method belongs to 
more than one discipline, without being able to identify these disciplines (Williams 
1983:13-14). He attributed the difficulty of identifying the disciplines to the variety of the 
specializations of these keywords, stating that they belong to several disciplines. 
However, Williams at the end of his introduction referred to his approach as historical 
semantic (1983:23). This indetermination of the field of study indicates a lack of theory 
of meaning in Williams approach. Stubbs (2008:4) referred to this limitation and lack of 
theory, contending that Williams’ work had not provided a theory of studying vocabulary 
in a comprehensive way nor had the words of a language been organised clearly and 
related to particular types of texts. Stubbs concludes that Williams’ work can be 
considered within the field of cultural studies and so “was not intended to be a linguistic 
analysis” (2008:4). 
In addition, Williams admits his method has a theoretical lack in terms of 
signification (1983:21). This made it problematic for Williams to identify the relationship 
between a word and its meaning, or in other words between the signifier and the signified; 
especially relative to what the process of signification might include, as e.g. in relation to 
Saussure’s concept of signification (1983). According to Williams, this relationship 
becomes more difficult to identify when meaning is generated and controlled by social 
rules. Thus, as the process of significations relies on the supposition that a word as a 
signifier acquires its meaning (the signified) on the basis of the context it occurs in, 
Williams did not identify any particular type of text or context for the analysis of the 
meanings of keywords. Instead, he relied on an arbitrary selection of words that he felt 
to be significant, by looking at their decontextualized etymological variations in Oxford 
English Dictionary and making his own commentary on the historical and contemporary 
meanings of these keywords. Describing this theoretical problem, Williams deliberately, 
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limited his analysis to the salient meanings of the keywords, without focusing on a 
particular process of signification or the context that the keywords occurred in. 
With regard to the methodological problem highlighted in Williams approach, this 
relates to the data the approach relied upon. Since the data was based on Williams’ 
personal commentaries on the etymological variations in OED and his own reading, the 
approach lacks the objectivity needed to explicate the socio-historical meanings of these 
keywords. In addition, Williams admits that there was a lack of the data in terms of the 
examples of usage of some keywords, and thus he contributed a number of examples of 
his own (1983:19). This implies that the analysis of the development and the senses of 
the keywords was based on personal preferences, which led to the possibility of the work 
not being completely objective. Furthermore, this reliance on personal data was 
expected to trigger a larger problem, contradicting the primary mission of the book in 
terms of studying keywords, which is of not reflective of the wider use of the keywords 
by different people in additional contexts.  
Another consideration in reference to Williams’ analysis is the focus on the salient 
senses of the keywords, without considering their complex or discursive variations. 
Williams referred to the difficulty of analysing the meanings of the keywords used in 
conflicts. He stated that he found a major issue to be that he found they “could not really 
be thought through” due to the social conflicts and controversies around them (1983:16). 
Although he was aware of the existence of the social disputes over the meanings of 
some keywords and the significance of analysing the contested meanings in the social 
context, he did not conduct such an analysis. Instead, he chose to analyse the salient 
meanings of the keywords, although his central aim was to “show that some social and 
historical process occur within language” (1983:22). This limitation could be considered 
as an extension of the problem of signification, since no particular text-type or context 
could be identified for analysis. Additionally, this could be considered a key consequence 
of the lack of a theoretical frame of meaning to this method of analysis, as referred to 
above.  
The theoretical and methodological limitations of Williams’ approach discussed 
highlight the necessity to introduce other approaches to keywords analysis. Thus, 
alongside Williams approach, other approaches offer theories and methods that to some 
extent can resolve the deficits of Williams’ approach. They include approaches that 
consider the discursive meanings of keywords and/or the socio-political context beyond 
that meanings. One of these approaches is the Stubbs approach, which will be discussed 
in detail in the following section. 
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3.3 Corpus-based Cultural keywords 
Drawing on Williams’ approach to keywords analysis, Michael Stubbs (2001) 
proposed a systematic approach to studying cultural keywords. Stubbs’ approach 
intended offered a linguistic analysis method to investigate the meaning of cultural 
keywords using Corpus Linguistics. Cultural keywords are “nodes around which 
ideological battles are fought” (2001:188). By utilising Corpus Linguistics, Stubbs aimed 
to present linguistic evidence for the meanings of the analysed keywords. Unlike 
Williams’ analysis, which was based on personal commentaries, Stubbs’ use of a large 
corpus provided a relatively objective analysis.  
In Stubbs’ analysis of cultural keywords, he chose to examine the meaning of 
some of Williams’ (1983) keywords, such as ethnic, standards and community, in order 
to demonstrate how these keywords can be analysed using corpus linguistics. Similar to 
Williams’ objectives for keywords analysis, Stubbs wanted to examine synchronically and 
diachronically, the meaning of keywords in use and in relation to other words. Thus, the 
data used for the analysis includes etymological data from a large historical dictionary 
and a 200-million-word corpus of contemporary English. A major difference between 
Williams’ and Stubbs’ analysis lies in that the latter analysed the meanings of the 
keywords on the basis of the context in which they were used, co-occurrences, and in 
relation to a particular text-type, by providing examples of the uses from particular 
discourse. In other words, Stubbs’ linguistic analysis of the corpus data was conducted 
in relation to various semantic features, examining the meaning of keywords according 
to how they co-occur with other lexical, grammatical and semantic units. In particular, he 
analysed them using Sinclair’s (1991) units of meaning model, which includes 
collocation, colligation, semantic preference and semantic prosody. It is a model Stubbs 
(2007:177) considers to be “a powerful model of phrasal units of meaning”.  
This model of Sinclair’s is based on Firth’s contextual theory of meaning which 
views that the meaning of a word is dependent principally on its relationship with co-
occurring words (1957). Following Firth, Sinclair proposes a model of four types of lexico-
semantic relations that can help with analysing particular words in terms of their co-
occurring words. On the basis of Sinclair (1991), Stubbs (2001: 64-65) addressed the 
structure of these types of relations. The first point was the collocation relation, which is 
a lexical relation between a node word and its collocates, i.e. surrounding words. 
Colligation on the other hand concerns the relationship between a lexical unit and a 
grammatical one; i.e. how a lexical item frequently co-occurs with a grammatical 
category. The other two units of meaning, semantic preference and prosody, are the 
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most essential to consider, as they are strongly related to the analysis of the salient 
semantic and discursive features of words in which they are partial relation to, which is 
the scope of this research.  
Following Stubbs (2001), semantic preference units concern the relation between a word 
and a set of semantically related words. An example of this is Stubbs’ analysis of the 
semantic preferences of the cultural word Standard in a 200-million-word corpus. He 
found that it co-occurs with other words to indicate the meaning of ‘normal’ such as 
(method, practice and routine) and with other set of words to signal the meaning of ‘moral 
principles’ such as (decency, fairness and morality) (2001:155). Semantic prosody 
relation, on the other hand, or what Stubbs preferred to call ‘discourse prosody’ is the 
expression of a speaker’s attitude towards a particular word or expression. Stubbs 
preferred the term ‘discourse prosody’, since he argues that it implies a relationship 
between speakers and other people, through attitudes expressed and based on a 
speaker’s assumptions and his view of the world, which is important for identifying the 
authorial stance towards a particular discourse, based on deliberate section of lexical 
items. Another reason Stubbs highlights, is that the term ‘discourse prosody’ has a role 
in creating discourse coherence (2001:66). Another typical definition of semantic 
prosody was introduced by Louw (1993: 30), as “consistent aura of meaning with which 
a form is imbued by its collocates”. Louw’s definition of semantic prosody implies 
discursive levels of underlying meanings, which then support Stubbs’ view, entitling it 
discourse prosody. An example Louw gives is that of a corpus-based analysis, which he 
conducted on the word ‘utterly’. This analysis revealed that the word has negative 
semantic prosody, as it co-occurs with words of negative meanings. Considering that 
Stubbs (2001) and Louw (1993) address Sinclair’s (1991) units of meaning, several other 
scholars, mainly corpus linguists have employed the units of meaning model in their 
examination of the meaning of particular keywords, such as feminism (Jaworska and 
Krishnamurthy 2012), elderly (Mautner 2007), Muslims (Baker 2010), sleaze (Orpin 
2005) and Wahhabism (Salama 2011).  
These studies attempted to combine a macro and a relatively micro analysis in order to 
examine how particular keywords are represented. This was specifically conducted by 
combining statistical corpus linguistics tools to the units of meaning model, with a specific 
focus on semantic preference and prosody relations. By utilising corpus linguistics, these 
studies were able to analyse an extensive body of decontextualized corpus data. In 
particular, their analysis was dependent on text fragments, collocations and the 
concordance lines, from a large corpus rather than investigating whole coherent texts. 
This reliance on largely decontextualized data cannot provide a critical in-depth 
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examination of the preferences or prosodies in the text. This criticism was generally 
taken into account by Widdowson (1998). He argued: 
This analysis yields many a fascinating fact about frequency of occurrence 
and patterns of co-occurrence. But what it cannot yield is information about 
how the texts thus analysed interacted with contextual conditions to realise 
discourse. (1998:712) 
This issue could be more problematic than this, especially in critical studies that 
require analysis of the social context. Mautner (2008:141) has pointed out that wide-
scale discursive phenomena that can be found, e.g. in argumentative texts, cannot be 
captured through corpus techniques alone, and thus there is the need to examine the full 
texts. Therefore, in the context of analysing socially contested keywords, corpus analysis 
techniques cannot be used in isolation, and thus it is necessary to conduct a critical 
analysis of a sample of whole texts to comprehend the whole picture.  
Another consideration here is that Stubbs (2001), as well as the authors of these 
studies, has argued that the keywords they aim to analyse are ideologically contested. 
Despite this argument, these studies have not investigated the ideological context, nor 
have they examined in depth how keywords are contested and debated. Instead their 
analysis was limited to the salient semantic meanings and the changes in these 
meanings across texts and over times. An exception to this is the study conducted by 
Salama (2011). Salama (2011) attempted to examine how the node Wahhabism (Saudi 
Islam) has been ideologically contextualized across opposing discourses by looking at 
collocation. This study involved a corpus-based analysis of the units of meanings 
combined with a CDA approach. In particular, Salama attempted to analyse the 
recontextulisation of ‘Wahhabism’ through the application of Sinclair’s (1991) model 
within a particular theoretical CDA framework called ‘classification schemes’ as identified 
by Fairclough (2001:114) as how “vocabulary is organised in discourse type”. This 
‘classification scheme’ used by Salama relies on two relations: textual synonymy and 
textual apposition, which serve the functions of re-lexicalisation and over-lexicalisation 
respectively. For example, Salama found the node ‘Wahhabism’ to be represented 
negatively in the first text collocating with words such as infiltration, lobby, regime and 
state constituting the meaning preference of ‘policing’ through the process of re-
lexicalisation, while it was used positively in the other text, collocating with teachings, 
writings and works suggesting ‘scholarliness’ via the process of over-lexicalisation. By 
the use of the two methods, Salama concludes the relations between collocations can 
ideologically contribute to the recontextualisation of one discourse topic in opposing 
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texts, revealing at the same time the opposing discursive voices concerning the same 
topic. However, although Salama (2011) considered the ideological clash over key terms, 
he did not take his analysis beyond the collocation level. This implies that he critically 
analysed the meaning of the keyword on the basis of its collocates without considering 
the co-text, or the whole text in which the keyword has occurred. This relates the 
argument to the earlier point made by Salama (2011), whereby the method of analysis 
did not represent an in-depth examination of the context since it was affected by the level 
of collocation.  
One of the chief advantages of Sinclair’s corpus-based model is that it provides 
an objective textual model for keywords analysis. Specifically, based on an analysis of 
large corpus, the model makes it possible to examine synchronically and diachronically 
the salient semantic and discursive features of keywords, including changes in their 
meanings across texts and time. In other words, this model gives a general sense of the 
textual trends and patterns surrounding the construction of particular lexical items (Baker 
2010). In general, corpus-based analysis offers an objective analysis, in the sense that 
it allows the user to access a wide range of textual patterns. In this regard, Baker 
(2010:313) has argued that reliance on corpus data helps to “reduce research bias”, as 
it is based on a large number of texts rather than a choice of just a few articles with a 
particular stance. O'Halloran and Coffin (2004), on the other hand, referred to the use of 
large corpora for the analysis of critical studies. They state that corpus-based analysis 
plays a crucial role in avoiding the over-interpretation caused by too focused analysis on 
a low number of texts in critical studies. However, they pointed out that too heavy 
dependence on corpus analysis could lead to an under-interpretation of the discursive 
phenomena under critical analysis. Thus, in order to achieve a balanced analysis and 
avoid the over-interpretation and under-interpretation of a text, they suggest combining 
Corpus Linguistics methods with critical linguistics methods (2004). Thus, it can be said 
that Corpus Linguistics techniques provide a general insight into textual trends across a 
corpus, but still do not offer an in-depth examination of the socio-political implications 
informing these lexical patterns. Therefore, there is a need for critical approaches to 
analyse critically what is beyond the text, and the socio-historical and socio-political 
contexts beyond a particular representation of a keyword.  
3.4 Critical approaches to the analysis of keywords  
Several scholars have attempted to provide a qualitative analysis of ideologically 
contested keywords. In particular, they have sought to analyse the context behind a 
particular usage of ideological keywords in-depth. Some of these studies did not rely on 
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a particular theoretical framework, such as those by Amoretti and Fuentes (2012) and 
De Beaugrande (1999). Amoretti and Fuentes (2012), for instance, attempted to examine 
diachronically how the node ‘Islah’/reform has been ideologically contested in authorial 
contexts in Maghreb states. On the basis of a critical review of literature on the historical 
and socio-political contexts of the Maghreb, Amoretti and Fuentes (2012) attempted to 
find out how the meaning of ‘Islah’ has been shaped and developed by reformists from 
different ideological and political parties. For instance, they reviewed the historical 
development and socio-political usage of the word ‘Islah’; how it was initially used by the 
end of colonisation era and its use by two main political trends; the liberals and the 
Salafists.  
These two political groups have assessed the term ‘Islah’ within the modernity 
debate, resulting in two conceptual trends whereby the liberals linked the ‘Islah’ concept 
to the term ‘tahdeeth’ (modernisation), and the Salafists adopted the term ‘nahdha’ 
(renaissance) to describe the project of ‘Islah’. Amoretti and Fuentes (2012) conclude 
that ‘Islah’ has been used dichotomously by the two ideological trends, which resulted in 
a conceptual duality represented in the case of ‘Islah’ by the use of the concepts of 
‘Tahdith’ and ‘Nahda’. The positive aspect of this study is that it is based on a context 
analysis of the literature, which makes it a critical contextualised study of the keyword, 
unlike the previously discussed corpus of non-contextualised studies. However, since 
this study was based on a review of a literature, no textual data or methodological and 
theoretical framework was used, and they failed to provide a well-grounded analysis for 
the use of ideological nodes in their socio-political contexts. In addition, the analysis of 
the study was generalised in terms of the contexts of the three states of Maghreb without 
distinguishing between the regional contexts addressed by the three states of Tunisia, 
Algeria and Morocco, which have different political and social systems.  
De Beaugrande (1999), undertook a comparative analysis of the ideological 
keyword ‘liberalism’ in three specific regional contexts, the United States, the United 
Kingdom and South Africa. For the analysis, he suggested using a large number of texts 
with particular focus on examining qualitatively the concordance lines of a particular 
ideological expression; interpreting its meaning on the basis of the context it occurs in, 
and then suggesting in-depth investigation of some uses of that particular ideological 
expression in various contexts. This suggestion is based on arguments De Beaugrande 
posited in relation to how ideology or ideological expressions should be investigated. He 
argues that ideology is a component of unconscious human awareness, which is difficult 
to recognise and to inspect. Therefore, he concludes that ideology should be investigated 
explicitly, within the order of discourse, by analysing the terms that indicate an ideology 
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such as Liberalism. These arguments comprise part of De Beaugrande’s criticism of 
discourse analysis approaches in terms of their view on investigating ideology. He 
criticised in particular the CDA view of ideology, which states that ideologies cannot be 
read explicitly from texts because texts are open to different interpretations that might 
vary in their ideological meaning. De Beaugrande’s (1999) criticism entails the CDA 
investigation of the implicit ideology in texts, with different interpretations that are partial, 
since the analysis is dependent on the interpreters’ choice and analysis of a small 
number of texts. This reliance on just a few texts also reduces confidence in the results 
of research, since it does not reflect the wider ideological significance possible that can 
be revealed when examining a larger number of texts providing the same discourse. 
Therefore, De Beaugrande (1999) suggested investigating ideology explicitly, by 
examining a large set of contexts for a particular ideological key term on the basis of 
large number of texts. De Beaugrande (1999:273) also suggested using corpus 
linguistics with discourse approaches to investigate ideology, to “find unexpected leads 
toward relations between discourse and society”, which can then only be identified when 
investigating a large body of authentic natural data. However, while he refers to the 
possibility of using corpus linguistics to complement discourse studies, he points out that 
CDA cannot possible be combined with corpus studies. De Beaugrande attributed this 
to the different nature of the analysis of both approaches discussed earlier, in which CDA 
analysis is based on personal intuition about only a few texts, while corpus analysis is 
based on a confident objective analysis of wider texts and contexts. However, this 
argument regarding combining CDA and corpus analysis has been addressed recently 
by many scholars (Baker et al. 2008; Gabrielatos and Baker 2008; Baker 2012; Salama 
2011; Amer 2012). Before discussing studies that have combined a large number of texts 
with discourse approaches to investigate particular expressions or nodes, a review of 
some discourse approaches and their views regarding ideological keywords and 
meaning is necessary.  
3.4.1 Discourse Theory  
Discourse Theory was developed by Laclau and Mouffe (1985). Drawing critically 
upon Marxist theory of ideology and discourse, Laclau and Mouffe view discourse as not 
limited to language but including all social practices and power relations. Thus, they 
consider language as a part of these practices, in which they all constitute “worlds of 
related objects that form the identities of social actors” (Howarth 2000:101). In general, 
DT is predicated on the notion that all social practices, including language are 
meaningful, and that their meaning is obtained through systems of significant differences. 
These meanings are subjects of ongoing contestation or in Laclau’s terms, they are 
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“constantly negotiated and constructed” (1988:254). The articulation of the meaning of 
these practices, or in other words the formation of discourse is determined by what 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985) called ‘articulatory practice’. Articulatory practice concerns the 
formation of relationships among elements that formulate discourse, in which these 
elements fix partially the meaning of this discourse. In Laclau and Mouffe terms 
(1985:113) articulatory practice is identified as:  
The construction of nodal points which partially fix meaning; and the 
partial character of this fixation proceeds from the openness of the 
social, a result, in its turn, of the constant overflowing of every discourse 
by the infinitude of the field of discursivity. 
It is apparent from this definition that the elements that formulate discourse in the 
practice of articulation can be referred to as ‘nodal points’. They have been defined by 
Laclau and Mouffe as “privileged signifiers that fix the meaning of a signifying chain” 
(1985:112). In concrete terms, nodal points are central signifiers around which 
discourses are organised. They constitute together a particular system of meanings 
(discourse) or a ‘chain of signification’ that assign meanings to other signifiers within that 
discourse (Rear and Jones 2013). For example, the discourse of Thatcherism is 
constituted and organised through nodal points such as ‘free economy’, ‘monetarism’ 
and ‘strong state’ (Hoawrth 2000). While these nodal points constitute the meaning(s) of 
particular discourse, these meanings are not fixed but are of partial fixation. In this 
regard, Laclaue and Mouffe (1985) have argued that full fixation of meaning is impossible 
to achieve. The fixation of meaning remains partial because of the openness of the social 
context, which results from the continuous overflow into discourse by the field of 
discursivity. Otherwise, the full fixation of meaning would lead social actions to repeat an 
existing system of meanings, which would make it impossible to construct new nodal 
points that partially fix meaning (Howarth 2000: 103). In contrast, full openness of 
meaning would lead to a large number of meanings, in which case the construction of 
meanings or discourse would be impossible: “a discourse incapable of generating any 
fixity of meaning is the discourse of the psychotic” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 112).  
This issue of the fixation of meaning within the openness of society was tackled 
by Laclau and Mouffe (1985) in their distinction between the concepts of ‘contingent 
elements’ in a discursive field and ‘necessary moments’ of a particular discourse. 
‘Contingent elements’ are part of the discursive field, in which the discursive field that 
exisited outside discourse is open and holds an overflow of meanings. ‘Necessary 
moments’, on the other hand, are part of particular discourses, in which these discourses 
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offer partial fixation of social meaning with a particular order in that field of meaning. The 
existence of these contingent elements in the discursive field affect particular discourses 
preventing complete closure. These contingent elements penetrate into discourse and 
become ‘necessary moments’ in that discourse, which is then partially fixed. Thus, a 
particular discourse that constitutes a system of meanings cannot be fully closed, as it is 
vulnerable to the contingent elements that exist in the discursive field, which enter 
discourse and construct new meanings in that discourse. This process has been called 
by Laclau and Mouffe (1985:110-111) the ‘discursive exterior’ as the ‘necessary 
moments’ of discourse are penetrated by ‘contingent elements’. This indicates that the 
full closure and openness of meaning is impossible in the view of DT as full closure would 
exclude all other meanings that exist in the discursive field, and full openness would 
provide no meaning for a particular discourse or society (Laclaue and Mouffe 1985:112). 
An example of this process was provided by Howarth (2000) in reference to the British 
state, whereby contingent elements, such as the political project by Mrs Thatcher entered 
discourse and articulated a new system of meaning, or nodal points, for the British state. 
However, this view on the partial fixation of social meaning led to problems 
determining the extent of the partiality the meaning or discourse should adhere to. In 
particular, if the discourse cannot be closed, how is the formation of society, as a 
meaningful system, then possible? In other words: if the social practices in discourse are 
relational and open for contingent meanings, how can the identity of a society be 
realised? This issue was addressed by Laclau and Mouffe (1985) by asserting Gramsci’s 
(1971) view on the primacy of politics in their social ontology. This posits that social 
systems, which are realised as constructed sets of discourses, are political formations 
including the constitution of antagonism and of social struggle for power. As these 
systems of social relations are of a political nature; they obtain their meanings, or social 
practices, via the struggle for social power, while being vulnerable to the contingent 
forces that attempt to construct and gain power in the social site. In concrete terms, the 
construction of society or discourse is a result of competing hegemonic struggle 
attempting to impose their projects on society (Howarth 2000:120). This conception of 
the political construction of society is what Laclau and Mouffe base their political theory 
of discourse on. Thus, they introduce three main concepts, which are social antagonism, 
political subjectivity and hegemony (Howarth 2000), as will be explained below.  
The first of these concepts, social antagonism has to do with conflicts where 
social agents are unable to acquire their identities and interests because they represent 
an enemy who is responsible for this failure. In other words, this process of antagonism 
occurs when a particular identity - or discourse – is opposed by another where the 
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formation of these identities cannot be fully articulated as they are contested by these 
forces preventing it from a full closure. This indicates that each identity is threatened by 
other antagonistic identities, in which case it represents these identities negatively in 
order to be stabilised as a meaningful discursive system (Howarth 2000:106). Within this 
political process of antagonism, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) have introduced two main 
cases in which antagonism is constructed in a discursive field of opposing discourses, 
including the logic of equivalence and the logic of difference. The logic of equivalence 
occurs when more than one existing identities or discourses construct a negative identity, 
or a discursive exterior, representing it as a threat that attempt to dissolute the solidarity 
of these identities. An example of this is the national liberation movements oppressed by 
the apartheid system in South Africa; when they united against apartheid referring to 
them negatively as white racists (Howarth 2000:107). On the other hand, the logic of 
difference accounts for lessening the differences between different social groups instead 
of displacing them in order to maintain dominance and hegemony. This can be made 
possible by breaking the existing chains of equivalence and integrating the disarticulated 
elements in a particular formation. An example of this is contrary to the earlier point, as 
in this case the apartheid system attempted to disrupt the chain of equivalence made by 
the national movements in an attempt to dislocate calls for a democratic South Africa to 
maintain the dominance (Howarth 2000:107).  
 Political subjectivity as the second central concept in DT, concerns how social 
actors attain and live out their identities, as well as their role as agents in the construction 
of social structures (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). This process emerges out of the 
contingency of discourses that would alter their identities. In other words, the identity of 
social actors can be constructed and transformed through contingent discursive forces, 
in which case the social actors are forced to identify with new identities. For instance, 
capitalism has added new fields of meaning to particular societies dislocating pre-
existing identities and imposing an identity crisis on social actors (Howarth 2000:109).  
 The third concept which is hegemony, and which is the most related to the scope 
of this thesis, includes combining different identities and political powers under a 
common project, as well as the construction of new social orders from various scattered 
elements. The objective of hegemonic projects is to construct and stabilize nodal points 
that form the basis of a social order, the main aim being to become a social imaginary, 
i.e. the horizon that “is not one among other objects but an absolute limit which structures 
a field of intelligibility and is thus the condition of possibility of the emergence of any 
object” (Laclau 1990: 64). This view of hegemony is based on Gramsci’s (1971) 
conception of it, which is not only limited to the common notion that views hegemony as 
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a struggle between social classes for particular interests. Instead, Gramsci (Cited in 
Howarth 2000:109) extends this narrow conception of hegemony to include the 
articulation of different social institutions and forces in a new hegemonic bloc. Herein, 
Gramsci (1971) transforms the interests of social classes into the interests of the whole 
of society as a ‘collective will’ that constitutes universal interests and forces. This concept 
of hegemony was developed by Laclau and Mouffe in three stages, in which they linked 
it (especially in the final stages) to the discursive construction of social practices. In the 
first model, Laclau (1977) and Mouffe (1979) based the hegemony concept on the role 
of fundamental social classes that aim to transform the whole nation according to their 
interests. In this model, they challenge the view that ideological appeals and calls to the 
nation belong to a particular class, but instead they are contingent elements articulated 
by antagonistic hegemonic projects that attempt to assign classes with particular 
meanings and connotations. 
 This notion of hegemonic practices as contingent elements was developed by 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985) in their second model of the conception of hegemony. They 
argued that all ideological elements and social agents in discourse are contingent and 
negotiable. The articulatory practices of these contingent elements are possible because 
of the openness of social relations, whereby these contingent elements penetrate from 
the open field of discursivity to enter a particular discourse and become nodal points. 
Specifically, hegemonic practices occur within the presence of antagonistic forces in the 
social field and within the existence of contingent elements articulated by opposing 
forces, in an attempt to hegemonize them (Laclau and Mouffe 1985:136). Laclau and 
Mouffe (1985:142) view these hegemonic practices as serving the function of stabilising 
systems of meaning or discourses or ‘hegemonic formations’. Thus, when these 
hegemonic formations are achieved, they become organised and centred upon the 
articulation of nodal points that constitute privileged signifiers and condense meanings 
that are partially fixed.  
The third model of hegemony, which is the most recent and relates most to this 
thesis is the notion of the contingency of elements which has been furtherly developed 
to be formed around the concept of ‘empty signifiers’. Laclau, at this stage, viewed 
hegemony as a procedure of filling empty signifiers with meaning. Thus, empty signifiers 
have been identified as signifiers without a particular signified and charging a concept 
with a meaning is recognised as a hegemonic practice (Laclau 1996; 2007). ‘Empty 
signifiers’ emerge through dislocations where a discursive exterior attempts to be 
hegemonic in a particular society (Laclau 1996; 2007). In particular, the emergence of 
empty signifiers presupposes the presence of a social structure with unknown entities, 
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in which these entities are both constituted and threatened by a discursive exterior. 
According to Laclau (1990:44), these indeterminate entities represent a constitutive 
impossibility in a society in which they can only be obtained and constituted through the 
production of an empty signifier that can be filled with absent objectives and meanings 
in society.  
 In other words, empty signifiers emerge within the existence of antagonism in 
which they play a crucial role in uniting different groups in the chain of equivalence (the 
logic of difference) and they function as a threat to the existing groups in the chain of 
difference (the logic of equivalence). In the case of the chain of equivalence, an empty 
signifier is produced by different groups, in which each attempt to fill it with their own 
meaning to unite under one project and gain hegemony and acceptance in society. An 
example of this is the concept of ‘nationalism’, which can be used as an empty signifier 
by different groups to centre their identities on a common project and ensure hegemony 
(Laclau 1996:100). On the other hand, within the chain of differences, a particular system 
of meaning or identity dominates society and excludes the other entities that see it as a 
negative threat. Due to the openness of society and the contingency of meaning, these 
dominant entities are vulnerable to the discursive exterior which represent a threat to the 
system. Thus, in this case, an empty signifier is imposed by excluded entities struggling 
for power; therefore, this empty signifier constitutes “a signifier of pure threat, of pure 
negativity and of the simply excluded element” (Laclau 1996:38). It is through the empty 
signifier that excluded entities can achieve hegemony and acceptance in society, while 
at the same time constituting a threat to the dominant group. This latter case of the empty 
signifier is important in this thesis, since it concerns the contestation of alibrāliyah as a 
key signifier between antagonistic groups within the logic of equivalence.  
Within the latter case of the concept of an empty signifier, other related concepts 
have been introduced by Laclau (1996), which are dislocation, myth and social 
imaginary. These are related, in the sense that they constitute and elaborate upon the 
process of the contingency of elements from the field of discursivity, to a particular 
discourse or system of meanings. Thus, dislocation concerns those events that do not 
exist in the discursive order, and which act to disrupt that order (Laclau 1996). These 
dislocations are operated by a discursive exterior that attempts to serve as a contingent 
element in a particular discourse or society. Myth and social imaginary result from this 
disruption, as they emerge through the spaces they create. Thus, Myths are “new spaces 
of representations which attempt to cover over dislocations” (Howarth 2000:111). In 
Laclau’s terms, the mythical space represents “an alternative to the logical form of the 
dominant structural discourse” (Laclau 1990:62). In concrete terms, it represents a 
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disrupting element to the dominant social structure, through attempting to impose absent 
social demands on the social structure as an alternative. Thus, if a myth succeeds in 
overcoming dislocations and incorporating a significant set of social interests, it becomes 
hegemonic and thereby transformed into a social imaginary. Thus, Laclau (1990:64) 
defines the social imaginary as an “absolute limit which structures a field of intelligibility 
and is thus the condition of possibility of the emergence of any object” due to the 
openness of the social space and the contingency of elements. 
The relationship between the concept of an empty signifier and the concepts of 
dislocation, myth and social imaginary were interpreted by Norval (2000) in his 
theoretical study of how ideology can be investigated, and its process of decontestation. 
Norval (2000) focuses particularly on explaining the process of the decontestation of 
conceptual formation of ideology, and how it is transformed from a contested empty 
signifier to a decontested hegemonic system of meaning. This is achieved by discussing 
the concept of empty signifier, as a form of the attempt of dislocation, which relates to 
the ideological discursive construction of socio-political identities. He argued that the 
‘empty signifier’ concept is strongly related to the study of ideology since “the study of 
ideology is the study of the mechanism which makes the illusion possible” (Norval 
2000:18). He clarified further, by stating that each new ideology that emerges out of 
dislocation in a society, such as nationalism and populism, should be linked to a 
particular set of social orders. These ideologies become hegemonic and decontested 
when the existing social order is dislocated and overcome by myth. This myth works to 
re-establish the closure of meaning when a social order has been dislocated, and it then 
succeeds in becoming a social imaginary. Thus, if ideology fails to introduce a particular 
set of orders or objectives it then becomes an empty signifier. It is an empty signifier in 
this case as it fails to fill the signifier with the interests and objectives it should carry out. 
Therefore, ideological struggles are “struggles over the filling out of such empty 
signifiers” (Norval 2000:19). Though he discussed the relationship between these 
concepts in relation to ideology, he did not clarify the particular relationship between 
empty signifiers and myth. In particular, if myth and empty signifiers are used to dislocate 
and disrupt the dominant social order or discourse, we ask what the differences are 
between the two concepts. In other words, if the empty signifier represents a signifier 
that needs to be filled with meaning, we must ask if myth serves as an element of 
dislocation that functions to fill an absence in the social structure by contributing meaning 
to the empty signifier.   
This problem with the explanation and application of DT concepts in the literature 
has been addressed by Howarth (2000). He states that these theoretical concepts 
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remain overly abstract and vague, and thus were difficult for researchers working with 
DT to apply. Howarth (1998) stated that Laclau and Mouffe set these theoretical concepts 
without providing a methodological guideline for researchers, moreover, they did not 
clarify these concepts through a set of questions and hypotheses. In order to overcome 
this, Howarth suggested using DT as a theoretical basis for case studies closely related 
to the assumptions and concepts of DT. A number of studies have since attempted to 
use the theoretical concepts of DT (Brown 2015; Carpentier and De Cleen 2007; 
Stavrakakis 2000).  
For example, Brown (2015) attempted to analyse the different contexts of the 
‘sustainability’ concept, by seeking to discover whether it is an empty signifier or not. 
Drawing on Laclau’s (1990) theory and on literature that concerns the concept of 
‘sustainability’, Brown argues that sustainability is an empty signifier, as it has been 
contested, throughout history, amongst different socio-political groups, who use it for 
their own interests to maintain power and fail to fill it with particular meaning or objectives. 
This is based on the factor that ‘sustainability’ has been imposed by different political 
groups to maintain their hegemonic power, serving as dislocation of current progress 
objectives and acting as an empty promise for a better future. In particular, sustainability 
has been imposed as a promising alternative to the existing socio-economic structure, 
proffering empty objectives for ecological, social, economic, political and moral fields. 
Suitability as an empty signifier in this case is consistent with Laclau’s (1996) view of the 
empty signifier as it is a process that emerges out of dislocations within a discursive 
order, and this process is subject to hegemonic struggle within the existence of 
antagonistic forces. Although, this study attempted to analyse the discourse of particular 
case studies in relation to DT concepts, it did not base its analysis on empirical data or 
textual analysis. This is because the linguistic analysis of discourse is not of his primary 
concern, although it can assist in providing an empirical analysis of discourse as a 
meaningful system. 
For a textual analysis of DT concept, Howarth (2000) suggested the possibility of 
using CDA with DT, although he did not clarify how these two approaches can be 
combined. He points to the idea that discourse analysis approaches, such as CDA might 
be helpful as a mechanism for providing ways into investigating the theoretical concepts 
of DT empirically (Howarth 2000:142). An attempt to combine both approaches by means 
of employing textual analysis was conducted by Montessori (2011) and Rear and Jones 
(2013). Rear and Jones’ (2013) study was situated in the context of a struggle between 
two dominant discourses, new-liberalism and conservatism, which evaluated a number 
of key signifiers in the texts of education policies in Japan produced by the office of the 
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prime minister. In their textual analysis of 10 education policy documents, Rear and 
Jones (2013) attempted to employ the CDA notion of intertextuality while employing the 
DT concepts of hegemony, nodal points and articulation. In particular, they attempted to 
identify the key signifiers or the nodal points in opposing discourses in the 10 texts, to 
identify the two distinctive discourses and the hegemony achieved through the fixation 
of meaning. Their analysis demonstrated that neo-liberalism and conservatism 
discourses are marked by a number of signifiers, while neo-liberalism is marked with 
nodal points, such as ‘individual freedom’, ‘rights’ and ‘critical thinking’, whereas 
conservatism discourse is centred around the nodal points of ‘patriotism’, ‘traditional 
norms’ and ‘morality’. Although this study refers to the aim of investigating intertextuality 
and changes in discourse, it does not show a diachronic shift in discourse nor the 
mechanism of this shift.  
Additionally, even though Rear and Jones (2013) study made a good attempt at 
relating the theoretical concepts of DT to the textual-oriented approach of CDA, it 
highlighted a major point in terms of how they identified the nodal points in texts. The 
study did not identify the base, in which the assigned terms can be considered nodal 
points in discourse. This explains the difficulty with applying theoretical concepts of DT 
in textual analysis, as in this case of identifying the nodal points in existing dominant 
discourses; in the chain of equivalence. 
Montessori (2011) developed a theoretical-methodological framework to analyse 
hegemony in discourse by means of combining DT with CDA. In the context of her study, 
which concerns the struggle for power between president Salina and the EZLN Party in 
Mexico, she integrates the theoretical view of DT on hegemony with methodological 
approaches to CDA developed by Fairclough and Wodak. In particular, she analysed 
speeches from both groups, comparing the narratives of each to identify the DT concepts 
of hegemony, which are the nodal points, and the empty signifiers along with the myth 
and social imaginary. By employing content analysis, and the analysis of strategies 
based on DT, she suggests that the keyword ‘modernisation’ operates as a nodal point 
in Salina’s narratives, since it has been achieved, while the word ‘democracy’ operates 
as an empty signifier in EZLN narratives as it is represented a promise for the future not 
yet realised. She also concludes that Salina’s narrative represents an imaginary, while 
EZLN narrative operates as a myth since, it has not been achieved as yet. 
 As Montessori (2011) study that combines DT with CDA focuses on the case 
study of the power struggle in Mexico, the combination between both approaches can 
be tackled in different ways depending on the case study.  This view is supported by 
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Howarth (2000:142) who states that the success of the application of Discourse Theory 
concepts along with its integration with empirical methods such as CDA depends on its 
close relation to the case under study. Thus, in the case of this study, the aim is to employ 
the theoretical concepts of empty signifier and dislocation to the presence of antagonistic 
relations between two groups, within the logic of equivalence, attempting specifically to 
study how alibrāliyah has been imposed as an empty signifier by antagonistic forces in 
their struggle for power. In order to apply these concepts and overcome their theoretical 
limitations, they will be combined with textually-oriented methods of CDA especially as 
both approaches view discourse as a social struggle over power in the theoretical level. 
Before explaining how the theoretical concepts of DT can be combined with CDA, a 
review of the CDA approach is necessary, as will be discussed in the following section.   
3.4.2 Critical Discourse Analysis approach (CDA) 
 The Critical Discourse Analysis approach (CDA) primarily concerns how 
language usage reflects the ideological relations of power and dominance. It considers 
language as a crucial form of social practice that ideologically affects the power relations 
among social groups in social institutions, as well as representing those power relations 
(Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258). CDA is also considered a problem–oriented 
approach, and thus it is interdisciplinary (Wodak and Meyer 2001). This is because it is 
driven by a particular problem positioned in a particular social context, and therefore 
attempts to analyse the causes of the existence of the problem on the basis of discursive 
strategies and the ideology that produced it. Thus, it is necessarily interdisciplinary, due 
to its broadly set objective to analyse the relationship between language use and social 
theory.  
This main notion of CDA has been prominently developed by Norman Fairclough. 
Fairclough’s main interests include discourse as the major component of social struggle 
and its effect in the eras of globalisation, new-liberalism and new capitalism (Fairclough 
1989, 1992, 2000). Other major contributors to CDA are Teun Van Dijk and Ruth Wodak. 
Van Dijk provided a socio-cognitive theory with a special interest in subjects related to 
the discourse of ethnicity and racism (1998, 2008). Wodak, on the other hand, developed 
DHA from the perspective of an interest in the discursive construction of identity and 
nationalism (1999, 2007). However, in this review, the focus will be on CDA, and how it 
views language (discourse) as the main locus of social conflict and struggle. In particular, 
Fairclough’s theoretical view on the relation between language use (the micro) and the 
social context (the macro) will be reviewed in reference to DHA that operationalises this 
relationship through the linguistic analysis of the discursive strategies used in texts.  
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Fairclough (1989) attempted to demonstrate the relationship between the micro 
and the macro by introducing the relationship between the concepts of the common 
sense of discourse and ideology and how these are generated in the course of social 
struggle. It is not a straightforward relationship but an interconnected one, which can 
contribute to an understanding of how discourse (language use) reveals the ideological 
power relations. Common sense, according to Fairclough (1989) refers to the meanings 
or assumptions that are drawn from texts and made by interpreters on the basis of their 
background knowledge. From a CDA position, these assumptions lead to discourse 
coherence; a coherence situated by the interpreter himself based on his assumptions 
and expectations. These assumptions are implicit, and this implies that they are to an 
extent also ideological. 
 Fairclough (1989) argued that common sense is to varying degrees ideological, 
to the extent it contributes to sustaining unequal power relations or establishing solidarity 
among the members of a particular social group. Therefore, if common sense is 
ideological, it is part of the social struggle for power. The interconnection of the 
relationship here lies in Fairclough’s (1989) statement that common sense either exists 
primarily in the interpreters’ minds or is imposed by an ideology. This implies that the text 
here is the most crucial aspect, as assumptions and the meanings of language 
expressions are either imposed ideologically in the text by the text producer and/or exist 
primarily in the interpreters’ minds. In other words, the ideological struggle is evidenced 
in texts, as these texts are generated in the course of social struggle. Thus the meaning 
of discourse is subject to constant change as ideologies vary and represent a struggle 
for social power. Otherwise, the meaning would be fixed, which according to Fairclough 
will then indicate the uniformity of ideology; whereby one discourse of power gains 
dominance over another.  
The relationship between common sense and ideology can be simplified by 
providing an example of the meaning of words, and this is the main objective of this 
thesis. Fairclough (1989:93) argued that the meaning of a word is one dimension of 
common sense and that it is frequently mistakenly treated as a matter of fact. In order to 
demonstrate that meanings are not simply definite, he discussed two aspects of the 
meaning of words, which are; 1) the variability of meaning and 2) the nature of meaning 
systems.  
The variability of meaning arises because a word has a range of meanings within 
society. This opposes the general tendency to underestimate the extent of variations of 
the meanings of a word within society as represented in the fixed variations provided in 
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a dictionary in which Fairclough argues that a dictionary “is very much a product of the 
process of codification of standard languages, and thus closely tied to the notion that 
words have fixed meanings” (1989:93). Fairclough also demonstrated that the meanings 
of a word vary ideologically in the course of social struggle. This ideological variation is 
closely associated with the second aspect of the meaning of words, which is the nature 
of meaning systems. According to Fairclough, the meaning of a word is not isolated or 
independent but is dependent on the meaning of the neighbouring words in the text. This 
is a view originally introduced by Firth in his contextual theory of meaning (1957), (see 
section 3.3). Fairclough’s notion differs from Firth’s, in the sense that the meaning of a 
word is, discursively rather than semantically, dependent on the meaning of the adjacent 
words in a text produced at the site of an ideological struggle.  
These two aspects of meaning, the variability of meaning and the nature of 
meaning systems, were demonstrated by Fairclough when exemplifying the meaning of 
the word ‘ideology’. In terms of the variety of meanings, he stated that the word itself has 
no single fixed meaning, but has a large variety of meanings depending on the 
ideological context it is produced in. He gave the example of the meaning of ‘ideology’ in 
the American post-war sense. He stated that it was then used as a synonym for the word 
‘totalitarianism’, in which the latter is used to subsume words such as fascism, 
communism and Marxism and where the word ‘ideology’ was structured as ‘a weapon 
against Marxism’ (Fairclough 1989:94). The point Fairclough wanted to stress here is 
that the meanings of the word ideology are not randomly generated but are produced in 
the course of the struggle for power between two or more meanings. Additionally, the 
meaning of the word ideology depends on its relationship to other words in the 
ideologically produced text.  
Moreover, the assumptions made by the interpreter about a variety of meanings 
is ideological and are interpreted in relation to other words that are also ideological and 
based on how items are structured and how assumptions are met by interpreters. This 
is to say the meanings of words are mutable, and whenever meanings such as ‘ideology’ 
appear to become fixed, this indicates that the social struggle over the contestation of 
the word has ended as one power has gained dominance; a process which Fairclough 
termed naturalisation. Consequently, if words like ideology become fixed this would 
indicate that its fixed meaning is ideological as it is a result of a social struggle where 
one power became dominant. According to Fairclough, this process of naturalisation, 
which results in a closure of meaning is “reflected in the fixity of the dictionary of the 
meanings of words” (1989:107). This indicates that all words from the CDA view are 
ideological, whether socially contested or fixed as a result of a social struggle.  
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This notion of CDA in relation to the ideological meaning of words has been 
reflected in Fairclough’s (1995) study of the meaning of ‘enterprise’ in the British socio-
political context. Fairclough argues that notions of ‘enterprise’ are not fixed as they 
appear in a dictionary. Instead, they are promoted notionally by an ideological set of 
tendencies as part of the social struggle to gain a sort of power. These ideologically 
articulated set of notions affects the order within society, and thus is part of cultural 
change. This argument by Fairclough drew from his analysis of three speeches given 
between 1985 and 1988 by Young; the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry at that 
time. In particular, he examined how notions of the node ‘enterprise’ had changed over 
time and the ideological strategies behind such use and change. 
To analyse the speeches, he looked first at the salient features of the use of the 
term ‘enterprise’. In particular, he looked at the verbal context, including collocations of 
the node ‘enterprise’. The analysis revealed varying verbal contexts and changes in the 
senses associated with the node ‘enterprise’ across the three analysed speeches, which 
according to Fairclough reflects a change in political strategies rather than meaning. 
Fairclough made an interesting point regarding the nature of the varying senses of 
enterprise provided in the speeches (1995:114).  
Different speeches highlight different senses, not by promoting one 
sense to the exclusion of the others, but by establishing particular 
configurations of meanings, particular hierarchical salience relationships 
among the senses of ‘enterprise’, which can be seen to be suited to 
wider strategic objectives of the speeches. 
These interrelated configurations have been strategically exploited in speeches 
as part of a process Fairclough labelled ‘intertextuality’. Intertextuality constitutes the 
links between the texts of a particular discourse and the other categories of these texts 
(1995:119). Thus, the use of intertextuality in speeches indicates the ideological potential 
of positing different meanings for ‘enterprise’ to serve political strategies.  
Fairclough concluded the study by discussing the ideological production and 
interpretation of the text or discourse. He argues that the examination of a particular 
meaning of discourse cannot be located in a single text. Instead, evaluating more than 
one text is necessary to analyse the transformation of discourse over time, so as to 
achieve an understanding the broader strategies behind such use or changes in the level 
of text production. In this argument, Fairclough pointed out the necessity of investigating 
the historical dimension of discourse or in other words the development of discourse over 
time. This historical analytical dimension was provided by Wodak, a CDA scholar, in her 
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model of Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) to CDA. Thus, in relation to the CDA 
approach, this thesis will employ the methodological tools of DHA within a broader 
theoretical framework of CDA, introducing elements of both DHA and CDA. In general 
terms, DHA offers an empirical model for analysing the discursive construction of 
particular discursive phenomenon through analysing the linguistic features in texts and 
providing ways to explain how discursive phenomena are nominated, assigned and 
justified. A detailed review of DHA is presented in the following sub-section.  
3.4.2.1 Discourse-Historical Approach  
DHA was developed at the University of Vienna by Ruth Wodak and colleagues 
as a component of their interdisciplinary study into the construction of ‘post war 
antisemitism’ in Austria (Wodak et al 1990). It is an interdisciplinary approach combining 
linguistic analysis with historical and sociological approaches. Similar to the main 
approach of CDA, DHA views discourses as context-dependant semiotic practices, 
including language, which are sites of social struggle for power (Reisigl and Wodak 
2009:89). In its analysis of discourse, DHA integrates the historical and social 
dimensions to the linguistic analysis, in order to analyse critically the change in discourse 
over time, taking into account socio-political and historical contexts.  
Following CDA, DHA accounted for the relation between discourse or language 
and ideology. It views ideology as a “one-sided perspective or world view composed of 
mental representations, convictions, opinions, attitudes and evaluation, which is shared 
by members of a specific social group” (Reisigl and Wodak 2009). Ideology functions as 
a means of establishing and maintaining uneven power relations (hegemony) through 
discourse. Thus, discourse serves as means of producing and reproducing ideology in 
various social institutions. In other words, discourse or language use is a means by which 
people in power can obtain and maintain power relations. Thus, in order to unfold these 
ideological power relations, DHA focuses on analysing the discursive linguistic practices 
situated within this struggle for power. In particular, it provides a methodological model 
for analysing discursive linguistic features that are used when expressing and 
constructing social power.  
To analyse discourse, DHA follows a triangulation approach and thus it is 
interdisciplinary (Reisigl and Wodak 2009). This includes looking at data from various 
analytical perspectives and considering various methods, theories and background 
information relating to the topic under study. The DHA triangulatory approach is 
grounded on the concept of ‘context’, which consists of four levels that can be analysed 
recursively (Reisigl and Wodak 2009, p.93). These four dimensions of context include: 
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(a) the immediate, language or text-internal co-text; (b) the intertextual and 
interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourse; (c) the 
extra-linguistic social variables and institutional frames of a specific context of situation; 
and (d) the broader socio-political and historical context, which discursive practices are 
embedded in and related to. The analysis of these four levels of context serve the 
function of unfolding the contextual meanings embedded in a particular discourse and 
related texts.  
In the analysis of the context, DHA pays special attention to the relationships of 
intertextuality, interdiscursivity and recontextualisation as a means of exploring how 
discourse and texts change in relation to socio-political change (Reisigl and Wodak 
2009). Intertextuality signifies that texts are connected to other texts in the past and the 
present. These connections between texts are constructed in various ways: through 
explicit or implicit reference to a topic or a social actor, and by making references to the 
same events or through transferring key arguments from one text to another. 
Recontextualisation, on the other hand, concerns transferring particular elements of 
discourse to new contexts. Within this process, a particular element partly obtains a new 
meaning, since it is transferred to another context of meaning. The third process of 
interdiscursivity relates to how discourses are linked to each other. This can be realised 
through the integration of topics or sub-topics of other discourses to a particular 
discourse, which is due to the openness and hybrid nature of discourses (Reisigl and 
Wodak 2009). These three processes would be of particular assistance in tracing and 
understanding how particular elements of discourse are constructed and transform as 
they are intertextualised, recontextualised and interdiscursive. 
Moreover, within the recursive contextual analysis of discourse, DHA offers an 
operationalised method for analysing discourse through analysing the context-
dependent linguistic features in texts. In particular, DHA identifies several discursive 
strategies that can be realised through textual analysis (Reisigl and Wodak 2009). These 
strategies indicate the practices that are adopted for particular social or political 
purposes. Some of these strategies include referential strategies, predicational 
strategies and argumentation strategies. These discursive strategies present the 
arguments of a particular group or social phenomena, which are either constructed 
positively or negatively. They can be realised when asking questions such as: (a) How 
are persons, objects, phenomena, processes and actions named and referred to 
linguistically?; (b) What characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to social 
actors, objects, phenomena, events and processes?, and (c) what arguments are 
employed in the discourse in question?. To clarify how these strategies can be analysed 
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in texts, Reisigl and Wodak (2001) undertook a detailed methodological account of the 
procedure in which these discursive strategies can be examined in their studies of the 
discourses of racism and nationalism. For example, a nomination strategy which is used 
for representing social groups is constructed in the text using lexical devices such as 
tropes, metaphors, metonymies or synecdoches. Predicational strategy, on the other 
hand, is closely related to referential strategy in which it represents how constructed 
social groups and phenomena are linguistically provided with predications. In particular, 
it can be realised as “evaluative attributions of negative and positive traits in the linguistic 
form of implicit or explicit predicates” (Reisigl and Wodak 2001:45).  
The third discursive strategy, which is argumentation strategy, considers how 
positive and negative attributions are justified, as in, for example, when justifying the 
socio-political inclusion or exclusion of particular group. It comprises premises which are 
content-related warrants that connect arguments with the concluding claim in the text. 
According to Reisigl and Wodak (2001:55) the identification of these three strategies is 
interrelated, in which e.g. the first two strategies, referential and predicational, are often 
employed as premises within the argumentation strategy. Thus, argumentation 
strategies could be considered of great importance when analysing discursive practices 
in texts especially, in that they constitute coherent discursively connected arguments by 
which the evaluative attributions toward social groups and phenomena are constructed 
and justified. Overall, the textual analysis of these strategies, along with the analysis of 
the other layers of context would be expected to reveal the ideological constructions of 
social identities and phenomena in discourse that are embedded in socio-political and 
historical contexts.  
A clear application of these notions of DHA was conducted by Richardson and 
Wodak (2009) in their study of the recontextualisation of fascism in the discourse of 
employment in the UK and Austria. In this study, they traced the historical development 
of the concepts used in the extreme right-wing discourses regarding issues of 
un/employment. Drawing upon Discourse-Historical methods regarding the levels of 
context and discursive strategies, Richardson and Wodak (2009) argued that slogans 
such as ‘British Jobs for British workers’ and ‘Austria First’ were recontextualised into 
contemporary political rhetoric, while carrying historical context-dependent meanings, 
derived from pre-World War II fascism and antisemitism ideologies. For example, when 
tracing the history of the ideologically loaded slogan ‘British Jobs for British workers’, the 
analysis of texts produced by the national party BNP revealed the slogan is associated 
with meaning that jobs are only for white people and that Britain is threatened by alien 
immigrants, suggesting the British people are a white race and immigrants are aliens. In 
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light of the historical context, the authors argue that these contemporary meanings of the 
slogan are a recontextualisation of anti-Semitism as practiced by British fascists against 
Jewish immigrants, who were described as aliens in the slogan ‘Britain for the British’ 
pre-World War II. In the case of Austria, the slogan ‘Austria first’ was used by the right-
wing German party DVU to refer to the ‘real Austrian’ as white and Christian arguing with 
a fallacy that Austria is not a country for immigrants. According to Richardson and Wodak 
(2009), this slogan allowed a recontextualisation of antisemitism national-socialism and 
Austro-fascism after World War I, which considered Jews as a danger and a threat to 
Austria. This notion of tracing the historical development of textual expressions is similar 
to the main scope of this thesis. Thus, DHA will prove useful for analysing the discursive 
construction of ideological expressions; considering how they are nominated, referred to 
and argued within socio-political and historical contexts. However, this extended work is 
going to be studied in light of more than one approach; both theoretical and 
methodological.  
3.5 The integration of CL, DT and CDA 
At the theoretical level, this thesis is grounded on the theories of DT, CDA and 
the DHA to CDA. In relation to the scope of this thesis, DT represents an appropriate 
foundation to ground this research on. This is because it provides a theory of the process 
by which discourse is generated through antagonism. In particular, it explains the 
procedure by which concepts such as the empty signifier are articulated and contested 
by antagonistic forces in the struggle to attain hegemony. This particular situation is 
closely related to the case of this thesis, as it attempts to investigate how alibrāliyah as 
a contested signifier is represented by opposing sectors of society, conservatives and 
progressives, as imposed by progressives in the project to gain hegemony in Saudi 
society. However, as DT did not present methodological guidelines to explain how 
discourse can be examined, CDA and its approach DHA are suitable tools for analysing 
discourse; especially as they are textually-oriented approaches.  
Theoretically, CDA and DHA consider discourse or language as the principal site 
of the social struggle for power. It is within this notion that CDA is similar to DT, as they 
both consider discourse as a means to achieve hegemony. Additionally, they both agree 
that discourse as a system of meanings is unfixed, and only becomes fixed when the 
ideological struggle for power ends and one gains hegemony. However, DT and CDA 
disagree regarding the ontology upon which discourse is generated and articulated. For 
instance, DT’s main view of the articulation of discourse, or in other words the emergence 
and maintenance of power, is predicated on the conception of the contingency of 
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meaning, in which contingent elements enter discourse and become partially fixed due 
to the openness of the social world. Unlike DT views on discourse as constituted by an 
unconditional contingent element, the CDA ontological view of discourse is based on the 
impression that discourse constitutes and is constituted by society (Fairclough and 
Wodak 1997). According to this notion, CDA criticizes DT’s ontological view of discourse, 
in which Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999:121-126) discussed the DT problem of 
insistence on the unconditional openness of the social and the contingency of discourse. 
They argue that this view implies the problem of distinguishing between what is 
discursive and what is non-discursive, especially as DT rejects this distinction by 
considering all articulatory practices to be discursive. This notion of the contingency of 
meaning would make it difficult to explain how articulated discourse relates to context. 
For example, it would be hard to explain what “social forces have greater capacity to 
effect articulatory changes and why” (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999:125). However, 
despite this limitation, DT is still useful at the theoretical level, as it offers a number of 
concepts to explain the processes in which social forces are struggling to achieve 
hegemony. In this respect, Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) refer to the viability of DT, 
stating that:  
Laclau and Mouffe provide valuable resources for theorising and analysing 
the openness and complexity of late modern social life - they capture the 
instability and flux of social practices and identities, and the pervasive 
dissolution and redrawing of boundaries, which characterise late modernity.... 
We regard Laclau and Mouffe as providing valuable conceptual resources for 
the analysis of change in discourse - in particular their conceptualisation of 
‘articulation’ and ‘equivalence/difference’. (124).  
This statement implies use of theoretical DT concepts of ‘articulation’ and 
‘equivalence/difference’ with CDA, to analyse articulation and change in discourse. Thus, 
to avoid the theoretical ontological limitations of DT concepts and due to its similarity to 
CDA, it can be integrated with CDA to resolve the issue of distinguishing between what 
is discursive and what is not discursive. Since this thesis concerns processes in which 
the alibrāliyah signifier is articulated and contested in the chain of difference among 
antagonistic forces, and DT concepts of hegemony, the logics of equivalence and 
difference and empty signifiers continue to be important. However, to operationalise 
these concepts and relate them to the historical and socio-political contexts in which they 
are constituted, CDA theory concerning the distinction between what is discursive and 
non-discursive remains necessary. This examination of context can be achieved through 
the employment of DHA theoretical conceptions of the layers of contexts discussed 
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earlier. These concepts explain the process by which the articulation and rearticulation 
of discourse in different texts and discourses can be examined relative to historical and 
socio-political contexts.  
In light of the theoretical concepts of DT and CDA, this study uses empirical 
methods to assist in analysing textually and discursively the construction and articulation 
of a particular signifier, alibrāliyah, as contested in the chain of difference. In particular, 
the empirical analysis of this study is based on Corpus Linguistic approaches (CL) and 
the methodological model of DHA. Within CL analysis, the Sinclair model will be 
employed, which includes relations of collocation and semantic preferences. The 
employment of this textual-based analysis model will be useful as a means of analysing 
the salient linguistic features in the text which would assist with delivering a general idea 
about the meaning of the keyword alibrāliyah within the immediate co-text in which it 
occurs. In particular, CL would make it possible to examine quantitatively the collocation 
and the semantic preferences of these collocates along with their usage over time, which 
will give a general insight into the main discourses associated with alibrāliyah in the large 
data set. This macro quantitative analysis will also help in the objective selection of texts 
for the micro discursive analysis. The analysis of micro discursive construction of the 
keyword alibrāliyah and its embedded meanings within the historical and socio-political 
contexts will follow the DHA method of discursive strategies to analyse the texts as 
whole. In particular, the discursive strategies of nomination, predication and 
argumentation should allow the researcher for analysing how alibrāliyah and the social 
actors in texts are discursively nominated, attributed to and legitimised. The application 
of argumentation strategy will be of importance as it makes it possible to examine the 
discursive practices and rhetoric employed in texts when discussing the alibrāliyah 
concept, which would allow for analysing critically how alibrāliyah is contested in different 
texts, and intertextualised and as a result of the shifts of meaning and the changes of 
discourse within the socio-political context.  
This methodological combination of CL and DHA methods was suggested in a 
study conducted at Lancaster University by Baker, Wodak and colleagues (2008) who 
studied how the discourse of refugees can be examined by combining Corpus Linguistics 
with critical discourse approaches specifically DHA. In combining the two approaches, 
they discuss the strengths and limitations of each approach, and how those strengths 
can be exploited while eliminating weaknesses. For instance, they argue that CL is a 
useful approach for a quantitative descriptive analysis of a large number of texts, which 
can give a degree of generality and confidence about the study findings. However, while 
CL concerns the descriptive dimension of the text, it is not sufficient to explain why 
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particular lexical patterns were found, as it does not take into consideration the social, 
political and historical contexts. Thus, to examine the context in which these lexical 
patterns are constructed closely, the study found that the DHA approach to CDA in 
particular is helpful, as it analyses the discursive strategies centred on the use of these 
patterns. In particular, DHA strength represented how “It builds on a network of 
referential, predicational and argumentative strategies along with analysis of metaphors, 
presuppositions, mitigation and hyperboles, etc. in deconstructing a text, all of which 
require a close analysis of context” (Baker et al. 2008:295). However, DHA has been 
criticised for its analysis of a small number of texts, which represents a problem in terms 
of the representativeness of results to the wider social context. Thus, the combination of 
CL and DHA can benefit both approaches and assist in conducting a descriptive textual-
based analysis of a large representative number of data, while contextualising these 
results on the basis of the context-based analysis of DHA. 
Thus, since the combination of the discussed approaches can be used to 
evaluate the textual and the discursive construction of particular social phenomenon, 
these approaches will be employed to answer the main research questions that follow: 
• How is ‘alibrāliyah’ articulated as an empty signifier by different groups in order to 
gain or maintain hegemony in the Saudi socio-political field? 
This question will be answered by asking the following sub-questions:  
1) What are the fields of discourse associated with the discourse of alibrāliyah and 
do they change over time? 
 2) What are the semantic preferences around the term alibrāliyah and do they 
change over time?  
3) What discursive strategies are used to construct alibrāliyah and to legitimise the 
different views towards it? 
4) What are the mechanisms through which the strategic discursive constructions 
of alibrāliyah shift over time?  
To answer these questions a detailed methodological elaboration including the 
choice of the data of the research will be discussed in the next chapter.  
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4 Chapter 4: Methodology; The corpus and 
the methods for analysis 
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4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the different approaches to examining the 
meaning of contested keywords, concluding with a proposed methodological framework. 
This chapter will now elaborate on this framework by presenting the data and the 
methods of analysis. The chapter will begin by discussing the criteria for the selection of 
the data and the compilation of the corpus. In the second part of the chapter, the methods 
of analysis are discussed; these are a combination of macro approaches that use corpus 
linguistics methods (Sinclair 1991) and micro approaches that use historical-discourse 
approaches (Reisigl and Wodak 2001). I discuss in detail the methods that have been 
employed for the data analysis and provide examples from data that illustrate the 
application of these methods. 
4.2 Data 
4.2.1 The data sources  
The most prominent platform for engaging in and reporting on socio-political 
debates in Saudi Arabia is the press. This is true of the debate over alibrāliyah, which is 
the topic of this thesis, as Alkhedr states that the contestation of alibrāliyah in Saudi 
society has been reported widely in the press and that different authors, either 
proponents or opponents, hold a range of attitudes towards it (Alkhedr 2012:640). 
Therefore, it was decided to investigate the contestation of alibrāliyah in the Saudi 
newspapers by examining the different discourses surrounding it and the mechanisms 
by which its discursive construction is changing.  
Four newspapers were selected as the source of data for this study, namely 
Alriyadh, Aljazirah, Okaz and Alyaum. These newspapers are amongst the leading Saudi 
daily newspapers (BBC 2006; Rugh 2004:59). They are privately-owned newspapers but 
must be licenced by the Ministry of Culture and Information in order to operate. These 
newspapers were chosen for several reasons, including the accessibility of the archive, 
the region of publication, their general orientations, and their readership. 
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Table 4-1: Information about the selected newspapers. 
These newspapers were originally published in broadsheet format and have 
recently started to be published online. The fact that these publications are available 
online makes it easier to access and search for articles, especially if the website provides 
an archive search feature. These archives provided by each newspaper allow for 
advanced searching and make it possible to search by the issue of the newspaper, the 
type of article, or using specific query terms. It is also possible to search for articles 
published within a defined period of time. Other leading newspapers, such as Alwatan 
and Almadinah, do not provide an accessible online archive of the issues of the 
newspaper. From a logistical perspective, it would not be feasible to obtain digital articles 
for a period of ten years from these newspapers, and this is one of the reasons why they 
have been excluded from this study.  
In addition, the selected four newspapers are published across various regions 
in Saudi Arabia. Alriyadh and Aljazirah, for instance, are published in the capital city, 
Riyadh, which is located in the central region of the country. Okaz is published in Jeddah, 
which is in the western region. Alyaum, on the other hand, is published in the eastern 
region of the country, in Dammam city. This coverage of different regions would reflect 
and represent the discussion of this study subject, alibrāliyah, across the country.  
The selected newspapers differ in their orientations and in the content that they 
publish. For example, Alriyadh and Aljazirah, which are produced in the capital city of 
Saudi Arabia, tend to cover reports related to the public sector (Alkarni 2006:36). 
However, these newspapers differ in their orientations when covering socio-political 
issues: Alriyadh is generally considered to be a progressive newspaper (Alkhedr 2012), 
while Aljazirah is more conservative (Rugh 2004:66). In addition, Okaz and Alyaum are 
similar in their tendency to cover regional news (Rugh 2004). However, Okaz is 
considered to be outspoken and provocative, whereas Alyaum tends to be conservative 
when dealing with socio-political issues (Rugh 2004:67; Baytalmal and Altayash 2003). 









Alriyadh4 Riyadh 1965 
Al-Yamama 
Corporation 
Aljazirah5 Riyadh 1960 AlJazirah Corporation 
Okaz6 Jeddah 1958 
Okaz Corporation for 
Press and Publication 
Alyaum7 Dammam 1965 Dar Al-Youm 
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Despite the differences in the orientations of these newspapers, the focus of this study 
will be on the way alibrāliyah is contested across these newspapers, as Saudi national 
newspapers, without comparing the way in which they discuss the issue. 
The newspapers included in this study all have a high rate of readership in Saudi 
Arabia. According to Baytalmal and Altayash (2003) Alriyadh, Aljazirah, Okaz and Ayaum 
have particularly high rates of readership in the regions in which they are published. 
Thus, Alriyadh and Aljazirah are highly read in Riyadh, Okaz in Makkah province, and 
Alyaum in the eastern province. The most recent circulation report, which was carried 
out in 2003 (Rugh 2004:61) revealed that these are the four most circulated newspapers. 
Alriyadh has the highest readership rate, with an average circulation of 170,000, followed 
by Okaz (147,000), Aljazirah (80,000) and Alyaum (80,000). 
 These newspapers all deal with local issues, especially socio-political issues. 
According to Alkhedr (2012), they reinforce the social role of the press in shaping the 
public’s attitude. Initially, these issues were primarily related to the public sector, such 
as the issues of education, health, and employment. Government censorship of the 
content of publications (Alkhedr 2012) meant that these issues were discussed with 
reservations. The government, represented by the Ministry of Information had the right 
to close a newspaper if it published something that contravened the print law, which 
states that ‘the government has no right to interfere with any newspaper except for the 
sake of general welfare’ (Rugh 2004:71). This included the ability to criticise government 
services, but without accusing or criticising the top leadership. This criticism must not 
extent to criticising Islam, and the published content must not contradict Islamic beliefs 
and rituals (Rugh 2004:66; Alahmad 2012:413). However, this direct censorship by the 
government was lifted in 2002 and the restrictions of the publications law were 
minimised, thereby giving the press more freedom (Rugh 2004:67; Alahmad 2012:434). 
This given freedom is based on the non-immediate censorship on the published content. 
Newspaper publishers are expected to carry out self-monitoring of their publications, but 
any reported content that contradicts the set law will still be investigated by the Ministry 
of Culture and Information (Alahmad 2012). This minimisation of censorship enabled 
newspapers to discuss socio-political issues affecting Saudi society more freely 
(Alshalhob 2006; Alkarni 2010). Thus, newspaper articles started to be able to criticise 
systems, such as the religious system, and to discuss controversial issues, such as 
reform and modernisation (Alkarni 2010).  
This discussion of socio-political issues is particularly prevalent in the column 
articles of these newspapers (Alshalhob 2006; Alkarni 2010; Alkhedr 2012). Column 
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articles in Saudi newspapers tend to discuss the issues that reflect the concerns that 
give rise to major discussion in Saudi society (Alkhedr 2012; Alshalhob 2006). Thus, they 
have been selected as the type of articles that will be used for the purpose of the analysis; 
other newspaper content, such as news reports and editorials, will be excluded. Although 
editorials reflect the newspaper’s attitudes towards a particular issue, they were excluded 
for the reason that no articles discussing alibrāliyah were identified. Having discussed 
the selection criteria for data sources, the methodology for compiling and analysing these 
newspaper articles will be discussed in the following sections.  
4.2.2 The corpus 
To examine the construct of alibrāliyah, a specialised corpus has been 
specifically compiled for the purpose of this study. This corpus consists of column articles 
in the four Saudi newspapers mentioned above that discuss alibrāliyah. The data were 
retrieved from the archives of these newspapers by searching using the lemma ‘liberali’ 
(liberal) and saving all the articles in which alibrāliyah was a major topic of discussion. 
As this research aims to provide a focused analysis of the way in which alibrāliyah is 
discussed and contested, and also because a large number of articles containing the 
lemma ‘liberali’ were found, it was decided to include only the articles in which alibrāliyah 
was the major topic of discussion, or one of the major topics. Thus, articles in which the 
word was only mentioned in passing were excluded. Since this study aims to identify the 
changes in the construal of alibrāliyah, it was decided to diachronically collect articles 
that were published during a period of 10 years, from late 2007, when alibrāliyah started 
to be contested in the Saudi context, until late 2016, when the collection of data ended.  
Although corpus linguists normally tend to favour collecting a large corpus for 
reasons of representativeness (see Sinclair 1991, Stubbs 2001, McEnery and 
Gabrielatos 2006), Ooi (2001: 178) argues that there is no optimal size for a corpus, as 
this depends on the aims of the study. Ooi has also pointed to the fact that a corpus does 
not necessarily have to be large, “since there are some genres of texts restricted in scope 
and time” (2001: 178). This corresponds to Mautner’s (2005: 815) argument that some 
studies, such as corpus-assisted critical discourse studies, do not require a large quantity 
of data. This is particularly the case in studies that focus on analysing special type of 
texts, e.g. those concerning a particular authorship, time of publication, as well as 
cultural, or national origin. According to Baker et al. (2008), CDA studies that use corpus 
analysis usually use small, specialised corpora and focus on examining the contextual 
features through the analysis of collocations and concordances. Examples are 
Partington and Morley’s (2002) 500,000-word corpus of newspaper editorials on political 
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matters, Partington’s (2003) 250,000-word corpus on the White House press briefings, 
and O'Halloran’s (2009) 26,000-word corpus of quasi-campaign texts from The Sun. The 
data size of the above-mentioned studies is similar to that of the current thesis, as the 
total number of articles for this thesis is 575 (505,122 words). Although this represents a 
relatively small corpus, it is sufficient for the purpose of this study. Therefore, my 
specialised small corpus, which consists of all the texts in which alibrāliyah forms a 
significant part of the discussion, is adequate for the purpose of the current study, since 
it is intended to be used within the CDA qualitative framework in order to examine the 
salient features of the discourse of alibrāliyah.  
The corpus was manually collected and annotated for time. Since this is a 
specialised corpus for a qualitative study, it required a manual search and selection for 
the type of articles relevant to the scope of this study. As stated earlier, the corpus 
consists only of the articles in which alibrāliyah is discussed in the Saudi context. Thus, 
articles in which alibrāliyah was mentioned in reference to other nations (such as the 
Liberal party in the UK or Japan), were excluded. To retrieve the articles included in the 
corpus, the online archives of each newspaper were accessed and searched using the 
lemma ‘librali’, and the web search feature provided by each newspaper’s website was 
used to retrieve all the results in which alibrāliyah and its derivations were mentioned. 
Each article that appeared in the results was viewed and skim read in order to determine 
its relevance, before being copied and pasted into a txt file. Each file then was annotated 
for time (quarter of a year), saved into a UTF-8 format, and named according to the 
source and date of publication (e.g. R01Jan16, which stands for Al-Riyadh 1st of January 
2016). This manual process was quite time-consuming but it was a feasible method of 
compiling a small specialised corpus and, given that there are no available tools that can 
perform this complicated process, it was necessary in order to be able to compile a 
specialised corpus.  
The corpus then underwent the processes of lemmatisation and part-of-speech 
(POS) tagging. These processes were automated using the Madamira tool, which is a 
morphological analyser tool for Arabic data (Pasha et al. 2014). Owing to the high 
complexity of the Arabic language in terms of its richly inflectional and cliticizational 
morphological system, Madamira was designed as a tool for the morphological 
disambiguation, lemmatisation and part-of -peech tagging of Modern Standard Arabic 
(MSA), the formal language that is used in the news and in the press. It is necessary to 
subject the data of the current study to Madamira processing in order to enable the 
researcher for searching with the lemma or by a particular part of speech, and also for 
obtaining highly accurate, lemmatised, POS tagged, or morphologically disambiguated 
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results when conducting the corpus analysis for collocates or concordances. Pasha et 
al. (2014) indicate that this tool performs highly accurate tagging in terms of the 
percentage of words that are correctly tagged, with 96% accuracy in lemmatisation, 95% 
in POS tagging, and 84% in morphological disambiguation. The 505,122-word corpus 
was processed using Madamira, thereby producing an output of tagged words. This 
output was then converted into a format specified by the corpus query tool SketchEngine 
and was then used as the input for the next process, namely the upload into 
SketchEngine.  
To conduct the corpus analysis, the tagged corpus was uploaded into 
SketchEngine8, a powerful corpus query tool developed by Kilgarriff et al. (2004). 
SketchEngine was specifically selected for use in the present study because it offers a 
number of distinct features that meet the needs of this study. The primary reason for 
choosing SketchEngine was that, unlike other corpus query tools, SketchEngine fully 
supports the analysis of Arabic written data. Alfaifi and Atwell (2015), in their study on 
the evaluation of Arabic corpora analysis tools, revealed that SketchEngine is one of the 
best tools that support the Arabic language. This result is based on an evaluation of six 
corpus query tools (Antconc, WordSmith, SketchEngine, IntelliText, Khawas and 
aConCord) on the basis of eight criteria (reading Arabic UTF-8 andUTF-16 files, 
displaying Arabic diacritics, Arabic text in R-to-L direction, normalising diacritics and 
Hamza, and providing an Arabic interface and Arabic personal corpus). The study 
concluded that the tools SketchEngine and Khawas satisfied most of the criteria, with a 
result of 7/8. However, although this study based its evaluation on the support of the 
Arabic language, it did not further indicate the other features that distinguished each of 
the tools from the other. Although Khawas was equal to SketchEngine in terms of the 
efficiency of supporting Arabic, Khawas (Al-Thubaity et al. 2014, 2015) was not found to 
be as efficient as SketchEngine in relation to the corpus analysis features. Khawas is a 
basic tool, run by Java, which is limited in functions and includes the simple functions of 
collocation and concordance analysis (Al-Thubaity et al. 2014). The support of the Arabic 
language, in addition to the various other advanced features, made SketchEngine the 
primary choice of tool for the present study.  
Another special feature in SketchEngine is the ‘trend analysis’ function. The 
present study made particular use of this feature for the diachronic analysis of the corpus. 
As SketchEngine is constantly undergoing development, the trend analysis feature was 
added quite recently, and was developed by Kilgarriff et al. (2015). Trends analysis is 
                                               
8 https://www.sketchengine.co.uk/ 
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“an implemented system for corpus-based diachronic analysis” which is designed to 
make it possible to examine language change (Kilgarriff et al. 2015). This feature 
functions automatically by calculating the frequency of each word in each time period. It 
then normalises the frequency per million words before measuring the trending of the 
word over time using linear regression or Theil-Sen gradient estimation statistical tests 
and providing graphs that show the trend line for the trending frequent lexical items.  
 The analysis in the present study made use of the trend feature alongside the 
primary features of collocation analysis that can be approached and viewed in various 
ways, such as date of publication, the source, the node form, and many other means. 
4.3 Methods of analysis 
4.3.1 Corpus linguistics methods 
Before discussing the procedure for analysing the data using corpus linguistics 
methods, the types of corpus linguistics approaches and the differences between them 
are illustrated. These approaches can be divided into corpus-driven, corpus-based, and 
corpus-assisted approaches. For the current study, a corpus-assisted approach has 
been adopted. The distinction between these approaches is a subject of debate in the 
field of corpus linguistics, especially in terms of the relationship between theory and data 
in corpus linguistics research (McEnery and Gabrielatos 2006). McEnery and 
Gabrielatos (2006) have specifically illustrated the difference between corpus-based and 
corpus-driven approaches, which are the approaches that have been used most 
frequently by corpus linguists and which have most frequently been debated. Studies 
that adopt a corpus-based approach use the corpus to test theories that were formulated 
before the corpus was constructed or used to inform the study. On the other hand, 
research that follows a corpus-driven approach uses the corpus data to identify evidence 
of language use independent of pre-existing theoretical frameworks, with the aim of 
developing an empirical theory. Although these represent two opposing approaches with 
regard to whether or not they should depend on theory, their applications do, however, 
usually tend to fall between two end-points of a continuum, rather than the pure version 
of one of these approaches being used. McEnery and Gabrielatos add that it is 
impossible to use a theoretical approach in language research, such as the use of the 
pure form of corpus-driven approach, as linguists usually approach data with 
assumptions and intuitions (2006:313).  
The third most common approach in corpus linguistics research is the corpus-
assisted approach, which is a relatively new field of research that considers corpus 
linguistics as an empirical quantitative method that can be used to support the qualitative 
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analysis of language use (Baker et al. 2013). It is often used in the context of what 
Partington (2004; 2008) calls corpus-assisted discourse studies (CADS), which generally 
aim to examine the features of discourse by integrating corpus linguistic analysis 
methods. Earlier pioneering research in this field includes that of Hardt-Mautner (1995) 
and Stubbs (1996). Other studies that adopt this approach include Baker (2004; 2010), 
Orpin (2005), Baker et al. (2008), Jaworska and Krishnamurthy (2012), and Baker et al. 
(2013). Partington also coined the term Modern Diachronic Corpus-Assisted Discourse 
Studies (MD-CADS), which is a sub-discipline of this field and is concerned with “the 
study of changes in linguistic habits or in social, political and cultural perspectives over 
a brief period of contemporary time, as illustrated in a particular discourse type or set of 
discourse types” (2010: 104). The present study falls under the broad umbrella of the 
MD-CADS approach as it examines the usage of alibrāliyah over a short period of 
contemporary time (2007-2016) and also uses a corpus-assisted approach to assist the 
qualitive analysis of the diachronic and discursive usage of alibrāliyah. However, this 
study does not follow the same methodological design that Partington often uses in his 
MD-CADS studies (2010; 2012). For example, Partington’s framework for examining 
changes in language is based on identifying the keywords by comparing two corpora that 
represent distinct periods of time, rather than, for instance, examining the trends of 
frequent keywords over time. Furthermore, he analyses the decontextualized 
concordance lines to uncover the features of discourse, or what he calls the ‘non-obvious 
meaning’, without examining the discourse critically through the analysis of full texts. 
Thus, this corpus-assisted discourse study follows a special set of methods designed to 
provide information about the salient and the hidden features of the discourse of 
alibrāliyah over time, on the basis of a large number of specialised corpus texts. These 
methods include the analysis of the trends of the keywords list, the collocations, and a 
qualitative analysis of a sample of full texts. These methods are illustrated in detail in the 
following sections. 
4.3.1.1 Frequency of usage of alibrāliyah over time 
In order to gain a general understanding of the usage of alibrāliyah both 
diachronically and across the corpus, an initial analysis of the frequency of its usage was 
conducted. This had the specific purpose of revealing whether there are any peaks or 
troughs in the discussion of alibrāliyah between 2007 and 2016. This analysis was 
carried out in two steps. Firstly, since all of the articles collected for the corpus are mainly 
on the subject of alibrāliyah, a diachronic analysis of the frequency of these articles 
across the newspapers was carried out. Secondly, an analysis of the frequency of the 
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lemma of the term alibrāliyah, i.e. ‘librāli’ was performed, both across the corpus and 
over time.  
4.3.1.2 Wordlist analysis 
The analysis of the wordlist was carried out in order to obtain information about 
the key discourses associated with the discourse of alibrāliyah. It aims specifically to 
analyse the usage of these keywords over time, in order to discover whether there have 
been any changes in the discourses associated with alibrāliyah. This analysis is based 
on the procedure of extracting the 100 statistically most frequent keywords in the corpus 
and then grouping the words that have similar meaning preferences. The wordlist can be 
automatically extracted and displayed in frequency order using the software tool 
SketchEngine. However, because the software extracts the most frequent words, 
regardless of their form, the focus in the analysis is only on the lexical words, meaning 
that grammatical words are excluded from the analysis. This procedure of analysing the 
lexical words is often adopted by corpus-assisted discourse studies (see Baker 2004; 
Baker et al. 2008; Partington 2012; Jeffries and Walker 2012). Hunston (2002:68) has 
also emphasised the fact that the analysis of the lexical keywords as a starting point 
helps in identifying the key topics in a specialised corpus.  
After the lexical words had been extracted, the items with similar meanings were 
manually grouped together in order to uncover the discourses most frequently associated 
with the discourse of alibrāliyah. This procedure follows Sinclair’s (1991) approach of 
semantic preference, which is often used by corpus linguists to identify the key themes 
in the corpus (see section 3.3). The identification of thematic groups follows an abductive 
approach, as it looks at the extracted keywords and categorises them into themes coined 
in relation to this study. By adopting this approach, the study is eliminating predefined 
approaches that would not provide accurate identification of the discourses related to the 
study.  
The analysis of the meaning preference was followed by an analysis of the usage 
of these keywords over time. The aim of this was to discover whether there have been 
any changes in the discourses associated with alibrāliyah. This was conducted using the 
automatic trends analysis feature provided by SketchEngine, which measures the 
relative frequency of each keyword per quarter-year. In this way, we can see whether or 
not there have been any changes in the usage of a keyword and if there has been any 
increase or decrease in usage over time.  
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4.3.1.3 Collocation Analysis  
In order to identify diachronically the meanings closely associated with the term 
alibrāliyah, the analysis of the collocation was conducted around the node ‘alibrāliyah’. 
This was carried out using SketchEngine, which is able to calculate the collocations of a 
node word. The procedure followed in this research was divided into two main processes; 
firstly, the associated semantic preferences were analysed and, secondly, the diachronic 
usage of the top collocates of the top semantic preferences was analysed. The analysis 
of the semantic preferences was carried out by searching the corpus using the lemma 
‘librāli’ and then calculating the collocations surrounding this node word within a 5-word 
span either side of the node. This calculation displayed the collocates in order of their 
co-occurrence frequency. From this, the top 50 lexical collocates were selected for the 
analysis and then categorised manually into thematic groups, following an abductive 
approach. This model of analysis has been found to be useful in identifying the different 
meaning preferences of a word, particularly when grouping the collocates according to 
their similarities in meaning features (Sinclair 1991; Stubbs 2001; Hunston 2002:76; 
Baker et al. 2008). This analysis was followed by an analysis of the diachronic usage of 
the top collocates of top themes. The purpose of this was to identify whether, over time, 
there has been any shift in their usage in association with alibrāliyah. In doing so, the 
frequency of these top collocates over time was first examined, and their collocates were 
then looked at in order to identify the salient topics associated with these two collocates 
in association to alibrāliyah. This analysis of the top collocates was also carried out for 
an essential purpose, namely to narrow down the corpus for the qualitative analysis, as 
is illustrated in the following section.  
4.3.1.4 Narrowing down the corpus for the qualitative analysis  
Following the macro corpus analysis of the texts, this research intended to carry 
out a detailed qualitative analysis of the discursive construction of alibrāliyah in a sample 
of whole texts. The selection of the sample was aided by the corpus analysis of the texts. 
In this regard, a number of decisions and steps were followed in order to reduce the 
corpus of 575 texts to a more manageable sample. The procedure was based on a 
systematic selection of a sample of 12 articles based on a) the key themes informed by 
the collocation analysis and b) the factor of time. For the first criterion, it was decided 
that the chosen texts should contain frequent occurrences of the two most frequent key 
themes, and that six articles would be selected for each key theme. This selection on the 
basis of themes takes also into consideration the aspect of time, as the selected articles 
should be representative of the whole period (2007-2016).  
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To exemplify this procedure, the selection of the sample follows the following 
steps. Firstly, a collocation analysis of words surrounding alibrāliyah should be 
conducted to identify the associated key meanings (see section 4.3.1.3). Then, the top 
two key discourses in terms of frequency are selected as the basis of selection, in which 
the most frequent word ‘collocate’ in each discourse is used to select the articles. In other 
words, these top collocates of each key discourse will be used as the basis for selecting 
the articles in which they co-occur with alibrāliyah more frequently. Given that time is an 
important factor, this selection of the articles that contain the most frequent collocates 
will also be based on time. As the selection process intended to choose six articles for 
each key theme, these six articles will have been published in six different years. One 
article will be chosen for every second year during the relevant time period, including the 
first and last years of that period. In other words, articles will be selected from the years 
2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, and 2016 in order to trace the diachronic change of the 
discourse and to look at the mechanism of the construction of the meaning of alibrāliyah 
over time. This procedure is relatively straightforward, as SketchEngine allows for 
viewing of the co-occurrence frequency of collocates for each article. In this tool, the 
articles are ordered by time and labelled by source and date. Once the sub-corpus had 
been selected according to these criteria, it was subjected to a detailed qualitative 
analysis that both allowed for a richer understanding of alibrāliyah and its collocates as 
they are used in real time, and also enabled an analysis of the different discourse 
strategies used to validate different construals of alibrāliyah in individual texts and across 
time.  
4.3.2 Critical discourse analysis: Discourse-Historical Approach  
In order to analyse the argumentation strategies used in discussing alibrāliyah, I 
adopted DHA as a tool for CDA, as developed by Reisigl and Wodak (2001, 2009). DHA 
offers an empirical model for an in-depth discursive and linguistic analysis of texts. This 
is represented in the developed model of discursive strategies that can be realised 
through a variety of linguistic devices. Thus, these methods are used to identify the 
discursive strategies used to construct alibrāliyah over time.  
4.3.2.1 Discursive strategies  
Discursive strategies are the practices that are adopted for particular social or 
political purposes (Reisigl and Wodak 2009). These strategies are located at different 
levels of linguistic organisation and complexity and, thus, can be realised through a close 
linguistic analysis of texts. In the case of this study, this model will be used to identify the 
discursive strategies employed in the texts to construct alibrāliyah and to legitimise the 
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different views towards it. According to DHA, five principal discourse strategies are used 
to construe key concepts, each of which will be explained in more detail below: 
nomination, predication, argumentation, perspectivisation, and mitigation/ 
intensification9.  
Nomination strategies 
Nomination strategies can be recognised in a text by asking the question: How 
are persons, objects, phenomena, processes, and actions named and referred to 
linguistically? It is a discursive strategy whose analysis uncovers the ideological 
orientation behind the linguistic expression. It is also a strategy that can reveal the means 
by which nomination is used to legitimate a particular claim or action. In this study, the 
analysis of the nomination strategies aims to identify the way in which alibrāliyah and the 
relevant social actors and phenomena are discursively labelled in the texts. Nomination 
strategies can be realised in texts through linguistic means such as deictics ( ’نحن’ -we), 
collectives ( ’عمتجملا’ -the society), metaphors ( ’رحلا ملاعلا’ -the free world for the European 
countries), toponyms ( ’ةيبورولأا لودلا’ -the European countries), negationyms ( ’نويديلقتلا’ -
traditionalists), and ideologonyms ( ’ةيلاربيللا’ -liberalism). The identification of these 
nominations would help us to analyse the means by which alibrāliyah is identified, and 
also the way in which these nominations are used to discuss alibrāliyah and to legitimate 
the different views towards it. alibrāliyah itself can be considered as an ideologonym, or 
what Reisigl and Wodak (2005:69) consider to be an expression of social practice that 
implies the involvement of social actors. Thus, the social actors involved within the 
debate of alibrāliyah are considered for the analysis of the nomination strategy. The 
analysis of social actors will also follow Van Leeuwen’s (2008)10 socio-semantic 
approach of identifying social actors, as it provides a detailed categorisation of the actors 
in terms of the ways in which they are linguistically and socially identified. This will help 
in identifying the way in which actors are constructed across texts and over time in the 
discussion of alibrāliyah.  
Predication strategies 
This strategy can be recognised in texts by asking the question: What 
characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to social actors, objects, 
phenomena, events and processes? It represents the way in which the constructed 
                                               
9 For a detailed illustration of the procedure of identifying these strategies see (Reisigl and Wodak 
2001, chapter 2) 
10 For a detailed account of Van Leeuwen categories of social actors see (Van Leeuwen 2008: 23-
54) 
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social groups and phenomena are linguistically provided with predications that aim to 
label social actors or phenomena more or less positively or negatively, deprecatorily or 
appreciatively. In other words, these predications represent “evaluative attributions of 
negative and positive traits in the linguistic form of implicit or explicit predicates” (Reisigl 
and Wodak 2005:45). In the current study, the focus will be on the way alibrāliyah and 
the related social actors and phenomena are predicated and attributed to in the texts. 
Predication strategies can be identified in texts through the use of attributes (in the form 
of adjectives, appositions, prepositional phrases, relative clauses, conjunctional clauses, 
infinitive clauses and participial clauses or groups), by predicates or predicative 
nouns/adjectives/pronouns, by collocations, by explicit comparisons, similes, metaphors 
and other rhetorical figures and by more or less implicit allusions, evocations and 
presuppositions/implications. (Reisigl and Wodak 2005:54) 
 An example of the predication strategy is the attribution to alibrāliyah of ’ غبطصت
اهعقاو نولب’  /imbues with the colours of reality; this represents a positive predicate through 
the use of a metaphor that indicates the flexibility and eligibility of alibrāliyah. As with the 
nomination strategy, the analysis of predication strategies would reveal the underlying 
ideologies in the construction and dis/legitimisation of alibrāliyah.  
Argumentation strategies  
Argumentation strategies can be realised by asking what arguments 
argumentation schemes are used in relation to the discourse of alibrāliyah in order to 
legitimise and justify the different views towards it. Argumentation strategies can be 
considered as central discursive strategies as, according to Reisigl and Wodak (2005:55-
56), they are based on the convincing devices that are used to legitimize the other 
discursive strategies, such as predication and perspectivisation strategies. 
Argumentation strategies can be analysed by first analysing the principal claims in the 
text and then the premises that justify these claims. These premises are content-related 
warrants that connect the arguments with the concluding claim in a text. These 
argumentation schemes can be reasonable, and can thus be labelled as ‘topoi’, or they 
can be fallacious, and thus labelled as ‘fallacies’, as is explained below.  
Topoi 
Topoi are “parts of argumentation which belong to the obligatory, either explicit 
or inferable premises” (Reisigl and Wodak 2005:74-75). They are “content-related 
warrants” or “conclusion rules” that link the arguments to the conclusion or the main claim 
and thus, they play the role of justifying the transition from the arguments to the 
conclusion (Reisigl and Wodak 2005:75). As topoi are content-related warrants, their 
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identification is, to an extent, dependent on the type of discourse or the context in which 
they occur. As such, this means the set of particular topoi construct the text in such a 
way that it is placed within a particular discourse and set of world views or values. For 
instance, the list of topoi identified by Reisigl and Wodak (2005:27-80) was intended to 
be related to the discourse of racism, although some are generally considered to be 
common across different types of discourses. In this regard, they state that the list they 
identify is “incomplete and not always disjunctive” and thus, other types of topoi can be 
coined by the analyst, depending on the type of discourse under analysis (2005:75). For 
example, in the contested discourse of alibrāliyah in the Saudi socio-political context, the 
general topoi that are identified by (Reisigl and Wodak 2005), such as the topos of 
definition, and the topos of positive and negative consequences, are found recurrently. 
However, the topos of freedom, which is commonly found across the texts is coined by 
the researcher to state the rule that, if a belief or action helps to achieve freedom, then 
one should adopt or perform it. Thus, the analysis of topoi in this study will rely on the 
general common topoi from the list compiled by Reisigl and Wodak (2005), alongside 
several other coined context-dependent topoi that are identified and explained 
throughout the analysis. The analysis of topoi will reveal the different moral frameworks 
within which different authors contest the concept of alibrāliyah and will demonstrate the 
chronological shift in the prominence of different worldview frameworks. The general 
common topoi identified by Reisigl and Wodak (2005: 75-80) and quoted below include, 
but are not limited to:  
a) The topos of advantage or usefulness: if an action under a specific relevant point 
of view will be useful, then one should perform it.  
b) The topos of uselessness/disadvantage: if one can anticipate that the 
consequences of a decision will not occur or if other political actions are more likely to 
lead to the declared aim, the decision has to be rejected.  
c) The topos of definition: if an action, a thing, or a person is named as X, the action, 
thing or person carries, or should carry, the qualities/traits/attributes contained in the 
meaning of X.  
d) The topos of danger or threat: if a decision could have specific dangerous or 
threatening consequences, one should not perform or do it. Or, if there are specific 
dangers and threats, one should do something about them.  
e) The topos of humanitarianism: if a decision does or does not conform with human 
rights and values, one should or should not perform or make it. 
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f) The topos of responsibility: because a group of persons is responsible for specific 
problems, they should find solutions to those problems.  
g) The topos of reality: because reality is as it is, a specific decision should be made. 
h) The topos of authority: X is right because an authority says that it is right. 
i) The topos of history: because history teaches that specific actions have specific 
consequences, one should perform or omit a specific action in a specific situation 
comparable with the historical example referred to. 
j) The topos of culture: because the culture of a specific group of people is as it is, 
specific problems arise in specific situations. According to Reisigl and Wodak (2005:80), 
this form of topos is sometimes employed in combination with the topos of danger or 
threat when referring to the danger of changing the identity of the culture in specific 
situations. 
k) The topos of abuse: if a right or an offer for help is abused, the right should be 
changed or the help should be withdrawn, or measures against the abuse should be 
taken. 
Fallacies 
Fallacies are argumentation devices directed against the antagonist in order to 
justify a particular action or idea (Reisigl and Wodak 2001). They are based on violations 
of the rules of rational disputes (Reisigl and Wodak 2001:71). Reisigl and Wodak (2001) 
refer to the rules identified by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992); these include the 
freedom of argument, the obligation to give reasons, correct reference to previous 
discourse by the antagonist, the obligation to be ‘matter-of-fact’, correct reference to 
implicit premises, the use of plausible arguments, and the need for logical validity, 
acceptance of the discussion’s results, clarity of expression, and correct interpretation. 
These ten rules for rational arguing form the basis of discourse ethics, and the violation 
of these rules is fallacious. An example of a fallacy can be found in a text fragment from 
the data that says: 
"   ايفاقث نويئافكنلاا ثدحتي ،اندنع–  غلاب سامحب-  ،مهحلاصل يفاقثلا نهارلا تيبثت نيلواحم ؛)ةيدوعسلا ةيصوصخلا( نع
فييزتلاو سيلدتلا نم ريثك دعب ،ةقيقحلا هجوأ نم  اهجو نومدختسي مهنإف" 
Which can be translated into ‘the cultural regressives speak with great enthusiasm about 
the Saudi speciality, trying to secure the current culture for their interest using one aspect 
of truth after a lot of fraud and counterfeiting’. This text includes a reported fallacy as the 
antagonist that is referred to as ‘‘  ايفاقث نويئافكنلاا’, the cultural regressives violates the rule of 
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obligation to ‘matter-of-factness’ and the rules about clarity of expression and correct 
interpretation. This rational argumentation device is used to delegitimise the ‘others’ view 
of securing the culture, thus constituting a fallacious threat of cultural change. 
Concerning the use of argumentation devices, it should be noted that the 
construction of the argumentation devices of topoi can be sometimes fallacious, as these 
can sometimes be based on a fallacy. This can be found when a speaker makes implicit 
attempts in some arguments to legitimise a particular action or belief using a particular 
topoi in order to delegitimise the opposing argument using a fallacy. According to Reisigl 
and Wodak (2009:110), it can be difficult to distinguish whether a particular 
argumentation scheme is employed as a topos or as a fallacy. This could be why some 
examples of arguments in a text can be considered to be both a topos and a fallacy at 
the same time. An example provided by Reisigl and Wodak (2009:102) is the text 
fragment ‘what I am really concerned about is the way the environmental topics have 
been misused by certain political pressure groups’. This fragment includes an 
argumentation device of a topos, or a fallacy, of abuse, which is based on the speaker’s 
concern about this abuse and implies that a specific course of action should be taken. 
He explicitly states that the actions carried out by the others are a fallacy. It should be 
also noted that fallacies in texts are either committed or reported. Committed fallacies 
are the fallacies that are committed by the author, such as using a strawman fallacy 
against the antagonist to delegitimise their view. Reported fallacies, on the other hand, 
are the fallacies that are reported by the author as having been carried out by the 
antagonist, such as the use of fallacy of threat when the antagonist makes a false claim 
that there is a threat. Here, the author also points out the fallacy committed by the other 
person in order to delegitimise their view and to legitimise his concluding claim.  
Perspectivisation, mitigation and intensification strategies 
Along with the analysis of the nomination, predication and argumentation 
strategies, this study will also analyse the perspectivisation, mitigation and intensification 
strategies. Unlike the first group of strategies, which are based on the representation of 
particular phenomena or social actors (us vs. them), the latter group of strategies are 
concerned with the way in which speakers express their involvement or position their 
point of view in discourse, as well as with the way they ‘qualify and modify the epistemic 
status of a proposition’ (Reisigl and Wodak 2001:81). Thus, the analysis of these 
strategies in this study aims to provide information about the ways in which alibrāliyah is 
represented by different views and the means by which these views contribute to the 
discursive construction of alibrāliyah. These strategies can be realised by asking the 
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question: From what point of view are nominations, attributions and arguments 
expressed and whether these views are intensified or mitigated? 
Perspectivisation strategies refer to the relative degrees of involvement or 
detachment across a text. Involvement strategies aim to express the speakers’ attitudes 
and feelings in order to emotionally and cognitively engage the hearers in the discourse 
(Reisigl and Wodak 2001:82). This can be recognised through the linguistic means of 
intensification, such as the use of adjectives and adverbs that express the degree of 
feeling and attitude, and through the use of personal deictics. Involvement strategies can 
also be realised by repetitions of morphemes, words, collocations of words, phrases, and 
even longer sequences of discourse. It can also be indicated through the use of direct 
speech and free indirect speech. Detachment strategies, on the other hand, are achieved 
through the linguistic means of relative and complement clauses, a sequence of 
prepositional phrases, the abstractive passive voice, nominalisations, or distancing 
personal and temporal deictics. These linguistic devices increase the level of detachment 
by constructing a distance between the subject or actor and the action, thereby shifting 
the responsibly of the actor or the speaker of the argument being made. Detachment 
strategies are also associated with mitigation, as they can be indicated through the use 
of indirect speech. 
As with perspectivisation strategies, the relevant mitigation and intensification 
strategies can be indicated through other linguistic means. They can be represented, 
with different degrees of intensification through the use of modality, verbs of thinking and 
saying, questions, negation, and assertion. In particular, intensification strategies can be 
realised through emphasising, as well as by amplifying particles and morphemes, 
intensifying quantifiers and verbs, the use of adjectives and adverbs that show the 
speaker’s emotions and feelings, and the use of the superlative form. Mitigation 
strategies, on the other hand, involve the analysis of mood and modality. Therefore, they 
can be achieved by using linguistic devices such as modal verbs and verbs of feeling 
that indicate a level of reservation, rather than assertion. Mitigation can also be identified 
through the use of constructed questions instead of assertion, assertion with ‘we’ or ‘it’, 
by tag questions, hesitation, and self-correction.  
It should be noted that along with the DHA strategies of nomination, predication, 
argumentation, perspectivisation and intensification strategies that are used in texts to 
legitimise particular actions or ideologies, Van Leeuwen’s (2007) categories of 
legitimation strategies are also employed to identify the means by which ‘alibrāliyah’ is 
legitimised/delegitimised. According to Van Leeuwen these categories include 
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authorisation, moral evaluation, rationalisation and mythopoesis. Authorisation deals 
with legitimation by referring to an authority social norms, law or persons. Moral 
evaluation concerns legitimising a statement or action through referring to discourses of 
value. Rationalization is a legitimation by reference to the goals of institutionalized social 
action or by the social knowledges that is cognitively valid. Mythopoesis finally is the 
legitimation that is delivered through narratives11. 
4.4 Translation considerations  
As the analysis is conducted on the Arabic data, the translation of these data is 
provided for illustrative purposes for non-native speakers of Arabic. The translation 
attempts to deliver the overall meaning as accurately as possible. The process of 
translation involves the translation of single words, such as the keywords and collocate 
findings, as well as the translation of whole texts, in which the delivery of the meaning of 
the arguments was of particular importance. According to Mona Baker (1992), it is 
impossible to deliver the whole meaning through the process of translation, some 
meanings are lost due to the differences in ways of expression from language to 
language and, thus, it is impossible to have an equivalent translation. To assure that the 
translation is adequate, the translated data was presented to a qualified translator who 
checked, reviewed and certified the translation (see Appendix C). The translation of the 
single words, keywords and collocates, can be found in the corpus analysis chapter, 
while the translation of the individual texts can be found in the appendices.  
4.5 Summary of the chapter 
This chapter has discussed the type of data used (newspaper articles), the 
compilation of the corpus and the processing of the data in the corpus tool SketchEngine. 
The methods of analysis have also been described. The main aim of this chapter has 
been to illustrate the combined methods of CL and DHA used in this thesis to examine 
the construal of alibrāliyah and the mechanism of its shift over time. As discussed, the 
reason for analysing the keywords and their collocations was to discover the meaning 
preferences associated with alibrāliyah at the macro level. This analysis also informed 
the selection of articles to be analysed at the micro level. For the micro analysis, the DHA 
approach of discursive strategies will be used to analyse the strategies by which 
alibrāliyah is discussed and legitimised over time. This will be carried out through the 
analysis of the strategies of nomination, predication, argumentation, and 
perspectivisation, and will demonstrate the ways in which alibrāliyah and social actors 
                                               
11 For the detailed account of legitimation strategies see (Van Leeuwen 2007) 
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are nominated, the argumentation devices used in dis/legitimising alibrāliyah, and the 
authority and evaluation over time. Both levels of analysis will provide information about 
the discourse of alibrāliyah in Saudi society and will reflect on the broader project of 
modernisation in the Saudi social field. The application of the methods is thoroughly 
illustrated in the following analysis chapters. 
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5 Chapter 5: The Corpus Analysis  
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5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed, in detail, the selection of the corpus data and 
the methodology employed for this study. This chapter will present an assisted macro 
analysis of the ‘alibrāliyah’ corpus, based primarily on Sinclair’s (1990) units of meaning 
model. The analysis will employ a diachronic approach to explore the usage and shift in 
meaning of the discourse on alibrāliyah, which will provide general insight into the 
struggle of articulating alibrāliyah in discourse surrounding modernity. This chapter will 
therefore start by analysing the frequency of the usage of alibrāliyah across a corpus of 
Saudi newspapers over time to reveal whether there are any peaks or troughs in the 
discussion of alibrāliyah. This will be followed by a presentation of the results of the 
corpus analysis, including the wordlist and the collocations around alibrāliyah, which 
reveal the key discourses associated with alibrāliyah and any changes in these 
discourses. The results of the corpus macro analysis will then serve as the basis for a 
subsequent qualitative micro analysis, which will provide a general understanding of the 
discourse of alibrāliyah in Saudi society. As the corpus data analysed is Arabic language, 
an English translation is provided for the excerpts for increased readability and clarity of 
analysis.   
5.2 The frequency of the usage of alibrāliyah  
Before discussing the preferences concerning the discourse of alibrāliyah, an 
initial statistical analysis of the frequency of the usage of alibrāliyah across the corpus is 
necessary. This frequency analysis will provide a general understanding of the 
diachronic usage of alibrāliyah across the newspapers and, more specifically, will reveal 
whether there are any peaks or troughs in the discussion of alibrāliyah within the time 
frame 2007 to 2016.  This analysis will be conducted in two steps. First, as all the articles 
collected for the corpus are primarily focused on alibrāliyah, a diachronic analysis of the 
frequency of these articles across the newspapers will be carried out. Second, an 
analysis of the frequency of the lemma for the term ‘ةيلاربيللا’/alibrāliyah i.e. ‘يلاربيل’/‘librāli’ 
will be performed, both across the corpus and over time.     
In regard to the frequency of articles over time, Figure (5-1) shows that the 
number of articles that discuss alibrāliyah was highest in 2010. This indicates that 
alibrāliyah was mostly debated across newspapers in the year 2010. The graph also 
shows that there was an increase in the number of such articles since the beginning of 
the contestation of alibrāliyah in 2007 until 2010. However, there was a general decrease 
in the number of articles published after 2010, with a few high peaks in 2012, 2014, and 
2016. Looking at each newspaper, it is clear that Aljazirah published the largest number 
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of articles contesting alibrāliyah compared to other newspapers. However, it is important 
to note that this study will not focus on analysing the attitudes of the newspapers, but 
rather on examining the representation of alibrāliyah across the newspapers, since the 
opinion articles that make up the corpus represent the attitudes of the authors rather than 
the stance of the newspaper in which they are published (see Section 4.2.1).      
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Alyaum 5 14 11 18 8 25 14 15 7 10
Okaz 9 13 11 21 21 25 9 7 5 16
Aljazirah 8 28 33 39 27 19 11 14 10 10






















Figure 5-1: Number of articles per year in the corpus (2007-2016) 
In regard to the frequency of the usage of the lemma ‘librāli’ over time, Figure (5-
2) shows similar results to Figure (5-1) in that the highest peak in the usage of alibrāliyah 
is in the year 2010. It also shows an increase in the frequency of the usage of the lemma 
‘librāli’ from the beginning of 2007 until 2010, which was followed by a decrease until 
2016, and a high peak in 2014. However, although there is a similarity between Graphs 
(5-1) and (5-2) in the patterns of frequency of usage per year, it can be seen that there 
are also some differences, due to the fact that the frequency of the lemma might differ 
from one article to another.        
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Figure 5-2: The frequency of the lemma 'liberali' (2007-2016) 
5.3 Key discourses in the corpus of alibrāliyah   
This section will be divided into two subsections. The first part aims to identify the 
main discourses associated with alibrāliyah, which will be identified by extracting the 100 
most frequent lexical items and then categorising them into thematic groups. The second 
part aims to diachronically investigate the discourses associated with alibrāliyah over 
time. This will be carried out through a trend analysis of the top 100 lexical items in the 
corpus. Both levels of analysis aim to discover the salient discourses associated with the 
use of alibrāliyah, and the usage and shift of these discourses over time. The results will 
also reveal, in general, which fields are discussed and contested within the discourse of 
alibrāliyah in the struggle over modernism in Saudi Arabia.  
5.3.1 Top 100 lexical items in the corpus of alibrāliyah    
An analysis of the wordlist was conducted to identify the key discourses 
associated with the use of ‘alibrāliyah’. Table (5-1) shows the 100 most frequent lexical 
items in the corpus, ordered by frequency. As the table shows, the word ‘يلاربيل’, which is 
the lemma of the term under investigation, ‘alibrāliyah’, is the most frequent keyword in 
the corpus (5,406 occurrences). This is followed by the word ‘عمتجم’ (society), which 
suggests that the discussion of alibrāliyah is closely connected to the social context. The 
word ‘ةيرح’ (freedom) is also very frequent, which would indicate that alibrāliyah is 
frequently discussed in association with freedom. The wordlist analysis also yielded 
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interesting results in regard to the word ‘يملاسإ’/ Islamic, which occurs frequently in the 
corpus, suggesting that the discourse of religion is also significant in discussions of 
alibrāliyah. For a complete account of the analysis of the keywords list, these keywords 
were categorised into thematic groups following an abductive approach, in order to 
identify the salient discourses associated with alibrāliyah (see Table 5-2). The most 
frequent keyword, ’يلاربيل’ / liberal, was excluded and not included under any thematic 
categorisation, since its meaning is the one under investigation.  
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Table 5-1: Top 100 most frequent lexical items in the corpus 
No. Word Translation Frequency No. Word Translation 
Frequen
cy 
1 يلاربيل Liberal 5,406 51 ملسم Muslim 453 
2 عمتجم Society 1,852 52 يبرغ Western 450 
3 ةيرح Freedom 1,571 53 ةلاح Case 450 
4 لاق Say 1,492 54 فقوم Position 449 
5 ركف Intellect 1,381 55 يديلقت Traditional 446 
6 يملاسإ Islamic 1,024 56 ةيضق Issue 443 
7 يركف Intellectual 1,013 57 ىنعم Meaning 442 
8 قح Right 942 58 دوجو Existence 439 
9 يعامتجا Social 918 59 لاؤس Question 436 
10 رايت Trend 914 60 يعو Awareness 434 
11 نيد Religion 898 61 لاقم Article 433 
12 يسايس Political 894 62 مت do 429 
13 ينيد Religious 875 63 ىوتسم Level 427 
14 ملاسإ Islam 869 64 صاخ Special 426 
15 يفاقث Cultural 850 65 ةروص Image 421 
16 ناسنإ Human 805 66 فرع Know 420 
17 عقاو Reality 802 67 دض Against 411 
18 باطخ Discourse 784 68 لجر Man 409 
19 يبرع Arab 781 69 لعف Do 405 
20 يدوعس Saudi 760 70 لمع Work 403 
21 يأر Opinion 757 71 يناسنإ Humanitarian 403 
22 دجو Find 752 72 لعج Make 401 
23 الله Allah 743 73 لوق Saying 393 
24 باتك Book 681 74 ىري See 390 
25 ةفاقث Culture 681 75 خيرات History 372 
26 موهفم Concept 677 76 لكش Form 371 
27 رمأ Matter 670 77 دقن Criticism 368 
28 يطارقوميد Democratic 664 78 ةركف Idea 368 
29 ةميق Value 639 79 لاح Situation 347 
30 درف Individual 632 80 ماق Stand 346 
31 ةلود Country 607 81 ريبك Large 345 
32 لقع Mind 605 82 فلتخم Different 341 
33 ماع General 595 83 راوح Discussion 339 
34 سان People 585 84 فلاتخا Differences 338 
35 موي Day 578 85 تقو Time 336 
36 فقثم Intellectual 
(person) 
556 86 مل  ع Science 336 
37 ىنع Mean 553 87 صن Text 331 
38 ةأرم Woman 552 88 لصأ Origin 331 
39 ةايح Life 540 89 عارص Conflict 329 
40 حلطصم Term 511 90 يناملع Secular 322 
41 ملاع World 503 91 ةقلاع Relation 319 
42 حبصأ Become 493 92 رظن Look 318 
43 ةقيقح Fact 490 93 اعد Call 317 
44 دارأ Want 490 94 ةلأسم Issue 315 
45 ديدج New 469 95 روتكد Doctor 314 
46 ببس Reason 467 96 يملع Scientific 311 
47 ثيدح Modern 464 97 مكح Judgment 308 
48 ماظن System 462 98 ةيؤر Vision 304 
49 دح Limit 460 99 عاطتسا Can 304 
50 أدبم Principle 453 100 ةكرح Movement 303 
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As can be seen from Table (5-2), the thematic groups reveal the salient 
discourses in the alibrāliyah corpus. It can be seen that the discourse of religion is 
particularly prominent in the corpus, as words equivalent to the terms ‘Islamic’, ‘religion’, 
‘religious’, ‘Islam’, ‘Allah’, and ‘Muslim’ are amongst the most frequent lexical items. Also, 
lexical items that indicate social discourse also feature in the wordlist, such as ‘يعامتجا’/ 
(social), ‘يفاقث’/(cultural), and ‘ةميق’/(value). The discourse of humanitarianism and human 
rights is also found amongst the salient discourses, indicated by lexical items such as 
‘ةيرح’/(freedom), ‘ناسنإ’/ (human), ‘قح’/(right), and ‘يناسنإ’/ (humanitarian) appearing 
frequently in the corpus. It can also be observed that words referring to national and 
regional entities, which are equivalent to the terms ‘Saudi’, ‘Arab’, and ‘Western’, are 
frequently used in the corpus, which suggests that discussions of alibrāliyah make 
reference to both the local Saudi and Arab context and the foreign/global Western 
context, although the corpus data primarily discusses alibrāliyah in the local context.   
The ‘conflict’ theme indicates that there is a conflict regarding alibrāliyah, where 
the terms ‘difference’, ‘against’, and ‘relationship’ suggest that there are conflicting 
relations between different elements associated with alibrāliyah. It is also noticeable that 
key terms indicating mental objects and communication are found amongst the most 
frequently used items, which suggests that there is ongoing debate regarding the 
meaning of alibrāliyah as a ‘term’, a ‘concept’, a ‘discourse’, or an ‘idea’ and so on. 
Similarly, the ‘science’ theme suggests debate regarding the meaning of alibrāliyah in 
terms of its objective ‘scientific origin’. In addition, a number of evaluative keywords are 
used, which can be considered representations of the discourse prosody. These terms 
do not indicate a specific meaning on their own but could suggest that there are some 
elements within the alibrāliyah corpus that are attributed to, such as ‘reality’, ‘modern’, 
‘traditional’ and so on.   Approximately 10% of the wordlist does not refer to a particular 
theme, including words equivalent to the terms ‘life’, ‘limit’, ‘case’, and ‘article’. Overall, 
this analysis of the key discourses reveals significant results, in which alibrāliyah is 
associated with a number of salient discourses, including the discourses of religion, 
social practices, human rights, and political movements.  This indicates that the key term 
alibrāliyah is contested and discussed in relation to the religious, social, humanitarian, 
and political fields in the Saudi social context. This reveals that the debate over liberalism 
is concerned with similar discourses to the previous modernist trends, specifically the 
socio-religious discourse, which also indicates that attempts at modernism are struggling 
as a result of challenges from socio-religious norms.   
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Table 5-2: Thematic categories of the top frequent keywords 
5.3.2 Usage of the keywords over time 
To identify the usage of the above discussed key lexical words over time, a trend 
analysis of the usage of these keywords was conducted using SketchEngine’s trend 
feature (see Section 4.2.2). As can be seen from Table (5-3), words equivalent to 
‘Islamic’, ‘Islam’, ‘religion’, ‘religious’, and ‘Allah’, which indicate the discourse of religion, 
show a general decrease in usage over time. The graphs and the trend values clearly 
show the levels of use of these religious terms, where the trend lines show a decline of 
use and the trend values show negative values followed by the (-) symbol, which 
indicates a general decrease in the usage trend. All the religious discourse terms show 





يملاسا/‘Islamic’, نيد/‘religion’, ينيد/‘religious’, ملاسإ/‘Islam’, 
الله/‘Allah’, ملسم/‘Muslim’, 
Social and cultural 
notions 
عمتجم/‘Society’, يعامتجإ/social’, يفاقث/‘cultural’, ةفاقث/‘culture’, 
ةميق/‘value’, ماظن‘system’, سان/‘people’ 
Humanitarianism 
ةيرح/‘Freedom’, ناسنإ/‘human’, قح/‘right’, درف/‘individual’, 
ناسنإ/‘humanitarian’ 
Political movements 




يدوعس/‘Saudi’, يبرع/‘Arab’, يبرغ/‘Western’ 
Social groups 
(sex/occupation) 




عارص/‘Conflict’, ةقلاع/‘relationship’, دض/‘against’, 
فلاتخا/‘difference’ 
Science ملع/‘Science’, يملع/‘scientific’, لصأ/‘origin’ 
Mental objects 
موهفم/‘Concept’, يركف/‘intellectual’, يأر/‘opinion’, موهفم/‘concept’, 
رمأ/‘matter’, لقع/‘mind’, أدبم‘/principle’, ببس/‘reason’, يأر/‘opinion’, 
ةيضق/‘issue’, لاؤس/‘question’, يعو/‘awareness’, ةروص/‘image’, 
ةركف/‘idea’, ةلأسم/‘issue’, فقوم/‘position’, ةيؤر/‘vision’, 
مكح/‘judgment’ 
Communication 
باطخ/‘Discourse’, ىنعم/‘meaning’, حلطصم/‘term’, لوق/‘saying’, 
راوح/‘discussion’, صن/‘text’, لاق/‘say’ 
Mental processes دجو/‘Find’, ىنع/‘mean’, دارأ/‘want’, فرع/‘know’, ىري/‘see’ 
Action processes 
دوجو/‘Existence’, حبصأ/‘become’, ققح/‘achieve’, لعف/‘do’, 
مت/‘complete’, لعج/‘make’, لمع/‘work’, اعد/‘call’, عاطتسا/‘can’ 
Areas and places ةلود/‘Country’, ملاع/‘world’ 
Time موي/‘Day’, تقو/‘time’, خيرات/‘history’ 
Evaluative 
ماع/‘General’, عقاو/‘reality’, ةقيقح/‘fact’, ديدج/‘new’, ثيدح/‘modern’, 
يديلقت/‘traditional’, صاخ/‘special’, ريبك/‘large’, فلتخم/‘different’, 
Others 
ةايح/‘Life’, دح/‘limit’, ةلاح/‘case’, لاقم/‘article’, ىوتسم/‘level’, 
لكش/‘form’, دقن/‘criticism’,لاح/‘status’ 
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which shows a generally positive value. However, the graph for the keyword ‘Muslim’ 
shows that there is a decrease in usage of this term towards the end of the defined 
period. This reveals that, overall, there is a decreased prevalence in religious discourse 
in the corpus of alibrāliyah, which indicates that the discussion of alibrāliyah in relation 
to religion has generally decreased over time.  
The trend analysis also revealed interesting results in regard to terms that 
indicate the discourse of humanitarianism or human rights, which show a diachronic 
increase in usage in the corpus of alibrāliyah. As can be seen in the graphs, usage of 
words such as ‘ةيرح’/(freedom), ‘ناسنإ’/ (human), ‘قح’/(right), and ‘ اسنإين ’/ (humanitarian) 
increased over the defined time period. In regard to the trend values of these terms, the 
values are generally positive for the keywords in the discourse of humanitarianism, 
except for the terms ‘قح’/(right) and ‘درف’/(individual), although the graphs for these two 
terms do show an increase towards the end of the period. This increase in usage of 
humanitarianism keywords indicates that the discussion of alibrāliyah in relation to 
human rights discourse has increased over time.    
It is also notable that terms that indicate social discourse show a steady trend 
line. As can be seen in the graphs, the keywords ‘عمتجم’/(society), ‘يعامتجا’/ (social), 
‘يفاقث’/(cultural), and ‘ةفاقث’/(culture) show a steady usage throughout the period, which 
suggests that alibrāliyah is consistently discussed in relation to social discourse.  
However, usage of words that indicate political discourse fluctuates and thus does not 
show a changing trend over time. For example, the term ‘يطارقوميد’/(democratic) shows a 
fluctuation in usage in the graph, with a trend value of 0.0000, which indicates that there 
is no trend in its usage over time. In addition, the usage of the keyword ‘يناملع’/(secular) 
fluctuates, but with a general negative value, which indicates an overall decrease over 
time. Thus, it can be said that alibrāliyah is discussed in relation to political discourse 
from time to time, and inconsistently.   
Other notable results include that the ‘conflict’ terms, such as ‘عارص’/(conflict), 
‘دض’/(against), and ‘فلاتخا’/(difference) decrease in use, with spikes at the beginning and 
in the middle of the defined period.  Another salient finding is that keywords that indicate 
national and regional entities, namely ‘Saudi’, ‘Arab’, and ‘Western’ decrease in usage.  
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Keyword Translation Trend Graph  Keyword Translatio
n 
Trend Graph 
يلاربيل Liberal 0.1227+ 
 
 ملسم Muslim 0.1051+ 
 
عمتجم Society 0.0349   يبرغ Western -0.1051−  
ةيرح Freedom 0.4877+ 
 
 ةلاح Case -0.3249− 
 
لاق Say 0.0000   فقوم Position -0.4040−  
ركف Intellect -0.1405−   يديلقت Traditional 1.0723+ 
 
يملاسإ Islamic -0.4244− 
 
 ةيضق Issue -0.2679− 
 
يركف Intellectual -0.1583−   ىنعم Meaning 0.1051+ 
 
قح Right -0.1763− 
 
 دوجو Existence 0.3443+  
يعامتجا Social -0.2679− 
 
 لاؤس Question 0.2493+ 
 






نيد Religion -0.1227− 
 
 لاقم Article -1.1503− 
 
يسايس Political 0.2308+ 
 
 مت Complete 0.0524 
 
ينيد Religious -0.4244− 
 
 ىوتسم Level 0.2308+ 
 
ملاسإ Islam -0.4663− 
 
 صاخ Special -0.0699 
 
يفاقث Cultural 0.2125+   ةروص Image 0.2308+ 
 ناسنإ Human 0.2679+   فرع Know 0.0699  
عقاو Reality 0.1943+ 
 
 دض Against -0.6248−  
باطخ Discourse -0.1405− 
 
 لجر Man -0.3057−  
يبرع Arab -0.1227− 
 
 لعف Do -0.3639− 
 
يدوعس Saudi -0.5773− 
 
 لمع Work -0.5317− 
 






دجو Find 0.0524 
 
 لعج Make 0.1051+  
الله Allah -0.4663− 
 
 لوق Saying -0.4040− 
 
باتك Book -0.3639−   ىري See -0.0349 
 
ةفاقث Culture 0.0874 
 
 خيرات History -0.6008− 
 
موهفم Concept -0.5095− 
 
 لكش Form 0.1405+ 
 
رمأ Matter -0.3639−   دقن Criticism -0.4877− 
 
يطارقوميد Democratic 0.0000 
 
 ةركف Idea -0.9325− 
 
ةميق Value -0.0174   لاح Situation 0.2308+ 
 
درف Individual -0.3639− 
 
 ماق Stand 0.2308+ 
 
ةلود Country 0.5543+ 
 
 ريبك Large -0.0874 
 
لقع Mind -0.5543− 
 
 فلتخم Different -0.3443− 
 
ماع General 0.4877+ 
 
 راوح Discussion -1.0723−  
سان People -0.2308−   فلاتخا Difference
s 
-0.1051−  






 مل  ع Science -0.5317− 
 
ىنع Mean 0.6008+ 
 
 صن Text -0.0524  
ةأرم Woman -0.7812− 
 
 لصأ Origin 0.4877+ 
 
ةايح Life -0.5317−   عارص Conflict -0.0174  
حلطصم Term -0.4663− 
 
 يناملع Sect -0.0524  
ملاع World 0.4877+ 
 
 ةقلاع Relation -0.2679− 
 
حبصأ Become -0.1583− 
 
 رظن Look 0.1763+ 
 
ةقيقح Fact -0.4040− 
 
 اعد Call 0.1943+  
دارأ Want 0.5317+ 
 
 ةلأسم Issue -0.4877−  
ديدج New -1.0355− 
 
 روتكد Doctor -0.6248− 
 
ببس Reason -0.2308− 
 
 يملع Scientific -0.2867−  
ثيدح Modern -0.1227− 
 
 مكح Judgment -0.1227−  
ماظن System -0.1227−   ةيؤر Vision 0.4877+  
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دح Limit 0.5317+ 
 
 عاطتسا Can 0.0349  





Table 5-3: The usage of keywords over time 
5.4 Collocation analysis: discourse preferences of alibrāliyah   
This section aims to examine the top lexical collocates around alibrāliyah over 
time. The first part aims to identify the meaning preferences around alibrāliyah. This was 
achieved by extracting the 50 top collocates and categorising them into thematic groups. 
This was followed by a diachronic analysis of the top collocates in the top themes to 
closely examine their usage in association with alibrāliyah, and whether there is a shift 
in the construction of alibrāliyah. This was carried out by first identifying the top lexical 
collocates in the top two themes, and then conducting both a trend analysis and a 
collocation analysis. The results of the analysis in this section will provide an overview 
of the usage of alibrāliyah, and any shifts in usage, which in turn will reveal the general 
nature of the debate over alibrāliyah.      
5.4.1 Collocates of alibrāliyah 
To identify the meaning preferences of alibrāliyah, a collocation analysis of the 
top 50 most frequent lexical collocates around the lemma of alibrāliyah, ‘librālī’, was 
conducted in a span of 5 words to the left and right. As can be seen from Table (5-4), 
the collocation analysis shows relatively similar results to the keywords analysis, in that 
the top five collocates are ‘يلاربيل’/’liberal’, ‘ةيرح’/(freedom), ‘يدوعس’/(Saudi), ‘عمتجم’/(society), 
and ‘يملاسإ’/(Islamic), which were all amongst the top 10 collocates in the keyword 
analysis. However, the collocate ‘يناملع’/(secular), for example, is found amongst the top 
10 in the collocation analysis, but came low down in the ranking of the keywords list 
(90th), which suggests that alibrāliyah is closely associated with the meaning preference 
of secularism, as revealed by its lower frequency in the overall corpus and by its high 
frequency in collocation with alibrāliyah. It is also notable that the lemma ‘يلاربيل’/’liberal’ 
is the most frequent collocate, which suggests that a number of derivatives of alibrāliyah 
are used in collocation with each other recurrently across the corpus. Another interesting 
result is that the word ‘ةيرح’/(freedom) is the second top collocate, which indicates that 
the meaning of alibrāliyah is closely associated with freedom. The top collocates, 
‘يدوعس’/(Saudi), ‘عمتجم’/(society), and ‘يملاسإ’/(Islamic) indicate that alibrāliyah is linked to 
the cultural context and is discussed in relation to Saudi society and to Islam. To enable 
an overall examination of the meaning preferences of alibrāliyah, the collocates were 
categorised into thematic groups, as seen in Table (5-5). This excludes the lemma 
‘يلاربيل’/’liberal’, as this is the lemma of the keyword being analysed.   
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Table 5-4: The 50 most frequent collocates for 'alibrāliyah' with a span of -5 to +5 
As can be seen below in Table (5-5), the collocates are categorised into thematic 
groups, with the overall frequency of the collocates of each theme calculated. The table 
shows that alibrāliyah is most frequently associated with the discourse of human rights, 
followed by the discourse of religion, and then social discourse. The collocates that 
indicate the meaning preference of human rights -  ةيرح‘freedom’, قح'right’, درف'individual’, 
ناسنإ ‘human’ - suggest that alibrāliyah is used in connection with human rights concepts. 
The close and frequent association to religion also suggests that alibrāliyah is closely 
connected to Islam and discussions of religion. Furthermore, the association between 
alibrāliyah and social discourse indicates that it is closely related to social and cultural 
matters.  The political movement collocates suggest that alibrāliyah is also relevant to 
the meanings of terms such as ‘secular’, ‘democratic’, and ‘conservative’. In addition, the 
table shows that a large number of collocates signify the meanings of thoughts and 
beliefs, e.g. ‘ةركف’/ (idea), and communication and communicative processes, such as 
‘حلطصم’/(term) and ‘ىنعم’/ (meaning). These words might not indicate any particular 
meanings on their own, however, they do suggest that alibrāliyah is often discussed at a 
metalinguistic level, which might be due to the high contestation over its meaning by 
different groups.   
No. Collocates Translation Frequency No. Collocates Translation Frequency 
1 يلاربيل Liberal 680 26 يقيقح Real 87 
2 ةيرح Freedom 325 27 يعامتجا Social 86 
3 يدوعس Saudi 320 28 ةلود Country 83 
4 عمتجم Society 215 29 ةركف Idea 83 
5 يملاسإ Islamic 207 30 قح Right 82 
6 رايت Trend 207 31 ىنعم Meaning 80 
7 ركف Intellect 206 32 ةقيقح Fact 76 
8 لاق Say 196 33 دوجو Existence 76 
9 موهفم Concept 194 34 ديدج New 74 
10 يناملع Secular 137 35 ظفاحم Conservative 73 
11 ملاسإ Islam 136 36 ىري See 73 
12 باطخ Discourse 135 37 اعد Call 69 
13 ىنع Mean 134 38 ةيناملع Secularism 68 
14 أدبم Principle 129 39 يديلقت Traditional 67 
15 دجو Find 123 40 حبصأ Become 65 
16 حلطصم Term 113 41 درف Individual 64 
17 يبرغ Western 107 42 ملاع World 63 
18 يبرع Arab 106 43 ثيدح Modern 63 
19 يسايس Political 106 44 ةفسلف Philosophy 62 
20 ةميق Value 96 45 يفاقث Cultural 61 
21 يركف Intellectual 93 46 ماظن System 61 
22 عقاو Reality 91 47 موي Day 60 
23 نيد Religion 90 48 ناسنإ Human 60 
24 يطارقوميد Democratic 88 49 فرع Know 60 
25 ينيد Religious 87 50 دارأ Want 59 
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Table 5-5: The 50 most frequent collocates categorised into thematic groups 
The collocation analysis shows interesting results, where alibrāliyah is mostly 
associated with the meaning preferences of human rights and religion. For the purpose 
of down-sampling the analysis of the large corpus, these top two themes were selected 
for an in-depth analysis.  To this end, the top collocates for each theme, namely 
‘يملاسإ’/(Islamic) and ‘ةيرح’/(freedom), were selected to down-sample the corpus data into 
a number of individual articles to allow for a micro investigation of the meaning of 
alibrāliyah in relation to the meaning preferences of Islam and freedom over the whole 
period (2007-2016). The process of selecting the articles was based on the frequency of 
the top collocates over time, whereby the articles that most frequently include these 
collocates with alibrāliyah were selected for the micro analysis (see Section 4.3.1.4).  
Before conducting the micro analysis of alibrāliyah, a statistical analysis of the usage of 
the two top collocates - ‘يملاسإ’/(Islamic) and ‘ةيرح’/(freedom) - over time was conducted 
to determine whether there have been any diachronic changes in their usage in 




Religion يملاسإ/ ‘Islamic’, ملاسإ /‘Islam’, نيد /‘religion’, ينيد /‘religious’ 520 
Human rights  ةيرح/‘Freedom’, قح/'right',  درف/ individual'',  ناسنإ/’human’ 531 
Social discourse 






يدوعس /‘Saudi’,  يبرغ /‘Western’, يبرع/ ‘Arab(ic)’ 506 
Political 
movements 
يناملع/ ‘Secular’, يسايس/ ‘political’, يطارقوميد/ ‘democratic’,  













لاق /‘Say’, ىنع /‘means’ 385 
Mental objects 
and processes 
ىري /‘See,  فرع /‘know’, دارأ /‘want’, رايت /‘trend’, /‘principle’  
أدبم 
510 
Action processes دجو /‘Happen’, دوجو /‘existence’, ىعد /‘call’,  حبصأ/'become’ 392 
Evaluative 
عقاو/  ‘Reality’, يقيقح/ ‘real’,  ةقيقح/'fact',  ديدج /’new’,  
يديلقت/‘traditional’,   ثيدح/ ‘modern’ 
458 
Areas and places ةلود/ ‘Country’, ملاع/ ‘world’ 146 
Time موي /‘Day’ 60 
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5.4.2 Usage of the top collocates over time 
To identify the diachronic usage of the top lexical collocates, ‘يملاسإ’/(Islamic) and 
‘ةيرح’/(freedom), a frequency analysis of their usage over time was conducted.  As can 
be seen from Figure (5-3), the trend line shows a general decrease in the usage of the 
collocate ‘يملاسإ’/(Islamic) over the defined period. By contrast, it shows a general 
increase in the usage of ‘ةيرح’/(freedom) in association with alibrāliyah over time. As seen 
in the graph, both collocates show a steady increase in usage from the beginning of the 
defined period until 2009. This is followed by a fluctuation in use of the two collocates 
from 2010 to 2013, in which the collocate ‘Islamic’, for example, shows a sharp increase 
in 2013. However, towards the end of the period, specifically from 2014 to 2016, the 
usage of the collocate ‘freedom’ increased dramatically, while there was a sharp 
decrease in usage of ‘Islamic’.  This indicates that alibrāliyah’s association with Islam 
decreased over time. On the other hand, the increased usage of ‘freedom’ as a 
collocation to alibrāliyah indicates an increase in the association between alibrāliyah and 
the meaning of ‘freedom’ over time. This suggests that, over the time period in question, 
there was a general shift away from discussions of alibrāliyah within the discourse of 
religion and towards discussions with the discourse of freedom and rights. 
 
Figure 5-3: The usage of the top collocates over time 
To examine in particular the salient topics associated with the two collocates 
‘Islamic’ and ‘freedom’, a collocation analysis was conducted for the two terms. As Table 
(5-6) shows, the collocates around ‘Islamic’ were primarily concerned with political 
discourse, as evidenced in the words used (رايت/trend, يسايس/political, يناملع/secular, 
عارص/conflict), but also with social and national discourses (as seen in the words Saudi, 
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and society). This suggests that the collocate Islamic is discussed as part of political and 
social discourses. On the other hand, the collocates around freedom, shown in Table (5-
7), are primarily words associated with the discourse of rights (درف/individual, 
ةاواسم/equality), and with words referring to mental objects (موهفم/concept, أدبم/principle, 
ىنعم/meaning), as well as one word that indicates the opposite of rights (traditional). This 
suggests that freedom in relation to alibrāliyah is discussed in terms of rights, and its 
meaning is expressed by collocating it with the words meaning, and concept, and is 
discussed in relation to traditional social norms. 
Table 5-6: Top 10 collocates of 'Islamic' 
Table 5-7: Top 10 collocates of 'Hurria'/freedom 
An examination of the usage of the collocates ‘freedom’ and ‘Islamic’ at the 
beginning and the end of the period 2007-2008, 2015-2016, reveals interesting results. 
As seen in Table (5-8), the collocate يملاسإ/‘Islamic’ at the beginning of the period was 
collocated with words indicating political discourse (state, democratic, system, Western). 
However, at the end of the period, it was collocating with evaluative words (e.g. 
مكح/judgment, فنع/violence), and with words relating to rights (such as ررحت/liberation, 
بلاط/call for). This suggests that the collocate يملاسإ/‘Islamic’ is associated mainly with 
political discourse at the beginning of the period, and with the discourse of rights at the 
end of the period. 
Collocates Translation  Frequency  
ىنع Means (v) 24 
قلطم Absolute 21 
موهفم Concept 19 
يدرف Individual (adj) 18 
أدبم Principle 17 
ىنعم Meaning  12 
ةميق Value 11 
درف Individual (n) 11 
يديلقت Traditional  10 
ةاواسم Equality  10 
Collocates Translation  Frequency  
رايت Trend 18 
يدوعس Saudi 10 
عمتجم Society  9 
حلطصم Concept 9 
ملاسإ Islam 9 
يسايس Political  9 
عقاو Reality 8 
يناملع Secular 7 
عارص Conflict 7 
ةركف Idea  6 
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Table 5-8: Top 10 collocates of 'Islamic’ in two periods (ordered by frequency) 
On the other hand, Table (5-9) shows the collocates of ةيرح/ ‘freedom’, which 
collocates with words associated with different fields in the beginning of the period, e.g. 
words for mental objects (ىنع/mean, ىنعم/meaning), the word يداصتقا/‘economic’, and 
words that indicate progress and rights (مدقت/development, ررحت/liberation, قلطم/absolute). 
However, at the end of the period, ةيرح/ ‘freedom’ collocates mainly with words related to 
rights (including درف/individual, اعد/call for, قلطم/absolute, يناسنإ/humanitarian). These 
findings suggest that the word ةيرح/ ‘freedom’ in relation to alibrāliyah was not associated 
with a particular discourse at the beginning of the period, but came to be discussed in 
association with the discourse of rights. The identification of the use of alibrāliyah in 
association with rights at the end of the period suggests that the concept of alibrāliyah 
begins to be linked with meanings of rights, which indicates the beginning of the success 
of liberals in their fight against conservatives, and overall the success of the attempts at 
modernism through the project of alibrāliyah.    
Table 5-9: Top 10 collocates of 'Hurria'/freedom in two periods (ordered by frequency) 
It should be noted that as the selection of the articles for the qualitative analysis 
was based on these two collocates, it would reveal the mechanism by which the terms 
Islam and freedom are used in association with alibrāliyah, as well as the shift in the 
Collocates of Islamic in 2007/2008 Collocates of Islamic in 2015/2016 
Collocates Translation Collocates Translation 
ةلود State ىنعم Meaning  
جهنم Method ررحت Liberation  
ماظن System رايت Trend 
ةباتك Writing ملاسإ Islam 
لشف Failure  قيبطت Application  
ذختا Adopt بلاط Call for 
ةصرف Opportunity  يبرغ Western 
عمس Hear فلتخا Differ 
يبرغ Western  مكح Judgment  
يطارقوميد Democratic  فنع Violence  
Collocates of ‘freedom’ in 2007/2008 Collocates of ‘freedom’ in 2015/2016 
Collocates Translation Collocates Translation 
ىنعم Meaning يدرف Individual  
ىنع Means ىنع Means (v) 
يداصتقا Economic يديلقت Traditional  
قلطم Absolute قلطم Absolute  
دارأ Want موهفم Concept 
ريبك Big ةميق Value 
ررحت Liberation  اعد Call for 
روطت Development  يناسنإ Humanitarian  
ينانوي Greek  اسنرف France 
يطارقوميد Democratic  ديق Restriction  
 - 91 - 
 
construction of alibrāliyah in general and in association with these two collocates in 
particular. 
5.5 Conclusion  
The macro corpus analysis of alibrāliyah has yielded interesting results in terms 
of its diachronic usage over time, and its association with key discourses and the primary 
meaning preferences. Both the keywords and collocation analyses reveal that alibrāliyah 
is mainly associated with the discourses of religion and human rights, across the whole 
corpus. The results also show that there was a shift in the usage of alibrāliyah in relation 
to these two discourses, in which the salient construction of alibrāliyah changed from 
being associated with religious discourse to being associated with the discourse of 
freedom and human rights. Just as this corpus-assisted analysis helps in examining the 
salient construction of alibrāliyah across a large data set and over a 10-year period, it 
also assists in the down-sampling of data for a micro analysis of the mechanism by which 
alibrāliyah is constructed and changed over time. Therefore, a sample of whole articles 
will be examined in detail in the next chapter using the concepts of critical discourse 
analysis and discourse theory to investigate the means by which alibrāliyah is 
constructed and changed over the specified period.  
 
 - 92 - 
 
6 Chapter 6: Discursive Analysis of the Texts 
of the Religious Theme 
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6.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents an analysis of six articles that discuss the concept of 
‘alibrāliyah’ in relation to the field of religion. These texts are selected with the assistance 
of the corpus analysis in which it is considered to select the articles where ‘alibrāliyah’ 
collocates frequently with the word ‘Islam’ over time (see section 4.3.1.4 for the detailed 
procedure). The analysis of the articles is presented chronologically to identify whether 
there has been any shift in the debate over ‘alibrāliyah’ in relation to Islam over time. 
These articles presented in chronological sequence are: 
• ةيلاربيللا ةملسأ ‘The Islamisation of ‘alibrāliyah’ by Mohammad Alkanan, Aljazirah 
newspaper, 14/10/2007; tagged (Religion 2007) 
• دئادشلا دنع ىكذلأا ..نوددشتملا  ‘The Extremists... The Smartest at Adversity’ by 
Faris Hizam, Al Riyadh Gazette,01/09/ 2009; tagged (Religion 2009) 
• ةثادحلل دادتما ةيلاربيللا ‘alibrāliyah’ is an extension to ‘ḥadāthah’ by Abdulrahman 
Alshehri, Aljazirah newspaper, 27/01/2011; tagged (Religion 2011) 
• ربيللا وه نميملاسلاا يلا؟  ‘Who is the Islamist’s liberal?’ by Abdulrahman Al-Habib, 
AlJazirah newspaper,17/06/ 2013; tagged (Religion 2013) 
• يسايسلا فيظوتلا و ناسنلاا نيب ناسنلاا قوقح. ‘‘Human Rights’: between Man and 
Political Employment’ by Mohammad Al-Mahmood, Al-Riyadh Gazette, 
19/03/2015; tagged (Religion 2015) 
• ايجولديلاا دعب ام وا ةيلاربيللا ‘‘alibrāliyah’ or Post-Ideologies’ by Mohammad 
Almahmoud, Al-Riyadh Gazette, 14/01/2016; tagged (Religion 2016) 
Each article is analysed in terms of discursive strategies using the Discourse-
Historical Approach12, and then in terms of the semantics of the word ‘alibrāliyah’ and 
the groups involved in the debate according to Discourse Theory. In particular, the 
analysis of each article begins with a summary of the main arguments presented in the 
text, in order to provide an overview of the discussion. Then, the stages of the arguments 
are presented, including the claims made by the author to legitimate their main views. 
This is followed by a discussion of the discursive strategies used in the articles, including 
the topoi and fallacies. The nomination and perspectivisation strategies are also 
presented to determine the overall worldview of the authors and the implications of using 
such strategies. The discussion of the arguments and the strategies used is then 
followed by a presentation of the analysis of the semantics around the term ‘alibrāliyah’ 
and the construction of the groups involved in the debate. This is carried out in order to 
                                               
12 For a detailed analysis of the texts in terms of DHA see Appendix (B)for the analysis of texts in 
Arabic and Appendix (D) for the translated analysed texts. 
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focus on the way ‘alibrāliyah’ is articulated semantically within the arguments and how 
the groups position themselves and others in their attempts to fill ‘alibrāliyah’ with their 
own meanings. This analysis reveals how ‘alibrāliyah’ as an empty signifier is charged 
with meanings over time and the way the different groups attempt to charge it in order to 
gain or maintain hegemony.  
6.2 Discursive analysis of the text ‘ةيلاربيللا ةملسأ’ /‘The Islamisation of 
‘alibrāliyah’’; (Religion 2007) 
6.2.1 Main arguments in the text 
The main argument in this article concerns the idea that it is impossible to 
Islamise ‘alibrāliyah’. In constructing this argument, the author sets up an opposition 
between Islam and ‘alibrāliyah’. He argues that Islam and ‘alibrāliyah’ are two different 
value systems with different sources of legislation and thus that ‘alibrāliyah’ cannot be 
adopted within Islam. He also adds that ‘alibrāliyah’ and Islam are not only different but 
also antagonistic in the sense that they cannot co-exist in one society. This idea of the 
impossibility of co-existence is explained through the author’s argument that the 
existence of ‘alibrāliyah’ means the dislocation of Islam, which implies that the 
‘alibrāliyah’ concept is a threat to Saudi religious society. 
To legitimise the argument that it is impossible to Islamise ‘alibrāliyah’, the author 
begins the article with the claim that the process of Islamisation has been exploited to 
gain intellectual concepts acceptance in religious society. He justifies this claim by 
providing a historical overview of the process of Islamisation that has been applied to 
various cultural concepts and artefacts before being assigned to intellectual concepts. In 
this way, he argues that the act of Islamisation has moved from being acceptable, 
assigned by ‘'ينيدلا رايتلا /the religious group to concepts such as  ‘يملاسلإا بدلأا‘ /Islamic 
literature and يملاسلإا ملاعلإا‘ ’/the Islamic media, to being unacceptable as others trends 
have started to assign it to intellectual concepts. He goes on to argue that the 
Islamisation carried out by religious groups has been rejected by ‘ةيناملعلا’/the secular 
trend, whose objections received no consideration from the religious group. With this 
argument, the author creates a division between two groups; the secular group and the 
religious group by observing that the Islamisation of intellectual concepts is conducted 
by the secular group to gain acceptance in the society he identifies by its religious 
identity, ‘Ummah’. The negative representation of the secular group’s action of 
Islamisation is emphasised with reference to extreme cases of Islamisation, ‘alyasār 
alislāmi’/ Islamic left and ‘alishtirākīyah alislāmīyah’/ Islamic socialism, which are 
concepts that have never been contested in Saudi society.  
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After the negative representation of the Islamisation of intellectual concepts, the 
author moves to introduce ‘alibrāliyah’ as one of these concepts that is now undergoing 
a process of Islamisation. He refers to ‘alibrāliyah’ as 'ةثيدح'/ new to the public; newer 
than the older concept of ‘alilmāniyah'/ ‘secularism’, which the author claims have 
subsided and failed to be established in society. Comparing ‘alibrāliyah’ to 'alilmāniyah'in 
this way implies that ‘alibrāliyah’ is constructed as an extension to secularism and viewed 
as a secular concept. ‘alibrāliyah’ is also described as ‘ةيرط’/ soft, tender and Islamised 
in order to be acceptable and palatable to the public. In this way, the actor responsible 
for the Islamisation of ‘alibrāliyah’ is made clear and labelled as ‘ نييدوعسلا نيفقثملا و باتكلا
نييلاربيللا’/ liberal Saudi intellectuals and writers. Islamic liberalism is represented by the 
author negatively as ‘نيجه’/ hybrid for attempting to combine ‘alibrāliyah’ and Islam, 
implying the impossibility of integration between them. The author then presents the view 
of the Saudi liberals regarding ‘‘allibraliah alislāmīyah’, before refuting it in the next 
section. He states that Saudi intellectuals consider ‘alibrāliyah’ an adjustable means to 
the religion of the society to achieve the freedom of individuals. By presenting the Saudi 
intellectuals’ view of ‘‘allibraliah alislāmīyah’, the author sets up a number of concepts, 
such as the cultural flexibility of ‘alibrāliyah’ and the possible Islamisation of ‘alibrāliyah’, 
which he construes as fallacious in the following section. 
The author argues against the liberals’ view of the possible Islamisation of 
‘alibrāliyah’ by listing the similarities and differences between ‘alibrāliyah’ and Islam and 
the reasons they cannot be integrated. He states that they are similar in that both 
concepts include the values of ‘freedom’, ‘justice’, and ‘equality’. However, he argues 
that their relationship and integration is not decided by these values but the source that 
legislates these values. According to the author, the source of legislation for both 
concepts is different: the source of ‘alibrāliyah’ is ‘لقعلا’/ the human mind, and the source 
of Islam is ‘يحولا’/ prophecy. Thus, their integration is impossible. He clarifies this 
argument from a philosophical perspective, stating that the ‘human mind’ legislates the 
freedom of individuals in ‘alibrāliyah’ by opposing any doctrine, including religion, that 
would take away this freedom. On the other hand, he argues that freedom legislated by 
prophecy in Islam is restricted, because Islam includes rules with restricted freedom in 
terms of human behaviour. This comparison between freedom values legislated by the 
human mind and prophecy establishes an opposition between ‘alibrāliyah’ as a secular 
concept that opposes all sorts of doctrines, including religion, and between the religion 
of Islam. Therefore, to the author, ‘alibrāliyah’ cannot be Islamised due to the 
fundamental difference and antagonism between ‘alibrāliyah’ and ‘Islam’. 
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The author concludes the article by emphasising the impossibility of Islamising 
‘alibrāliyah’. He disproves the notion that ‘alibrāliyah’ is an adjustable means that can be 
adopted in any society by arguing that ‘alibrāliyah’ is an independent concept that is 
legislated by ‘the human mind’ to achieve individual freedom. He implies that ‘alibrāliyah’ 
is a threat by stating that, as the concepts of ‘alibrāliyah’ and Islam are independent, 
adopting ‘alibrāliyah’ would lead to the dislocation of Islam. Furthermore, the author 
emphasises the impossibility of Islamising ‘alibrāliyah’ by re-referring to the secularity of 
what he terms philosophical concepts such as ‘alibrāliyah’, which he argues eliminate 
and reject religious texts and sources; thus, it is impossible to Islamise them and to 
integrate them within Islam.  
To justify the main argument of the impossibility of Islamising ‘alibrāliyah’, the 
author employs a number of discursive strategies. Throughout the article, the author 
uses the reported fallacy of the Islamisation of intellectual concepts including ‘alibrāliyah’, 
stating that integrating Islam with intellectual concepts is a false argument because they 
represent separate independent concepts from different sources. The argumentation 
scheme of the topos of abuse is also used against the group responsible for Islamising 
‘alibrāliyah’ – labelled as ‘liberal Saudi intellectuals’ – to demonstrate how they deceive 
religious Saudi society by Islamising ‘alibrāliyah’ in order to gain acceptance within 
society. In this regard, Saudi religious society is identified through the strategy of 
nomination, with its religious identity implying that it would not accept a secular 
movement and stressing that Islamising intellectual concepts to make them appeal to a 
religious society is an unacceptable action. Another main strategy used to justify the 
impossibility of the Islamisation of ‘alibrāliyah’ is the use of the topos of threat by means 
of stating that ‘alibrāliyah’ is a threat to the ‘Ummah’ and its adoption will lead to the 
dislocation of Islam since both concepts cannot be integrated. The constructed argument 
is mainly made using detachment strategies with the use of the third person voice. This 
non-involvement of the author is strategically employed to strengthen the arguments by 
making them appear objective and factual to the reader. Overall, it can be argued that 
the main argument of the impossibility of adopting ‘alibrāliyah’ within Islam is made from 
a religious perspective, through constructing an opposition between ‘alibrāliyah’ as a 
secular concept and Islam as a religion. This is carried out through the legitimation 
strategy of moral evaluation – comparing the values systems of Islam and ‘alibrāliyah’ 
and concluding that ‘alibrāliyah’ as a secular concept cannot be integrated with God’s 
superior system of Islam. Establishing this opposition between ‘alibrāliyah’ as a secular 
concept and Islam represents a rejection and resistance against ‘alibrāliyah’, which is 
construed as a threat to Saudi religious society.  
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Table 6-1: Main discursive strategies used in 6.2 
6.2.2 Articulation of meanings and groups in terms of Discourse Theory  
In ‘The Islamisation of ‘alibrāliyah’’, ‘alibrāliyah’ is articulated in relation to two 
main concepts: Islam and secularism. It is constructed in opposition to Islam to signify 
the impossibility of the co-existence of the two concepts in one society. ‘alibrāliyah’ is 
also articulated in relation to secularism to present it as a non-religious concept, the 
adoption of which constitutes a threat to Saudi society – which the article refers to as 
‘Ummah’, a term that implies the conflation of national and religious identity.  
In constructing ‘alibrāliyah’ as associated with secularism, the concept is 
articulated with a number of elements that connote secularity. It is first articulated as one 
of the intellectual/philosophical concepts that is formed by non-religious groups. This 
reference to ‘alibrāliyah’ as belonging to non-religious groups indicates its attribution to 
the meaning of secularism as a threat against its existence in religious society – 
‘Ummah’. Furthermore, ‘alibrāliyah’ is constructed in the article as an alternative to the 
failed concept of secularism and thus they are part of the same project. ‘alibrāliyah’ is 
also articulated by the author as a product of an anti-religious source – ‘the human mind’. 
Constructing ‘alibrāliyah’ as a product of a source that opposes religion gives it an anti-
religious secular sense. In this way, ‘alibrāliyah’ and secularism are articulated within the 
logic of difference, as both concepts are represented as one bloc against Islam, and their 
attempt of formation constitutes a threat to the religion of Saudi society. 
Therefore, articulating ‘alibrāliyah’ with the meaning of secularism signifies its 
opposition to religion. Throughout the article, ‘alibrāliyah’ is collocated with Islam, with 
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liberalism is also used recurrently in the article. As this concept has been coined by the 
‘liberal Saudi intellectuals’, the author uses it to refute the liberals’ idea of the possibility 
of Islamising ‘alibrāliyah’. To the author, Islam is misused when assigned to ‘alibrāliyah’ 
by the liberals to gain acceptance in the religious society referred to in the text as 
‘Ummah’. This view represents the author’s rejection of the formation of ‘alibrāliyah’ and 
of assigning it to the dominant religious ideology. In his rejection of the concept of Islamic 
liberalism, he articulates ‘alibrāliyah’ as different from Islam and as antagonistic to it. In 
this regard, ‘alibrāliyah’ is articulated through the fallacy of definition: that it is ‘not an 
adjustable means’ to be integrated with religion and to be adopted. ‘alibrāliyah’ is also 
constructed as different and antagonistic to Islam through the author’s argument that 
they are concepts from different sources. The author refutes the existence of a 
relationship between Islam and ‘alibrāliyah’ by stating that the source of ‘alibrāliyah’ is 
‘the human mind’, whereas the source of Islam is ‘prophecy’. ‘alibrāliyah’ and Islam are 
even constructed as antagonists of each other, since to the author ‘the human mind’ 
source rejects and stands against the religious doctrine in legislating the principles of 
‘alibrāliyah’. This construction of antagonism is emphasised through the author’s 
argument that the existence of ‘alibrāliyah’ means ‘the dislocation of Islam’, which not 
only indicates the impossibility of Islamising it, but also the impossibility of its co-
existence with Islam. Thus, in discourse theory terms, ‘alibrāliyah’ and Islam are 
articulated within the logic of equivalence as their antagonism entails the polarity of the 
two concepts and the existence of one means the dislocation of the other. 
The articulation of ‘alibrāliyah’ with the meaning of secularism and in opposition 
to Islam is made to resist and prevent the formation of the liberal group in Saudi society. 
This is made apparent through the construction of ‘alibrāliyah’ and secularism as one 
bloc in opposition to Islam. The explanation of ‘alibrāliyah’ as a threat, whereby its 
existence entails the dislocation of Islam, also reveals the hegemonic conflict between 
the religious and the liberal groups and demonstrates the vulnerability of the dominant 
religious group to being displaced by the liberal group attempting to gain power in Saudi 
society.  
6.3 Discursive analysis of the text ‘دئادشلا دنع ىكذلأا ..نوددشتملا’/ ‘The 
Extremists… The Smartest at Adversity”; (Religion 2009) 
6.3.1 Main argument in the text 
In this article, the author argues that the voices of the Islamists are louder than 
those of the liberals except during terror attacks, when liberal voices become louder and 
Islamist voices are weakened. According to the author, unlike liberals, Islamists keep 
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silent when a terror incident occurs and do not condemn it. This opposition set up 
between the two groups is manifested discursively in the article through a negative 
representation of Islamists as dangerous and positive representation of liberals as 
harmless.  
From the beginning of the article, Islamists are represented negatively through 
the author’s nomination of them as ‘نوددشتم’/ extremists. The text begins with the author’s 
statement that the rise and fall of the voices of Islamists and liberals is conditioned by 
the time of a terror attack incident. When a terror attack occurs, the voices of the liberals 
are raised to condemn the incident, but the voices of the Islamists are lowered. Then, a 
while after the incident, the liberal voices decrease, and the Islamist voices increase. The 
return of the Islamist voices is portrayed in the article through an exaggerated metaphor: 
‘to the level of ignition’, which emphasises the voices’ strength and volume.  
The argument of the rising and falling of the voices of both groups is supported 
by the author’s assertion that this is the case in the Saudi state, and the use of an 
example of a terror attack carried out on an important figure in Saudi society – His Royal 
Highness the Minister of Interior. The author argues that when the incident took place, 
liberals condemned the attack and Islamists occupied themselves with side issues. By 
arguing that Islamists were busy with side issues, such as the ‘Tash’ series, rather than 
the terror attack, the author is implying that Islamists are ignorant by considering the 
actors from ‘Tash’ more dangerous than the terrorist attacker. This statement also 
demonstrates the author’s construction of Islamists as a danger, which is emphasised 
through a constructed metaphorical image, in which the author portrays the Islamists’ 
returning after the effects of the incident have subsided as coming out of their 
‘قدانخ’/trenches with spears to throw towards their opponents with all their ‘force’, 
‘incitement’, and ‘betrayal’. The usage of the word ‘قدانخ’ / trenches creates an impression 
that Islamists are dangerous by hiding and staying calm during terror incidents and only 
afterwards coming out in all their power to attack their opponents. Through this image, 
the author is intensifying and repeating the argument of the fall and rise of the voices of 
both groups. He emphasises this by stating that the conflict between both groups has 
not changed over the past 75 months.  
By representing the Islamist group as dangerous, the author questions why their 
voices are low at the time of terror incidents and become ‘سرش’ /aggressive once again 
afterwards. This question implies the danger of Islamists through the nomination of 
Islamists as ‘نوددشتملا’/extremists and the description of their voices as ‘سرش’ /aggressive. 
Notably, the author does not answer the question, but instead makes the Islamists 
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responsible for answering it, particularly ‘imams’ and school teachers, which implies that 
they are both characterised by the author as members of the extremist Islamist group. 
He illustrates this responsibility by arguing that imams should have condemned the latest 
terror attack of the attempted assassination of the Minister of Interior at their ‘juma’a’ 
speeches, which occurred eight hours after the attack. To intensify this blame, the author 
questions the number of imams who condemned the attack and gives the reader the 
responsibility of answering this by asking them to recall the juma’a speeches in their 
neighbourhoods. The author also makes an example of the imam of the Prophet’s 
Mosque, who did not condemn the attack in his speech.  
The author further stresses the danger of the Islamist group by questioning the 
number of imams who spoke about the ‘Tash’ series rather than terror attack. He states 
that the answer is a ‘ اكةينطو ةثر ’/national disaster, as more mosques spoke about the 
series than condemned the most dangerous terror attack in the state. The use of the 
term ‘national disaster’ demonstrates the author’s construction of Islamists as a danger 
to the Saudi state as a nation. This is also revealed through the personification of the 
‘mosques’ portrayed as ‘speakers’, which implicates mosques as the platforms of the 
religious group that is a danger to the nation. Moreover, emphasising the attack as the 
most dangerous incident that has not been condemned by Islamists intensifies the 
author’s depiction of the religious group as dangerous.  
The author concludes the article by repeating the argument that religious group 
voices are louder than their opponents’, the liberals, except when terror attacks occur. 
He describes the religious group as ‘ىكذلأا’/smarter than the liberals as they know when 
to speak and when to keep silent. He also represents them as a danger by labelling them 
‘ىوقلأا’/powerful in their extremism. He finally emphasises the danger of the power of 
Islamists with a metaphor in which the extremists are going to flip the table on liberals a 
while after the time of the terror attack.  
Overall in this article, the author employs a national framing in his construction of 
both groups, in which the religious group is constructed as a danger to the nation of 
Saudi Arabia but liberals are constructed as harmless and nationalist by condemning the 
terror attack. Throughout the article, the author uses the predication strategy, whereby 
his construction of liberals as harmless is discursively implied through their opposition to 
the dangerous Islamists. This discursive construction of both groups is employed through 
strategies of argumentation – predominantly the use of the topos of the danger of 
Islamists, in which they are portrayed as ‘extremists’ who by not condemning the terror 
attacks taking place in the country are a powerful threat to society. The author also uses 
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the topos of responsibility, by positioning the Islamists as responsible for extremism 
because they kept silent during the time of the attack described. A nomination strategy 
is also employed, with particular use of the strategy of appraisement to magnify the 
danger of the Islamists by characterising them as extremists. Representing Islamists as 
a danger is also manifested through the involvement strategies of intensifications, 
metaphors, and repetition. An overall legitimation strategy of moral evaluation is also 
employed through the negative evaluation of Islamists as dangerous to the nation and 
extremist, and the positive evaluation of liberals as harmless and nationalist. In 
constructing the religious group as a danger in opposition to the liberal group, these 
strategies represent the power struggle of liberals attempting to gain power in Saudi 
society by dismissing the Islamists’ loyalty to the nation.  
Table 6-2: Main discursive strategies used in 6.3 
6.3.2 Articulation of meanings and groups in terms of Discourse Theory  
In ‘The Extremists… The Smartest at Adversity”, ‘alibrāliyah’ is constructed as 
antagonistic to the extremist religious group. It is articulated as being harmless and 
nationalist, in opposition to the danger Islamists and Islamism pose to the Saudi nation. 
In this sense, ‘alibrāliyah’ is identified through creating an antagonist bloc – the religious 
extremists Islamist group. 
Throughout the article, ‘alibrāliyah’ is not identified or articulated explicitly. 
Instead, it is constructed as antagonistic to the moment of Islamism. By constructing 
Islamists as extremists, ‘alibrāliyah’ and liberals are then implicitly articulated as non-
extremist and harmless. Furthermore, the author constructs the voices of Islamists as 
louder than their liberal opponents’, except when terror attacks occur, when the liberal 
voice is heard while Islamists keep silent. This construction of voices reveals the power 
and dominance of Islamists and Islamism and the weakness attributed to liberals. It also 
signifies ‘alibrāliyah’ with the meaning of nationalism, by constructing Islamists as non-
nationalists for not condemning the attack and liberals as nationalists for doing so. In this 
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of religion. By such identification, the author is excluding the religious Islamist group from 
society. ‘Imams’ and ‘school teachers’ are established as examples of the Islamist group 
that the author excludes from the nation who form a bloc against liberals and ‘alibrāliyah’.  
The construction of extremist Islam as an opponent to ‘alibrāliyah’ represents a 
hegemonic conflict between both groups in which it is particularly difficult for liberals to 
gain hegemony. This is apparent through the author’s construction of the Islamists as 
smarter and more powerful than the liberals. The struggle to gain hegemony is also made 
clear by articulating Islamists as a threat to the nation. These constructions of the 
Islamists as ‘powerful’, ‘smarter’, and ‘extremist’ demonstrates the author’s implication 
of the religious dominant group as responsible for blocking the formation of the liberal 
group. Moreover, the author’s positive construction of liberals as nationalists and 
harmless in opposition to Islamists reveals the liberal attempt to gain hegemony and 
acceptance in religion-dominated Saudi society through the concept of nationalism.  
In summary, in discourse theory terms, ‘alibrāliyah’ and Islamism are articulated 
within the logic of equivalence as two polar groups. While Islamists are articulated with 
the meanings of danger and non-nationalist, liberals are construed as harmless and 
nationalist. Constructing Islamism as a national threat suggests the implication that the 
author regards Islamism as responsible for blocking the existence of liberals. Thus, 
liberals are articulated as the opposite to this threat to gain hegemony and acceptance 
in Saudi society.  
6.4 Discursive analysis of the text ‘ةثادحلل دادتما ةيلاربيللا’/‘alibrāliyah is an 
extension to ‘ḥadāthah’’; (Religion 2011) 
6.4.1 Main arguments in the text 
In this article, the author argues against the critics of ‘alibrāliyah’ and its 
existence. He presents ‘alibrāliyah’ as an ideal concept that should exist in Saudi society. 
He also places the responsibility of the struggle of liberals to exist on the Islamist group. 
He argues that the resistance of Islamists to ‘alibrāliyah’ is similar to their resistance to 
the concept of ‘ḥadāthah’. Using this argument, the author establishes an opposition 
between the liberal group and the Islamists, which is manifested discursively in the 
positive representation of liberals and ‘alibrāliyah’ and the negative representation of 
Islamists and Islamism.  
The author begins the article by using the topos of history to argue that, similar 
to ‘ḥadāthīyūn’, liberals are criticised for their adoption of the concept of ‘alibrāliyah’. He 
claims that liberals should not be criticised because any group cannot completely 
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represent concepts they belong to. He supports this argument with the topoi of logic and 
experience, by claiming that logic and life experience prove the impossibility of complete 
agreement between concepts such as ‘alibrāliyah’ and the people adopting this concept. 
The argument is further supported by the author’s falsifying of the assumption of the 
infallibility of liberals through the use of the reported fallacy of human infallibility to state 
that as all human liberals are fallible, they cannot wholly represent the ideal concept of 
‘alibrāliyah’. This notion of the impossibility of representing a concept due to the fallibility 
of human beings is illustrated with an example related to the religious belief of the critics 
of ‘alibrāliyah’, whereby the author proposes the idea of the impossibility of the complete 
representation of religions by their followers. Through the use of the topos of comparison, 
the author argues that if liberals do not exist because they do not represent ‘alibrāliyah’, 
then it follows a priori that Muslims do not exist as no Muslim can commit completely to 
the ideal principles of Islam.  
The author legitimises his positive representation of ‘alibrāliyah’ by quoting a 
speech given by Dr Alrashed – a liberal intellectual – on the concept of ‘alibrāliyah’. This 
direct speech attributes ‘alibrāliyah’ as a simple concept that promotes freedom of 
choice. It also uses the topos of freedom to state that freedom in ‘alibrāliyah’ is 
determined by a majority, so if the majority chooses to be conservative, then this is their 
freedom of choice. A topos of example of ‘alibrāliyah’ in Western countries is used to 
support the notion of the freedom of ‘alibrāliyah’, whereby an example is given of 
marijuana, which is legal in the Netherlands but not in the UK as the result of the choice 
of the majority. The notion of the freedom of the majority is presented as an advantage, 
because the author argues that this notion of freedom establishes liberals as the most 
closely aligned with all societal groups, as they believe in the rights of Islamists, 
communists, conservatives, nationalists, and socialists.  
The author then moves on to discuss the problem of the existence of ‘alibrāliyah’ 
in Saudi society. He argues that there is a strong resistance by the Islamists against 
‘alibrāliyah’. He states that this resistance is realised through the debate between 
Islamists and liberals, which continues to focus on the relationship between ‘alibrāliyah’ 
and Islam. The strawman fallacy is also employed to demonstrate that Islamists criticise 
the intentions of liberals instead of criticising or discussing the concept of ‘alibrāliyah’. 
Then, the author attacks the Islamist group, accusing them of eliminating ‘alibrāliyah’ in 
Saudi society. Through the use of the topos of abuse, the author states that Islamists 
practise means of suppression against liberals by accusing them of planning to destroy 
religion and spreading immorality in society.  
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The positive representation of liberals and the negative representation of 
Islamists is then discursively used by the author to illustrate the nature of the conflict 
between the groups and the reason for the emergence of ‘alibrāliyah’. The author argues 
that the emergence of ‘alibrāliyah’ in Saudi society is a call for freedom which is not 
supported by the dominant Islamist group. He addresses the Islamist argument that 
‘alibrāliyah’ is unnecessary because Islam supports freedom by countering it with the 
argument that ‘alibrāliyah’ supports freedom as Islam does, and thus it does not oppose 
Islam. He argues that the opposition is not towards Islam as a religion but towards 
Islamists as a group that stands against the freedom of others. Indeed, he labels 
Islamists ‘extremists’ because they supress and eliminate the existence of liberals. The 
topos of freedom is then used in combination with the topos of abuse to state that liberals 
call for freedom but they cannot succeed in the presence of Islamists who prevent this 
freedom. In this sense, the author makes Islamists responsible for the struggle of liberals 
to exist in society.  
The author concludes with the employment of the topos of history to state that 
the suppression and elimination practised by Islamists against liberals is the same 
suppression ‘ḥadāthah’ encountered in the past. He argues that both ‘alibrāliyah’ and 
‘ḥadāthah’ share the same project of social reform, though they differ in form – ‘ḥadāthah’ 
was based on literary form while ‘alibrāliyah’ is based on wider intellectual and cultural 
form. Finally, the author claims that despite these differences, ‘alibrāliyah’ is an extension 
of ‘ḥadāthah’ and complementary to it because they are part of the same project.  
In summary, the author presents the conflict between liberals and Islamists, 
through which liberals are represented positively and Islamists negatively. He nominates 
liberals as advocates for freedom and Islamists as extremists who stand against this 
freedom and who seek to eliminate the existence of ‘alibrāliyah’. The author also refers 
to the idea that this suppression practised by Islamists has occurred before, against the 
concept of ‘ḥadāthah’. In this sense, he presents ‘alibrāliyah’ as an extension of 
‘ḥadāthah’ and both concepts as opponents of Islamists. This argument is discursively 
supported by the topos of history, the topos of abuse enacted by Islamists, and the topos 
of freedom. Involvement strategies are also employed throughout the article, which uses 
a predominantly first-person perspective and personal deictics, particularly when 
addressing the problem of the obstruction caused by Islamists seeking to prevent the 
existence of ‘alibrāliyah’. Nomination strategies are also used, including the strategy of 
classification, whereby the author classifies the different trends that are accepted by 
liberals – ‘socialists’, ‘conservatives’ and ‘communists’ – along with the strategy of 
appraisement which nominates Islamists negatively as ‘ةفرطتم ةعامج’/extremists. The 
 - 105 - 
 
legitimation strategy of moral evaluation is also employed in which liberals are as equally 
fallible as religious people, and Islamists are presented negatively as suppressive and 
extremist. All these strategies are used throughout the article to legitimate the positive 
representation of ‘alibrāliyah’ and liberals and the negative representation of Islamists as 
extremists who supress the freedom of liberals to exist. Overall, this demonstrates the 
struggle of liberals to exist and gain power in Saudi society.  
Table 6-3: Main discursive strategies in 6.4 
6.4.2 Articulation of meanings and groups in terms of Discourse Theory  
 In this article, ‘alibrāliyah’ is constructed in relation to two main concepts: 
‘Islamism’ and ‘ḥadāthah’. ‘alibrāliyah’ is articulated in opposition to the concept of 
Islamism, whereby both concepts are made opponents of each other through the 
author’s presentation of Islamists as an oppressor of the liberal group. On the other hand, 
‘alibrāliyah’ and ‘ḥadāthah’ are articulated as sharing the same objective of social reform 
and as oppressed by the same opponent – the Islamist group. ‘alibrāliyah’ is also 
articulated in relation to other elements that give it positive meanings, in order to for it to 
gain acceptance and hegemony.  
In presenting ‘alibrāliyah’ positively, the author establishes it as an ideal concept 
that seeks freedom. In this way, ‘freedom’ is a node used to create a meaning for 
‘alibrāliyah’ and is articulated in terms of the freedom of the majority. According to the 
author, this freedom aligns ‘alibrāliyah’ with all other groups, including Islamists, because 
it guarantees their freedom. Thus, this sense of the freedom of ‘alibrāliyah’ makes it a 
transcendental signifier that can unite all other identities under it in Saudi society.  
By discussing ‘alibrāliyah’ in relation to transcendental freedom in the article, the 
author observes the obstruction of the dominant Islamist group, arguing that ‘alibrāliyah’ 
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articulates Islamists as ‘oppressors’ of ‘alibrāliyah’ and, as a result, oppressors of 
freedom. This antagonism between ‘alibrāliyah’ and Islamists is manifested around the 
node of freedom, whereby liberals call for freedom, tolerance, and pluralism but Islamists 
do not believe in this sense of freedom. In this regard, the author articulates Islamists as 
‘extremists’ who stand against the freedom of others. Articulating Islamists with the 
meaning of extremism implies their construction as a threat to the existence of freedom 
and ‘alibrāliyah’ in society. In this sense, the concepts of ‘alibrāliyah’ and Islamism are 
constructed within the logic of equivalence, by which the Islamist group is constructed 
as an oppressor to the formation of the liberal group. 
‘alibrāliyah’ is also constructed in relation to the concept of ‘ḥadāthah’, as they 
both share similar experiences in their struggle over hegemony in Saudi society. 
‘alibrāliyah’ and ‘ḥadāthah’ are both represented via the chain of equivalence and in 
opposition to the Islamism of the author’s opponents. This is made clear by articulating 
‘alibrāliyah’ as an ‘extension’ of ‘ḥadāthah’. They are constructed as concepts that are 
different in form but similar in objective, along with sharing the same antagonist. They 
are different in that ‘ḥadāthah’ emerged in a literary form while ‘alibrāliyah’ exists in a 
wider cultural form. However, both identities are made equivalent by the author who 
argued that they have the same demand, which is to call for social reform in Saudi 
society. ‘alibrāliyah’ and ‘ḥadāthah’ are also constructed as one bloc, as they are both 
oppressed by the same antagonist – the Islamist group that prevents them from existing 
and obtaining hegemony. In this sense, they are articulated within the logic of difference, 
whereby they are constructed as different concepts that share the same objective of 
social reform and are oppressed by the same antagonist – the Islamist group.  
Overall, the construction of antagonism between ‘alibrāliyah’ and Islamism is 
clustered around the node of ‘ةيرح’/freedom. While the liberal identity is articulated in 
association with the meaning of the transcendental freedom of groups, the Islamists are 
represented as oppressors of this sense of freedom. This notion implies the strong 
polarity between both groups, in which the existence of one means the dislocation of the 
other since they are in disagreement regarding the sense of freedom. This antagonism 
between Islamists and liberals is also made apparent through the construction of 
Islamists as a threat to the existence of ‘alibrāliyah’, which demonstrates the liberal 
struggle to gain hegemony. This struggle is also represented by the author establishing 
‘ḥadāthah’ and ‘alibrāliyah’ under one bloc, in which both identities encounter resistance 
and oppression from the antagonist dominant Islamist groupin Saudi society.  
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6.5 Discursive analysis of the text ‘يملاسلاا يلاربيللا وه نم’/ ‘Who is the 
Islamist’s Liberal?’; (Religion 2013) 
6.5.1 Main arguments in the text 
In this article, the author argues that liberal Islam is the future in the cultural 
context. This fusion between Islamism and ‘alibrāliyah’ is based on the historical 
progression of culture in the Arab region, whereby it was first characterised by national 
liberal tendencies and then transformed into Islamist movements. He presents the 
concept of ‘alibrāliyah alislāmīyah ’/ Islamic liberalism as a modern progressive fusion, 
as ‘alibrāliyah’ conforms with the principles of Islam. He also argues that this combined 
concept could resolve the conflict between Islamist and liberal groups, but it encounters 
resistance from both groups attempting to limit its existence. These arguments are 
strategically justified with premises and predicates that back these arguments.  
The author begins the article with the claim that the trajectory of the Arab cultural 
scene reveals the state of fusion of the opposites ‘alibrāliyah’ and Islamism. This claim 
is made from a historical perspective using the topos of history to state that this fusion is 
a result of a historical progression in which the evolution of Arab culture from liberal 
nationalism to Islamism will lead to Islamic liberalism in the future. This is further backed 
by Hegel’s historical dialectics, which is based on the idea that unity evolves through 
contradiction, through a process in which an idea turns into its opposites and then this 
contradiction dissolves the idea to produce one united idea. Hegel’s philosophy of 
historical progression is illustrated in this article through the use of the topos of example, 
whereby the author provides contemporary examples of states that have successfully 
transformed from Islamism to ‘alibrāliyah’ whilst retaining the essential values of Islam, 
such as the Islamist liberal parties that are gaining power in Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco.  
The author moves to define the concept of ‘alibrāliyah alislāmīyah’, presenting it 
positively through the employment of predication strategies and a number of positively 
constructed topoi. He argues that ‘alibrāliyah alislāmīyah’ is based on the idea that Islam 
conforms with ‘alibrāliyah’ because liberal values are inherent within Islam. This 
argument is supported with the assertion that ‘alibrāliyah alislāmīyah’ is nominated as so 
as the liberal values are essential to Islam. The topos of rights is also used to present 
‘alibrāliyah alislāmīyah’ as a concept that concerns human rights because Islam 
conforms with the main principles of ‘alibrāliyah’, such as ‘ةيرحلا’/freedom and 
‘ةاواسملا’/equality. In this sense, the author states that ‘alibrāliyah alislāmīyah’ focuses on 
interpreting religious texts in relation to these humanitarian values. This is supported by 
the notion that Islamic liberalism is a progressive concept that focuses on, the 
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reinterpretation of religious texts in a way that suits the current modern circumstances 
rather than relying on the old fundamentalist interpretations.  
The positive representation of the concept of Islamic liberalism is further 
supported by the author’s presentation of the disadvantages of the concepts, ‘alibrāliyah’ 
and Islam, as separate and the advantages of combining it in under one concept. Here, 
the author employs the topos of the disadvantage of the lack of religious texts that deal 
with political issues in detail. Thus, using the topos of advantage, he argues that this 
issue can be resolved by the adoption of ‘alibrāliyah’ within Islamic rule, because 
‘alibrāliyah’ addresses political issues in detail and at the same time conforms with the 
basis of Islam. In this regard, the author also refutes the idea that adopting ‘alibrāliyah’ 
is a secular practice, and instead suggests that its adoption indicates the return to the 
essential principles of Islam that is liberated from the interpretations of fundamentalists. 
In order to stress the positivity of the concept of ‘alibrāliyah alislāmīyah’, the author uses 
the topos of history combined with the topos of authority to state that the concept of 
‘alibrāliyah alislāmīyah’ is not new but was proposed theoretically in earlier centuries by 
renaissance Islamic scholars under a different name; the only difference being that their 
theories have only been acknowledged recently.  
The author then argues that there is a resistance against the existence of 
‘alibrāliyah alislāmīyah’ by two groups – Islamists and liberals. He addresses the 
viewpoints of each group and counters them using fallacious premises. He argues that 
liberal resistance is based on an objection to combining the terms ‘يملاسلإا’/Islamist and 
‘يلاربيللا’/liberal in one concept. According to liberals, the term ‘يملاسلإا’/Islamist means 
‘يلوصأ’/ fundamentalist; thus, fundamentalists and liberals cannot be combined under 
one concept. On the other hand, Islamist resistance is expressed through the topos of 
Islamic law; the author states that they view ‘alibrāliyah alislāmīyah’ as ignorant of the 
fundamental ideologies of Islamic jurisprudence, such as consensus and analogy, and 
as substituting Islamic values for universal ones. The author counters these oppositions 
through the employment of the fallacy of resistance combined with the topos of existence 
to state that this resistance will not eliminate the existence of ‘alibrāliyah alislāmīyah’. He 
also uses the strawman fallacy against both liberals and Islamists, stating that they go 
beyond the rational criticism of ‘alibrāliyah alislāmīyah’ to accuse the intentions of 
Islamist liberals.  
The author concludes the article by emphasising the positive notion of ‘alibrāliyah 
alislāmīyah’. He presents Islamist liberals as modernists since they adopt the Islamic 
rules that are compatible with modern life and society rather than the fundamental 
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traditional rules. He also refers to Islamist liberals as believers in the right of freedom of 
Muslims to select the system that best suits their interests.  
Overall, the concept of ‘alibrāliyah alislāmīyah’ is proposed by the author as a 
progressive concept that suits modern Islamic society by combining ‘alibrāliyah’ and 
Islam. The argument is made from a historio-political perspective and predominantly 
uses the topoi of history, rights, and authority. The nomination strategy of ‘appraisement’ 
is used mainly for a positive representation of ‘alibrāliyah alislāmīyah’ and for a relatively 
negative representation of its opponents – Islamists and liberals who resist the concept. 
By not being personally involved in the argument, the author employs detachment 
strategies to demonstrate an objective factual perspective of ‘alibrāliyah alislāmīyah’. 
This objective view is made further apparent through the use of legitimation strategies of 
authorisation, whereby the article refers to Hegel’s historical dialectics on the fusion of 
concepts alongside the strategy of theoretical rationalisation that is used to present the 
reasons for articulating the concept of Islamic liberalism. It can be argued that this article 
presents a remarkable shift in the discourse of ‘alibrāliyah’ and its relation to Islam 
because, unlike the previous articles, the author attempts here to dissolve the opposition 
between ‘alibrāliyah’ and Islam. This case can be explained in detail from the perspective 
of discourse theory. 
Table 6-4: Main discursive strategies in 6.5 
6.5.2 Articulation of meanings and groups in terms of Discourse Theory  
In ‘Who is the Islamist’s Liberal?’, the author constructs ‘alibrāliyah’ in association 
with the concepts of Islam and Islamism. ‘alibrāliyah’ and Islamism are made equivalent 
within one concept – ‘alibrāliyah alislāmīyah’. In this sense, the proposed concept of 
‘alibrāliyah alislāmīyah’ represents a dispersal of the opposition between the two poles 
‘alibrāliyah’ and Islamism. This is represented by the author’s key claim that ‘alibrāliyah’ 
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In constructing ‘alibrāliyah’ in relation to Islamism, the author breaks down the 
antagonism between the two concepts with new articulations.  
The concept of ‘alibrāliyah alislāmīyah’ is mainly articulated in the sense of 
modernity and modern Islam. According to the author, it is through the adoption of 
‘alibrāliyah’ within Islam that modernity and progression can be achieved in Islamic 
societies. ‘alibrāliyah alislāmīyah’ is articulated in the sense that Islam and ‘alibrāliyah’ 
are compatible concepts, because Islam adopts the general values of ‘alibrāliyah’. These 
values concern human rights, with a particular focus on freedom and equality. However, 
although both concepts are similar in terms of their essential humanitarian values, the 
author argues that they differ in terms of dealing with these values, because Islam deals 
with them broadly in the religious texts but ‘alibrāliyah’ considers them in detail. Thus, 
the author articulates ‘alibrāliyah’ as a concept compatible with Islam since it can offer a 
detailed legislation of the essential values of Islam. In this sense, he excludes the idea 
that ‘alibrāliyah alislāmīyah’ is a secular notion, arguing that ‘alibrāliyah’ is adopted by 
retaining the essential values of Islam and that is employed to interpret these values. 
The author also indicates that a reliance on ‘alibrāliyah’ in the interpretation of the 
religious texts would lead to the renewal of Islam and the creation of a modern version 
that suits current culture. Furthermore, that it would provide liberation from the 
interpretations of fundamentalists, which are based on judgments that were historically 
suitable but are considered now outdated.  
The author argues that ‘alibrāliyah’ needs its antagonist, Islamism, to be 
articulated in modern Islamic societies. In discourse theory terms, Islam here represents 
a necessary antagonistic element to the concept of ‘alibrāliyah’ for it to be formed and 
accepted. It is through this chain of equivalence that the possibility of the articulation of 
‘alibrāliyah’ is made. To the author, the antagonism between ‘alibrāliyah’ and Islamism 
can bring them together, whereby their differences and similarities could be exploited to 
unite them under one identity: ‘alibrāliyah alislamiah’. In this sense, ‘alibrāliyah’ and 
Islamism are articulated within the logic of difference as both concepts are made 
equivalent under one concept: ‘alibrāliyah alislāmīyah’. 
According to the author, there are two antagonistic frontiers that prevent the 
formation of the concept of ‘alibrāliyah alislāmīyah’ – the liberal and the Islamist 
fundamentalist groups. Fundamentalists are articulated in the article as ‘extremists’, as 
they adhere to the old interpretations of religious texts and object to the progressive 
reform of Islam. On the other hand, liberals are constructed as objecting to combining 
‘alibrāliyah’ and Islam in one concept, as they view this as a hidden intention for Islamists 
 - 111 - 
 
to gain power under the label of ‘alibrāliyah’. Both groups are constructed as conducting 
hegemonic practices through which they prevent each other from gaining or maintaining 
power, thus preventing the dispersion of antagonism under the bloc of ‘alibrāliyah 
alislāmīyah’.  
To sum up the argument in terms of discourse theory, the articulation of the 
concept of ‘alibrāliyah alislāmīyah’ represents an attempt to dissolve the antagonism 
between ‘alibrāliyah’ and Islamism. This demonstrates a hegemonic practice of giving 
‘alibrāliyah’ a meaning associated with Islam, constructing it as a desirable modern 
concept for Islamic religious societies. By constructing ‘alibrāliyah’ in association with 
Islam, ‘alibrāliyah alislāmīyah’ is articulated as non-secular since it adopts ‘alibrāliyah’ 
but retains the basic principles of Islam. This construction of ‘alibrāliyah’ and Islamism 
under one bloc in opposition to fundamentalists and liberals reveals a possibility that 
‘alibrāliyah’ could shift from being completely antagonistic to Islam and Islamism to 
equivalent and compatible with Islam in a conservative religious culture such as Saudi 
society.  
6.6 Discursive analysis of the text ‘يسايسلا فيظوتلا و ناسنلاا نيب ناسنلاا قوقح’/ 
‘‘Human Rights’: between Man and Political Employment’; (Religion 
2015) 
6.6.1 Main arguments in the text 
In this article, the author’s key claim is based on the relativity of the concept of 
‘alibrāliyah’. He argues that the adoption of Western-based human rights in any culture 
– including freedom, which is the basis of ‘alibrāliyah’ – should not be absolute but could 
be modified according to the cultural circumstances. In this sense, the author presents 
‘alibrāliyah’ positively, as a concept that adopts human rights and could be relatively 
adopted in the Saudi culture. This is achieved through the employment of discursive 
strategies, particularly the strategies of argumentation and perspectivisation. 
The author begins the article by presenting a historical account of the emergence 
and development of human rights in the West. He argues that during the Renaissance 
era, European civilization started to move away from concerns of abstract metaphysics 
towards the reality of the human. This focus on the human in the West led to the 
formation of principles of human rights. The author refers to the notion that the 
construction of these principles was first relatively linked to theological conceptions. By 
this notion, he implies the possibility of forming human rights initially in association with 
religious perspectives. However, through the topos of advantage he indicates that these 
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humanitarian principles reached their clearest form at the time of the French Revolution, 
which he describes as the beginning of the era of humanity. By linking the achievement 
of humanity to the French revolution, the author implies that human rights can be 
achieved through liberation from the authority of doctrines, including religion.  
The author then claims that the success of the French Revolution led to the global 
spread of human rights. He argues that this spread was also because human rights are 
based on a shared universal human principle, in which all humans are of the same origins 
and are created equal, as well as Western colonisation, which carried the West’s vision 
of rights to the whole globe. The author also attributes the success of the spread of rights 
to globalisation caused by the development of transport and the media, which are viewed 
as products of Western civilization.  
However, despite acknowledging the success of the Western model of human 
rights, the author argues that the adoption of these rights should not be absolute but 
relative. By combining the topos of universality and the topos of relativity, the author 
argues that the Western vision of human rights is universal in terms of its main principles 
but relative in terms of the application and implementation of these principles. He 
stresses the notion of the relativity of these principles in two dimensions: space and time. 
He also indicates that the details of the application of these rights have been modified 
and changed by the West itself over time as the result of critical reviews that seek 
progression and development. With regard to the relativity of these principles in terms of 
space, the author claims that non-Western cultures can adopt fundamental Western 
rights but adjust the application of these principles according to the circumstances of 
their culture. Up to this point, the author employs the detachment strategy through the 
usage of the third-person perspective, through which he gives an account of the history 
of rights in the West and the relativity of their application outside the West.  
Through the employment of involvement strategies, the author then introduces 
‘alibrāliyah’ as a concept that concerns the right of freedom. With the use of first-person 
plural deictics (‘ان’/our, us, ‘نحن’/we), he emphasises the relativity of the Western model 
of human rights by noting how they can employ the concept of ‘alibrāliyah’ that he 
presents positively as ‘the comprehensive philosophy of freedom’. In this argument, he 
constructs an ingroup through the use of collective personal pronouns to highlight the 
possibility of adopting a special version of ‘alibrāliyah’ for inner Saudi culture that is 
different from the Western version. This strategy of the ingroup construction of Saudi 
culture that is distinguished from the Western culture legitimates ‘alibrāliyah’ as a 
concept that can be adjusted to Saudi society. In this regard, the author discusses in 
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detail the means by which ‘alibrāliyah’ could be adopted in Saudi culture. Using the topos 
of relativity in combination with the fallacy of absoluteness, the author argues that the 
sense of freedom in ‘alibrāliyah’ is not absolute but differs from one culture to another, 
depending on their particularities. Thus, it is relative in the sense that it is impossible to 
copy the Western experience of ‘alibrāliyah’ due to the different cultural circumstances. 
He emphasises this idea by constructing the inner ‘alibrāliyah’ of Saudi culture as 
distinctive from the ‘alibrāliyah’ of other cultures, such as the Western world (France, 
Sweden, USA) or the Arab and Islamic world (Tunisia and Egypt).  
The author continuous to legitimate ‘alibrāliyah’ by creating the ingroup and 
outgroup. At this point, he objects and condemns external interference with Saudi affairs 
in terms of the adoption of human rights (lines 158- 207, in Arabic lines 99-130). The 
creation of the outgroup is emphasised through the use of the topos of the abuse of 
external interference. Using Sweden as an example, the author argues that the country 
attempts to impose its vision of rights on Saudi society without understanding the 
complex nature of the Saudi culture. Furthermore, he establishes external attempts to 
interfere as a threat that would affect the sovereignty of the Saudi nation. This notion of 
outgroup threat is followed by establishing the responsibility of the ingroup to avoid this 
threat by working to develop a unique version of rights that suits the inner culture. Using 
the topos of responsibility, the author makes the ingroup, including the reader, 
responsible for cultural changes and social reforms in accordance with human rights, 
using the justice system and women’s rights as an example by claiming that these 
systems are flawed and undergoing reform due to the sense of responsibility inner 
groups have towards the development of their cultures. The author concludes the article 
by emphasising the responsibility of the ingroup to establish and develop a system of 
human rights that is based on Saudi cultural conceptions and not imposed by external 
powers.  
Overall, the author in the article intends to convey the idea that the adoption of 
human rights, with emphasis on the concept of ‘alibrāliyah’, should begin from the inside, 
through an adjustment of universal rights to the cultural conditions of Saudi society. In 
order to legitimate ‘alibrāliyah’ as a concept that focuses on the right of freedom, the 
author employs the topos of history to provide a positive historical account of human 
rights, the topos of relativity to position these rights in space and time, and the topos of 
the responsibility of the ingroup to adopt these rights within Saudi culture. Nomination 
strategies are also used, whereby the author employs the process of ‘association’ using 
the pronoun ‘we’ to implicate himself and the reader as members of Saudi society, and 
the process of ‘disassociation’ to separate Western and Saudi cultures. Similarly, the 
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involvement strategy of the use of first-person plural pronouns is used to create a division 
between the ingroup and outgroup, in which the non-Saudi outgroup is represented as a 
threat to the Saudi nation by imposing their specific models of rights and thus the ingroup 
is responsible for adopting ‘alibrāliyah’ and creating social reform. By presenting the 
adoption of ‘alibrāliyah’ in Saudi culture as necessary to achieving the right of freedom, 
the author delivers these arguments and strategies through the legitimation strategy of 
rationalisation.  
Table 6-5: Main discursive strategies in 6.6 
6.6.2 Articulation of meanings and groups in terms of Discourse Theory  
In this article, ‘alibrāliyah’ is constructed as a concept that concerns the right of 
freedom. It is articulated as a relative concept that can be adopted and modified 
according to the conditions of a particular culture. In constructing the relative meaning of 
the originally Western concept of ‘alibrāliyah’, the author creates a logic of difference 
between Western culture and Saudi culture, in which both groups can adopt ‘alibrāliyah’ 
differently in practice yet still share the same universal principles of human rights. A logic 
of difference is also created between ‘alibrāliyah’ and Saudi culture through the author 
referring to the notion of the possibility of adopting ‘alibrāliyah’ in Saudi society, which 
indicates a dispersal of the antagonism between ‘alibrāliyah’ and conservative Saudi 
culture.  
‘alibrāliyah’ is introduced in this article as the comprehensive philosophy of 
freedom. In this sense, it is articulated around the node of ‘freedom’, which is presented 
as relative according to different cultures. Furthermore, the freedom of ‘alibrāliyah’ is 
constructed as not absolute but differing according to time and space. The construction 
of ‘alibrāliyah’ in relation to time is determined by diachronic development and change 
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to be ‘alibrāliyah’ when it stops evolving. ‘alibrāliyah’ in relation to space is articulated 
around the word ‘ اقثةف ’/culture, whereby it is a product of cultural conditions and meanings. 
To the author, the meaning of ‘alibrāliyah’ is determined by culture, as each culture has 
a distinctive identity that should be considered when adopting ‘alibrāliyah’. Thus, 
‘alibrāliyah’ is seen as a concept that can be modified by a culture to achieve progress 
rather than an absolute static concept imposed on a society.  
It also around the node of culture that the antagonism is created between Saudi 
and non-Saudi cultures, which is established in the article to legitimate the possibility of 
‘alibrāliyah’ existing in a distinctive form for Saudi society in a way that does not 
contradict the essential values of the culture. In this regard, a difference is created 
between the form of ‘alibrāliyah’ that would exist in Saudi society and the liberalism of 
Western culture that produces it, as they differ in their cultural conditions. A difference is 
even created between the ‘alibrāliyah’ of Saudi society and the ‘alibrāliyah’ of Islamic 
and Arab countries in order to emphasise the distinctness of Saudi identity and the need 
to adopt and develop a special version of ‘alibrāliyah’. Legitimising ‘alibrāliyah’ through 
its antagonism towards Western cultures is emphasised with the example of the Swedish 
state, which attempts to impose its vision of rights on Saudi society. This interference is 
presented as unacceptable by the author, as it does not consider the reality of Saudi 
culture. The antagonism is even stressed when establishing this Western interference 
as a threat to the sovereignty of the Saudi nation. Thus, through this antagonism the 
author has attempted to convince the reader that the adoption of ‘alibrāliyah’ and human 
rights should be accomplished from the inside rather than the outside, and the Saudi 
nation is therefore responsible for achieving progress through the implementation of 
human rights in its society.  
It is worth noting here that there is a lack of explicit reference to Islam as a cultural 
component of Saudi society. Unlike the articles previously discussed, which primarily 
focus on the relationship between ‘alibrāliyah’ and Islam, this article is characterised by 
the absence of a debate on Islam. The word ‘Islamic’ is used once in the article to refer 
to the difference between Saudi culture and other Islamic countries, such as Egypt and 
Tunisia. This suggests that the author does not consider religion to be the core identity 
of Saudi culture; instead, national identity is used to identify Saudi society. This is 
apparent in the difference created between Saudi and non-Saudi cultures and in the 
representation of any non-Saudi attempt to impose rights as a threat to the nation. 
However, there is an implicit reference to religion as impeded through the presentation 
of the history of rights in Europe and the claim that these rights were first linked to 
theological perspectives before they reached their purest form at the time of the French 
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Revolution. This claim reveals the author’s impeded analogy between the development 
of rights in the West and in Saudi society, suggesting that human rights including 
‘alibrāliyah’ could be implemented first in relation to cultural religious conceptions and 
then developed in isolation from religion. Overall, this explicit ignorance of Islam as a 
religion suggests that it is not the main element of discussion regarding ‘alibrāliyah’ 
anymore, and the discourse of ‘alibrāliyah’ in the article shifts to be considered in relation 
to national discourse.  
In summary, ‘alibrāliyah’ in this article is constructed around the nodes of 
‘ةيرح’/freedom and ‘ةفاقث’/culture. It is articulated as a concept that concerns the human 
rights of freedom universally. However, it is constructed in relation to the element of 
culture in order to state the notion of relativity in its application, which can differ from one 
culture to another. This notion of ‘alibrāliyah’ as relative to culture is constructed through 
the creation of a difference between Saudi and non-Saudi cultures, including Western 
and Islamic/Arab cultures. Saudi culture is articulated in this article through national 
identity rather than religious identity. This is made clear by the author holding Saudis 
responsible for adopting rights and constructing any interference from other cultures as 
a threat to the Saudi state. These strategies of articulation indicate the author’s intention 
to legitimise ‘alibrāliyah’ in Saudi society by shifting the debate to the national discourse 
in order to gain acceptance and hegemony for ‘alibrāliyah’.  
6.7 Discursive analysis of the text ‘  دعب ام وا ةيلاربيللاتايجولويديلإا /‘‘alibrāliyah’ or 
Post-Ideologies’; (Religion 2016) 
6.7.1 Main arguments in the text 
In this article, the author argues that ‘alibrāliyah’ is an alternative to totalitarian 
ideologies, including religious ideologies. By suggesting ‘alibrāliyah’ as an alternative to 
collective ideologies, the author sets up an opposition between ‘alibrāliyah’ as a post-
ideology and fundamental Islam as an ideology. This opposition suggests that 
‘alibrāliyah’ is equal to non-fundamental Islam against ideological fundamental Islam. In 
this regard, the author views ‘alibrāliyah’ in the sense of non-fundamentalism as the 
solution to the conflicts caused by fundamental clashing ideologies in the Islamic and 
Arab world.  
In setting up an antagonism between ‘alibrāliyah’ and collective ideologies, the 
author represents ‘alibrāliyah’ positively and ‘ideology’ negatively. Just after beginning 
the article with the argument that ‘alibrāliyah’ is the alternative to clashing ideologies in 
the Arab and Islamic world, the author justifies this argument by introducing the concept 
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of ‘ideology’, representing it negatively (lines 14- 38, in Arabic lines 10-27). Through the 
use of the topos of disadvantage, the author attributes ideology as ‘فئازلا يعولا’/ false 
consciousness, which represents the opposite to science and rational thinking (line 17, 
in Arabic line 12). This attribution of ideology as false consciousness is supported by the 
author’s justification that ideology is naturally ‘dogmatic’ as it includes a set of ideas 
represented as assumed facts that does not allow for scientific or rational thinking. In this 
sense, dogmatic ideologies are constructed in opposition to science and rationality, with 
religion given as an example of a dogmatic doctrine (lines 19-21, in Arabic lines14-19). 
The author also justifies his attribution of ideology as false consciousness by referring to 
the ideological practice of using utopian premises to present an imagined alternative to 
what he calls the actual misery situation by speaking to the emotions of the crowd rather 
than their minds. 
On the other hand, ‘alibrāliyah’ is represented positively as a good alternative to 
the concept of ideology (lines 38-70, in Arabic lines 28-47). Using the topos of advantage, 
the author identifies ‘alibrāliyah’ in contrast to ideology, attributing it as relative, non-
dogmatic, and self-criticising. By introducing ‘alibrāliyah’, the author demonstrates that 
‘alibrāliyah’ has some of the negative features of ideology, including the promotion of 
utopian ideas. However, it opposes ideology in its collective sense by being non-
dogmatic and instead a subject of constant criticism and change. In this sense, the author 
presents ‘alibrāliyah’ as a relative concept that, unlike collective ideologies, is dependent 
on the latest scientific research rather than emotions or imagination. Through this 
positive characterisation of ‘alibrāliyah’, the author argues that ‘alibrāliyah’ opposes 
collective ideologies through its concern with the notion of individuality. This opposition 
is made clear with the argument that ‘alibrāliyah’ is not an ideology in the negative sense 
of collectivity, and that it can be considered an ideology only in the sense of freedom of 
individuals, The opposition between ‘alibrāliyah’ and collective ideologies is further 
stressed in the article through the identification of ‘alibrāliyah’ as the ideology of liberation 
from collective ideologies.  
The author then highlights these negative and positive representations by 
identifying first the negative consequences of ideology followed by the positive 
consequences of ‘alibrāliyah’. Through the employment of the topos of negative 
consequences, ideology is described as resulting in ‘ماهوأ’/ illusions through which 
nothing is achieved, especially at an individual level. Negative consequences are also 
illustrated by the author using the topos of the example of the Muslim world, which lives 
in conflict as a result of dominant religious collective ideologies. By referring to Islam as 
a collective ideology, the author highlights the notion that religion can only be considered 
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an ideology when it includes fundamental ideas. This demonstrates the author’s 
distinction between Islam as a non-collective ideology and fundamental Islam, which 
represents an ideology in the negative sense.  
‘alibrāliyah’, on the other hand, is characterised positively as resulting in the 
liberation of individuals from the conflicts of fundamental religious collective ideologies . 
According to the author, this liberation entails moving the individuals from conflicts with 
others to conflict with the self. In this sense, he constructs ‘alibrāliyah’ as a 
transcendentalist notion in which individuals are capable of achieving success for 
humanity through relying on the self rather than depending on collective ideologies that 
result in conflicts and corruption. It is through this sense of transcendentalism that the 
author proposes ‘alibrāliyah’ as an alternative to fundamental Islamic collective 
ideologies, arguing that it guarantees the progress of the world where individuals work 
on self-conflicts, needs, and intuitions.  
By concluding the article with the positive consequences of ‘alibrāliyah’, the 
author is strategically intending to give the reader a final positive impression of 
‘alibrāliyah’ as a good alternative to collective ideologies. This argument of altering 
fundamental collective ideologies with ‘alibrāliyah’ as a post ideology is also strategically 
manifested through the topos of the advantages of ‘alibrāliyah’ in opposition to the topos 
of the disadvantages of collective ideologies. The topoi of the negative consequences of 
ideologies and the positive consequences of ‘alibrāliyah’ are also employed to give a 
negative representation of ideology and positive representation of ‘alibrāliyah’. 
Furthermore, predication strategies are used by the author to present ideology negatively 
as dogmatic and false consciousness in contrast to ‘alibrāliyah’ as relatively non-
dogmatic and self-criticising. ‘alibrāliyah’ is also referred to as a transcendental concept 
in separation from collectivity, in which social progression can be achieved by relying on 
individuals striving for success. These arguments and predicates are made using 
detachment strategies whereby the author uses the third-person voice. This use of 
detachment strategies gives the argument an objective factual dimension, which 
constitutes a persuasive strategy. The arguments are also constructed using the 
legitimation strategy of ‘instrumental rationalisation’, whereby the author refers to the 
advantageous consequences of ‘alibrāliyah’ in contrast to the disadvantageous 
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Table 6-6: Main discursive strategies in 6.7 
6.7.2 Articulation of meanings and groups in terms of Discourse Theory  
In a general sense, ‘alibrāliyah’ is discursively constructed in this article as 
antagonistic to the signifier of ideology, particularly Islamic fundamentalist collective 
ideology. In this sense, the author constructs ‘alibrāliyah’ and non-collective Islam under 
one bloc against collective Islam. By constructing ‘alibrāliyah’ and non-fundamental 
Islam in opposition to fundamental Islam in this way, two blocs are created within the 
logic of equivalence which can be considered two antagonistic poles. On the other hand, 
the construction of ‘alibrāliyah’ and non-collective Islam in one group implies a logic of 
difference by which the dispersal of antagonism between ‘alibrāliyah’ and Islam is 
represented by the equation of ‘alibrāliyah’ with Islam in terms of non-fundamentalism. 
These antagonistic constructions are employed mainly through the articulation of 
‘alibrāliyah’ with elements that indicate the meaning of individuality in opposition to 
fundamental ideologies that are constructed in association with the meaning of 
collectivity.  
‘alibrāliyah’ is articulated in the article through the disadvantages of its antagonist 
collective ideologies. As the concept of fundamental collective ideology is constructed 
with the moments of dogmatism, irrationality, and emotions, ‘alibrāliyah’ is constructed 
with the opposite elements: through the advantages of being non-dogmatic, relative, 
rational, and scientific. These moments of ideology are used to represent the negative 
meaning of collectivity, through which the collective is driven by a dogma advocated for 
through speaking to the emotions of those collectives. On the other hand, ‘alibrāliyah’ is 
articulated as opposite to collectivity; that is, with the meaning of individuality. In this 
sense, ‘alibrāliyah’ is constructed with the meaning of individual freedom through the 
presentation of it as relative; it is shown to be non-dogmatic and subject to constant 
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‘alibrāliyah’ is also articulated through the elements of the consequences of the 
opposing collective ideologies. According to the author, fundamental collective 
ideologies result in illusions and conflicts. Therefore, ‘alibrāliyah’ is presented as an 
alternative to collective ideologies because it would result in the liberation of individuals 
from these conflicts and the achievement of progress for human beings. In this sense, 
‘alibrāliyah’ is proposed as a transcendental concept that would guarantee individuals 
success and achievements to the world they live in. It is through this transcendentalism 
that the author suggests ‘alibrāliyah’ as a dislocation of collective ideologies, in which its 
transformation into imaginary will result in positive consequences for Saudi society.  
The author conveys this idea of altering collective ideologies with the 
transcendental concepts of ‘alibrāliyah’ by suggesting substituting fundamental Islamic 
ideologies that cause conflicts in the Muslim world with ‘alibrāliyah’. This establishing 
‘alibrāliyah’ as antagonistic to fundamental Islam suggests that ‘alibrāliyah’ in its 
transcendental sense is equivalent to non-fundamental Islam, though this later sense of 
Islam is absent in the text. This absence of Islam in the non-fundamental sense indicates 
that Islam is no longer an element of the discourse of ‘alibrāliyah’. In the articles 
previously discussed, ‘alibrāliyah’ was constructed as antagonistic to Islam, then as 
complementary to it, and finally it was discussed in isolation from any religious discourse. 
In ‘‘alibrāliyah’ or Post-Ideologies’, ‘alibrāliyah’ is constructed at a higher level of 
articulation in relation to Islam, through an equivalence across difference, whereby 
‘alibrāliyah’ is constructed in antagonism with fundamental Islam and in agreement with 
non-fundamental Islam. This higher level of articulation suggests a shift in the 
construction of ‘alibrāliyah’ from being antagonistic to Islam in general to an antagonist 
of fundamental Islam in particular. This shift in the discourse of ‘alibrāliyah’ demonstrates 
a hegemonic practice by liberals to gain acceptance and success in forming a liberal 
identity.  
Overall, ‘alibrāliyah’ is constructed as an antagonist of collective fundamental 
ideologies, and primarily in opposition to fundamental Islam. It is articulated in relation to 
individuality, which includes non-dogmatic, relative, and scientific meanings that oppose 
the nature of fundamental Islamic ideologies. Through this antagonism of ‘alibrāliyah’ to 
fundamentalism, the author implies the articulation of ‘alibrāliyah’ in equivalence to non-
fundamental Islam. This sense of the individuality of ‘alibrāliyah’ in relation to non-
dogmatic Islam implies its association with transcendentalism and individual religion. 
This indicates a shift in the discourse regarding ‘alibrāliyah’, whereby it has become 
linked to non-fundamental Islam and individuality in religious practice in contrast to the 
earlier debate in which it was seen simply as antagonistic to Islam. This precise 
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articulation of ‘alibrāliyah’ and its diachronic shift suggests that ‘alibrāliyah’ is signifying 
success and transformation from a myth based to a social imaginary in the modern Saudi 
Arabia.  
6.8 Discussion and Conclusion  
Throughout the articles analysed in this chapter – which were written in the time 
span of 2007 to 2016 – the discourse of ‘alibrāliyah’ in relation to Islam shifts. At the 
beginning of the period, ‘alibrāliyah’ is seen as antagonistic to Islam, shifting into being 
an antagonist of Islam in its fundamental form and then as equivalent to non-fundamental 
Islam towards the end of the period. This shift in the articulation of ‘alibrāliyah’ is carried 
out through filling the signifier of ‘alibrāliyah’ with meanings to create an identity for 
progressives in the Saudi socio-political field. These articulations are even created by 
the opponents of ‘alibrāliyah’, whereby its proponents intertextualise some of these 
articulations and counter them with a number of argumentative devices to identify them 
positively with the opposite meanings. These meanings form the features of the 
discourse of liberalism in relation to religious discourse in Saudi Arabia, which can be 
illustrated and summed up by the following themes identified within the articles. 
• Relativity  
In terms of the notion of relativity, ‘alibrāliyah’ has shifted from being non-flexible 
with Islam at the beginning of the period into being a flexible concept that can be relatively 
employed within the religious culture of Saudi Arabia. The text labelled (religion 2007), 
argues that ‘alibrāliyah’ is not a relative concept that can be integrated with the system 
of Islam. This argument is made from the perspective that ‘alibrāliyah’ represents a 
different value system to Islam in which the system of ‘alibrāliyah’ stems from a human 
source whereas the source of Islam is prophecy. However, in the middle of the period, 
specifically in text (religion 2013), ‘alibrāliyah’ is viewed as a flexible concept that can be 
integrated with Islam to construct a concept called ‘alibrāliyah alislamiah’. This argument 
suggests that ‘alibrāliyah’ conforms with Islam as both systems have shared values; thus, 
‘alibrāliyah’ can offer modern interpretations of Islamic texts that suit modern societies. 
The relativity of the concept of ‘alibrāliyah’ is discussed in detail towards the end of the 
period, in which it is viewed as an originally Western universal concept that is not 
absolute in application but relative based on cultural circumstances. In the text (religion 
2015), the author argues that the universal concept of ‘alibrāliyah’ can be adjusted to the 
cultural conditions of Saudi society so it does not contradict the essential values of Saudi 
culture. However, in contrast to text (religion 2013), which presents the religion of Islam 
as the essential system, the text (religion 2015)considers Saudi culture the essential 
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system through which ‘alibrāliyah’ should be adopted. This suggests that the discourse 
of ‘alibrāliyah’ is less linked to Islam as a religion towards the end of the period and more 
linked to the broader concept of culture at the national level.  
 
• Secularity vs. Fundamentalism 
Throughout the articles, the articulation of ‘alibrāliyah’ shifts from the meaning of 
secularism to the meaning of non-fundamental Islam. For example, in the text (religion 
2007) ‘alibrāliyah’ is equated with the concept of secularism. It is presented as a non-
religious concept that is derived from a secular origin that constitute a threat to Saudi 
society, nominated with the religious identity ‘Ummah’. However, in text 6.5 ‘alibrāliyah’ 
is considered a non-secular concept in the sense that it conforms with the essential 
values of Islam. It is also presented as against fundamentalism and old fundamental 
interpretations of religious texts. At the end of the period, ‘alibrāliyah’ is constructed in 
opposition to fundamentalism and fundamental Islam. In this sense, the author in text 
(religion 2016) equates ‘alibrāliyah’ with non-fundamental Islam that seeks the freedom 
of individuals against fundamental totalitarian ideologies. 
 
• Individuality vs. Collectivity  
With regard to the sense of individuality and the freedom of individuals, the first 
five articles associate ‘alibrāliyah’ in general with the value of freedom without discussing 
it specifically in relation to the concept of individuality. The author of the text (religion 
2016) discusses this in detail, by linking ‘alibrāliyah’ to the notion of individuality in 
opposition to the sense of collectivity. ‘alibrāliyah’ is presented in the text as an 
alternative to collective ideologies, including fundamental Islamic ideologies. It is 
articulated as a non-ideology that seeks to liberate individuals from dogmatic totalitarian 
ideologies. In this sense, it is associated with the notion of transcendentalism that 
believes in the independence of individuals to achieve success and progress for the 
world they live in.  
The articulation of the meanings of ‘alibrāliyah’ cannot be separated from the 
construction of the groups involved in the debate. With the shift identified in the meaning 
of ‘alibrāliyah’, from being an antonym to Islam to a synonym to non-fundamental Islam, 
the articulation of the groups has also shifted; the relationship between liberal 
progressives and religious groups shifts from the liberals being antagonistic to Islamists 
to being antagonistic to fundamental Islamists. In Discourse Theory terms, a notable 
antagonism exists at the beginning of the period between the religious group and the 
liberal group, which is created within the logic of equivalence, whereby both groups 
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represent two antagonistic poles. However, by the middle of the period, this antagonism 
is dissolved and ‘alibrāliyah’ becomes equivalent to Islam and constructed under one 
bloc named ‘alibrāliyah alislāmīyah’. Towards the end of the period, the relationship 
between the groups achieves a higher level of articulation, in which liberals are created 
as antagonists of fundamental Islamists and equivalent to non-fundamental progressive 
Islamists.  
The mechanism of the shift in the relationships between the groups can be 
discussed in particular in terms of the presentation of these groups in the articles. For 
example, in the article labelled (religion 2007) liberals are presented as seculars who 
constitute a threat to religious society (Ummah). This forms a rejection of the formulation 
of the liberal group, implying that the existence of liberals means the dislocation of 
religious identity. However, texts (religion 2009) and (religion 2011) stand with the 
liberals against the religious dominant group, by referring to the religious group as a 
dangerous extremist group that opposes the formation of the liberal group. By 
constructing the groups within the logic of equivalence, these three articles present the 
struggle to maintain or gain hegemony in the Saudi socio-political field. This antagonism 
is dissolved in text (religion 2013), which proposes that liberals and Islamists can be 
united under one identity. This construction further shifts in texts (religion 2015) and 
(religion 2017), in which the articulation of the liberal group becomes more defined: Saudi 
liberal identity is presented as dependent on cultural conditions based on non-
fundamental Islam against fundamental Islam. This shift suggests that liberals could be 
successful in finding a way to form an identity in the Saudi socio-political field and to turn 
‘alibrāliyah’ into a social imaginary. 
6.9 Summary  
The analysis of the texts in this chapter has yielded a number of results in relation to the 
way alibrāliyah is articulated along with the relation between the groups over time. It 
reveals that the articulation of alibrāliyah shifts from being opponent to Islam in general 
at the beginning of the period into being opponent to fundamental Islam plus equivalent 
to non-fundamental Islam at the end of the period. This shift presents the process of 
filling alibrāliyah with meanings to either gain or maintain hegemony in the Saudi socio-
political field. It suggests that liberals succeed in their attempt to create an identity in the 
Saudi society through charging alibrāliyah with their own meaning and attempting to 
transform it into a social imaginary. The overall suggestions of these findings will be 
drawn on, in combination with the results of chapter 7, at the end of chapter 8.     
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7 Chapter 7: Discursive Analysis of the Texts 
on the Theme of Human Rights  
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7.1 Introduction  
This chapter will present an analysis of six articles that discuss the concept of 
‘alibrāliyah’ in relation to the field of human rights. The texts were selected based on the 
corpus analysis, in which it was decided to select the articles where ‘alibrāliyah’ 
collocates frequently with the word ‘ةيرح’/ freedom over time (see Section 4.2.1.4 for the 
detailed procedure). The analysis of the articles will be presented chronologically in order 
to identify whether there is any shift in the debate over ‘alibrāliyah’ in association with 
the notion of freedom over time. The selected articles, presented in chronological order, 
are: 
• نوعودخملا نوتوبكملا نوربيللا و ربيللا ‘alibrāliyah’ and the Deceived and Oppressed ‘Liberal 
Figures’, by Tawfiq Alsaif, Okaz Gazette, 17/10/2007; tagged (Rights 2007) 
• ؟تاعمتجملا لكل ةبسانم ةيلاربيللا له ‘Is ‘alibrāliyah’ Suitable to All Societies?’ by 
Abdulrahman Alhabib, Al-Jazirah newspaper, 22/06/2009; tagged (Rights 2009)  
• ؟ةيوضوف مأ ةيرح ةيلاربيللا. ‘alibrāliyah’: Freedom or Chaos?’ by Abdullah Alsa’wi, Al-
Jazirah, 27/01/2011; tagged (Rights 2011) 
•  ةيدوعس ةهكنب ةيلاربيل  ‘Liberalism with Saudi Flavour’, by Ahmed Fakeah, OKAZ 
Gazette, 21/04/2013; tagged (Rights 2013) 
• ةيلاربيللاو ةيرحلا نيب كابتشلاا ضف ‘Breaking the Engagement between Freedom and 
‘alibrāliyah’, by Mohammad Alkana’n, Al-Jazirah newspaper, 31/12/2015; tagged 
(Rights 2015) 
• يديلقتلا مهفلا ءوس و ةيلاربيللا ةيرحلا ‘Freedom of ‘alibrāliyah’ and the Conventional 
Misunderstanding’, by Mohammad Al-Mahmoud, Al-Riyadh Gazette,15/09/2016. 
; tagged (Rights 2016) 
Each article will be analysed in terms of the discursive strategies used, following 
the Discourse-Historical Approach13, and then in terms of the semantics of the word 
‘alibrāliyah’ and the groups involved within the debate following the Discourse Theory. 
The analysis of each article will begin with a summary of the main arguments in the text 
in order to provide an overview of what the text is debating. This will be followed by 
presenting the different stages of the arguments, including the claims made by the author 
over the course of the article to legitimate their overall views. This will be followed by a 
discussion of the discursive strategies used in the articles, including the topoi and 
fallacies used; in addition, the nomination and perspectivisation strategies will be 
presented in order to determine the overall worldview and the implications behind the 
use of these strategies. The discussion of the arguments and underlying strategies will 
be followed by an analysis of the semantics surrounding the term ‘alibrāliyah’ and the 
                                               
13 For a detailed analysis of the texts in terms of DHA see Appendix (B)for the analysis of texts in 
Arabic, and Appendix (D) for the translated analysed texts. 
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construction of the groups involved in the debate. This is carried out in order to focus on 
the way ‘alibrāliyah’ is articulated semantically within the arguments, as well as how the 
groups position themselves and others in their attempt to fill ‘alibrāliyah’ with their own 
meanings. This analysis will reveal how ‘alibrāliyah’, as an empty signifier, is charged 
with meanings over time, and the way that the different groups attempt to charge it in 
order to gain or maintain hegemony. 
7.2 Discursive Analysis of ‘نوعودخملا نوتوبكملا نوربيللا و ربيللا’/ ‘alibrāliyah’ and 
the Deceived and Oppressed ‘Liberal Figures’; (Rights 2007) 
7.2.1 Main arguments in the text  
In this article, the author’s key claims are based on refuting the argument of an 
anti-liberal columnist, Ayed, in relation to the meaning of ‘alibrāliyah’. The author employs 
a process of intertextuality through which he counters the arguments made by Ayed in 
an article on alibrāliyah published in Alwatan newspaper. The author argues that defining 
alibrāliyah by reducing it to the concept of freedom, as Ayed had done in the article, is 
‘useless’, stating that the meaning of a word extends beyond its etymological definition. 
The author also counters the arguments that Saudi intellectuals do not understand the 
meaning of alibrāliyah and that the principles of alibrāliyah are deceptive slogans, 
concluding that these are false arguments. The counter-arguments the author puts forth 
represent a challenge to the legitimacy of anti-liberals defining ‘alibrāliyah’ in the Saudi 
context.  
The author begins the article by presenting a counter-argument to Ayed’s claim 
that ‘alibrāliyah’ means freedom, describing this definition as useless. This fallacy is used 
to undermine the etymological approach of Ayed, implying that ‘alibrāliyah’ is more 
meaningful than suggested and has contextual meanings beyond its etymological 
meaning. The author also undermines Ayed’s argument regarding the meaning of 
alibrāliyah by using the topos of uselessness to state that this useless definition is not 
needed by Saudi newspaper readers and ‘intellectuals’, suggesting that they are 
sufficiently knowledgeable about alibrāliyah. The author here implies that key social and 
philosophical signifiers such as ‘alibrāliyah’ do not derive their meaning from their 
historical origins alone, and that consequently it is the duty of intellectuals to define them 
in more sophisticated ways than is offered by Ayed.  This act of undermining Ayed’s 
definition is constructed through a very high-level use of involvement strategies, most 
particularly the ironic tone that runs throughout the article, for example when the author 
states: “ ىزجف لله بتاكلا اريخ ىلع هذه دئاوفلا ةميظعلا ”/’May Allah reward Ayed for these great 
benefits’. This involvement strategy of using an ironic tone presupposes a shared 
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superior knowledge in readers, as the author is suggesting that both he himself and the 
readers can see the uselessness of the etymological definition and that they are 
therefore more sophisticated than Ayed and in a better position to participate in learned 
discussions on the topic.  
The author continues to delegitimise Ayed’s ideas through counter-arguing the 
claim that Saudi intellectuals do not understand what ‘alibrāliyah’ means. In this 
argument, the author employs a number of reported fallacies. Through their use of irony 
and overenthusiastic praising of Ayed’s evidence, the author makes it clear that he views 
Ayed’s arguments as arising from the fallacy of definition, that is to say, that Ayed 
assumes that because a word has certain origins or etymology, that its meaning should 
be clear and constant in relation to these origins.  The author also suggests that Ayed’s 
arguments are invalid as they employ the fallacy of knowledge. This fallacy of knowledge 
is reported to delegitimise Ayed’s rationality and authority to define ‘alibrāliyah’. These 
fallacies comprise an implicit topos of non-legitimisation that aims at indicating that the 
anti-liberal Ayed does not have the authority to define alibrāliyah. The reference in this 
argument to ‘muthaqafeen’/intellectuals, who Ayed claims do not understand alibrāliyah, 
indicates that intellectuals are the actors identified amongst Saudis by Ayed as not 
understanding what ‘alibrāliyah’ might mean.  This indicates Ayed’s opposition to 
intellectuals, in which the latter includes the author, who is aligned to the reader.  
The author’s ironic praise also extends to Ayed’s claims that ‘huriah’/freedom and 
‘musawah’/equality are also terms that have deceived intellectuals.  The implicit rebuttal 
of this claim relies on a topos of freedom and therefore situates the argument within the 
realms of an egalitarian and humanistic intellectual tradition, rather than an authoritarian 
and theological tradition. The topos/fallacy of uselessness is used by the author in an 
ironic style, stating that the that politicians and intellectuals are easily deceived by liberal 
principles, more easily even than fishmongers. The author is here clearly suggesting that 
Ayed’s undermining of politicians and intellectuals is false, and that, contrary to Ayed’s 
claim, both groups are knowledgeable and critical in their thinking.   The fallacy of threat 
of liberal principles is also used sarcastically to indicate that the principles of freedom 
and equality do not lead to ‘ةينوساملا’/ freemasonry. Instead, using the topos of 
humanitarianism, the author indicates that freedom and equality are the highest human 
values, in order to delegitimise Ayed’s argument regarding the threat of these values. 
The author ends the article by highlighting grammatical error to reaffirm the 
uselessness of Ayed’s definition. Specifically, the author refers to the grammatical 
mistake made by Ayed when he wrote that the meaning of ‘alibrāliyah’ will not come from 
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‘librāliūna’, instead of ‘librāliīna’. The author states here ironically that Ayed might mean 
by ‘librāliūna’, the wrong grammatical plural form of liberals, people other than 
‘librāliīna’/‘the correct grammatical plural form of liberals’. By highlighting this 
grammatical mistake, the author is not only delegitimising Ayed’s knowledge but 
undermining his ability to construct grammatically correct sentences, thus representing 
him as entirely unfit to participate in an intellectual debate.  
Throughout the article, the author employs several argumentation strategies, 
though primarily uses the reported fallacy of definition, the fallacy of the threat of 
‘alibrāliyah’, and the topos of uselessness to delegitimise Ayed’s anti-liberal vision of 
alibrāliyah. Within this argument, the author also uses also nomination strategies to 
ironically construct Ayed’s view on liberals through the process of over-determination, 
for example ‘the deceived oppressed’, and uses the first-person plural pronoun in order 
to align with the reader. The latter decision indicates the use of attachment strategies, 
through which the author identifies with the reader against the anti-liberals. Intensification 
strategies are also used, such as in the repetition of the main argument. All of these 
strategies are delivered in a rhetorical ironic style intended to undermine the anti-liberal 
definition of ‘alibrāliyah’ through, in Van Leeuwen (2007) words, the delegitimisation of 
theoretical rationalisation.  
Table 7-1: Main Discursive Strategies in 7.2 
7.2.2 Articulation of meanings and groups in terms of Discourse Theory   
The author in this article delegitimises the anti-liberal authority to define 
‘alibrāliyah’. In so doing, the author opposes the meanings of ‘alibrāliyah’ provided by 
anti-liberals, though this is not articulated at this stage as a single definition but left open 
to extend beyond the etymological definition. Thus, the author’s articulations are based 
on opposing the antagonist’s definition of ‘alibrāliyah’, along with challenging their 
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define ‘alibrāliyah’, and so creates an antagonism between the group that is legitimately 
able to define the concept and those who are not.  
The opposition to the anti-liberal definition of ‘alibrāliyah’ is constructed by 
undermining the provided meaning in terms of its simplicity and perceived uselessness. 
The author states that ‘freedom’ as a connotation of ‘alibrāliyah’ is false, especially in the 
negative sense claimed by anti-liberals. The author also made reference to the 
uselessness of the summarised etymological definition of ‘alibrāliyah’ by anti-liberals, 
which does not fully describe the meaning of ‘alibrāliyah’. Hence, the author is 
simultaneously keeping the meaning and use of ‘alibrāliyah’ open while delegitimising 
the right of Ayed to define alibrāliyah and undermining the etymological meaning he 
provides. 
Though the author does not offer any explicit definition of ‘alibrāliyah’, it is implied 
that some concepts are connotations of ‘alibrāliyah’. In particular, the author opposes 
Ayed’s anti-liberal view that the concepts of ‘freedom’, ‘brotherhood’ and ‘equality’ are 
deceiving concepts of ‘alibrāliyah’, instead implicitly identifying these concepts as the 
highest human values. This indicates that these concepts are seen by ‘alibrāliyah’ 
advocates at this stage as related to the concept of ‘alibrāliyah’, though in a general 
sense. Accordingly, ‘alibrāliyah’ is here linked by the author to these three concepts, 
which represent the semantic domain of humanist principles of social justice. In addition, 
the author’s argument that politicians and political scientists are those who are 
legitimately able to debate alibrāliyah indicates that alibrāliyah is seen as associated with 
the semantics of politics and political science. Through this argument, the author is 
suggesting that the semantics of ‘alibrāliyah’ go beyond etymology and involve the 
contextual domain of politics.   
By delegitimising and undermining anti-liberal view on alibrāliyah, the author is 
creating an antagonism against anti-liberals. This antagonism is created within the logic 
of equivalence by setting anti-liberals as the opposing pole. This means that anti-liberals 
are positioned as the antagonist bloc that is opposed by the author, who constructs them 
negatively through a number of elements.  The opposition is specifically between the 
anti-liberal group, who are seen as not legitimately permitted to define ‘alibrāliyah’, and 
between philosophers and political scientists, who are considered able to legitimately 
debate the concept of ‘alibrāliyah’.  
Throughout the article, this anti-liberal antagonist bloc is constructed through the 
use of the ironic style by means of arguing for the uselessness of the anti-liberal 
perspective of alibrāliyah, and their general lack of knowledge regarding alibrāliyah. On 
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the other hand, the author has not provided a definition of who liberals are at this stage. 
Instead, he opposes anti-liberals’ perspective on ‘alibrāliyah’ and liberals. This is also 
apparent through the author’s indication that alibrāliyah is related to the domain of 
politics, where he awards the responsibility for and legitimacy of defining alibrāliyah to 
political scientists, without himself defining what ‘alibrāliyah’ means.  This indicates that 
liberal identity at this time is not yet clearly shaped. However, it can be argued that, at 
this stage, the liberal identity is created through the opposition against the anti-liberal 
group. 
In summary, in this article ‘alibrāliyah’ is primarily articulated through opposing 
the anti-liberal view on ‘alibrāliyah’. In the general sense, the author delegitimises the 
idea that ‘alibrāliyah’ is limited to meaning freedom in the negative and simple sense and 
implies that it has contextual meanings beyond the etymological sense. However, 
alibrāliyah is implicitly constructed with the connotations of ‘freedom’, ‘brotherhood’, and 
‘equality’ in the general sense. In this sense, the author associates ‘alibrāliyah’ with the 
semantic domains of humanitarianism, social justice, and politics, and assigns scientists 
in these fields the legitimate authority to debate this concept. These meanings are also 
articulated in order to construct anti-liberals as antagonists within the logic of 
equivalence, positioning them as the opposite bloc who lack the knowledge that would 
enable them to legitimately define the term. The other pole, liberals, is not explicitly 
constructed within the article, which indicates that, at this stage, liberals’ identity is 
constructed in opposition to anti-liberals rather than providing a clear statement on their 
identity.  
7.3  Discursive Analysis of the text ‘؟تاعمتجملا لكل ةبسانم ةيلاربيللا له’/ ‘Is 
alibrāliyah Suitable for all Societies?’; (Rights 2009) 
7.3.1 Main arguments in the text  
In this article, the author is attempting to find a meaning for ‘alibrāliyah’ and 
determine whether it is a universal concept that is suitable for all societies. The 
arguments relating to the definition of ‘alibrāliyah’ are based on citations from liberal 
scholars rather than providing a novel definition of the term. The author also discusses 
the applicability of ‘alibrāliyah’ at a universal rather than a local level. In this regard, it is 
concluded in the article that alibrāliyah is based on the principles of freedom, equality, 
and participation in decision-making. The author also states that ‘alibrāliyah’ is not a 
universal concept and thus its use is not appropriate in all countries. 
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The article begins by arguing that ‘alibrāliyah’ has no specific definition. The 
author then provides a general definition of ‘alibrāliyah’, arguing that it is based on the 
broad principles of freedom, equality, and participation in decision-making.  However, he 
also notes that liberal trends differ in application, ranging from the right to the left of the 
political spectrum. Based on this view, the author argues that ‘alibrāliyah’ can be defined 
on the basis of the Stanford Encyclopedia entry. In this attempt to define ‘alibrāliyah’, the 
author is using the topos of authority of knowledge by means of citing the encyclopedia 
to legitimise his arguments in relation to the meaning of ‘alibrāliyah’, and whether or not 
it is a universal concept. He also uses the topos of number to indicate that ‘alibrāliyah’ 
has many applications and that there is a lot of discussion around its meaning. 
The author then goes on to argue that ‘alibrāliyah’ is not relevant for all countries, 
using the topos of authority by basing this argument on the view of a liberal scholar 
named John Rawls. Rawls’ argument is based on the idea that some societies have their 
own hierarchical working systems in which individuals are collaborative rather than being 
equal, as in liberal societies. The author also counters the notion of the universality of 
‘alibrāliyah’ by reporting negatively on other scholars who believe in the suitability of 
‘alibrāliyah’ for all societies. 
The author also specifically questions the possibility of all countries having a 
unified system of ‘alibrāliyah’, citing Kant, who argues that ‘alibrāliyah’ cannot be unified 
globally. He also quotes Kant’s view on the impossibility of humanitarianism being 
encapsulated in one political form such as ‘alibrāliyah’, explaining that, instead, each 
state should guarantee equality and freedom regardless of their political system. 
The author continues to ask questions about ‘alibrāliyah’ and its application in 
states, including questions about the way liberal countries should treat non-liberals. In 
this regard, he argues that liberal groups should not interfere in the affairs of non-liberal 
groups. This argument is justified by quoting Mill’s view that objects to the interference 
of liberal states in non-liberal states to protect liberal principles. However, the author 
makes an exception in regard to the treatment of extremist groups who violate the law 
and ignore basic human rights. He here uses the topos of responsibility, the topos of 
consequences, and the topos of rights to indicate that these extremist groups are 
responsible for their actions and the consequences of those actions, as they do not 
respect human rights.  
The author ends the article with another related question that concerns whether 
non-liberal groups should participate in decision-making in liberal states. His answer to 
this question is based on two different views of liberal scholars. First, he quotes Rawls’ 
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view that liberal countries are rational and therefore they cannot be involved in decisions 
made by collective or religious systems. On the other hand, he quotes the opposing view 
of Eberle and Berry that the non-involvement of other groups in the decision is an 
exclusion of religious groups. This referencing of different views towards the end of the 
article is intended to show that liberals are not united under one view but rather hold 
conflicting standpoints.  
 Though the author uses a negative tone to imply towards the end of the article 
that liberals have conflicting views, throughout the article he uses objective language. 
This is manifested in a detachment strategy using indirect speech style to cite the views 
of liberals. The topos of authority is also employed throughout the article for detachment 
purposes and to give the arguments an objective factual foundation. Other topoi used 
throughout the article include the topos of definition, the topos of rights, and the fallacy 
of exclusion.  All of these argumentative devices are used to argue that though 
‘alibrāliyah’ is theoretically based on freedom, equality, and participation in decision-
making, it differs in application to the extent that it becomes contradictory to these 
principles by not guaranteeing them to other non-liberal groups.  
 
Table 7-2: Main Discursive Strategies in 7.3 
7.3.2 Articulation of meanings and groups in terms of Discourse Theory    
In this article, ‘alibrāliyah’ is defined generally in relation to the broad principles 
of freedom, equality, and participation in decision-making. However, the author explains 
that the application of these principles differs in different liberal states, as well as in 
different liberals’ views. In this regard, he cites different views of alibrāliyah concluding 
that these differences indicate that ‘alibrāliyah’ is not a universal concept.  
The author defines ‘alibrāliyah ’in relation to the three main principles of freedom, 
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principles he quotes different liberal views related to the way these principles can be 
applied. In relation to the meanings of ‘freedom’ and ‘equality’, the author chooses to 
illustrate these concepts by citing Rawls’ view that these liberal principles are not suitable 
to all non-liberal states, as non-liberal societies can apply their own humanitarian 
principles without relying on liberal versions of the same principles. This view is also 
supported by Kant, who argues that humanity is not formed according to one political 
system such as ‘alibrāliyah’, as freedom and equality can also be found in other systems. 
The concept of freedom is also discussed in relation to the way liberals treat non-liberals 
in terms of these principles. The author argues that liberal states should not interfere with 
or restrict the freedom of non-liberal states, as a number of liberals claim. In terms of the 
participation in decision-making principle, the author argues that non-liberal groups 
should not participate in decision-making in liberal countries. All of these arguments are 
selected to imply that liberal principles are contradictory in application in the time these 
humanitarian principles exist in other systems than ‘alibrāliyah’. 
In his identification of the contradiction of freedom principles, the author identifies 
a number of groups, primarily liberal and non-liberal groups. This is manifested through 
the implication that liberals as a group are not in agreement, and thus ‘alibrāliyah’ should 
not be adopted. In this case, the author draws a distinction between the liberal system 
and collective systems, including religious systems. Through this distinction, he creates 
an antagonism between the collective and the liberal systems. This antagonism is 
created within the logic of equivalence, whereby ‘alibrāliyah’ is positioned as a bloc 
against collectivism and religion. 
In this antagonism, the author is favouring collective systems, especially religious 
ones, over liberal systems. This is explicit in his argument that the principles of freedom, 
equality, and participation in decision-making do not exist only in ‘alibrāliyah’ but also in 
collective systems. Through this argument, the author implies that it is unnecessary to 
adopt ‘alibrāliyah’ if its principles exist in religious collective systems. This also indicates 
the lack of any need for ‘alibrāliyah’ in religious societies, such as the Saudi society, 
especially when the religious collective systems guarantee the principles of ‘alibrāliyah’.  
In summary, in this article ‘alibrāliyah’ is defined generally in relation to the 
principles of freedom, equality, and participation in decision-making. In discussing the 
application of these principles, the author concludes that ‘alibrāliyah’ is a contradictory 
concept since it does not guarantee its principles. In dismissing ‘alibrāliyah’, he indicates 
that its principles are not limited to this concept alone, but also exist in collective 
societies, such as religious societies. Through this distinction, the author creates a logic 
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of equivalence between ‘alibrāliyah’ and religious systems. This antagonism highlights 
the author’s view regarding the lack of any need to adopt ‘alibrāliyah’ in Saudi religious 
society, and moreover that it is not a suitable system for this society.   
7.4 Discursive analysis of the text ‘؟ةيوضوف مأ ةيرح ةيلاربيللا.’/ ‘alibrāliyah, is it 
Freedom or Chaos?’; (Rights 2011) 
7.4.1 Main arguments in the text 
The key claim in this article is based on the notion that there is no need to adopt 
‘alibrāliyah’ in Saudi society. This is based on the argument that Saudi society has its 
own Islamic system of values that include the value of freedom which the author argues 
is superior to the concept of freedom in the ‘alibrāliyah’ system, and thus ‘alibrāliyah’ 
should not be adopted. In constructing this argument, the author makes a comparison 
between the value of freedom in ‘alibrāliyah’ and in Islam, concluding that freedom in 
Islam is absolute, but in ‘alibrāliyah’ is unrestricted and thus distorted. This argument 
concludes by stating that there is no need for freedom in ‘alibrāliyah’ as Islam guarantees 
freedom and thus the latter should not be substituted.  
The article begins by appraising the Islamic value system with a specific focus on 
the value of freedom. On this point, the author argues that freedom is an important 
Islamic value. In justifying this argument, he employs the topos of authority, citing a 
Qur’anic verse that states “نيدلا يف هاركإ لا”/ ‘there is no compulsion in Islam’. By citing this 
verse, the author indicates that Islam supports humanitarian values, including the value 
of freedom such as in converting to Islam and practicing its rituals  
The author then moves on to explain that freedom in Islam is precedent, and that 
freedom in Islam precedes freedom in ‘alibrāliyah’. In his support of this argument, he 
states that this precedence of freedom in Islam is ignored by many authors, as if freedom 
were the exclusive product of ‘alibrāliyah’. He also employs the topos of culture to state 
that freedom in ‘alibrāliyah’, as coined by Western philosophers, is not compatible with 
Islamic freedom, due to the differences between the structures of both cultures. He 
further describes freedom in the system of ‘alibrāliyah’ as distorted to the extent that has 
become chaos.  
The author continues to represent the concept of freedom in ‘alibrāliyah’ in a 
negative way. However, he argues that the value of freedom has been distorted by 
‘alibrāliyah’ due to the unrestricted tendency of this kind of freedom, which is used for 
subjective purposes. He further explains that ‘alibrāliyah’ has broadened the concept of 
freedom to the extent that it has come self-contradictory. Through provides an example 
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of usury that he argues is based on individual freedom with no set restrictions. The 
argument that freedom has been distorted by ‘alibrāliyah’ is also supported by a 
comparison between freedom in ‘alibrāliyah’ and in Islam. The author argues that unlike 
‘alibrāliyah’, freedom in the Islamic system has a high value due to the restricted nature 
of this kind of freedom. Continuing this argument, he questions the benefit of adopting 
‘alibrāliyah’, which has been created in a culture different from ‘Ummah’, which has a 
superior version of freedom guaranteed by Islam. 
The author continues to represent ‘alibrāliyah’ negatively by illustrating the 
meaning of freedom in ‘alibrāliyah’. In defining freedom in ‘alibrāliyah’ as unrestricted, he 
justifies this with the statement that freedom needs some restrictions in order to be 
considered a value. If it is not restricted, as in ‘alibrāliyah’, then it becomes too broad and 
empty to the extent that it becomes chaotic. The author argues that the unrestricted 
freedom of ‘alibrāliyah’ is entirely different from freedom in Islam, as the latter is absolute 
since it has restrictions that create its meaning. This categorisation of freedom in 
‘alibrāliyah’ as unrestricted and in Islam as absolute is intended to create a gap between 
the two concepts in which the former is described negatively and the latter positively.  
The author then begins to positively present the concept of freedom in Islam, 
arguing that freedom in Islam is superior since ‘Islam’ means ‘ملاستسلاا’/submission, and 
this submission can only be achieved through freedom. This is further explained by 
stating that freedom in Islam means the absolute liberation from any obedience but to 
Allah. Using the fallacy of freedom, the author goes on to compare ‘alibrāliyah’ to Islam 
by stating that in ‘alibrāliyah’ there is no obedience, and that obedience and freedom in 
‘alibrāliyah’ are opposing concepts. However, in Islam, freedom and obedience are 
inseparable and integrated to the extent where the more obedient a person is the more 
freedom they have. 
The author ends the article by arguing that, as freedom exists in Islam, there is 
no need to borrow the concept from alibrāliyah. The author justifies this argument by 
stating particularly that as freedom is an essential value in the Islamic cultural system, 
there is no need to borrow a lesser value from a lower system. He also uses the reported 
fallacy of the false alternative to claim that it is illogical to substitute the system of Islam 
with ‘alibrāliyah’ when the former is superior to the latter.  
In summary, the article is primarily based on comparing freedom in ‘alibrāliyah’ 
and in Islam, concluding that it is essential and superior in the Islamic system and thus 
there is no need to borrow it from outside that system. To support this argument, the 
author uses the legitimation strategy of authorisation, basing the argument on the topos 
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of authority in regard to Quranic texts, as well as the legitimation strategy of moral 
evaluation through reference to the value of freedom in both systems, and using the 
topos of humanitarianism, topos of culture, and topos/fallacy of abuse of values by 
‘alibrāliyah’. Nomination strategies are also used, specifically categorization, identifying 
freedom in ‘alibrāliyah’ as unrestricted and chaotic, and in Islam as absolute. In addition,  
the Saudi culture has been nominated with its religious identity associating them as 
‘Ummah’. In terms of perspectivisation strategies, the author mainly employed the 
detachment strategy, presenting his arguments from a third-person perspective. 
However, towards the end of the article the author is involved using first-person when 
discussing the lack of any need or justification to substitute Islam with ‘alibrāliyah’. All of 
this indicates that this article associates ‘alibrāliyah’ with a negative sense of freedom, 
representing it as a foreign and negative concept that should not be adopted. 
 Table 7-3: Main Discursive Strategies in 7.4 
7.4.2 Articulation of meanings and groups in terms of Discourse Theory  
‘alibrāliyah’ in this article is constructed in relation to the concept of freedom. It is 
specifically articulated in comparison to the value of freedom in the Islamic system. In 
this regard, the author presents a detailed account of the meaning of freedom in both 
systems, ‘alibrāliyah’ and Islam, concluding that freedom in Islam is superior and thus 
alibrāliyah should not be adopted. In this sense, the author creates an opposition 
between alibrāliyah and Islam in which alibrāliyah is represented negatively and Islam is 
represented positively.  
The author associates freedom in alibrāliyah with a number of elements. 
Freedom is constructed in association with the negative connotations of being 
unrestricted, distorted, and contradictory. The notion of unrestrictedness is illustrated 
through the idea that ‘alibrāliyah’ has no limit on freedom, to the extent that it becomes 
self-contradictory. This contradiction resulting from its unrestrictedness is due to the 
broadness of a freedom that has no controlling factor to limit this freedom. According to 
Nomination 
strategies 
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the author, this makes ‘alibrāliyah’ chaotic as it has no set system of values that define 
it.  
On the other hand, freedom in Islam is associated with the positive concept of 
‘absoluteness’. To the author, this absoluteness is derived from the contrasting value of 
obedience, which controls and defines freedom in the Islamic system. In discourse theory 
terms, obedience represents the necessary antagonism that articulates the meaning of 
a particular concept. The relation between absolute freedom and obedience is illustrated 
through the idea that a person becomes absolutely free by choosing to worship no one 
but Allah. This relation is correlative, whereby the more one obeys Allah, the freer one 
will become.  
In discussing the meanings of freedom in both alibrāliyah and Islam, the author 
constructs these meanings by means of contrasting the two systems. In this sense, the 
author constructs an antagonism between ‘alibrāliyah’ and Islam in terms of the value of 
freedom. This antagonism is created within the logic of equivalence, through which Islam 
and ‘alibrāliyah’ are constructed as completely antagonistic concepts. This antagonism 
is created primarily from a cultural perspective, where Islam is constructed as the inner 
cultural identity while ‘alibrāliyah’ is constructed as the outsider, Western concept that 
constitutes a threat to Islamic culture. 
The construction of groups, on the other hand, is represented in two main camps: 
‘us’, which represents the Islamic culture, or ‘Ummah’, and ‘them’ represented by the 
Western liberal group. This is manifested throughout the author’s argument that the 
concept of freedom that is constructed by Western liberals is not compatible with Islamic 
cultural values, and that Islam has its own value of freedom. This antagonism is also 
apparent in the negative construction of freedom in ‘alibrāliyah’ as unrestricted and 
chaotic, and in the positive construction of freedom in Islam as absolute. In addition, the 
opposition between groups is articulated in the argument that ‘alibrāliyah’ should not be 
adopted as it is a product of an inferior group, and that the value of freedom already 
exists as part of the superior inner culture of Islam.  
In summary, ‘alibrāliyah’ in this article is defined as antagonistic to Islam in 
relation to the value of freedom. While ‘alibrāliyah’ is associated primarily with chaos, 
Islam is associated with the absolute freedom and as being a system of values. The 
antagonism between ‘alibrāliyah’ and Islam is apparent through the primary argument 
that ‘alibrāliyah’ should not substitute the Islamic cultural system. This antagonism is 
created within the logic of equivalence, where ‘alibrāliyah’ constitutes a dislocatory threat 
to the Islamic culture of Saudi society. In this sense, the author is warning against 
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transforming ‘alibrāliyah’ into an imaginary in Saudi society and against being hegemonic 
in a religious society. 
7.5 Discursive Analysis of the text ‘ةيدوعس ةهكنب ةيلاربيل’/ ‘alibrāliyah with Saudi 
Character’; (Rights 2013) 
7.5.1 Main arguments in the text 
The author in this article is primarily discussing the status of the debate around 
‘alibrāliyah’ in Saudi society and argues that ‘alibrāliyah’ has been discussed only 
superficially in Saudi society instead of objectively and in depth. He defines ‘alibrāliyah’ 
generally in relation to the concept of freedom and argues that in order to employ 
‘alibrāliyah’ in society, it should be discussed in depth in relation to freedom, instead of 
limiting the discussion to the field of religion. 
The article starts with the argument that there is ongoing debate regarding 
‘alibrāliyah’ in Saudi society. This argument is constructed by employing the topos of 
number stating that that there is a lot of discussion around the concept in the cultural, 
intellectual, and social spheres, in order to indicate the significance of the debate. The 
author states that this discussion has even been referenced in the television series ‘Tash 
ma Tash’, using sarcastic language. Here, he uses the reported fallacy of ignorance to 
state that a concept such as ‘alibrāliyah’ should not be approached in this disgusting, 
sarcastic way, but rather should be discussed in great depth in order to understand its 
meanings and applications.  
The author then provides a philosophical definition of ‘alibrāliyah’ so that the 
concept can be discussed in depth. He argues that ‘alibrāliyah’ is primarily associated 
with the concept of freedom, and illustrates this by citing an Arab philosopher who states 
that freedom is the core meaning of ‘alibrāliyah’ (lines 15-34, in Arabic lines 12-19). The 
author adds that the word ‘ةيرح’/freedom is the word most closely associated with 
‘alibrāliyah’ in the Arab world, along with other synonymous words including 
‘للاقتسا’/independence, ‘ةيطارقوميد’/democracy, and ‘ةيمنت’/development. In addition, the 
author associates the meaning of freedom with the political field, stating that the slogan 
of freedom can be used for various political purposes. In this sense, he considers the 
meaning of ‘alibrāliyah’ to overlap with the concept of freedom to mean the freedom of 
individuals, which can be used in a political sense and associated with the concept of 
the state, organisations, and the economy. 
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 The author continues by discussing the case of alibrāliyah in the Saudi context, 
explaining that the group of people who label themselves ‘liberals’ in Saudi society are 
not true liberals since they do not apply the principles of ‘alibrāliyah’. He argues that 
Saudi liberals are living in the past by adhering to traditions and by standing in the way 
of the freedom of others. He ends the article by suggesting the adoption of the principles 
of ‘alibrāliyah’ in order to be labeled as liberals. This is explained through the call for 
analysing in depth the concept of ‘alibrāliyah’ along with a focus on the present and future 
rather than the past.  
 Overall, the article is written using mainly the strategy of argumentation and 
employing the topos/fallacy of ignorance, the topos of authority, and the topos/fallacy of 
definition to argue that the issue of ‘alibrāliyah’ is ignored in Saudi society due to it being 
only superficially discussed, and that it should be adopted on the basis of a deep 
understanding of its background origin in the West. This argument is constructed through 
the use of involvement strategies by using direct speech to report the views of a 
philosopher and first-person plural voice to emphasise the importance of an in-depth 
treatment of the concept of alibrāliyah in the inner Saudi society. The legitimation 
strategies of this main argument comprise two main types: authorisation and theoretical 
rationalisation. Authorisation is provided by referring to the view of an Arab philosopher 
who has worked on defining ‘alibrāliyah’. This reference to a scholar from the inner Arab 
circle is intended to promote acceptance of the argument amongst readers. The 
legitimation of theoretical rationalisation, on the other hand, is used throughout the article 
by means of referring to the way things should be ordered; in this case, the way Saudi 
society should approach the outsider concept of alibrāliyah.   
 
 
The author moves on to discuss the situation of ‘alibrāliyah’ at the local level of 
Saudi society. He argues that ‘alibrāliyah’ has been considered only superficially since 
its recent arrival in Saudi society. Using the fallacy of ignorance, he states that the issue 
of ‘alibrāliyah’ has been ignored in society by means of dealing with it at the service level 
through linking it exclusively to the domain of religion, as was previously the case with 
‘ḥadāthah’. The author suggests that alibrāliyah should be considered in more depth, by 
studying its socio-historical context in the West and discussing the ways in which it can 
be employed in Saudi society. 
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Table 7-4: Main Discursive Strategies in text 7.5 
7.5.2 Articulation of meanings and groups in terms of Discourse Theory  
The author in this article has associated ‘alibrāliyah’ primarily with the concept of 
freedom. Specifically, he relates alibrāliyah to the notion of the liberation from the past 
and from old traditions, and associates alibrāliyah with the temporal notion of present 
and future. These notions comprise the author’s view of what Saudi liberalism should 
look like. In this regard, he draws a comparison between Saudi liberalism, which is 
viewed as superficial, and Western liberalism, considered as the profound root of 
‘alibrāliyah’. 
In general, the author ascribes a number of positive attributions to alibrāliyah. 
First, he considers the notion of freedom to be the basis of alibrāliyah. To the author, 
freedom in alibrāliyah is based on the notion of freedom of individuals and differs in 
different applications related to the domains of politics and the economy. alibrāliyah is 
also linked to the concepts of ‘independence’, ‘democracy’, and ‘development’. The 
author further equates the notion of alibrāliyah with the concept of modernism. In this 
sense, he associates alibrāliyah with a temporal notion, in particular with the notions of 
the ‘present’ and the ‘future’. In the same regard, he links alibrāliyah to the meaning of 
the liberation from the past and from old traditions.  
The meanings are articulated to construct an idea of how Saudi liberalism should 
look. To this end, the author draws a comparison between alibrāliyah in Saudi society 
and liberalism in the West, arguing that alibrāliyah in Saudi Arabia is superficial, and that 
Saudi liberals do not represent the concept of alibrāliyah. On the other hand, Western 
liberalism is seen as the original liberalism as it emerged and spread from the west. The 
comparison is made clear through the argument that liberalism is treated superficially, 
as a consumer product, in Saudi society and not as an intellectual concept that is related 
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articulation of the Saudi group and the West within the logic of difference. The logic of 
difference is evident in the author’s attempt to dissolve the boundaries between both 
groups by relating them to the common project of Western liberalism. In other words, the 
author suggests reviewing the contextual background of liberalism in the West and 
incorporating it within the Saudi society in order to construct and develop a concept of 
liberalism for Saudi society. This equivalence between alibrāliyah in the Saudi context 
and Western liberalism marks a significant shift in the discourse of alibrāliyah in Saudi 
society, in which the articulation of alibrāliyah shifts toward equating alibrāliyah in the 
Saudi context with Western liberalism within the logic of difference, instead of the 
previous antagonism with Islam, within the logic of equivalence.                                            
Overall, in this article ‘alibrāliyah’ is associated with the general meaning of 
freedom. In particular, the author relates ‘alibrāliyah’ to the concepts of ‘independence’, 
‘democracy’, ‘modernism’, and ‘development’. These meanings are articulated to 
suggest ways in which Saudi liberalism can be identified instead of the current superficial 
treatment of the concept. In addition, the meanings of individual freedom, social, 
economic, and political fields are also associated to the ideal concept of liberalism in the 
West. The notions of Western liberalism are articulated in order to suggest ways in which 
Saudi liberalism can evolve by incorporating the original, Western liberalism. In this 
regard, alibrāliyah in Saudi society and Western liberalism are articulated using the logic 
of difference through the suggestion of incorporating Western liberalism into Saudi 
society.  
7.6 Discursive Analysis of the text ‘ةيلاربيللاو ةيرحلا نيب كابتشلاا ضف’/‘Breaking 
the Engagement Between Freedom and alibrāliyah’; (Rights 2015)  
7.6.1 Main arguments in the text 
The author in this article argues against the claim that ‘alibrāliyah’ means 
‘ةيرح’/freedom, claiming that those who view alibrāliyah as freedom have an intellectual 
deficiency. In this way, the author attempts to disconnect alibrāliyah from the meaning of 
freedom, through a number of points, including a discussion of the etymology of 
‘alibrāliyah’, of the precedence of the value of freedom than ‘alibrāliyah’, of the ambiguity 
of the concept of alibrāliyah, and of its negative historical background. 
The author begins the article with a discussion of the idea that alibrāliyah is 
associated with freedom. This is justified through the reported fallacy of definition, 
whereby the author states that intellectuals, journalists, and Twitter users consider 
‘alibrāliyah’ to mean ‘ةيرح’/freedom, in both etymological and in actual contexts. The 
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author states that those groups consider any implementation of the value of freedom to 
be an implementation of alibrāliyah. Employing the psychogenetic fallacy (argumentum 
ad hominem), the author argues that this view represents an intellectual deficiency in the 
minds of those groups. Therefore, the author offers to declare the facets of this deficiency 
by means of breaking the association between ‘freedom’ and ‘alibrāliyah’.  
The first facet concerns the etymology of the word ‘alibrāliyah’. The author argues 
that ‘alibrāliyah’ is a non-Arabic word that derives from the English word liberalism, which 
is of Latin origin. He further states that, etymologically, the word ‘alibrāliyah’ means 
freedom; however, by employing both the fallacy of definition and the fallacy of 
relevance, he argues that the etymological equivalence of alibrāliyah and freedom does 
not necessarily mean that this is the case in context. To this end, the author employs the 
topos of reality to claim that the actual application of alibrāliyah over time shows that it 
does not represent the value of freedom. 
The author then moves on to introduce the second reason why alibrāliyah’ does 
not mean freedom, arguing that the existence of the value of freedom precedes the 
existence of alibrāliyah. In particular, he employs the topos of history to state that 
civilizations, cultures, and religions spoke of freedom before the emergence of alibrāliyah 
in Europe, adding that the concept of freedom in alibrāliyah is related to the Western 
civilization and to its cultural development over history. This is followed by stating that 
freedom in alibrāliyah is self-contradictory, providing the example of a philosopher of 
alibrāliyah named John Locke, who was a slave trader.   
The article then discusses the third facet, which concerns the ambiguity of the 
concept of alibrāliyah. Through the use of topos of number, the author argues that 
alibrāliyah has various definitions, leading to the issue of it having two main meanings: 
‘ةيررحتلا’/liberation, and ‘ةينادرفلا’/individuality. He states that the issue is mainly with the 
meaning of individuality, and whether this means individuality against collectivity, or the 
self against the other. In this regard, the author cites a philosopher who states that 
‘alibrāliyah’ can mean ‘individualism’, which means the reliance of the individual on the 
self, or ‘selfishness’, which means that self-interest is the basis of behaviour. 
The author continues to discuss the reasons why the association between 
alibrāliyah and freedom should be broken, referring to the fourth facet which is in regard 
to the historical background of alibrāliyah. Through representing ‘alibrāliyah’ negatively 
by means of employing the topos of history and the topos of abuse, the author argues 
that the liberalism that appeared in Britain led to the colonisation of the world, allowed 
Jews to occupy Palestine, and led also to many massacres around the world. The author 
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also refers to the current references on the failure of ‘alibrāliyah’ to represent the value 
of freedom. This is justified through the topos of reality and the reported fallacy of 
freedom and justice, to argue that the issue of religious freedom in Western countries is 
presently the most prominent concern. In this regard, he provides the examples of 
Islamophobia, the Prophet cartoon, and the objection to building mosques. This 
argument is driven to the conclusion that though freedom in alibrāliyah is an ideal 
concept, in application it fails to the extent that it becomes a contradictory concept. 
Overall, the author attempts to disengage freedom from alibrāliyah by employing 
the argumentation strategies of fallacy of definition, the topos of history, the topos of 
authority, and the topos/fallacy of abuse. To justify this argument, he mainly employs the 
involvement strategies by means of personally accusing the liberal group of being 
psychologically deficient, using the psychogenetic fallacy (argumentum ad hominem). 
Nomination strategies are also used to construct ‘the others’ through a process of 
functionalisation in which alibrāliyah supporters are identified as ‘نيفقثم’/intellectuals, 
‘نييملاعإ’/journalists, and ‘نيدرغم’/Twitter users. All of these strategies are legitimised 
through the legitimation mode of moral evaluation through which the author discusses 
the reasons alibrāliyah does not represent the value of freedom, and through the mode 
of authorisation, through which the author makes reference to an expert to legitimise his 
main argument. 
Table 7-5: Main discursive strategies in 7.5 
7.6.2 Articulation of meanings and groups in terms of Discourse Theory  
In this article, the author attempts to disassociate the notion of freedom from 
‘alibrāliyah’. This is articulated mainly by arguing that the etymology of ‘alibrāliyah’ as 
meaning freedom does not mean that this is its actual meaning based on the present 
social practices and historical events, which prove the opposite. This argument is 
constructed to counter the group of Saudi intellectuals who argue that ‘alibrāliyah’ means 
freedom. Thus, an antagonism is created against this group by means of the subjective 
Nomination 
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argument that they have an intellectual deficiency. Another antagonism is also created 
against the Western culture, which the author views as a threat to Saudi society, by 
arguing that alibrāliyah is a negative Western product. 
To disassociate ‘alibrāliyah’ from the meaning of ‘ةيرح’/ freedom, the author 
argues that the semantic meaning of alibrāliyah contradicts its contextual practices, 
stating that the semantic connotations of freedom lead people to view ‘alibrāliyah’ as 
meaning freedom. In this regard, the author states that the historical and the present 
context of alibrāliyah indicates the opposite, and associates alibrāliyah with the meanings 
of violence and brutality when reviewing the history of alibrāliyah, which is associated 
with invasion of various parts of the world. He also links alibrāliyah to the meanings of 
hate and injustice when discussing the present practices of liberal states, including their 
treatment of others, especially Muslims. 
The author also refers to the semantic ambiguity of the concept ‘alibrāliyah’, 
which means it is morally illegitimate for it to mean freedom. He states that ‘alibrāliyah’ 
has two semantic meanings: ‘individuality’ and ‘freedom’. He argues that the issue is with 
the sense of individuality, as it could indicate one of two meanings, either individuality 
against collectivity, or selfishness against selflessness. To the author, both meanings 
are negative and oppose, in practice, the value of freedom. 
In breaking the link between alibrāliyah and freedom, the author creates an 
antagonism against two main groups. First, he constructs an antagonism against the 
local group of intellectuals, journalists, and Twitter users who believe in the freedom of 
alibrāliyah. The author accuses these groups of having an intellectual deficiency in an 
attempt to delegitimise their belief in ‘alibrāliyah’. This represents a complete antagonism 
towards intellectuals, which is created within the logic of equivalence. The logic of 
equivalence is also used against the ‘Western’ group, which first proposed the concept 
of alibrāliyah. This antagonism is apparent through the representation of the Western 
application of alibrāliyah throughout history as violent and brutal. In addition, the author 
portrays the current employment of alibrāliyah by Western countries with an image of 
injustice and hatred, especially against Muslims’ freedom to practise their religion. This 
antagonism towards intellectuals and the West was used to create and position them as 
one bloc that represents a threat to society. 
In summary, the author attempts in this article to separate out the value of 
freedom from alibrāliyah by means of imbuing alibrāliyah with negative meanings. In 
particular, he associates ‘alibrāliyah’ with the contradictory notions of ‘violence’, 
‘injustice’, and ‘hatred’, which the author views as the actual evidence of alibrāliyah. He 
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also negatively associates the concept of alibrāliyah with the meanings of ‘individuality’ 
and ‘selfishness’. These meanings are articulated to create an antagonism first against 
the Saudi intellectuals who call for alibrāliyah, and also against the Western culture that 
invented the concept. This is based on the view that alibrāliyah is a threat to Saudi society 
and the fear of substituting the Islamic system with alibrāliyah.   
7.7 Discursive analysis of the text ‘يديلقتلا مهفلا ءوس و ةيلاربيللا ةيرحلا’/ ‘Freedom 
of ‘alibrāliyah’ and the Conventional Misunderstanding’; (Rights 2016) 
The author in this article is arguing against the traditionalists’ view of alibrāliyah, 
who are seen as ideologised and to have misunderstood the concept of alibrāliyah. He 
argues that alibrāliyah is not based on the notion of unrestricted freedom, as the 
traditionalists claim, but is instead based on the notion of relativity, and depends on the 
cultural features of a particular society. The author also refers to the point that, unlike 
other systems, freedom is the central value of alibrāliyah and does not contradict the 
principles of Islam. In this sense, he concludes that alibrāliyah would assess the Islamic 
system by means of its relative application based on the cultural factors.  
In justifying the main arguments of the article, the author starts by making the 
claim that alibrāliyah is currently clear to critical readers but is still misunderstood by the 
ideologised traditionalist public. Using the topos of knowledge, the author states that 
those interested in the subject of alibrāliyah understand its meaning. However, using the 
topos of ignorance, he further states that the ideologised public, which he labels 
‘نويديلقت’/traditionalists, do not understand the meaning of alibrāliyah as their readings are 
based on ideologised sources that are against alibrāliyah. In this sense, he uses the 
topos/fallacy of abuse to refer to the abuse of clerics, who are seen as the producers of 
the ideologised sources that represent alibrāliyah in a negative way. Through labelling 
those clerics as “  ظاعو"ةيديلقتلا / ‘the clerics of traditionalists’, the author accuses them of 
speaking to the emotions of the public in order to ideologise them against alibrāliyah. 
The author continues to argue against traditionalists by countering their view of 
the unrestrictedness of freedom in alibrāliyah. The author states that ‘alibrāliyah’ could 
mean theoretically unrestricted freedom, however, according to the author this is 
impossible in practice as unrestricted freedom would result in the opposite of freedom, 
complete restriction. Through illustrating the notion of freedom in alibrāliyah and its 
relation to the notion of unrestrictedness, the author makes a comparison between 
alibrāliyah and Islam. He positions alibrāliyah as similar to Islam by arguing that Islam 
emphasises the theoretical notion of unrestricted freedom. This is achieved by referring 
to an Islamic rule that states that all things are originally permitted unless otherwise 
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stated in holy texts, which indicates that freedom in Islam is theoretically unrestricted but 
controlled in practice by a number of rules. 
The author argues that this is also the case in alibrāliyah, in which its 
unrestrictedness is in fact limited by some practices. He states that alibrāliyah is not only 
restricted by the requirement not to harm others, as some traditionalists claim, but that 
in fact the restrictions go much deeper than that. The author argues that alibrāliyah is 
restricted by cultural factors that makes freedom relative, and dependent on social 
norms. Using the topos of relativity and the topos of culture, he states that the boundaries 
regarding harm to others are relative based on the boundaries of the culture, including 
religion. The author here includes religion as part of culture, stating that cultural norms 
that are based on religion could be fixed or changing, depending on the nature of the 
practices of that religion. The author supports this argument with the topos of cultural 
examples, from both the West and from Islamic culture. In terms of the Western culture, 
the author provides the example that it is unacceptable in London or Paris to walk naked 
in the street, as this violates the norms of these cultures. On the other hand, cultures that 
are characterised by their Islamic identity do not allow adultery, as this practice is not 
compatible with the Islamic culture. These examples are used to make the point that 
freedom is relative and bounded by cultural rules, and not based only on not harming 
others, as traditionalists claim. 
After comparing the notion of the relativity of freedom in alibrāliyah and Islam, the 
author moves on to argue that while the value of freedom is subsidiary in other concepts 
it is central in alibrāliyah. He states that each system has its own primary interest and 
that the primary interest of alibrāliyah is the freedom of individuals. This is further 
supported with the topos of example, in which the author argues that as freedom is 
central in ‘alibrāliyah’, justice is the central concept in ‘ةيكارتشلاا’/socialism, which makes 
both systems distinct and unique. 
The author returns to discuss the notion of relativity of freedom in alibrāliyah. He 
argues against the traditionalists’ claim that this relativity makes alibrāliyah a myth as it 
has no fixed definition. He argues that alibrāliyah is a trend or a state, which makes it 
relative, and can be integrated within other systems such as liberal Islam or liberal 
Christianity. This is supported with the topos of existence of alibrāliyah in all societies 
and the topos of ignorance of this existence. In this regard, the author explains that 
alibrāliyah exists to different extents in all societies, though this is ignored by these 
societies. He gives the example of an Iranian cleric, Khamenei, who is seen as liberal 
because he holds less extreme views in the extremist state of Iran. The author also uses 
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the topos of culture to emphasise the idea of the relativity of alibrāliyah to cultural 
circumstances. He illustrates this with an example of freedom to travel in relation to age, 
where he argues that liberals would choose a younger age e.g. 18, while the 
conservatives would choose an older age, for example 22.  
The author ends the article by arguing that the examples provided of the relativity 
of alibrāliyah do not contradict Islam but instead assess the application of Islamic 
principles. Using the topos of culture, he argues that liberals will not discuss the main 
principles of Islam but could offer liberal views on the way these principles might be 
practised. The author also uses the fallacy of exclusion to state that having fixed views 
on Islamic principles rather than liberal ones is a form of exclusion, especially as the 
application of these principles is a subject of debate. 
Overall, the author in this article argues mainly for the relativity of alibrāliyah on 
the basis of cultural factors, including Islam, which he states is not contradictory. In 
justifying this argument, he uses the topos of relativity, the topos of culture, and the 
fallacy of definition of alibrāliyah by traditionalists. The author also uses perspectivisation 
strategies, specifically employing the involvement strategy using first and second-person 
perspective to address traditionalists, followed by detachment strategies to explain from 
a third-person perspective the notion of the relativity of alibrāliyah and its relation to 
Islam. Nomination strategies are also used through the processes of functionalisation, 
categorisation, and association. Legitimation strategies are also employed. using the 
strategy of theoretical rationalisation through which the author attempts to convince the 
reader that the truth of the relativity of alibrāliyah and that it is adopted by all societies 
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Table 7-6: main discursive strategies in text 7.7 
7.7.1 Articulation of meanings and groups in terms of Discourse Theory  
The author in this article relates alibrāliyah primarily to the notion of freedom, and 
in particular to the meaning of individuality, which the author argues it is bounded to the 
cultural circumstances that control it. He regards Islam as part of culture and argues that 
alibrāliyah does not contradict Islam but instead assesses its application. These 
articulations of meaning are used to counter the traditionalists’ view on alibrāliyah that it 
is contradictory to Saudi society and to their religion.  
The main articulation of alibrāliyah concerns the notion of its relativity to the 
culture in which it is employed. In this sense, alibrāliyah is articulated according to the 
restrictions imposed by the culture it is applied within. This freedom of alibrāliyah is 
associated with the freedom of individuals, and it is practised according to the cultural 
norms that view these practices as acceptable. These liberal practices are articulated as 
non-contradictory to Islam as they offer liberal resolutions to Islamic principles that are 
under constant debate. In this regard, the author positions Islam as part of the culture 
that is shaped by and shapes the concept of alibrāliyah.  
These articulated meanings of alibrāliyah are used to argue against the 
traditionalists’ view of alibrāliyah. While the traditionalists argue that alibrāliyah is 
unrestricted, the author argues that it is restricted by cultural norms, including religion. 
Through this argument, the author is creating an antagonism against traditionalists within 
the logic of equivalence, in which traditionalists are positioned as the antagonistic pole. 
This antagonistic pole of traditionalists includes, according to the author, the ideologised 
conservative public and their extremist Islamic clerics, labelled as ‘ideologisers’. On the 
other hand, the author articulates a logic of difference between alibrāliyah and liberal 
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Islam, in which alibrāliyah is relative to the Islamic culture it is practised in, which can 
provide liberal views for less extremist Islam. 
Overall, alibrāliyah in this article is associated with the meaning of freedom of 
individuals, which is relative to cultural norms, including Islam. These meanings are 
created to argue against conservatives’ view of alibrāliyah, in which it is seen as 
unrestricted and with no identity. The author, in countering the conservative public, 
creates an antagonism against them within the logic of equivalence. However, the author 
equates alibrāliyah with progressive Islam by referring to the relativity of the concept, 
which can be employed to provide a modern, progressive Islam. These relations of 
antagonism are intended to advocate for alibrāliyah and to suggest the notion that 
alibrāliyah is a social concept and not a myth, as traditionalists claim, based on the 
author’s view of it as a culturally relative concept that represents progressive Islam in the 
Saudi context.   
7.8 Discussion and Conclusion  
Throughout the above-discussed articles, written in the period 2007-2016, the 
discourse of alibrāliyah shifts in relation to the theme of freedom. It changes from simply 
meaning freedom without explicitly clarifying what this freedom might include, to being 
associated with the meaning of unrestricted freedom, and then, by the end of the period, 
to meaning a relative freedom that is restricted by cultural conditions. This link between 
alibrāliyah and freedom is found in Islam, in which it is discussed mainly in relation to the 
necessity of having the freedom of alibrāliyah at the time freedom exists as a value in 
Islam. At the beginning of the period, this discussion in relation to Islam primarily 
constructs freedom in alibrāliyah as antagonistic to Islam in general, which then shifts to 
become equivalent to progressive Islam and antagonistic to fundamental Islam at the 
end of the period. The construction of the relation between alibrāliyah and freedom in 
relation to Islam is found to be relevant to the following main themes, which are found 
across the articles. 
• Relativity vs. Absoluteness 
In terms of the notion of relativity, alibrāliyah has shifted from being an 
independent concept that cannot be integrated with other systems to being a relative 
concept that can be adapted according to the values of the culture, i.e. Islam. Text 
(Rights 2009), written at the beginning of the period, refers to the notion that the concept 
of ‘alibrāliyah’ that is seen as concerns freedom and human rights is not a universal 
concept, and cannot be adopted relatively in different states. Instead, it is suitable only 
 - 150 - 
 
for the Western states that created it.  This idea is further developed in Text (Rights 
2013), in which the author views the concept of freedom in alibrāliyah as a Western, 
unrestricted, chaotic system that cannot be employed universally, and especially not in 
Islamic religious states. This is illustrated in the idea that Islamic societies have their own 
Islamic system that includes the value of freedom, which is restricted and absolute in 
contrast to the unrestricted freedom in the alibrāliyah system. However, Text (Rights 
2016) at the end of the period explains that alibrāliyah, with its main value of freedom, is 
a relative concept that can be adopted within Islamic cultures to provide liberal 
resolutions to Islamic issues that are under constant debate. This shift suggests the 
success of liberals in shifting the meaning of alibrāliyah toward being a relative concept 
that can be restricted by the Islamic cultural values in order to offer a liberal progressive 
Islam as an alternative to fundamental Islam.   
• Modernity 
The notion of modernity is discussed later in the period in which alibrāliyah is 
constructed in relation to the meanings of modernity and progress.  For example, Text 
(Rights 2013) indicates that ‘alibrāliyah’ means modernity and development. This is 
illustrated through the notion of liberation from the past and old traditions, toward working 
for the present and the future. This notion is constructed to imply that Saudi liberalism 
should be concerned with discussing the means for achieving modernity instead of 
arguing over its relation to Islam and social norms. While this article focuses on the total 
separation of alibrāliyah from cultural norms, Text (Rights 2016) shows a shift in the 
notion of modernity, in which it is constructed in relation to the progressive Islamic 
culture. It equates alibrāliyah with the meaning of modern Islam, according to which 
alibrāliyah can be adopted in Saudi religious society by means of providing more flexible 
and liberal choices for practising Islam. In this sense, alibrāliyah is not separate from 
Saudi religious identity, but rather conforms with the cultural norms of the society, 
including its religion.    
• Individuality vs. Collectivity   
In terms of the notion of freedom of the individual in opposition to freedom of the 
collective, the concept of alibrāliyah has shifted over time from the meaning of collective 
freedom to the meaning of individual freedom. The freedom of the collective meaning is 
noted in text (Rights 2011) and text (Rights 2013), which state that freedom of the group 
exists within the system of Islam, which is superior to the freedom of the individual 
meaning in alibrāliyah, and therefore it is not necessary to substitute Islam with 
alibrāliyah. However, in text (Rights 2013) this notion shifts, and the meaning of freedom 
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of individuals in order to achieve social progress is put forth. Published at the end of the 
period, text (Rights 2016) specifically defines the meaning of individuality in relation to 
Saudi cultural conditions. It refers to the point of the freedom of the individual to conform 
to the existing cultural norms, including religion, by following the liberal progressive 
choices that suit them. This notion of individuality represents the meaning of 
transcendentalism, whereby individuals are independent and free to practise their 
religion to achieve progress for the world they live in. 
The process of filling the empty signifier of ‘alibrāliyah’ with signifiers entails a 
conflict between groups that aim to maintain or gain hegemony through charging the 
concept with different meanings. As the meaning of alibrāliyah shifts from being 
antagonistic to the Islamic system to being equivalent to progressive Islam, the 
articulation of the groups has also shifted, from the liberal group being antagonistic to 
the conservative Islamist group in general, to intellectual liberals being antagonistic to 
populist religious conservatives and equivalent to progressive Islamists in particular. In 
discourse theory terms, the groups are constructed at the beginning and middle of the 
periods within the logic of equivalence, in which Saudi liberals are equated with Western 
liberals under one bloc in antagonism to the Islamist conservative group. However, 
towards the end of the period, a greater articulation of an equivalence across difference 
is found, in which liberals are articulated as antagonistic to Islamist populists within the 
logic of equivalence, and as equivalent to progressive Islamists within the logic of 
difference.     
The mechanism of the shift in relations between the groups can be discussed in 
terms of the positions each group takes in regard to the self and others across the texts. 
In text (Rights 2007), the author positions anti-liberals as the antagonist group through 
challenging their authority to define the concept of alibrāliyah, without the author himself 
providing a definition. At this early stage, this indicates that the identity of liberals has not 
yet been shaped, other than themselves positioning the anti-liberal conservative group 
as the antagonists. The position taken in texts (Rights 2009) and (Rights 2011) is the 
opposite, in which the authors position liberals as the antagonist group, whose existence 
constitutes a threat to society by substituting Islam with alibrāliyah. These three articles 
construct the groups using the logic of equivalence, which represents the groups’ 
struggle to either gain or maintain hegemony. The antagonism is dissolved in text (Rights 
2013), in which the Saudi liberals are equated with Western liberals with a view to 
achieving modernity and progress.  This view is opposed in Text 7.6, in which the author 
attempts to dissolve the relation between Western liberalism and freedom by taking a 
weak position and accusing Saudi intellectuals of being psychologically deficient in 
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adopting the concept of alibrāliyah. The relation between the groups becomes more 
defined in text (Rights 2016), in which the Saudi liberal identity is viewed as being 
dependent on progressive resolutions of Islam identified by the culture in opposition to 
the fundamental conservative Islam of the populists. This shift in the construction of 
liberal identity suggests that liberals are succeeding in forming their identity and gaining 
hegemony in the Saudi socio-political field through filling the concept of alibrāliyah with 
the meaning of non-fundamental progressive Islam.   
7.9 Summary 
The analysis of the texts in this chapter has shown several results in terms of the means 
by which alibrāliyah is identified and the relations between the groups in constructing it 
over time. It reveals that alibrāliyah has been associated with Islam in general at the 
beginning of the period and then linked to progressive non-fundamental Islam at the end 
of the period. This shift in meaning suggests a shift in the relation between the groups in 
which liberals start to succeed in forming their identity through this shift. This suggests 
that liberals also succeed in turning alibrāliyah from a myth into a social imaginary. Other 
suggestions related to the wider Saudi socio-political field will be drawn on at the end of 
chapter 8.     
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8.1 Summary of objectives and methods of analysis  
The key objective of this study is to discover the meaning of the contested term 
‘alibrāliyah’ and to investigate the power struggle of the different groups in identifying it 
in the Saudi socio-political field. In particular, it aims to find out whether there is a 
diachronic shift in the meaning of ‘alibrāliyah’ in the period (2007-2016), and as a result 
whether any change can be identified in the articulation of the groups struggling for 
hegemony in this ideological debate. In Discourse Theory view, ‘alibrāliyah’ is considered 
an empty signifier in which each group aims to fill it with their own meaning to gain or 
maintain hegemony. In order to trace the meaning of ‘alibrāliyah’ as articulated by 
different groups over time, a methodological framework has been developed. This 
framework is designed to investigate the meaning of ‘alibrāliyah’ at the macro and micro 
level by means of combining the Corpus Linguistics methods and Discourse-Historical 
Approach. In particular, Corpus Linguistics methods has enabled the researcher to look 
at the meaning of ‘alibrāliyah’ at the macro level in which it has revealed the salient 
meaning of ‘alibrāliyah’ across time. The discourse-historical approach allowed to look 
at the construction of ‘alibrāliyah’ at the micro level in which it has demonstrated the 
underlying meanings in whole texts and the strategies used to construct these meaning. 
The combination of both approaches allowed for providing a reasonably comprehensive 
picture of the highly debated discourse of ‘alibrāliyah’ in the Saudi society.  
This methodological framework has been employed to investigate the 
representation of ‘alibrāliyah’ in the platform of Saudi press. Thus, the data consist of a 
compiled corpus of 575 newspaper articles which were examined at two levels. Firstly, 
the entire dataset was analyzed using corpus linguistics methods of keywords and 
collocation analysis to identify the key meanings of ‘alibrāliyah’ across the whole corpus 
and over time. Secondly, a set of 12 articles, down-sampled from the corpus on the basis 
of the top themes which are the religion and the rights, were analysed using the 
discourse-historical approach (DHA). DHA enabled the researcher to identify the 
underlying meanings across time through the analysis of the discursive strategies 
including the argumentation strategies used along with the nomination, predication and 
perspectivization strategies. This analysis is followed by an interpretation that is based 
on the theoretical lens of discourse theory in terms of struggle over hegemony in 
identifying ‘alibrāliyah’ and the semantic meanings each group articulate to fill the empty 
signifier of ‘alibrāliyah’. Discourse Theory has also enabled the researcher for looking at 
whether the shift in the articulation of ‘alibrāliyah’ turns it from being an empty signifier 
into being a marker of social imaginary in the Saudi socio-political field.           
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8.2 Findings of the Study 
The findings of this study can be discussed first at both the macro and the micro 
levels before going into discussing them in combination and revealing the implications 
they both tell about the discourse of ‘alibrāliyah’ in Saudi society. At the macro level, the 
corpus analysis has yielded interesting results in terms of the key meaning preferences 
associated with ‘alibrāliyah’, and in relation to the diachronic shift of these meanings 
across the period (2007-2016). In particular, the corpus analysis has revealed that 
‘alibrāliyah’ is mainly associated with the discourse of religion and human rights, in which 
the salient construction of alibrāliyah has changed over time from being associated with 
the religious discourse to being associated with the discourse of freedom and human 
rights. It has been found that this interesting salient finding needs a micro qualitive 
analysis in order to test whether these results represent the discourse of ‘alibrāliyah’ at 
the micro level, and to investigate the mechanism of the shift of meanings in detail. 
Therefore, with the assistance of the corpus, 12 articles were selected for the qualitative 
analysis in which 6 articles represent the theme of religion and the other 6 represent the 
theme of rights.  
The micro analysis of the articles presenting both themes, religion and rights, has 
revealed a shift in the discursive construction of ‘alibrāliyah’ and the liberal group. This 
is revealed through examining the meanings the different groups attempt to charge 
‘alibrāliyah’ with to obtain or maintain power. In particular, the empty signifier of 
‘alibrāliyah’ has been filled with meanings related to the notions of relativity and 
individuality. In terms of the notion of relativity, the articulation of the term ‘alibrāliyah’ 
has shown a shift over time in which ‘alibrāliyah’ changes from being a non-relative, non-
flexible concept to the religious conservative Saudi culture into being a relative concept 
that can be adopted to the norms of the Saudi culture. ‘alibrāliyah’ is also associated with 
notion of individuality against collectivity at the end of the period through referring to the 
need for ‘alibrāliyah’ in guaranteeing the freedom of individuals to achieve progress. In 
this sense, ‘alibrāliyah’ is articulated in the sense of the concept of transcendentalism in 
which individuals are independent and free in practicing their belief to achieve progress 
for the world they live in. 
The articulation of ‘alibrāliyah’ has also shown a shift in relation to the concept of 
secularity in which it shifts from being a secular concept that contradicts the religion of 
Islam into being a non-secular concept that is compatible to non-fundamental Islam. 
‘alibrāliyah’ is also articulated in terms of the concept of modernity later in the period, 
constructing it as a modern progressive concept that conforms to the progressive Islamic 
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culture by means of offering liberal choices that suits the circumstances of the modern 
life. From discourse theory perspective the shift in the articulation of the meaning of 
discourse suggests a shift as well in the articulation of the groups involved in the conflict 
over hegemony. 
Therefore, it is found that in both set of articles of different themes, there is a shift 
in the relation between the groups; the liberals and the Islamists. The first half of the 
period revealed a complete antagonism between Islamists and liberals created within the 
logic of equivalence in which both groups represent two antagonist poles. This 
antagonism is then started to disperse and redefined in higher articulation in a difference 
across equivalence in which liberals are constructed as antagonists to fundamental 
Islamists and as equivalent to non-fundamental Islamists. It is suggested that this shift in 
the articulation of the discourse and the groups indicates the success of liberals to 
establish their own identity and to gain hegemony in the Saudi socio-political field.   
Having presented the shift in the construction of ‘alibrāliyah’ at the macro and 
micro levels, it can be argued that both approaches are complementary to each other 
and are necessary together in investigating the shift of a discourse in a comprehensive 
way. While the corpus analysis in the current study shows the salient meanings of 
‘alibrāliyah’ over time, the discourse analysis uncovered the diachronic discursive 
construction of ‘alibrāliyah’ and the hegemonic conflict over defining it.   
8.3 Original contribution 
The main contribution of this study concerns offering a developed a 
methodological framework for investigating the construction of ideological movements 
and the relation between the groups struggling for hegemony. This framework traces 
diachronically at the macro and the micro levels the salient and the discursive meanings 
of a movement through examining the keyword of the ideology and its contextual 
meaning based on collocation and whole text analysis. It is a comprehensive framework 
for the phenomena under study that has allowed for investigating diachronically the 
ideological word of ‘alibrāliyah’ and the way its construction shifts over time by different 
groups. It has also enabled the researcher to look at the mechanism of the articulation 
of the relation between the groups at the micro level and the way the shift of the relations 
has changed the hegemonic positions of the groups. As discussed above, this framework 
has been developed through combining Corpus Linguistics methods with Discourse-
Historical Approach and Discourse Theory.  
Another contribution made by this this study is providing a further literature for 
the socio-political context in Saudi Arabia. As evidenced by the review of the literature, 
 157 
 
few studies have examined the socio-political discourse in Saudi context and the power 
struggle of the groups in the area. Thus, this research provides an analytical study on a 
recent conflict on modernisation that is particularly on the discourse of liberalism and the 
mechanism by which it is articulated and shifts the relations between the groups in Saudi 
Arabia. This study should thus be helpful to researchers interested in the Saudi 
ideological contexts, allowing them to build on an analysis of a discourse formation, in 
this case ‘alibrāliyah’ in Saudi society and the nature of the ideological conflicts of the 
groups in the region.  
8.4 Limitations of the current study and suggestions for future research  
A number of limitations can be identified for the current study despite the effort 
made to comprehensively analyse the meaning of the ideology and the power struggle 
over hegemony. One of the limitations concerns the focus of the study on the analysis of 
the movement of ‘alibrāliyah’ in one platform which is the press. This is due to time and 
space restrictions in which other platforms were intentionally excluded. A multi-genre 
analysis would be considered in future research based on this study by means of 
conducting a comparative analysis.  
Another limitation that is worth noting is the issue of translation. Since translation 
cannot transfer the whole meaning, it was not found easy to interpret the analysis into 
the target language. As the analysis was based on the source language which is Arabic, 
the best effort has been done by the researcher to translate the texts which is validated 
by a certified translator (see appendix C). For this limitation, the translation was 
undertaken to be as much accurate as possible to deliver the overall meaning into 
English language effectively. 
For the future research, it can be argued that the developed model for this study 
can be applied in further studies to investigate the articulation of movements and the 
struggle of groups in articulating them to gain power. This would improve knowledge on 
the mechanism of the construction of movements in different contexts. Also, it would be 
helpful to extend this study and conduct a longer-term diachronic study on the different 
movements of modernity in Saudi society. Studying the movements on a longer term 
would allow for a more detailed understanding of the historical and socio-political context 




8.5 Final Remarks  
Drawing on the results of this research, these results are significant in terms of 
understanding the nature of the conflicts between the groups in Saudi society along with 
the development of these conflicts. It is through the main result of this research that 
shows a shift in the meaning of alibrāliyah, a one can understand that the recent success 
of liberals went through a discursive contestation and debate on the term. This conflict 
cannot be detached from the previous conflicts, discussed in chapter 2, in which the 
conflict around alibrāliyah can be considered an extension to them as alibrāliyah here 
allows progressives to establish an identity in the region. Up to this point, liberals link 
their identity to the religious field to gain acceptance and exitance. However, to distance 
and distinguish themselves from the Islamic religious group, they identify themselves in 
terms of being non-fundamental progressive Islamists. Thus, their success is based on 
filling alibrāliyah with their ideological meaning related to religion to gain power in the 
socio-political field. This power that appears now in the region would affect the recent 
Saudi social site in terms of their identity construction plus the diversity in attitudes. The 
effect would be clear in terms of the Saudi social tendency towards progressive moderate 
Islam that consequently would allow policy makers to issue policies that suit these 
tendencies in the region.     
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The analysis of the Arabic texts (newspapers’ articles) in
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 أسلمة اللي�ب ال�ة
ي الأوساط الثقاف�ة حول مفهوم )الأدب 
ي الثمانين�ات الم�لاد�ة وقع جدل كب�ي �ف
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ي لا تمت للأدب بصلة كونه منتجا
اليت
ي وجه 
م��د له بحكم أنه ن�ع خاص من الأدب �ل�ت ف م الق�م الإسلام�ة و�دعو لها، و�قف �ف
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 آخر استجد داخل وسط أوسع من 
ً
ذلك الجدل لم ينقطع ول�ن هدأت أمواجه لأن جد�




ي الأوساط الاجتماع�ة 
�ط الإسلا�ي ( وصحافة )المجلات الإسلام�ة( �ف
انتشار ثقافة )ال ث
ي بالنسبة للأدب مع 
منذ الثمانينات وحيت ع� الفضائ�ات، فتكررت م�ب رات الت�ار الدييف
ي تؤكد هذا الإعلام، دون أ




ع� فصل الدين عن كل منا�ي الح�اة فما � � وما لق�� لق��، غ�ي أن قطاعا
ي شيت 
 م�ث وع الأسلمة �ف
ً
من الإسلاميني ف لم �ك�ت ث بتلك الاع�ت اضات العلمان�ة، مواص�
 )القروض الإسلام�ة(، و)ال �جات الإسلام�ة(، مجالات الح�اة، فظهرت ما �س�
و)الس�احة الإسلام�ة( إ� ذلك ذلك من صور الأسلمة. ل�ن الملاحظ أن هذە )الأسلمة( 
ي( كالإعلام الإسلا�ي ، 
�ط الإسلا�ي ، أو )الإبداع الب�ث
لم تقف عند )المنتج المادي( كال ث
ي ( كالعالم الإسلا�ي ، إنما دخلت أو )التقل�د الاجتما�ي ( كالزواج الإسلا�ي ، أو )الواق
ع الح�ايت
ي أوساط أمة 
ي (، فاصطبغت بها �ي �سهل قبولها و�س��قها �ف
ع� نماذج من )الفكر الإ�سايف
ي 
تم�ل نحو دينها وما يتصل به، فظهر )ال�سار الإسلا�ي (، أو )الإش�ت ا��ة الإسلام�ة( اليت




ي الله عنهزعموا أن لها جذرا
  .ر الغفاري ر�ف
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ي الو�ي الجماه�ي ي، خاصة بعد انحسار المد 
ولأن الفكرة )اللي�ب ال�ة( لا زالت حديثة �ف
ي تبنت هذا الفكر ضمن 
ي وفشله الذر�ــــع من واقع كث�ي من الأنظمة الع���ة اليت
العلمايف
عني ف أنظمتها، فقد سلك بعض ال�تاب والمثقفني ف السعوديني ف من اللي�ب اليني ف أو المخدو 
بالفكر اللي�ب ا�ي إ� )أسلمة( هذە الفكرة الط��ة �ي �سهل ع� الجماه�ي ي استساغتها، 
 هجينا �حاول 
�
ي لا تعدو أن تكون فكرا
فسمعنا بمصطلح جد�د هو )اللي�ب ال�ة الإسلام�ة(، اليت
الجمع بني ف الإسلام واللي�ب ال�ة، أو بالأصح قولبة اللي�ب ال�ة حسب الق�م الإسلام�ة، تحت 
، لذا ف�ي لا تتعارض مع دين زعم 
�
ي أصلها )وس�لة( ول�ست دينا أو فكرا
أن اللي�ب ال�ة �ف
المجتمع، الذي �ستطيع أن �ك�فها حسب ق�مه وأعرافه، فمنذ شي�ع مصطلح )اللي�ب ال�ة( 
ي الم�ادين الإعلام�ة، ومن ثم انعكاسه التأث�ي ي ع� الأوساط 
ي منتد�اتنا الثقاف�ة وترد�دە �ف
�ف
ني ف القبول والرفض والح�اد، واللي�ب ال�ة تخضع ولا زالت ل�ث�ي من ال�تابات الاجتماع�ة ب
ي محاولة فك �ة لإ�جاد علاقة حضار�ة بينهما، 
ي ترصد موقف الإسلام منها، �ف
التحل�ل�ة اليت
ي للي�ب ال�ة مع معالجة نقاط الاتفاق 
ي تناولت الجانب الفلس�ف
وكذلك المقالات النقد�ة اليت
ي محورها الرئ�س والاختلاف بني ف الفكر 
اللي�ب ا�ي والفكر الإسلا�ي ، فظهرت كتابات ركزت �ف
ي )العل�ي ( 
ي �ع�ب عن )وس�لة متغ�ي ة( من اخ�ت اع العقل الب�ث
ع� أن اللي�ب ال�ة مفهوم إ�سايف
ي الاستبدادي، لتحقيق )غا�ة ثابتة( �ي ضمان ح �ة 
 مع العقل ال�هنويت
�
لإدارة ال�اع سلم�ا
إقامة نظام متكامل من العدل الاجتما�ي الشامل، لذا فاللي�ب ال�ة الفرد ومن ثم التطلع إ� 
  .)وس�لة( لا تتعارض مع روح الإسلام وغا�اته الأساس�ة
 
من ذلك ولدت مسألة )أسلمة اللي�ب ال�ة(، وهنا يتج� الفهم المنكوس، لأن الذين �حكم 
الإ�سان�ة )ح��ة وعدالة  العلاقة بني ف الإسلام واللي�ب ال�ة، ل�ست المقاصد الح�ات�ة أو الق�م
ي 
ي العلاقة متفقان عليها، إنما الحكم بينهما والفصل �ف
ي نجد أن طر�ف
ومساواة وغ�ي ها(، اليت
ي الفك �ن الإسلا�ي واللي�ب ا�ي ، 
ي �ي ثابتة �ف
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ي )العقل الب�ث ي(، وفق تق��ر فلاسف
ة التن��ر ودعاته ف�ي بالنسبة للي�ب ال�ة، تتمثل �ف
ي المقام الأول 
الأصليني ف : )إنه لا سلطان ع� العقل إلا للعقل وحدە(، حيت يب�ت الإ�سان �ف
ي الت�ف والاعتقاد، ضد كل من ي��د ان�ت ف اعها 











الب�ث ي �ص�غ  منه، سواء أ�ان سلطانا
ي الإسلام فالمرجع�ة 
)القوانني ف الوضع�ة( و��ث عها لحما�ة فرد�ة الإ�سان وح �ته. أما �ف
ي 
الحضار�ة )دين�ة( متمثلة بالو�ي )قرآن وسنة(، من خلال النصوص والت ث �عات اليت





� ذلك فاللي�ب ال�ة ل�ست )وس�لة متغ�ي ة( �ي �سهل بلورتها وفق حاجات مجتمع معني ف ، ع
ي هو )تحقيق الح��ة الفرد�ة(، لا يتم إلا �شكل مواز� مع جانب 
إنما �ي فكر له جانب فلس�ف
ي انتفاء 
حضاري هو )تحد�د العقل مرجع�ة وضع�ة(، وأي إخلال بأحد الجانبني ف �عيف




أسلمة اللي�ب ال�ة، فإن كان العقل يرفض )أسلمة العلوم( الطب�ع�ة والإ�سان�ة، من منطق أن 
ي منفعته كل الب�ث ، الذي �شمل المسلمني ف وغ�ي هم، فهو 
ي عام �ش�ت ك �ف
العلوم إرث إ�سايف
 يرفض أسلمة الأفكار وا
�
لعقائد ذات الجذور الفلسف�ة الخاصة والمرجع�ات الحضار�ة أ�ضا
المستبعدة للنصوص الدين�ة، وعل�ه يرفض )أسلمة اللي�ب ال�ة( للخصوص�ة الفك��ة بني ف 
 .الإسلام واللي�ب ال�ة، والتضاد الجوهري بينهما
fo( seitiralimis fo sopoT-
 )seulav
fo( secnereffid fo sopoT-
 .)ecruos
fo ycallaF ro sopoT-
 .’hailarbilla‘  fo noitinifed
fo ytilibixelf fo ycallaF-
 ’hailarbilla‘
fo( regnad fo sopoT-
 htiw malsI gnicalper
 )hailarbilla‘

















 srotca laicos niaM snoitaciderP
  secitcarp dna
 اليت ي تؤكد ع� فصل الدين عن كل منا�ي الح�اة فما � � وما لق�� لق��-
ي وفشله الذر�ــــع من واقع كث�ي من الأنظمة الع���ة اليت ي تبنت هذا  -
انحسار المد العلمايف
 الفكر ضمن أنظمتها
 
 تم�ل نحو دينها وما يتصل به-
 
ي الو�ي الجماه�ي يلا  -
 زالت حديثة �ف
 ل�ست )وس�لة متغ�ي ة( �ي �سهل بلورتها وفق حاجات مجتمع معني ف -
ي هو )تحقيق الح��ة الفرد�ة(، لا يتم إلا �شكل مواز� مع جانب -
�ي فكر له جانب فلس�ف
 حضاري هو )تحد�د العقل مرجع�ة وضع�ة(
 
 هجينا �حاول الجمع بني ف الإ -
�
ي لا تعدو أن تكون فكرا
 سلام واللي�ب ال�ةاليت
 أو بالأصح قولبة اللي�ب ال�ة حسب الق�م الإسلام�ة- 
، لذا ف�ي لا تتعارض مع - 
�
ي أصلها )وس�لة( ول�ست دينا أو فكرا
تحت زعم أن اللي�ب ال�ة �ف
 دين المجتمع، الذي �ستطيع أن �ك�فها حسب ق�مه وأعرافه
 

















ال�تاب والمثقفني ف 
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 المتشددون.. الأذكى عند الشدائد
 
عند كل حادثة أمنیة، یرتفع الصوت اللیبرالي إلى أقصاه، ویخبو الإسلامي المتشدد حتى 
وحینھا یتراجع اللیبرالیون قلیلا،ً لیعود الإسلامیون المتشددون إلى درجة تھدأ العاصفة، 
 .الاشتعال
ھذا تحدیداً ما یجري في السعودیة، منذ حادثة الاعتداء على سمو مساعد وزیر الداخلیة. 
الأصوات اللیبرالیة في أقصاھا عبر مواقع الإنترنت، وعلى الفضائیات، والإسلامیون 
أنفسھم بقضایا جانبیة، ویزیدون التركیز على "طاش"، فیخیل إلیك أن ناصر یشغلون 
 .القصبي أو عبدالله السدحان أخطر من الانتحاري عبدالله عسیري
ھي أیام قلیلة، ویھدأ اللیبرالیون، وسنرى المتشددین یخرجون من خنادقھم برماح، یرمون 
یحین خبر آخر؛ إیقاف خلیة، أو  بھا مخالفیھم بكل قوة وتحریض وتخوین. وھكذا إلى أن
 .تسجیل حادثة أمنیة جدیدة، لا قدر الله، فیعودوا إلى صمتھم
شھرا،ً تعزز ھذه الرؤیة، من دون أن یحدث أي تغییر جلي في  ٥۷المراجعة على مدى 
 .صراع الفریقین، لتحقیق أھدافھما
 ؟السؤال: لماذا یخفت الصوت المتشدد ھذه الأیام، ویعود شرسا ًبعدھا
إجابة السؤال تبدأ من خطیب جمعة ولا تنتھي عند معلم في مدرسة. فبین الإعلان عن 
ساعات. أظنھا كافیة  ۸محاولة الاغتیال وقیام صلاة الجمعة في المملكة مسافة لا تتجاوز 
لأي خطیب لیستبدل موضوع خطبتھ. لكن كم خطیبا ًفعل ذلك؟ على كل قارئ أن یتساءل، 
لجمعة في جامع حارتھ. وعلى سبیل المثال، خطیب الحرم النبوي ویستذكر عنوان خطبة ا
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لكن، في الحال ذاتھ، كم خطیبا ًتحدث عن الدراما الرمضانیة، ومنھا حلقة مسلسل "طاش" 
عن التعلیم؟ لعل الإجابة ستبدو بمثابة الكارثة الوطنیة، إذا تبین لنا أن الجوامع، التي تحدثت 
المسلسلات، أكثر عدداً من جوامع قرر خطباؤھا استبدال عنوان الخطبة إلى العملیة عن 
 ۲۱الانتحاریة. والأكثر إیلاما ًأن یكون ھناك خطیب جمعة یتحدث عن حلقة "طاش"، بعد 
 .ساعة من تسجیل أخطر عملیة إرھابیة عرفتھا البلاد في العصر الحدیث
ول الإرھاب في البلاد، أن الإسلامیین المتشددین الواضح في الصراع الإسلامي اللیبرالي ح
 ٥۷أكثر ذكاء من خصومھم اللیبرالیین. یعرفون متى یتحدثون ومتى یصمتون. ومسیرة 
شھراً تشیر إلى أنھم لم یخسروا كثیراً مثلما كان منتظرا. فھم في تشددھم حاضرون بكل 
لنرى المتشددین یقلبون الطاولة على قوة. وما علینا إلا الانتظار قلیلا،ً أسبوعین أو نحوھما، 
 !اللیبرالیین
rebmun fo sopoT-
regnad fo ycallaf ro sopoT-
 noitan eht ot stsimalsI fo
 stsimalsI tsimertxe :2 mialC
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 أنفسھم بقضایا جانبیةیشغلون  -
 یخرجون من خنادقھم برماح، یرمون بھا مخالفیھم بكل قوة وتحریض وتخوین -
 أكثر ذكاء من خصومھم اللیبرالیین -
 یعرفون متى یتحدثون ومتى یصمتون -
 لم یخسروا كثیراً  -
 فھم في تشددھم حاضرون بكل قوة -
 !یقلبون الطاولة على اللیبرالیین -
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 للي�ب ال�ة امتداد للحداثةا
ي السابق كانت أبرز مشا�ل الحداثة ومعوقاتها هو تع��فها وتحد�د ماهيتها، وكانت 
�ف
 ول�ست حول مضامينه، ولذلك 
�
المعركة حول الحداثة معركة حول المصطلح تحد�دا
ط المنه�ب ي 
ع الغذا�ي عن �سم�ة ال�اع حول الحداثة بأنه حوار لغ�اب ال�ث
ّ
كان ي�ت ف
ط المنه�ب ي للحوار وهو الاحتكام إ� تع �ف م
حدد �مكن الانطلاق منه.. ولأن ال�ث
ي ألا �ُلزم الناقد المنقود بتع �ف لا �ُقر به، فإن الغذا�ي �قفز 
علم أو لم  -والعل�ي �قت�ف
ول�س للي�ب ال�ة  -عن هذا ال�ث ط المنه�ب ي والعل�ي ف�مارس نقدە اللاذع للي�ب اليني ف  -�علم 




ن �سمع منهم تع��فا
ي كث�ي من كتاباتهم ومقالاتهم بل كانوا أقرب إ� الاتفاق ع� تع �ف اللي�ب ال�ة 
أنهم بينوا �ف
 .وتحد�د أهدافهم بعكس الحداثيني ف 
 
له  -أي مصطلح  -و�المنطق العق�ي والتج �ة الواقع�ة فإن المصطلح 
ّ
لا �مكن أن يتمث
جه الدن�ا بكل ما ف�ه بح�ث �كون هو المصطلح والمصطلح هو، بل المنطق أي فرد ع� و 
 
�
عن  -بطبعه وطب�عته  -والعقل و�رهان الح�اة �قول إن أي إ�سان لابد أن �كون خارجا
أي مصطلح يتس� به أو ينسب نفسه إل�ه، وكل النقد الذي وّجه للي�ب اليني ف لم �كن 




اض التماثل والتطابق بني ف اللي�ب ال�ة واللي�ب اليني ف وهذا منطق�ا
ينطلق من اف�ت اض عصمة اللي�ب اليني ف عن الخطأ وتجاوز المصطلح، و�ذا كان الأمر كذلك 
ي وجود مسلمني ف أو يهود أو نصارى ع� وجه الأرض �كون أو� بالحكم لأن الأد�ان 
فإن ن�ف
ي أدب�اتها تط�ح النظ �ة المثال�ة لل
ع�ش وتدعو الفرد لمقار�تها قدر الإمكان مع السماو�ة �ف
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من هنا أقول ل�ل الناقدين إنكم تخطئون باعتقادكم أن اللي�ب اليني ف معصومون فهم ��ث 
ي ممارساتهم أو تطب�قاتهم العمل�ة 
للي�ب ال�ة لا مثل�م �خطئون و�صيبون وأخطاؤهم �ف
ي عدم وجودهم كفكر وثقافة؛ فاللي�ب ال�ة مبدأ عظ�م �ُف�ت ض بكل إ�سان أن �دعو إل�ه 
تعيف
ف بالانتساب إل�ه، واللي�ب ال�ة باختصار و�بساطة وكما قال المفكر اللي�ب ا�ي 
و�تبناە و�ت�ث
 :د. عبدالرحمن الراشد
 
ي �س�ط يؤمن بح��ة الاخت�ار فقط، وهذە الح"
�ة تضيق وتتسع وفق �ي مفهوم إ�سايف
رؤ�ة كل فرد.. فإن اختارت الأغلب�ة أن تكون محافظة، فهذا حقها وخ�ارها، و�ن فضلت 
ي حني ف �سجن ال�ث طة 
العكس، فالأمر لها. لهذا �سمح هولندا بتدخني ف الحش�ش، �ف
ي النها�ة باخت�ار الجماعة، فإذا كانت أغلب�ة 
ال ب �طان�ة من يتعاطاە. فح��ة الفرد مق�دة �ف
جتمع محافظة، فخ�ارها هو الذي �سود. لهذا فاللي�ب اليون، من الناح�ة النظ �ة، أقرب الم
الناس إ� الجميع، ح�ث �ف�ت ض أنهم يؤمنون بحق الإسلاميني ف والشيوعيني ف والقوميني ف 
 ."والمحافظني ف الاجتماعيني ف 
 
 الإسلاميني ف واللي�ب اليني ف بني ف  -إن جاز �سميته بذلك  -وللأسف الشد�د فإن واقع الحوار 
ي الأساس بموض�ع العلاقة بني ف اللي�ب ال�ة والإسلام، ولا يزال الجدل بينهما 
لا زال يهتم �ف
ي النقاش �حمل دلالة ع� كون النقاش 
 مع أن بقاء موض�ع العلاقة �حتل الصدارة �ف
�
كث�ي ا
ي بينهما لم 
م ق�د أنملة.. مما �دل ع� ممانعة ق��ّة للفكر اللي�ب ا�ي �ف
ّ
يتطّور ولم يتقد
ي الحوار والنقاش من مستوى 
ي وجهة نظري نابعة عن قفز �ف
الممل�ة، وهذە الممانعة �ف
الظاهر والُمعلن إ� مستوى الباطن وال�، بمعيف أن كل هذە الممانعة والمناهضة قائمة 
خذ
�




























 fo ycallaf ro sopoT-
  noitinifed
 namuh fo ycallaf ro sopoT-
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 taerg a si ’hailarbilla‘ :3mialC
 si taht tpecnoc enamuh
   eciohc fo modeerf no desab
 noitinifed fo sopoT-
 modeerf fo thgir fo sopoT-
 elpmaxe fo sopoT-
 fo egatnavda eht fo sopoT-
 ’slarebil‘
 neewteb etabed eht :4mialC
 ton sah slarebil dna stsimalsI
 eht gnitacidni devlove
 tsniaga ecnatsiser gnorts
 ’hailarbilla‘
 )etabed fo( ytilaer fo sopoT-
  ecneuqesnoc fo sopot+









































































دون أن �علم، و�ي تكمن  الت�ار الإسلا�ي ورغم كل هذا إلا أن هنالك أخطاء كب�ي ة �قع فيها 
ي ذلك وسائل 
ي محاولاته المستمرة للن�ل من اللي�ب ال�ة والحد من انتشارها، و�ستخدم �ف
�ف
ي كونهم القمع المختلفة ومن 
ي تطال ال�ث�ي من اللي�ب اليني ف �ف
أبرزها الاتهامات المتكررة اليت
ي المجتمع، وع� 
ي �ف
يهدفون إ� هدم الدين و��ث الفسوق والإباح�ة والتحلل الأخلا�ت
الرغم من عدم وجود أدلة موثقة ع� هذە التهم سوى كتابات متفرقة لأسماء مستعارة 
�ار الإسلا�ي �� ع� هذە التهم، وقد شاهدت إلا أن الت -قد تكون إسلام�ة عم�لة  -
قام و�كون موضوعها عن اللي�ب ال�ة ورأ�ت أن الأدلة 
ُ
ي ت
ال�ث�ي من الحوارات والندوات اليت
ي �ستشهد بها 
لم تتجدد  المعارضون�ي �ي لم تتغ�ي منذ زمن ط��ل، حيت النصوص اليت
 
�
ي �ستندون عليها أو قل





ي الممل�ة  الت�ار اللي�ب ا�ي أعتقد أن �شوء 
سببه الأول هو  -وغايته الوح�دة �ي الح��ة  -�ف
ولذلك فإن بعض  -كق�مة ثقاف�ة وفك��ة   -لا �دعم الح��ة  الت�ار المس�طر والموجودأن 
ة اللي�ب ال�ة إذا كانت هذا الأمر ف�قولون : ما فائد الت�ار اللي�ب ا�ي الإسلاميني ف ينكرون ع� 
موافقة للإسلام..؟! والحق�قة أن اللي�ب ال�ة لا علاقة لها بالإسلام ولا بأي دين آخر بل �ي 
فكر مستقل بذاته، ل�نها لا تتقاطع معه من ح�ث هو دين �دعم الح��ة و�ع�ي الحق 
ي الدين و�سلام الُم�َرە، فال
ي أن �عتقد بخلافه، بل لا �قبل الإ�راە �ف
�ث ط ال�ف وري للآخر �ف
ي الدخول إل�ه والرضا به كدين للإ�سان.. إذن فالمخالفة لم 
لصحة الإسلام هو الح��ة �ف
ي�ت ف عمه ال�ث�ي من الرموز، ومن هنا �مكن فهم  للإسلام كت�اربل  للإسلام كدينتكن 
ي التعب�ي عن آرائه  الت�ار اللي�ب ا�ي وتعل�ل وجود 
ي الظهور والمطالبة بح��ته �ف
و�لحاحه �ف
ي الممل�ة هو أن رموزها �ُطالبون باح�ت ام ح �ة التعب�ي وأفك
ارە، ل�ن العائق أمام اللي�ب ال�ة �ف
ي حني ف هم �قفون أمام ت�ار لا يؤمن بهذە الح��ة و�حاول قمعهم و�قصاءهم و�ستخدم 
�ف
ي ذلك كل الوسائل المتاحة ومن أشدها تهم التكف�ي والتخ��ن 

























 era stsimalsI :5mialC
 etanimile ot gnitpmetta
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 fo ecnegreme eht :6mialC
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 fo ycallaf ro sopoT-
 malsI neewteb pihsnoitaler
 )secnereffid( ’hailarbilla‘ dna





 ’dnuof I ,was I‘
 fo noititeper-




























































اليت ي  الجماعات المتطرفةوهو السلاح الذي لا �ستخدمه أحد سوى  -المجتمع عليهم 
ي قلبها العائق لا تؤمن بالتعدد�ة الفك��ة والثقاف�ة، وهذا 
�ف ب �ف
ُ
�جعل اللي�ب ال�ة ت
مع  لتسامحوا ح��ةح�ث لا �مكن أن تدعو لل - الح��ةوالذي هو  -ومحركها الأساس 
ي حني ف يؤمن اللي�ب 
ي التعب�ي ل�ن طرف �حاول إقصاءك ونبذك، ف�ف
ا�ي بحق الإسلا�ي �ف
ي 
ي التعب�ي ، والمف�ت ض أن تكون المعادلة متساو�ة: )أعطيف






ت�ار اليوم من معارضة واجهها قبله  الت�ار اللي�ب ا�ي ما يواجهه  -و�قراءة تار�خ�ة  -ل�ن 
الت�ار واستطاع تجاوز المرحلة بأقل الخسائر الممكنة، مع وجود فارق أن  الحداثة
�حاول التغي�ي ع� المستوى الفكري والمجتم�ي وهذا ما جعل مهمته أصعب  اللي�ب ا�ي 
ي أمامه و�خ�ج بأ��� 
، فهو �حتاج إ� وقت أطول حيت يتجاوز كل العقبات اليت
�
وعس�ي ة جدا
لو أننا أخذنا الحداثة ع� اعتبارها ص�غة نقد�ة  المكاسب الممكنة .. برأيي ي الشخ�ي 
نصوص�ة تخصص�ة فإن اللي�ب ال�ة �ي الص�غة الفك��ة والثقاف�ة للحداثة، ومن هنا فإن 
ي الرموز والشخص�
ي الممل�ة ومكملة لها مع اختلاف �ف
ات أما اللي�ب ال�ة امتداد للحداثة �ف









 modeerf fo thgir fo sopoT-
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 na si ’hailarbilla‘ :7mialC
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 .عظ�م �ُف�ت ض بكل إ�سان أن �دعو إل�ه و�تبناە و�ت�ث ف بالانتساب إل�همبدأ -
ي �س�ط يؤمن بح��ة الاخت�ار فقط، وهذە الح��ة تضيق وتتسع وفق رؤ�ة كل فرد-
 .�ي مفهوم إ�سايف
ي حني ف هم �قفون أمام ت�ار لا يؤمن بهذە الح��ة -
 رموزها �ُطالبون باح�ت ام ح��ة التعب�ي �ف
ي قلبها و  -
�ف ب �ف
ُ
 .والذي هو الح��ة -محركها الأساس ت
 �ي الص�غة الفك��ة والثقاف�ة للحداثة -
ي الممل�ة ومكملة لها -
 امتداد للحداثة �ف
 
 فهم ��ث مثل�م �خطئون و�صيبون -
ي ممارساتهم أو تطب�قاتهم العمل�ة للي�ب ال�ة لا تعيف ي عدم وجودهم كفكر وثقافة -
 وأخطاؤهم �ف
 أقرب الناس إ� الجميع -
 منون بحق الإسلاميني ف والشيوعيني ف والقوميني ف والمحافظني ف الاجتماعيني ف يؤ  -
 وغايته الوح�دة �ي الح �ة -
ي التعب�ي  -
 يؤمن اللي�ب ا�ي بحق الإسلا�ي �ف
 �حاول التغي�ي ع� المستوى الفكري والمجتم�ي  -
 �حتاج إ� وقت أطول حيت يتجاوز كل العقبات اليت ي أمامه و�خ�ج بأ��� المكاسب الممكنة -
 
 دين �دعم الح��ة  -
ي أن �عتقد بخلافه-
 �ع�ي الحق للآخر �ف
ي الدين و�سلام الُم�َرە -
 لا �قبل الإ�راە �ف
 
ي محاولاته المستمرة للن�ل من اللي�ب ال�ة والحد من انتشارها-
 �ف




ي كونهم يهدفون إ� هدم الدين و��ث الفسوق والإباح�ة والتحلل الأخلا�ت
 �ف
 -كق�مة ثقاف�ة وفك��ة  -لا �دعم الح��ة  -
 ي�ت ف عمه ال�ث�ي من الرموز -
 هذە الح��ةلا يؤمن ب -
ي ذلك كل الوسائل المتاحة ومن أشدها تهم التكف�ي )اللي�ب اليني ف ( �حاول قمعهم و�قصاءهم  -
و�ستخدم �ف
ي �ستعدي كل أط�اف المجتمع عليهم
 والتخ��ن اليت
 لا تؤمن بالتعدد�ة الفك �ة والثقاف�ة -
 �حاول إقصاءك ونبذك -












 ص�غة نقد�ة نصوص�ة تخصص�ة -
 






 )1002 kadoW dna lgisieR( seigetartS evisrucsiD txeT






















 من هو اللي�ب ا�ي الإسلا�ي ؟
ي العام العريب ي 
ي من ح�ث أنها كانت ناقش المقال السابق تغ�ي ات الرأي الثقا�ف
بالقرن الما�ف
ذات ميول تحديث�ة بصبغة لي�ب ال�ة وطن�ة و�سلام�ة نهض��ة س�طرت ع� المشهد 
ي منتصفه تحول المشهد إ� القوم�ة، و�نهايته مال إ� حركات الإسلام 
الس�ا�ي ، ثم �ف
 .الس�ا�ي 
 
اللي�ب ال�ة فما هو مستقبل هذا المشهد؟ ثمة حالة من اندماج الأضداد الس�اس�ة بني ف 
ي 
ي رؤ�ة س�اس�ة واحدة، ع� ط��قة جدل�ة ه�جل �ف
والإسلام�ة؛ فهل �مكن أن تتآلفان �ف
تفس�ي ال�اعات الفك��ة ع�ب التار�ــــخ ب�اع الأضداد واندماجها؟ أي �شوء فكرة تحمل 
ي الثان�ة وتجمع النق�ضني ف 
نق�ضها بداخلها ع�ب فكرة تنفيها، لينتج بعدها فكرة ثالثة تن�ف
ـآلف
ُ
ي ص�ي ورة حيت نها�ة التار�ــــخ. ل�ن  وت
ي فكرة جد�دة؛ لتعاود السلسة كرتها �ف
بينهما �ف
 لي�ب ال�ة إسلام�ة؟ وما �ي ؟ وك�ف يراها أصحابها والآخرون؟
ً
 .هل هناك فع�
 
ي تو�س )حزب النهضة(، 
ما نراە من تصدر أحزاب الإسلام الس�ا�ي بالانتخابات كما �ف
ي أنها قبلت والمغرب )حزب العدالة والتنم�ة(، و 
م� )حزب الح��ة والعدالة(، �عيف
ي من أصوليتها؟ 
بالنظام الد�مقرا�ي اللي�ب ا�ي والتعدد�ة الح ��ة وتداول السلطة؛ فماذا ب�ت
 ول�نها تحافظ ع� سلفيتها الثقاف�ة 
�
�مكن القول إنها تتحول إ� اللي�ب ال�ة س�اس�ا
ي طور التحول إ� أحزاب مدن�ة
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والآن هناك قطاعات أساس�ة من الإسلاميني ف تتوجه نحو اللي�ب ال�ة الس�اس�ة و�عضها 
ي تو�س. وهناك أحزاب منا�ة 
ي �ث ا�ة س�اس�ة حيت مع ت�ارات �سار�ة كما �ف
دخل �ف
ي م� 
. بالمقابل هناك للإخوان المسلمني ف تصنف كأحزاب لي�ب ال�ة مثل حزب الوسط �ف
الحزب اللي�ب ا�ي المغريب ي الذي �علن أنه يرفض و�ستبعد أي موقف يتنا�ف مع التعال�م 
ي اللي�ب ال�ة الإسلام�ة
 .الإسلام�ة. إذن، ثمة اندماج س�ا�ي يتشكل �ف




فما �ي اللي�ب ال�ة الإسلام�ة؟ رغم أنها ل�ست ت�ارا
إنما �مكن وضع المنطلقات الأساس�ة لها. بعد المنطلق الدييف ي وهو  ومفكرون متفرقون،
الإ�مان بالمبادئ الأساس�ة للإسلام، كالعق�دة الإسلام�ة وأركان الإسلام؛ فتلك الحركات 
ترى أن الإسلام يتبيف الق�م اللي�ب ال�ة العامة كالح��ة )الرأي والتعب�ي والاعتقاد( واستقلال�ة 
ي تفس�ي ها للنصوص الدين�ة ع� هذە الفرد والمساواة بني ف 
الب�ث وحقوق الإ�سان؛ مركزة �ف
الق�م. و�ي تدعو للتف �ق بني ف آراء الفقهاء و�ني ف الإسلام، و�عادة تفس�ي النصوص الدين�ة 
 لظروف الزمان والمكان وعدم الاقتصار ع� التفس�ي ات القد�مة. واختلافهم مع 
�
وفقا
ي تفس�ي الق�م الإسلام
�ة الأساس�ة للح�اة الحديثة �شكل عام وللس�اسة الأصوليني ف هو �ف
 .ع� وجه الخصوص
ي الفقه الإسلا�ي تتناول 
ي الس�اسة يرى بعضهم أنه ل�ست هناك نصوص محددة �ف
ف�ف
الأمور الس�اس�ة باستثناء الشورى، وح�ث إن اللي�ب ال�ة تتفق مع روح الإسلام ف�ي تغدو 
مؤسسات س�اس�ة لي�ب ال�ة )كال�ب لمان مرغ��ة لبناء الدولة. والبعض يرى أن إ�شاء 
والانتخابات والحقوق المدن�ة( وس�اسات الرعا�ة الاجتماع�ة، لا يتناقض مع أي نصوص 
ي بعض 
 لبعض المبادئ الإسلام�ة المنصوص عليها �ف
�
دين�ة، بل �مكن اعتبارها تطب�قا
 من ِس�ي َ الخلفاء الراشدي
�
ي �مكن استخلاصها أ�ضا
ن )الس�د �سني فالنصوص القرآن�ة، واليت
 عن كتاب 
ً





 si )malsI larebil( ’haimalsila
 malsI taht no desab
 ’hailarbilla‘ htiw smrofnoc
 lareneg eht stpoda ti sa
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و�ي من هذا المنطلق لا تفصل الدين عن الدولة، بل ترى أن الدين الإسلا�ي لم يتدخل 
ي تفاص�ل الس�اسة أو ط��قة بناء الدولة، إنما وضع مبادئ أخلاق�ة عامة وترك التفاص�ل 
�ف
ي ذلك عودة للمبادئ الأساس�ة للاجتهادات الب ث �ة. 
واللي�ب اليون الإسلاميون يرون �ف
ي ترا�مت ع� 
للإسلام المتحررة من سلطة رجال الدين المس�سني ف أو من الانحرافات اليت
ي الوقت 
ي وقتها، ول�نها لم تعد كذلك �ف
ي كانت مناسبة �ف
مر العصور أو من الاجتهادات اليت
 .الحا�ف 
 
ي هذا جد�د، فقد سبق أن 
ظهر منذ ما أطلق عل�ه ع� النهضة وما تلاها مفكرون ول�س �ف
ي ، محمد 
إسلاميون نهض��ون �طرحون مثل تلك الأفكار العامة، أمثال: ال�وا�يب ي ، الأفغايف
عبدە، خ�ي الدين التو��ي ، ابن باد�س، ع�ي عبد الرازق، مالك بن نيب ي ؛ إلا أن هؤلاء كانوا 
ي التطبيق الس�ا�ي . الجد�
ي ح�ي ف الفكر ول�س �ف




اض اصطلا�ي ع� دمج مفرديت
، اع�ت
ً
�� . هناك أو�
�
المع�ت ضون ع� اللي�ب ال�ة الإسلام�ة ك
 مصطل�ي : 
ي الس�اسة، فاللي�ب اليون �شددون ع� التمي�ي ف بني ف
” مسلم“لي�ب ا�ي و�سلا�ي �ف
لام وأغلب اللي�ب اليني ف بالعالم الإسلا�ي هم ، فالمسلم هو الذي �دين بدين الإس ”إسلا�ي ”و
ي الفرد المنت�ي للحركات الس�اس�ة 
مسلمون، بينما الإسلا�ي مصطلح س�ا�ي حد�ث �عيف
ي رؤ�ة س�اس�ة واحدة؟ ومن هنا فسلامة 
الأصول�ة؛ فك�ف �جتمع الأصو�ي مع اللي�ب ا�ي �ف
 .المصطلح تكون اللي�ب ا�ي المسلم ول�س اللي�ب ا�ي الإسلا�ي 
 




سلاميون بدورهم �ع�ت ضون ع� اللي�ب ال�ة الإسلام�ة اع�ت اضا
ي الإسلام كإلغاء الإجماع 

























 fo( egatnavdasid fo sopoT-
 stxet suoigiler fo kcal
 +)scitilop htiw gnilaed
 fo egatnavda fo sopoT
    .scitilop ni ’hailarbilla‘
  sthgir fo sopoT-
 ytirohtua fo sopot -
 )stxet suoigiler(
 fo ytirohtua fo sopoT-
 egdelwonk
  msiraluces fo ycallaF-
 eht fo( yrotsih fo sopoT-
  )tpecnoc
 eht fo( ecnegreme fo sopoT-
 )tpecnoc
 noitisoppo ehT :3mialC
 tonnac malsI larebil  tsniaga
 hailarbillA‘ etanimile
    ’haimalsilA
  ecnatsiser fo sopoT-
 yb noitinifed fo ycallaF-








































































بحجة عدم إمكان�ة حصوله، وكالق�اس ع� أسس منطق�ة ول�س أصول�ة فقه�ة.. 
ووقت�ة تنت�ي بزمنها، لي�ت تب ع� ذلك مبدأ تار�خ�ة الُسنَّ ة، وتقس�م الت ث �عات إ� عامة 
ي هو اعتبار أي خلاف بني ف 
ي الُسنَّ ة لزمنها. والثايف
أي أن أمور الس�اسة و�دارتها جاءت �ف
ي المسألة محل الخلاف، مما �سهل 
الفقهاء دلالة ع� عدم وجود حكم فق�ي محدد �ف
ي الأحكام ال�ث ع�ة، والا 
ي �ف
دعاء بأن هذا المنهج هو منهج الوسط�ة. اتباع منهج تول��ف
والثالث هو استبدال منظومة الق�م الإسلام�ة بمنظومة الق�م العالم�ة، أي تحقيق الق�م 
 .العالم�ة للإسلام، ول�س الق�م العل�ا للإسلام
 
ي الساحة، ل�نها أحدثت 








يتجنب تصن�فه لتفادي اتهامه بالميوعة الس�اس�ة أو الح�اد�ة الانتهاز�ة من كلا الطرفني ف 
�ي للي�ب اليني ف الإسلاميني ف بل 
ي الأصوليون بالنقد ال�ث
الإسلاميني ف واللي�ب اليني ف . ولا �كت�ف
هم ومقاصدهم التغ��ب�ة الخبيثة. واللي�ب اليون بدورهم �شكون بأن يتهمون نوا�ا
 �ستخدمون الد�مقراط�ة اللي�ب ال�ة كتكت�ك مرح�ي للاستحواذ ع� 
اللي�ب اليني ف الإسلاميني ف
 .السلطة ثم �سف كل الق�م الد�مقراط�ة
 
ي أدب�ات ال
لي�ب اليني ف ل�ن اتهام النوا�ا والخبا�ا �صعب إثباته قبل ظهور ملامحه، والظاهر �ف
الإسلاميني ف أنهم يتبنون الاجتهادات الإسلام�ة المتك�فة مع الح�اة الع �ة والقادرة ع� 
ي �جدونها 
بناء المجتمع الحد�ث دون الاعتماد ع� الاجتهادات الفقه�ة التقل�د�ة اليت
ي م�دان الس�اسة مدنيون يرون أن الإسلام 
 أو متشددة أو متخلفة. وهم �ف
�
متحفظة جدا
 لمصالحهم وظروفهمترك لل
�
ي اخت�ار أنظمتهم وفقا
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 لیست تیارا ًواحدا ًبل أطیاف وحركات متفاوتة ومفكرون متفرقون- 
ترى أن الإسلام یتبنى القیم اللیبرالیة العامة كالحریة )الرأي والتعبیر والاعتقاد( واستقلالیة  -
الفرد والمساواة بین البشر وحقوق الإنسان؛ مركزة في تفسیرھا للنصوص الدینیة على ھذه 
 القیم. 
فقا ًلظروف تدعو للتفریق بین آراء الفقھاء وبین الإسلام، وإعادة تفسیر النصوص الدینیة و -
 الزمان والمكان وعدم الاقتصار على التفسیرات القدیمة.
واختلافھم مع الأصولیین ھو في تفسیر القیم الإسلامیة الأساسیة للحیاة الحدیثة بشكل عام  -
 .وللسیاسة على وجھ الخصوص
 .مرغوبة لبناء الدولة -
 لا تفصل الدین عن الدولة -
 .في تفاصیل السیاسة أو طریقة بناء الدولةترى أن الدین الإسلامي لم یتدخل  -
یتبنون الاجتھادات الإسلامیة المتكیفة مع الحیاة العصریة والقادرة على بناء المجتمع الحدیث  -
دون الاعتماد على الاجتھادات الفقھیة التقلیدیة التي یجدونھا متحفظة جدا ًأو متشددة أو 
 متخلفة. 
 
أن الإسلام ترك للمسلمین حریتھم واجتھاداتھم في اختیار  ھم في میدان السیاسة مدنیون یرون-
 .أنظمتھم وفقا ًلمصالحھم وظروفھم
 
 ”إسلامي” و” مسلم“یشددون على التمییز بین مصطلحي:   -
یشكون بأن اللیبرالیین الإسلامیین یستخدمون الدیمقراطیة اللیبرالیة كتكتیك مرحلي  -
 .الدیمقراطیةللاستحواذ على السلطة ثم نسف كل القیم 
 
 یعترضون على اللیبرالیة الإسلامیة اعتراضا ًشرعیا ً - 







 )1002 kadoW dna lgisieR( seigetartS evisrucsiD txeT






















 بني ف الإ�سان والتوظ�ف الس�ا�ي « حقوق الإ�سان»
ي ع�ث الم�لادي هو القرن الذي بدأت ف�ه الحركة الإ�سان�ة تفصح 
�ُمكن اعتبار القرن الثايف
ي 
أورو�ا، كحركة ثقاف�ة عامة أخذت تط�ح أسئلتها ع� الحراك الواق�ي ، من عن نفسها �ف
 -نموا  -الأديب ي . وقد تصاعد هذا الحرك وذاك الحراك بالتضافر  –خلال الحراك الفكري 
ل�خلقا ما �س� ب: ع� النهضة، ذلك الع� الذي وضع اللبنات الأو� للحضارة 
محاور الهم والاهتمام من س�اق  –�سب�ا  –قلت ف�ه الغ ��ة/ العالم�ة المعا�ة، بعد أن انت
ي / المجرد إ� س�اق واقع الإ�سان
 .المتعا�ي / الميتاف ي ف ��ت
ظل الإ�سان محل اهتمام واضح طوال ع� النهضة؛ حيت و�ن لم تتبلور له رؤ�ة واضحة 
ي هذا الاهتمام �ج�ت ح رؤاە العالمة
ي  محددة لماه�ة الحقوق الإ�سان�ة المتوخاة. لقد ب�ت
�ف
أنه  –آنذاك  –محاولة منه لدفع الظلم الواقع ع� الإ�سان، ع� الأقل ف�ما بدا واضحا 
 .ظلم ينتهك الحق الطب��ي للإ�سان
ي وتمددە إ� مجمل الحقول المعرف�ة، ومن ثم الفضاءات 
مع س�طرة الهم الإ�سايف
كمرجع�ة الاجتماع�ة/ الس�اسة، أخذت مجموعة من المبادئ الإ�سان�ة العامة تتشكل  
ي الذي لم �كن بمعزل عن التصورات اللاهوت�ة؛ حيت و�ن لم يتطابق معها 
للجدل الحقو�ت
ي مستوى الط�ح المبا�ث )لأن ثمة رؤى تحل�ل�ة ترى أن الأطروحات العقلان�ة/ الطب�ع�ة 
�ف
ي العمق اللاوا�ي / اللامبا�ث تصورات لاهوت�ة(
 .آنذاك تنتظمها �ف
ي إعلان الثورة  –ولا أقول الأ�مل  –� صورتها الأوضح لقد وصلت هذە المبادئ العامة إ
�ف
ي الذي كان فاتحة ع� جد�د للإ�سان. ع� ضوء عموم�ة هذە الحقوق 
الفر�س�ة الحقو�ت
ومش�ت كاتها اشتغلت المسارات الفك��ة والمسارات العمل�ة المهمومة بالإ�سان؛ من أجل 
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ميع؛ ارتباطا بأصل الأصول خلق عالم جد�د �كفل الحقوق الإ�سان�ة الأساس�ة للج
ي أن الناس جم�عا ولدوا أحرارا ومتساو�ن
 .الإ�سان�ة، المتمثل �ف
ا�سع فضاء الجدل�ات الحقوق�ة منذ الثورة الفر�س�ة وشعاراتها التحرر�ة/ الإ�سان�ة و�� 
الظاهر والمضمر  –اليوم. بع�دا عن المنعرجات والانتكاسات، بل والخيبات، كان الرهان 
ل منظومة متكاملة طب�ع�ة )اتكاء ع� مبدأ الأصل الطب��ي  متوفرا  –
�
ع� مدى إمكان�ة �شك
ي العام. استمر الراهن، و�ساوق مع 
الواحد( لحقوق الإ�سان، �ستند إ� المش�ت ك الإ�سايف
َرص نجاحها تصاعد اله�منة 
ُ
ي تحقيق منظومة شبه متكاملة، زاد من ف
نجاح لا ينكر �ف
ي عولمت الاستعمار�ة للحضارة الغ� 
رؤ�تها الحضار�ة، ومن  –أو حاولت أن تُ عولم  –��ة اليت
ثم الإ�سان�ة، خاصة بعد إ�شاء المنظمات الدول�ة الراع�ة للحقوق الس�اد�ة، والطامحة 
ي تتغ�ا السلام العام
 .إ� فض كل أشكال ال�اع بالطرق السلم�ة، أو بالقوة اليت
ي ل�ن، يب�ت النجاح الأ��ب لعولمة هذە الحقوق م
ي ساهمت �ف
رتبطا بتطور وسائل النقل اليت
ي ، ومن بعد تطور وسائل التواصل الإعلا�ي ، فضلا عن المؤثرات 
ي والثقا�ف
التواصل الإ�سايف
ي ترافق عولمة التقانة واقتصاد السوق. مما نتج عنه شي�ع الرؤ�ة 
العامة المتعولمة اليت
بمنظماته الدول�ة وقواە  -الغ ��ة لحقوق الإ�سان وتعولمها بحكم أن العالم المعا� 
 .لا يزال غ���ا إ� حد كب�ي  -المعرف�ة والعلم�ة والاقتصاد�ة، فضلا عن اله�منة العسك��ة 
ي العقود المتأخرة؛ بقدر ما واجهته من 
بقدر ما حققته عالم�ة حقوق الإ�سان من نجاح �ف
ط�ح عليها تباعا، والاطراد مع حجم نجاحها. بل إن فلاسفة ا
ُ
لتن��ر، فضلا أسئلة باتت ت
عن فلاسفة ما بعد التن��ر، كث�ي ا ما طرحوا الاستشكالات حول م�ث وع�ة اعتبارها مبادئ 
ي كل زمان )بالإشارة إ� 
ي كل مكان/ بيئة، و�ف
طب�ع�ة/ إ�سان�ة عامة؛ �جب ع� الجميع �ف
ي 
الجدل حولها من ح�ث تعاليها ع� التار�ــــخ(، كما طرحوا الاستشكالات حول تفاص�لها اليت
ي ت
تجاوز المش�ت كات الإ�سان�ة العامة، كما تتجاوز المبادئ العامة إ� ح�ث التفاص�ل اليت
ي 
 .ترتبط أ��� فأ��� بالمتغ�ي الزمان والمتغ�ي المكايف
 namuh fo yrotsih fo sopoT-
 egatnavda fo sopoT + sthgir
 fo sopoT + sthgir namuh fo
 sthgir namuh fo noitinifed
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ي يبدو أنها ا�تملت كمرجع�ة عامة، كانت 
ي أن هذە المنظومة الحقوق�ة اليت
ي  –هذا �عيف
�ف
رة الغ���ة اليت ي أنتجتها. فكث�ي من محل استشكال من داخل الحضا -كث�ي من محاورها 
ي الواقع العم�ي بدونها( لا تزال 
ي لا �مكن ت ف ف �لها �ف
وستب�ت  –تفاص�لها )تلك التفاص�ل اليت
ي بعض الأح�ان إ� عصب المبادئ العامة. كما لا تزال مسألة  –
محل جدل كب�ي ، �صل �ف
لزمان�ة والمكان�ة( محل تعاليها )صلاحيتها من ح�ث إطلاقيتها بوصفها عابرة للمتغ�ي ات ا
ي ا�تملت فيها، ل�ست 
جدل أ�ضا؛ لأن ع� التن��ر الذي أنتجها، والعصور اللاحقة اليت
ي نهض عليها ع� التن��ر 
بمعزل عن المراجعات النقد�ة؛ فضلا عن كون فكرة التقدم اليت
ي ب�ف ورة تحّول/ تطور الفكرة تبعا لمتغ�ي ات الواقع؛ انطلاقا من كون الواقع م
تغ�ي ا تق�ف
ي النها�ة لا بد وأن تكون متطورة/ متغ�ي ة؛ ما 
بتغ�ي مسار الأفكار. أي أن الرؤى الحقوق�ة �ف
ي 
ي النها�ة  –�ق�ف
ي الزمان؛ فمن المحتم  -�ف
ي الزمان. و�ذا تأ�د أنها �سب�ة �ف
أن تكون �سب�ة �ف
ي المكان
 .أنها ستكون �سب�ة �ف
ي النسب�ة الزمان�ة، ولا النسب�ة الم
ي كانت تجليتها والحجا كطبعا، لا تعيف
حولها  جان�ة )اليت
من أبرز معط�ات الدراسات الأن�� و�ولوج�ة المعا�ة( أن ل�س ثمة مرجع�ة إ�سان�ة عامة، 
ي حدود المتاح 
�ي محل اتفاق، ولا بد من توفرها؛ لتوف�ي الح �ة والعدالة للإ�سان، ولو �ف
ي كله ع� النسب�ات، وكون أمر 
ي تف��غه إ�سان�ا. الاشتغال الإ�سايف
من الأمور �سب�ا، لا �عيف
ورة الاشتغال عل�ه؛ مع الو�ي بنسبيته، 
ي �ف
من محتواە، ومن ثم إهماله؛ بقدر ما �عيف
واستغلال ما ُيت�حه البعد النسيب ي من أجل تحقيق أ��ب قدر من المواءمة الظرف�ة، تلك 
ي تتغ�ا الإطلاق من زاو�ة التك�ف مع �سب�ة النسيب ي 
 .المواءمة اليت
ي / بيئة، لا ليث�ي إشكال�ة التقابل بني ف هنا �أ




إطلاق�ة حقوق الإ�سان و�سبيتها فحسب، و�نما ليث�ي إشكال�ة ت ف ف �ل الحد المتفق ع� 
غرب. 
ّ
ي واقع مغاير/ واقع ال�
ي موضع الاتفاق فيها( �ف
إطلاقيته )= المش�ت ك الإ�سايف
ي تتوفر ع� مستوى من الإطلاق�ة، ومن ثم مستوى عاٍل من فالمبادئ الإ�سان�ة العا
مة اليت
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ي لا ينتج عنها 
ي �ي متشبع بكل أنواع الفرادة والمغايرة الإ�سان�ة، اليت
ع� واقع إ�سايف
ي تطبيق تلك المبادئ العا
استعصاء –ابتداء  –مة المش�ت ك، و�نما ينتج عنها استعصاء �ف
 .حول فهمها وتفس�ي ها، ومن ثم التوافق حول هذا الفهم وهذا التفس�ي 
ي 
لنأخذ أحد أهم مبادئ حقوق الإ�سان: الح��ة مثلا. إن الح��ة من ح�ث �ي مبدأ إ�سايف
ي . ل�نها 
�سبح -ها من ح�ث مفهوماتها وتطب�قات –أصبحت من بده�ات المش�ت ك الإ�سايف
ي الغرب قبل ال�ث ق. وحيت المتفق عل�ه منها غ��ا و�ث قا، يتحّول 
ي خضم مسارات جد�لة �ف
�ف
ت ف ف �له ع� الواقع إ� معضلة فك��ة، قبل تحوله إ� معضلة عمل�ة. و�ذا كنت طالما
ي الواقع، من ح�ث �ي فلسفة الح �ة 
تحدثت عن اللي�ب ال�ة مطالبا ب�ف ورة تفع�لها �ف
أح�ج ما نكون إ� الح �ة(، فإنيف ي حاَجْجت متش��ي اللي�ب ال�ة الذين يزعمون  الأشمل )ونحن
ي تضمنها إطلاق�ة الح �ة، بالتأ��د ع� تمثلاتها الفك �ة 
أن ما �ع�ب اللي�ب ال�ة كامن �ف
ي ، و�اختلاف الفاعل 
المتنوعة، ومن بعد تن�ع تمثلاتها العمل�ة، إذ تختلف باختلاف المتل�ت
ي ك
ي ، وأنا �ف
ي الغرب الثقا�ف
ل ذلك استشهد بتن�ع واختلاف تطب�قاتها من مكان إ� مكان �ف
 –أشد ما �كون الاختلاف  –نفسه، الغرب الذي يتوا� بمش�ت كاتها العامة، بينما �ختلف 
 .ع� التفاص�ل وع� �ث وط الت ف ف �ل ع� الواقع
ي حجا�ب ي عن اللي�ب ال�ة، أقول اليوم عن المنظومة العامة لحقوق الإ�سان: 
كما كنت أقول �ف
ي استنساخ تج��ة ما 
مهما كانت ناجحة  –إن التوافق ع� المبادئ ال�ل�ة/ العامة، لا �عيف
ي بيئتها 
ي بيئة أخرى. اللي�ب ال�ة أو الح �ة أو تصورات العدالة )ومنها أطروحة –�ف
واس�ت ف راعها �ف
ي تجعل العدالة أوسع من مجرد نظ��ة مثال�ة = ردە ع� أطروحة راولز... أم
ار�تا سن اليت
ي مش�ت كاتها المبادئ�ة
إلخ( لم تعد كل هذە مسلمات إطلاق�ة؛ رغم �ف ورة التأ��د عليها �ف
ي الوقت نفسه  –العامة. فنحن إذ ندعو للي�ب ال�ة وللح �ة ندرك 
أن اللي�ب ال�ة لدينا لن  -�ف









 داخل الإطار العريب ي / الإسلا�ي ، لن تكون لي�ب اليتنا �ي لي�ب ال�ة
ي أم �كا. وحيت
ي �ف
تكون �ي اليت
تو�س، ولي�ب ال�ة تو�س لن تكون �ي لي�ب ال�ة م�، وهكذا دوال�ك. و�وم أن تكون اللي�ب ال�ة 
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استات�ك�ة جامدة ع� تج �ة موحدة لن تكون لي�ب ال�ة بحال، وستختنق مسارات  لي�ب ال�ة
ي تناقض مع كث�ي من حقوق الاخت�ار، تلك الحقوق 
ي مضايق الق�، ومن ثم �ف
التحرر �ف
ي 
المرتبطة من جهة بمسار تطور الفرد من ح�ث هو فرد، والفرد من ح�ث هو عضو �ف
ي �َ ث �ط  -من جهة أخرى  –مجتمع، كما �ي مرتبطة 
بالمجتمع من ح�ث هو فضاء تواف�ت
 .كث�ي ا من الخ�ارات، ومن ح�ث هو إطار محدد للو�ي ��ث ط كث�ي ا من مسار التصورات
ي ، إذ إن ل�ل 
ي �ف ورة مراعاة ظروف الاختلاف الثقا�ف
من هنا، من هذە الزاو�ة بالذات، تأيت
ي الذي لا �مكن القفز عل�ه؛ حيت مع إرادة تغ
ي إلا بيئة قانونها الثقا�ف
ي�ي ە، فتغي�ي ە لا �أيت
بالاشتغال عل�ه من داخله، ول�س من خارجه. و�التا�ي ، فالنقد الموجه إ� مجتمعاتنا 




ير أشد مع�ار�ة متعال�ة تد�ي الإطلاق�ة ضمنا، ولا تتب� حق�قة أنها تخل
ي / الاجتما�ي 
 .ما �كون المغايرة لظرفنا الثقا�ف
ي تحاول 
دين التدخلات الخارج�ة )كما هو حاصل من الس��د حال�ا( اليت
ُ
إننا إذ نرفض ون
فرض رؤ�تها ع� واقعنا دون أن ت�ي طب�عة هذا الواقع و�شكال�اته المعقدة، لا نرفض 
ة وعدالة وحقوق، و�نما بدافع وعينا أننا وندين بدافع ادعاء أننا بلغنا ما نطمح إل�ه من ح��
نكر توظ�فها ضدنا 
ُ
ي لا ننكرها، ول�ن ن
�شتغل ع� تنم�ة إ�جاب�اتنا، وتدارك سلب�اتنا اليت
لأغراض تتجاوز تفاص�لها إ� ح�ث الموقف الضدي العام منا. ومن هنا، فرفضنا لهذە 
اس�ة تتعمد الحشد التدخلات �صدر عن وعينا أن خلف ال�افطات الحقوق�ة إرادات س�
ي / العد�ي هنا أو هناك، و�نما من 
والتجي�ش، لا من أجل تعد�ل أو إصلاح المسار الحقو�ت
أجل فرض خ�ارات س�اس�ة تمس س�ادة الوطن الذي تب�ت س�ادته مبدأ أساس�ا لا �قبل 
 .النقاش من جمع الأطراف
ي وجهها و�وجهها هؤلاء إلينا، كنا قد 
ي نحن قبل هذە الاتهامات اليت
ي نقاش عليف
دخلنا �ف
حول كث�ي مما يتداوله الإعلام الغريب ي عنا، ومنذ أمد ل�س بالقص�ي . لسنا مجتمعات صامتة، 
ي تتخلل تج��تنا كأي عمل 
كما �ي الصورة النمط�ة عنا هناك، لسنا نتعا� عن الأخطاء اليت
 fo ytilasrevinu fo sopoT-
 fo sopoT + selpicnirp
 fo ycallaf + ytivitaler
 + selpicnirp fo ssenetulosba
 larutluc dna erutluc fo sopoT
  .ecnereffid
 fo ytirohtua fo sopoT-
  egdelwonk
 
 fo ycallaf ro sopoT-
 +’hailarbilla‘ fo noitinifed
 evitagen fo sopoT
 fo sopoT + secneuqesnoc
 .sthgir namuh fo egatnavda
 dna erutluc fo sopoT-
  secnereffid larutluc
 rof ytilibisnopser fo sopoT-
     egnahc larutluc












































































ي مس�ي ة تط��ر من
ي معرض ل�ث�ي من الأخطاء. مثلا، القضاء لدينا يندرج �ف
ذ سنوات، إ�سايف
ي 
إنه تط��ر نابع من إدرا�نا نحن ل�ف ورة التط��ر، ول�س لأن هناك من �ك�ل له الشتائم �ف
ي إعلامنا المح�ي لنقد �مس 
الغرب أو ال�ث ق. وكما يتعرض القضاء للتط��ر، فإنه يتعرض �ف
ي تكتنفه؛ من إجل م��د من الإصلاح
 .بعض أوجه القصور اليت
ع� قط 
ّ
ي عنه، لم �سكت كذلك قضا�ا المرأة، لم ند
ي مستوى المر�ف
أن وضع المرأة لدينا �ف
بكل  –عن أوجه القصور، لم نجمد ع� وضعنا بوصفه الوضع الأمثل، بل يزخر إعلامنا 
بمناقشات واسعة وحاّدة حول قضا�ا المرأة لدينا، ولا تخلو قناة فضائ�ة، ولا  –أنواعه 
ئل التواصل الاجتما�ي ، من جدل صح�فة، ولا مجلة، فضلا عن المواقع الإل��ت ون�ة، ووسا
�ــــح وحاد حول سلب�ات الواقع النسوي لدينا. إننا ن�ي حجم السلب�ات لدينا أ�ا كان 
ي الوقت الذي نرفض ف�ه أن �فرض علينا 
م�دانها، ونحاول إصلاحها بأنفسنا لأنفسنا، �ف
ي إن سلمت من التوظ�ف الس�ا�ي ، لم �سلم من الجهل بتعق�د
ات الآخرون حلولهم اليت
ي مس�ي ة التط��ر
 .مجتمعاتنا، ومن ثم الجهل بالمسائل المعت�ب ة �ف
ي التأس�س ثقاف�ا ونظام�ا لحقوق  –عن و�ي  –نحن نؤكد، وسنظل نؤكد، أننا �ستثمر 
�ف
الإ�سان، لا تحت وطأة الضغط من هنا أو من هناك، و�نما لأننا �جب أن نكون ع� 
ي اللائق بنا. نحن مل�ت ف مون ب
ضمانة حقوق الإ�سان، بل ومل�ت ف مون بتط��ر المستوى الإ�سايف
ي هذا المس�؛ قالوا أو لم �قولوا، 
المنظومة الحقوق�ة ذاتها، نحن كذلك، وسنستمر �ف
ي بحقوق الإ�سان نابع من تصوراتنا نحن، من 
شّنعوا، أو لم �شنعوا،؛ لأن ال�ت ف امنا المبديئ
ي ذلك 
ي أن نكون الأفضل دائما؛ دون أن �عيف
ي رغبتنا الصادقة �ف
تجاهل ما هو إ�جايب ي حيت �ف
ي تصدر عن بعض الصادقني ف إ�سان�ا، أولئك الذين �ختلفون عن 
المواقف الناقدة اليت
ي من أجل التوظ�ف الس�ا�ي . 
 المس�ّسني ف الذين �ستخدمون النقد الحقو�ت
 
 srehto gnikcatta fo ycallaF-
   )ecnerefretni(
 dna erutluc fo sopoT -
  ecnereffid larutluc
 rof( ytilibisnopser fo sopoT -
 dna egnahc larutluc
     )sthgir namuh gnitpoda
 + ecnerefretni fo ycallaF-
 lanretxe( taerht fo sopoT
 )taerht
  kcatta evisuba fo ycallaF-
 ytsah fo ycallaF-
 noitasilareneg
 rof( ytilibisnopser fo sopoT -
 dna egnahc larutluc
     )sthgir namuh gnitpoda
 ecitsuj( elpmaxe fo sopoT-
 )dleif
 nemow( elpmaxe fo sopoT-
  )seussI



















































ي . أصب -
حت من بده�ات المش�ت ك الإ�سايف
ي الغرب قبل ال�ث ق.  تطب�قاتها من ح�ث مفهوماتها و -
ي خضم مسارات جد�لة �ف
 �سبح �ف
 �ي فلسفة الح��ة الأشمل -
ي  -
ي ، و�اختلاف الفاعل الثقا�ف
 تختلف باختلاف المتل�ت
ي فر�سا،  -
ي �ف










 لن تكون لي�ب اليتنا �ي لي�ب ال�ة تو�س، ولي�ب ال�ة تو�س لن تكون �ي لي�ب ال�ة م�، وهكذا دوال�ك.  - 
 أح�ج ما نكون إ� الح��ة -
 ندعو للي�ب ال�ة وللح �ة -
ي نقاش عليف ي حول كث�ي مما نحن قبل هذە الاتهامات ا -
ي وجهها و�وجهها هؤلاء إلينا، كنا قد دخلنا �ف
ليت
يتداوله الإعلام الغريب ي عنا، ومنذ أمد ل�س بالقص�ي . 
 لسنا مجتمعات صامتة، كما �ي الصورة النمط�ة عنا هناك-
لسنا نتعا� عن الأخطاء اليت ي تتخلل تج��تنا  -
 إدرا�نا نحن ل�ف ورة التط��ر-
ي التأس�س ثقاف�ا ونظام�ا لحقوق الإ�سان –عن و�ي  –نؤكد، وسنظل نؤكد، أننا �ستثمر -
 �ف
ي اللائق بنا.  -
 �جب أن نكون ع� المستوى الإ�سايف
نحن مل�ت ف مون بضمانة حقوق الإ�سان، بل ومل�ت ف مون بتط��ر المنظومة الحقوق�ة ذاتها، -
ي بحقوق الإ�سان نابع من تصوراتنا نحن-
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 الإ�ديولوج�اتاللي�ب ال�ة أو ما بعد 
قّرر عنوان هذا المقال ط�َح اللي�ب ال�ة كبد�ل متجاوز ل�ل الإ�ديولوج�ات المتصارعة ع� 
فع عن اللي�ب ال�ة صفة  -ابتداء  –رأس المال الاجتما�ي /الس�ا�ي . و�ــهذا يبدو 
وكأنه ي�ف
وّجها/ت�ارا/مذهبا فك��ا �س� إ� التغي�ي بواسطة 
َ
)الإ�ديولوج�ا(؛ مع أنها لا تعدو أن تكون ت
ي �جري الحشد لها باستمرار. فهل اللي�ب ال�ة الإ
 –قناع بحزمة من الأفكار المتعاضدة اليت





ح�ث طب�عيتها الأساس�ة، أم �ي إ�ديولوج�ا، ول�نها )إ�ديولوج�ا ال�
ي �ص
ح طرحها كخ�ار للخروج من هذا ال�اع المحتدم بني ف الت�ارات الشمول�ة السائدة �ف




منظومة من الأفكار اليت ي تحاول أن  –كمفهوم   –إذا كانت الإ�ديولوج�ا �ف
فإنها تكون متسقة، بح�ث تع�ب عن رؤ�ة تتغ�ا تفس�ي الواقع، أو �س��غه، أو تغي�ي ە، 
ي : الو�ي الزائف. أي أنها 
ط�ح كمقابل للعلم�ة والتفك�ي العقلايف
ُ
بالمفهوم المتداول/السليب ي ، ت
ي ما هو أ��� من )منظومة أفكار، أو �سق فكري(، إذ لا بد 
حيت  –بهذا المفهوم السليب ي تعيف
ُبعد أن تكون الأفكار فيها أفكارا ذات  –ينطبق عليها هذا الوصف بالمفهوم السليب ي الرائج 
ي تط�ح نفسها 
عقائدي )ل�س دين�ا بال�ف ورة(، أي أن تتضمن مستوى من الدوغمائ�ة اليت
ي أو العل�ي )ك�ث ط لتحصني ف ال�قني ف 
كجزء من ال�قني ف اللامسؤول، وأن تخ�ت ق ال�ث ط العقلايف
اللامسؤول(، وأن تتضمن عنا� خ�ال�ة وعاطف�ة تلامس المشاعر والعواطف والغرائز 
ن آل�ة الحشد الجماه�ي ي، وأن تتضمن ُوعودا ط��او�ة، بوصفها قبل العقول؛ كجزء م







-non eht fo ygoloedi















 na si ’hailarbilla‘ :1mialC
 ot eciohc evitanretla
 gnihsalc nairatilatot
    .seigoloedi
 
 fo noitinifed fo sopoT-
  ’hailarbilla‘
 
 fo noitinifed fo sopoT-
 do sopoT + ygoloedi
  ygoloedi fo egatnavdasid
 fo egatnavdasid fo sopoT-
 fo ycallaf +msitamgod
    .ytilanoitar
 fo esuba fo ycallaf ro sopoT-
 + seigoloedi yb snoitome






































































؛ ما لم تكن هذە الأفكار أفكارا شمول�ة، عابرة للفرد )للفرد، ول�س من 
طبعا، كل هذا لا يتأيتّ
عل�ه كقوة قادرة ع� إحداث الفرد( إ� المجم�ع، ذلك المجم�ع الذي �جري الرهان 
ي الغالب  -التغي�ي ، الذي هو 
تغي�ي قص�ي النفس ول�نه حاد، تغي�ي ثوري �حرق المراحل؛  -�ف
وراتها �ي 
ي تصور هذا الإ�ديولو�ب ي  -لأن كل المراحل، و�كل �ف
ي التصور  -�ف
داخلة �ف
ي للواقع، وهو التصور الذي لا �ح�ف بأي تقدير من ِقَبل الإ�ديولو 
�ب ي /المؤدلج، بل العقلايف
ي ، إذ يراە ُمع�قا للفعل الجماه�ي ي الانفعا�ي الذي 
وأ��� من ذلك، هو محل رفض ضميف
ي كل الأحوال
 .يوجهه �ف
ي النها�ة  –هذە معالم/ملامح الإ�ديولوج�ا، من ح�ث �ي 
 .و�ي زائف -�ف
ات ولا ر�ب أن بعض صور اللي�ب ال�ة تتضمن بعضا من هذە الملامح السلب�ة المرافقة لعمل�
ي اللي�ب ال�ة أفكارا ط��او�ة تتضمن م�ف ف عا حشد�ا 
الأدلجة أ�ا كان نوعها. نحن نعرف أن �ف




ورة، و�التا�ي ، فل�س غ�اب العن� الخ�ا�ي والعاط�ف
بال�ف
ي ء من هذە الملامح السلب�ة، 
ال�ت و�ــــج للأفكار اللي�ب ال�ة. ل�ن، ومهما تلبست اللي�ب ال�ة ��ث
ع� أن كل أفكارها ل�ست مكتملة ولا �قين�ة، بل �ي أفكار  –أول ما تؤكد  - أنها تؤكد إلا 
ي كل الأحوال؛ حيت مفهوم )الح��ة الفرد�ة( الذي 
مطروحة ع� �ساط النقد/المساءلة �ف
�كون أساس الرؤ�ة اللي�ب ال�ة، �جري الاشتغال عل�ه نقدا وتط��را داخل الفضاء اللي�ب ا�ي ؛ 
ي أنه 
ل�س ثمة دوغما تطبع أفكار اللي�ب اليني ف ، بما فيها الأفكار المؤسسة ذاتها، فضلا ما �عيف
 .عن غ�ي ها
ي أو�ي   –إن النقد 
ي التقل�د اللي�ب ا�ي ، بل هو فعل تحرري �شتغل  –ك�ث ط عقلايف
ل�س ترفا �ف
داخل فضاء العقل اللي�ب ا�ي ع� أوسع نطاق. بل إن اشتغال اللي�ب ا�ي ع� نقد اللي�ب ال�ة لا 
ي لحظة زمن�ة ما، و�نما هو نقد يتجاوز ذلك، �ق
ف عند حدود المتاح علم�ا وفك��ا �ف
مع أحدث ما ينتجه العقل الب�ث ي من نظ��ات، وما تنتجه مرا�ز  -بجد�ة  -ليتفاعل 
ي نتائج 
ي ؛ حيت �ف
 من ال�قييف
ّ
ي كل الحقول. وهذا بلا شك، �حد
الأبحاث من نتائج علم�ة �ف
ي �جري الاتكاء عل
ي )واقعة نقد�ة(، ما �جعل )ال�قين�ة( العلوم اليت




























 fo egatnavdasid fo sopoT-




 fo egatnavdasid fo sopoT-
 + ’hailarbilla‘ ni msinaipotu
 fo egatnavda fo sopoT
 +   modeerf s’laudividni






-fles fo egatnavda fo sopoT-
 + ’hailarbilla‘ ni msicitirc
 fo ytivitaler fo sopoT









































































ي كل الأحوال، فضلا عن كون هذا التفاعل الحيوي مع التطور العل�ي 
هنا، ظرف�ة/�سب�ة �ف
ي كل الإ�ديولوج�ات 
تهما �ف
ّ
ي والخ�ا�ي ، اللذين ترتفع ِحد
ي �حد من الُبعدين: العاط�ف
والمعر�ف
 .جوهَر الخطاب -سلبيتهما � –الشمول�ة، إ� درجة أن �كونا 
ي كل هذا التفص�ل، هو أن اللي�ب ال�ة تتضمن 
ما �حد من كونها إ�ديولوج�ا  -جوه��ا  -الأهم �ف
 السليب ي . ف�ي 
ي  –إن كانت إ�ديولوج�ا  -بالمعيف
 إ�ديولوج�ا الفرد، من ح�ث �ي �ف
تب�ت
 .الأساس: إ�ديولوج�ا الح��ة الفرد�ة
 أن الإ�ديولوج�ا �ي تتض
ي النها�ة إ� ولا �خ�ف
ي تح�لها �ف
من كل تلك الملامح السلب�ة اليت
و�ي زائف؛ لا بد أن تكون شمول�ة، �شتغل ع� مفاع�ل لا �مكن لها أن تتحقق إلا من 
خلال تأط�ي شمو�ي للأفراد. وهو التأط�ي الذي لا يتحقق إلا بانتهاك الفرد�ة، فضلا عن 
 .انتهاك كث�ي من محددات العقلان�ة
ي للفرد الحر المستقل، تتمرد ع� أي تأط�ي ينتقص إن اللي�ب ال�
ة، من ح�ث انح�ازها المبديئ
من الاستقلال الفردي. وهذا ما �جعلها مناهضة لفعل التأدلج ذاته من ح�ث هو سلوك 
 .جم�ي 
اللي�ب ال�ة �ستع�ي ع� الأدلجة، من ح�ث �ي �ستع�ي ع� الشمول�ة، تلك الشمول�ة 
ي لا تتحقق الأدلجة إلا م
ن خلالها. و�ذا كان لا بد من توص�ف اللي�ب ال�ة كإ�ديولوج�ا، اليت
: إ�ديولوج�ا التحرر/ الاستقلال الفردي، أي �ي إ�ديولوج�ا التحرر من -تحد�دا  –ف�ي 
ي تتضمن الشمول�ة ابتداء. وع� هذا، ف�ي ل�ست المقابل المغاير لهذە 
الإ�ديولوج�ات اليت
ض لمبدأ الشمول، الذي لا بد أن �أخذ من الشمول�ات فحسب، بل �ي المقابل المناه
ي المت�قن للأفراد، لصالح الحساب المتخ�ل للجماعة المتخ�لة؛ لتنت�ي 
الحساب العييف
ي ع� كل المست��ات؛ فتنتقل 
الجماعة )باستثناء القلة القل�لة من أفرادها( إ� إفلاس إ�سايف
ي بضعة شعارات ل�ست 
ي النها�ة أ��� من أوهاممن بؤس إ� بؤس، ولا تجد العزاء إلا �ف
 .�ف
الشمول�ات بأنواعها �ي مجرد شعارات، تبدأ بأوهام، وتنت�ي بأوهام ع� مستوى واقع 

























 ni ytilanoitar fo sopoT-
 fo ycallaF + ’hialarbilla‘
 evitcelloc ni ytilanoitar
    seigoloedi
 
 fo egatnavda fo sopoT-
   ’hailarbilla‘ ni ytilaudividni
 
 yb esuba fo ycallaf ro sopoT-
 ot seigoloedi evitcelloc
 .slaudividni
 
 yb ecnatsiser eht fo sopoT-
 evitcelloc tsniaga ’hailarbilla‘
    seigoloedi
 msinogatna fo sopoT-
  msivitcelloc tsniaga










































































ي ء يتحقق، هذا إذا كنت ت��د من الإ�ديولوج�ا الجماع�ة تح
ي ء المعادلة. وهنا، لا �ث
قق �ث
ي /الواق�ي . وع� العكس، فكل تحقق إ�جايب ي 
ي عالم الفرد، الذي هو العالم الحق��ت
إ�جايب ي �ف
ي وواق�ي ، فضلا عن كونه �شكل 
ي عالم الفرد، هو منجز حق��ت
إضافة إ�  -بال�ف ورة  –�ف
 .المجم�ع
ي هذا الس�اق أن اللي�ب ال�ة إذ تحد من طغ�ان المبدأ الشمو�ي بداهة؛ ف
إنها ولا �غ�ب عنا �ف
تحد من طغ�ان المبدأ الفردي أ�ضا؛ إذ �ش�ت ط تحرر الفرد بمبادئ إ�سان�ة عامة وحا�مة، 
ي أن ثمة تزاحما/توازنا بني ف الح��ات 
تكفل ذات الحق الفردي الخاص ل�ل الأفراد، ما �عيف
 .الفرد�ة لصالح ح��ة كل فرد، ومن ثم، لصالح التحرر العام
اع�ا مع أنفسهم ومع الآخ��ن، نت�جة ه�منة إن العرب والمسلمني ف �ع�شون عالما � 
الإ�ديولوج�ات الشمول�ة ع� مس�ي ة النهوض، وع� مس�ي ة التحرر أ�ضا. وهذە 
تتضمن عنا� أصول�ة بدرجة  –ع� الأقل  –أصول�ات، أو  –بال�ف ورة  –الشمول�ات �ي 
ايب ي 
ي أن الاشتغال ال�ا�ي /الاح�ت
 ما، سواء أ�انت دين�ة أم قوم�ة. وهذا �عيف
�
 ل�س عرضا
، بل هو ُم�ّون أسا�ي فيها، بح�ث لا تتحقق �ث عيتها إلا من خلال �اع أو دعوة إ� 
�
طارئا
�اع، سواء أ�ان �اعا بين�ا مع مكونات الذات، أم كان �اعا مع الآخر، وسواء أ�ان 
�اعا عين�ا/واقع�ا، أم كان �اعا ع� مستوى الأفكار والتصورات وحجج الاتهام ذات 
ي الم
 .�ف فع الهجايئ
ي 
لقد أصبح من الواضح أنه لا �مكن الخروج من هذە الأنفاق ال�اع�ة الاح�ت اب�ة اليت
ي وجودە الفردي، 
�ست�ف ف ف الطاقات العقل�ة والروح�ة والماد�ة، إلا بالانح�از إ� الإ�سان �ف
ي المجرد من الإ�ديولوج�
ات الوجود المجرد من الأطر الجمعان�ة، أي الوجود الواق�ي /العييف
ب�ف النظر  –الشمول�ة: الدين�ة والقوم�ة. ول�س غ�ي اللي�ب ال�ة بمبادئها المنحازة للفرد 
تكفل مثل هذا التحرر من الوه�ي لصالح الواق�ي ؛ لتنقل الفرد من  –عن ه��اته المسبقة 
حالة ال�اع مع الآخر/الآخ��ن )ال�اع المدمر للذات وللآخر(؛ ل�صارع نفسه وعوالمه 
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 evitagen fo sopoT -
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 fo elpmaxe fo sopoT-
 fo secneuqesnoc evitagen







 fo egatnavda fo sopoT-
 fo sopoT + ytilaudividni






















































ي هذا المضمار إضافة إ�جاب�ة له بالأصالة، 
و�اعه مع الطب�عة؛ فتكون انتصاراته �ف
ي فضاء 
ي فراغ، و�نما �ف
ي ، ع� اعتبار أنه لا �شتغل ع� نفسه �ف
و�ضافة إ�جاب�ة للن�ع الإ�سايف
ي لا �عدو أن �كون إضاف
من  -أو ما �عتقد أنه يتمتع به  –ة ف�ه؛ أ�ا كان ما يتمتع به إ�سايف
 .استقلال
 









  seigetarts noitaciderP




























وّجها/ت�ارا/مذهبا فك��ا �س� إ� التغي�ي بواسطة الإقناع بحزمة من الأفكار المتعاض -
َ
ي �جري تكون ت
دة اليت
 .الحشد لها باستمرار
ع� أن كل أفكارها ل�ست مكتملة ولا �قين�ة، بل �ي أفكار مطروحة ع� �ساط  –أول ما تؤكد  -تؤكد  -
ي كل الأحوال
 النقد/المساءلة �ف
 ما �حد من كونها إ�ديولوج�ا بالمعيف السليب ي .  -��ا جوه -تتضمن  -
ي الأساس: إ�ديولوج�ا الح��ة الفرد�ة –إن كانت إ�ديولوج�ا  - - 
 إ�ديولوج�ا الفرد، من ح�ث �ي �ف
 .تب�ت
 الاستقلال الفردي. تتمرد ع� أي تأط�ي ينتقص من  -
 .مناهضة لفعل التأدلج ذاته من ح�ث هو سلوك جم�ي  -
 �ستع�ي ع� الشمول�ة لأدلجة، من ح�ث �ي �ستع�ي ع� ا -
 ج�ا التحرر/ الاستقلال الفردي : إ�ديولو -تحد�دا  –�ي  - 
 �ي إ�ديولوج�ا التحرر من الإ�ديولوج�ات اليت ي تتضمن الشمول�ة ابتداء. - 
 �ي ل�ست المقابل المغاير لهذە الشمول�ات فحسب، بل �ي المقابل المناهض لمبدأ الشمول- 
 إذ تحد من طغ�ان المبدأ الشمو�ي بداهة؛ فإنها تحد من طغ�ان المبدأ الفردي أ�ضا -
 �ش�ت ط تحرر الفرد بمبادئ إ�سان�ة عامة وحا�مة -
 
 لأفكار اليت ي تحاول أن تكون متسقةمنظومة من ا –كمفهوم   –تعيف ي  -
 تع�ب عن رؤ�ة تتغ�ا تفس�ي الواقع، أو �س��غه، أو تغي�ي ە،  - 
ي : الو�ي الزائفبالمفهوم ا -
ط�ح كمقابل للعلم�ة والتفك�ي العقلايف
ُ
  .لمتداول/السليب ي ، ت
 من )منظومة أفكار، أو �سق فكري(بهذا المفهوم السليب ي تعيف ي ما هو أ��� -
عد أن تكون الأفكار فيها أفكارا ذات ب ُ –حيت ينطبق عليها هذا الوصف بالمفهوم السليب ي الرائج  –إذ لا بد -
 بال�ف ورة( عقائدي )ل�س دين�ا 
ي النها�ة إ� و�ي زائف؛ لا بد أن تكون شمول�ة، �شتغل   -
ي تح�لها �ف
�ي تتضمن كل تلك الملامح السلب�ة اليت
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 اللیبر واللیبرون المكبوتون المخدوعون
كي یتلافى سوء الظن ، بدأ زمیلنا الاستاذ عبد الكریم عائض مقالتھ بالتاكید على انھ لا یھتم 
بل انھ استدل على ذلك بدلیل یفلق الصخر لو تجلى ( ٥١ -٠١الوطن )باللیبرالیة ولا یأبھ لھا 
وھذا لعمري دلیل . لھ ، وھو انھ لم یطالع حلقة طاش ما طاش المشھورة عن اللیبرالیین 
الذین ابتلینا بالاھتمام باللیبرالیة والبحث  نحنثم ان الكاتب الكریم رأف بحالنا . فات كل عالم 
فاع اسعار الاغذیة ، فعوضنا عن كل ذلك عنھا ، خاصة بعد سقوط سوق الاسھم ثم ارت
وانھا ” لیبر“بشرح مختصر عن اللیبرالیة التي لم یأبھ بھا ابدا ، فأخبرنا ان اصلھا كلمة 
او تعني الحریة حسبما ورد في نص )تعني الحریة ” لیبرالیسم“لاتینیة تعني الحر ، وان 
  .(والله العالم ایھما الصحیح –المقال 
 
خیرا على ھذه الفوائد العظیمة التي كان قراء الجریدة ومثقفو البلاد  فجزى الله الكاتب
اخبرنا ایضا زاد الله فوائده ان الحریة كلمة ساحرة وان الدعوة . متعطشین لھا ، وایما عطش 
الیھا بھرت الكثیر من المساكین من اخواننا الذین عانوا قبل سفرھم الى بلاد الله من الكبت، 
ولا یخفى على القارئ ان الاستاذ . ال الطفل على جمرة یظنھا حلوى ملونة فاقبلوا علیھا اقب
عائض قد توصل في ھذا التحلیل البارع الى تفسیر لم یسبقھ بھ احد من فلاسفة الغرب 
والشرق ، في قدیم الزمان وحدیثھ ، ولھذا فمن الممكن ان یسجل كرأي مرجعي یأخذ بھ 
اللیبرالیة واسرار افتتان الناس بجمالھا ، رغم اعراض الفلاسفة والباحثون حین یتحدثون عن 
كثیر من العلماء عن نظریة فروید المعروفة في التحلیل النفسي التي تركز على الباعث 
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بأن الباحثین واساتذة العلوم السیاسیة  –جزاه الله خیرا  –ولم ینس الاستاذ عائض تذكیرنا 
الذین قرأوا الفلسفة الغربیة وربما كتبوا عن اللیبرالیة ، لم  المثقفیندیین وغیرھم من السعو
بتوضیح  –اكرمھ الله  –یفھموا اللیبرالیة ، بل ربما لم یفھموا حتى معناھا ، ولھذا تفضل علینا 
كما الیونانیة اي الحر وان اللیبرالیة تعني الحریة ، ” لیبر“ان اصل اللیبرالیة ھي كلمة 
 .اوضحنا اعلاه
 
� الحمد على ان اكرمني وغیري من طلبة العلوم السیاسیة بقراءة مقال الاستاذ عائض ،  
فعرفنا بعد سنین طویلة اضعناھا في الدراسة والبحث والكتابة ، ان اصل اللیبرالیة ھي لیبر 
ح لنا الاستاذ وربما یسم. وانھا یونانیة وتعني الرجل الحر وان لیبرالیسم معناھا الحریة
. عائض باضافة المرأة الحرة ایضا ، خاصة للغربیات واشباھھن من نسائنا المسترجلات
الذي نقولھ لنسائنا ” یاحرمھ“على وزن ” یالیبره“: ان نقول لھذه  –اذا سمح الاستاذ  –فیمكن 
وألاعیبھ  كما نقول للرجل المخدوع بالغرب. العفیفات اللاتي لم ینخدعن باللیبرالیة وبلاویھا 
  .الذي یقولھ بعضنا للصبیان حین یغضب علیھم” یاولد“، على وزن ” یالیبر: “ 
 
ولا تنتھي فوائد مقال الاستاذ عائض عند ھذا الحد ، فھو یستثمر المناسبة لاخبارنا ایضا بأن 
مبادئ الحریة والإخاء والمساواة ھي شعارات خداعة انبھرت بھا شخصیات فكریة وسیاسیة 
وھذا لعمري اكتشاف اعظم من سابقھ ، فقد ظننت قبل مقال . ي فخاخ الماسونیةفوقعت ف
الاستاذ عائض بأن السیاسي والمفكر لا ینخدع بسھولة ولا ینبھر بجمیل الكلام ، بل یجادل 
لكني اھتدیت الان الى قلة بضاعتي وجھلي بالامور ، فالمفكرون . كل فكرة قبل تبنیھا 
منھم ، یقعون في شراك الخدیعة ، ربما بصورة اسھل من باعة والسیاسیون ، حتى الدھاة 
لاني اسمع ان احدا لم ینجح حتى الیوم في مخادعة ھؤلاء البائعین . السمك في سوق القطیف 
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. بأرفع القیم الانسانیة، مثل الحریة والمساواة والاخاء  ومثقفینا ، لا سیما حین یتعلق الامر
ولا نكرر ذكر اللیبرالیة لان الاستاذ عائض قد اخبرنا سابقا بأن لیبرالیسم معناھا الحریة ، 
والظاھر من المقال ان تلك الحریة ھي نفس ھذه الحریة التي انخدع بھا دھاة السیاسیین 
  .لماسونیة واشباھھاوالمفكرین ووقعوا بسببھا في حبائل ا
الحقیقة ان فوائد مقال الاستاذ عائض لا تحصى وربما تحتاج الى مجلدات لشرحھا ، ولا 
وربما لم یھتِد الیھا احد قبلھ )سیما تعیینھ لمعنى اللیبر واللیبرالیسم ، ثم الاسئلة التي طرحھا 
كتب في نص )لیینا ، وتأكیده بأن الاجوبة لن تأتي من عند لیبرا(فضلا عن ان یجیب علیھا
” لیبرالیینا“ولعلھ یقصد شخصا او مكانا او اناسا اخرین غیر ” من عند لیبرالیونا“المقال 
لیبرالي المشار الیھا  -الذین نعرفھم ، او ربما ھي شيء اخر غیر الجمع العربي لكلمة لیبر
  .(اعلاه
لذي ارى ان تعاد وخلاصة القول ان الاستاذ عائض قد سجل ھدف الموسم في ھذا المقال ا
طباعتھ وان یوزع على المثقفین واساتذة الجامعات والكتاب ، حتى یفھموا معنى اللیبر 
 .واللیبرالیسم وما تقود الیھ الحریة والمساواة من بلاء الانزلاق في شراك الماسونیة
  
 msinairatinamuh fo sopoT-
 
 fo noitinifed fo ycallaF-
 ’hailarbilla‘
 modeerf fo taerht fo ycallaF-
 
 fo( ssensselesu fo sopoT-
 .)noitinifed
 
 ssensselesu fo sopoT-
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رغم ك�� ة الندوات والنقاشات والمقالات حول اللي�ب ال�ة، لا يزال السؤال قلقا
، المبادئ العامة 
�
ي عالمنا العريب ي : ما �ي اللي�ب ال�ة؟ وماذا ت��د؟ حسنا
 �ف
�
ور�ما م ت �صا
ي القرار، وما بعد ذلك تتفّرق الت�ارات 
للي�ب ال�ة �ي الح �ة والمساواة والمشاركة �ف
ي الاقتصاد.. اللي�ب ال�ة ذ
 خاصة �ف
�
 ات ال�مني ف وذات ال�سار، وتختلف كث�ي ا
 
ما فائدة هذا التوضيح الفضفاض طالما أن أغلب النظم الاجتماع�ة الحديثة تؤمن 
ي الواقع ثمة 
ي من معيف لمصطلح اللي�ب ال�ة؟ �ف
بتلك المبادئ �شكلها العام.. فماذا ب�ت
ي توص�فاته وتطب�قاته كث�ي يزخر به، لأن أي مصطلح لا يتضح من تع��فه ا
لعام، بل �ف
ومواقف المقتنعني ف به.. أسئلة اللي�ب ال�ة متنّوعة، وسبق أن ناقشت بعضها.. هنا 
محاولة للفهم من خلال علاقة اللي�ب ال�ة الس�اس�ة مع غ�ي ها، ترجمتها بت�ف مع 
 (. ٧٠٠٢إضافات توض�ح�ة لا تخلُّ بالمضمون، من موسوعة ستانفورد للفلسفة )
 
السؤال الأو�ي الذي �ُقلق كل مذهب س�ا�ي : هل اللي�ب ال�ة الس�اس�ة مناسبة نبدأ ب
ي العالم؟ كلا! �ج�ب جون رولز )
(، أحد slwaRل�ل الجماعات الس�اس�ة والدول �ف
ي كتابه )قانون الجمهور( 
 فكرته الج��ئة �ف
�
أهم المفك��ن اللي�ب اليني ف المعا �ن، طارحا
ي ( غ�ي مبيف ي ع�  ، بأنه �مكن أن �كون هناك٩٩٩١عام 
مجتمع هر�ي لائق )عقلايف
 عن ذلك �كون 
�
ي تقول بأن كل الأفراد أحرار ومتساوون، وعوضا
المفاه�م اللي�ب ال�ة اليت
الأفراد مسؤولني ف ومتعاونني ف داخل جماعاتهم، ول�نهم ل�سوا متساو�ن. فالمفهوم 
ي داخل اللي�ب ا�ي ال��ي للعدالة لا �مكن بناؤە من الخارج دون المشاركة الفك
��ة للناس �ف
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 rebmun fo sopot-
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ذلك المجتمع الهر�ي ، رغم أن حقوق الإ�سان الأساس�ة تنطبق ع� كل الب�ث . إلا أن 
( يرفضون موقف رولز المضاد ٢٠٠٢مفك��ن أمثال توماس بو�ب ي ومارثا نوسبوم )
لعالم�ة مبادئ الح��ة والمساواة اللي�ب ال�ة، و�رون أن المبادئ الإ�سان�ة اللي�ب ال�ة 
 الدول.  تنطبق ع� كل
 
ي أن �خلط مع سؤال آخر: هل اللي�ب ال�ة نظ��ة لدولة معينة أم 
السؤال السابق لا ينب�ف
 نظ��ة س�اس�ة عالم�ة ل�ل الجماعات الب ث �ة؟ الف�لسوف كانط 
�
أنها ع� الأقل مثال�ا
ي عليها اح�ت ام كرامة مواطنيها كأفراد أحرار ومتساو�ن، ٥٩٧١)
م( يرى أن كل الدول ينب�ف
ي نمط س�ا�ي واحد؛ و�ع�ت ض ع� فكرة توح�د ول�نه ي
نكر أن الإ�سان�ة تتشكل �ف
ي كونفدرال�ة 
ي دسات�ي وتتحد كدول �ف
 �ف
�
ي مجموعة عالم�ة �ش�ت ك ضمن�ا
اللي�ب ال�ة �ف
 لضمان السلام. 
 
 التف��ق بني ف عالم مجتمعات لي�ب ال�ة والمجتمع 
�
بالنسبة للي�ب ال�ة ال�لاس�ك�ة ل�س مهما
ي المجتمع هو ضمان حقوق الح �ة الأساس�ة  اللي�ب ا�ي العال�ي ،
لأن هدف الحكومة �ف
(. ٧٠٠٢والمل��ة لمواطنيها، فلا تصبح الحدود الدول�ة ذات أهم�ة ك�ب ى )لوماس�ي 
بينما اللي�ب ال�ة الحديثة تلحُّ ع� مبادئ توز�ــــع ال�� وة لبل�غ العدالة الاجتماع�ة، بغض 
. لذا ظل النظر أن تلك المبادئ تنطبق داخل مجتمعات 
�
معينة أو يتم بلوغها عالم�ا
ي وجوب تطبيق مبادئ اللي�ب ال�ة داخل 
 بني ف مفكري اللي�ب ال�ة المعا �ن �ف
�
الخلاف كب�ي ا
 لأنها مكاسب إ�سان�ة عالم�ة )رولز، 
�
ي تطب�قها عالم�ا
الدول اللي�ب ال�ة فقط أم ينب�ف
 بو�ب ي ، بي�ت ف (. 
 
ي ط��قة التعام
ل مع المجتمعات والفئات المتشددة و�متد الخلاف بني ف اللي�ب اليني ف �ف
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ح��اتهم الدين�ة والفك��ة..إلخ. هل من السل�م للجماعة اللي�ب ال�ة أن تعرقل الس�طرة 
 الداخل�ة للجماعة المتشددة؟ 
 
ضنا أن الفئة المتشددة �ي جماعة س�
اس�ة أو دولة.. هل �مكن للي�ب اليني ف إذا اف�ت
ي مقالة خاصة بذلك 
ي شؤون الدول غ�ي اللي�ب ال�ة؟ �ج�ب الف�لسوف مّل �ف
التدخل �ف
ي أن يتم التعامل معهما ٩٥٨١عام 
م، أن البلدان المتح�ف ة وغ�ي المتح�ف ة ينب�ف
بط��قة مختلفة، فلا حق لل�ب ابرة كأمة.. فطالما أن الأخلاق الدول�ة تبادل�ة فإن 
الحكومات الهمج�ة لا �مكن حسابها ول�س لها حقوق متساو�ة للحكومات 
 مع الروح الإم ب �ال�ة ل ب �طان�ا 
�
ي كان متناغما




الاستعمار�ة آنذاك. ول�ن مّل �عود و�وضح أنه �ع�ت ض ع� تدخ




ي اتخاذ قراراتها الخاصة، فهل �حق أخلاق�ا
ا كانت اللي�ب ال�ة تؤمن بحق الجماعات �ف
ي 
ي الجماعات غ�ي اللي�ب ال�ة لتتك�ف مع مبادئهم الإ�سان�ة �ف
أن يتدخل اللي�ب اليون �ف
 قد يؤمنون أن 
�
الح �ة والمساواة؟ فكما يؤمن اللي�ب اليون بح��ة الأفراد، فإنهم أ�ضا
ي ا
رتكاب الأخطاء الإ�سان�ة لإدارة شؤونهم الجماع�ة الخاصة بهم. للجماعات الحق �ف
صادر ح��اتهم داخل مجتمعات معّينة هم أنفسهم قد �ع�ت ضون ع� 
ُ
فالأفراد الذين ت
؛ تام�ي ، ٠٩٩١إقحام مبادئ الح��ة اللي�ب ال�ة أو حيت يت�ف رون منها )مارجال�ت وراز، 
 (. ٣٩٩١
 
ف وا عند التعامل مع الجماعات المتشددة ل�ن رولز �عتقد أن اللي�ب اليني ف �جب 
أن �م�ي ّ
بني ف تلك العقلان�ة و�ني ف الخارجة ع� القانون، الأو� �مكن التعا�ش معها ع� عكس 
ي تتجاهل 
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ة بالقوة والتدخل حقوق الإ�سان؛ فمثل هذە الدولة قد �حق أن تكون عرضة للعق��
ي 
الخار�ب ي . إلا أن رولز ��ّ ع� أن العقلاء الذين يرفضون مبادئ الح��ة اللي�ب ال�ة ينب�ف
( وهو مفكر ٣٠٠٢�شج�عهم ول�س إرغامهم ع� تلك المبادئ. أما شاندران كوكا�س )
لي�ب ا�ي كلاس��ي ف�م�ل إ� التسامح ال�امل مع الناس الذين لا يؤمنون بمبادئ الح �ة 
 لي�ب ال�ة مع تحفظ أن تكون هناك حقوق اع�ت اض. ال
 
وتمتد أسئلة العلاقات إ� داخل الدولة اللي�ب ال�ة: إ� أي مدى �حق للجماعات 









ي است�عاب الجماعات المتعصبة، ل�ن جلاستون )
( �ط�ح أن ٣٠٠٢تار�ــــخ ط��ل �ف
م الأطفال، فلا �مكن المشكلة ال��ب ى �ي مع الجماع
�
ي تريب ي وتعل
ات المتعصبة اليت
النظر إليها ع� أنها جماعات تطوع�ة نق�َّ ة لها حق خ�ار رفض متطلبات الدولة 
اللي�ب ال�ة: فهم �مارسون القوة الإ�راه�ة ع� الأطفال، لذا فإن المبادئ اللي�ب ال�ة 
دورها هنا. وهنا سنواجه الأساس�ة حول حما�ة الأب��اء من الإرغام غ�ي العادل ستلعب 






 داخل الدولة اللي�ب ال�ة )بما 
�
ي تع�ش محل�ا
�جعل التسامح مع الجماعات المتشددة اليت
اض( يبدو أقل جاذب�ة من التسامح معها ع� النطاق الدو�ي . و 
ي الاع�ت
رغم ف�ه حقها �ف
 أن اللي�ب اليني ف �جب ٦٠٠٢ذلك ف�ظل بعض مفكري اللي�ب ال�ة )لوكاس س��ن 
�
( مقتنعا
أن �ضمنوا شبه س�ادة للجماعات المحل�ة غ�ي اللي�ب ال�ة، �سمح لهم بح �ة الت�ف 
 �شؤونهم ع� حسب ط��قتهم. 
 
ثمة سؤال آخر، إ� أي مدى �سمح للجماعات الرافضة لمبادئ اللي�ب ال�ة أن �شارك 
ي كتابه )اللي�ب ال�ة الس�اس�ة(، �ذكر رولز أن ب
ي الدولة اللي�ب ال�ة. �ف
اتخاذ القرارات �ف
مجتمعاتنا تتصف بأنها جماع�ة عقلان�ة، ومن ثم لا �مكن إرغامها ع� التغي�ي بم�ب ر 
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�ستند ع� أساس إ�مان بأخلاق�ات شمول�ة أو نظم دين�ة. ول�ن بعض اللي�ب اليني ف 
( �طرحون أن مثل هذا ٣٩٩١و��ي ي  ٢٠٠٢دين�ة )إب�ي ل المق�ّ�ني ف من الأوساط ال
ي مواقفهم 
الاع�ت اض هو إقصاء واضح للمتدينني ف . ومرة أخرى يتباعد اللي�ب اليون �ف
 لدرجة أن يتساءل المرء هل ثمة ما يب�ت يوّحد اللي�ب اليني ف ...؟ 
 
 +ytilanoitar fo sopoT-
  noislupmoc fo ycallaf
 fo ycallaf ro sopoT-
  noisulcxe
 fo ycallaf ro sopoT-
   sedutitta larebil fo ecnairav
 






























  seigetarts noitaciderP














  المبادئ العامة للیبرالیة ھي الحریة والمساواة والمشاركة في القرار -
 تتفّرق التیارات اللیبرالیة ذات الیمین وذات الیسار، وتختلف كثیرا ًخاصة في الاقتصاد.. -
 ثمة كثیر یزخر بھ -
 كلا! اللیبرالیة السیاسیة مناسبة لكل الجماعات السیاسیة والدول في العالم؟ھل  -
 تقول بأن كل الأفراد أحرار ومتساوون -
 تنطبق على كل الدول.  -
 توزیع الثروة لبلوغ العدالة الاجتماعیة -
 لھا تاریخ طویل في استیعاب الجماعات المتعصبة -
 
 
 یجب أن یمیّزوا عند التعامل مع الجماعات المتشددة بین تلك العقلانیة وبین الخارجة على القانون -
یجب أن یضمنوا شبھ سیادة للجماعات المحلیة غیر اللیبرالیة، تسمح لھم بحریة التصرف بشؤونھم  -
 على حسب طریقتھم.
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رغم ك�� ة الندوات والنقاشات والمقالات حول اللي�ب ال�ة، لا يزال السؤال قلقا
، المبادئ العامة 
�
ي عالمنا العريب ي : ما �ي اللي�ب ال�ة؟ وماذا ت��د؟ حسنا
 �ف
�
ور�ما م ت �صا
ي القرار، وما بعد 




 اللي�ب ال�ة ذات ال�مني ف وذات ال�سار، وتختلف كث�ي ا
 
ما فائدة هذا التوضيح الفضفاض طالما أن أغلب النظم الاجتماع�ة الحديثة تؤمن 
ي الواقع ثمة 
ي من معيف لمصطلح اللي�ب ال�ة؟ �ف
بتلك المبادئ �شكلها العام.. فماذا ب�ت
ي توص�فاته وتطب�قاته 
كث�ي يزخر به، لأن أي مصطلح لا يتضح من تع��فه العام، بل �ف
اللي�ب ال�ة متنّوعة، وسبق أن ناقشت بعضها.. هنا  ومواقف المقتنعني ف به.. أسئلة
محاولة للفهم من خلال علاقة اللي�ب ال�ة الس�اس�ة مع غ�ي ها، ترجمتها بت�ف مع 
 (. ٧٠٠٢إضافات توض�ح�ة لا تخلُّ بالمضمون، من موسوعة ستانفورد للفلسفة )
 
اس�ة مناسبة نبدأ بالسؤال الأو�ي الذي �ُقلق كل مذهب س�ا�ي : هل اللي�ب ال�ة الس�
ي العالم؟ كلا! �ج�ب جون رولز )
(، أحد slwaRل�ل الجماعات الس�اس�ة والدول �ف
ي كتابه )قانون الجمهور( 
 فكرته الج��ئة �ف
�
أهم المفك��ن اللي�ب اليني ف المعا �ن، طارحا
ي ع� ٩٩٩١عام 
ي ( غ�ي مبيف
، بأنه �مكن أن �كون هناك مجتمع هر�ي لائق )عقلايف
 عن ذلك �كون  المفاه�م اللي�ب ال�ة
�
ي تقول بأن كل الأفراد أحرار ومتساوون، وعوضا
اليت
الأفراد مسؤولني ف ومتعاونني ف داخل جماعاتهم، ول�نهم ل�سوا متساو�ن. فالمفهوم 
ي داخل 
اللي�ب ا�ي ال��ي للعدالة لا �مكن بناؤە من الخارج دون المشاركة الفك��ة للناس �ف
  
 lareneg ehT :1 mialC
 era ’hailarbilla‘ fo selpicnirp
 dna ytilauqe ,modeerf
 noisiced ni noitapicitrap
 yllacificeps ti dna gnikam
  noitacilppa ni seirav
  rebmun fo sopoT-
  noitinifed fo sopoT -
 
 
 rebmun fo sopot-
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. إلا أن ذلك المجتمع الهر�ي ، رغم أن حقوق الإ�سان 
الأساس�ة تنطبق ع� كل الب�ث
( يرفضون موقف رولز المضاد ٢٠٠٢مفك��ن أمثال توماس بو�ب ي ومارثا نوسبوم )
لعالم�ة مبادئ الح��ة والمساواة اللي�ب ال�ة، و�رون أن المبادئ الإ�سان�ة اللي�ب ال�ة 
 تنطبق ع� كل الدول. 
 
ي أن �خلط مع سؤال آخر: هل ا
للي�ب ال�ة نظ��ة لدولة معينة أم السؤال السابق لا ينب�ف
 نظ��ة س�اس�ة عالم�ة ل�ل الجماعات الب ث �ة؟ الف�لسوف كانط 
�
أنها ع� الأقل مثال�ا
ي عليها اح�ت ام كرامة مواطنيها كأفراد أحرار ومتساو�ن، ٥٩٧١)
م( يرى أن كل الدول ينب�ف
ي نمط س�ا�ي واحد؛ و�ع�ت ض ع� فكرة 
توح�د ول�نه ينكر أن الإ�سان�ة تتشكل �ف
ي كونفدرال�ة 
ي دسات�ي وتتحد كدول �ف
 �ف
�
ي مجموعة عالم�ة �ش�ت ك ضمن�ا
اللي�ب ال�ة �ف
 لضمان السلام. 
 
 التف��ق بني ف عالم مجتمعات لي�ب ال�ة والمجتمع 
�
بالنسبة للي�ب ال�ة ال�لاس�ك�ة ل�س مهما
ي المجتمع هو ضمان حقوق الح �ة الأساس�ة 
اللي�ب ا�ي العال�ي ، لأن هدف الحكومة �ف
(. ٧٠٠٢المل��ة لمواطنيها، فلا تصبح الحدود الدول�ة ذات أهم�ة ك�ب ى )لوماس�ي و 
بينما اللي�ب ال�ة الحديثة تلحُّ ع� مبادئ توز�ــــع ال�� وة لبل�غ العدالة الاجتماع�ة، بغض 
. لذا ظل 
�
النظر أن تلك المبادئ تنطبق داخل مجتمعات معينة أو يتم بلوغها عالم�ا
 بني ف مفكر 
�
ي وجوب تطبيق مبادئ اللي�ب ال�ة داخل الخلاف كب�ي ا
ي اللي�ب ال�ة المعا �ن �ف
 لأنها مكاسب إ�سان�ة عالم�ة )رولز، 
�
ي تطب�قها عالم�ا
الدول اللي�ب ال�ة فقط أم ينب�ف
 بو�ب ي ، بي�ت ف (. 
 
ي ط��قة التعامل مع المجتمعات والفئات المتشددة 
و�متد الخلاف بني ف اللي�ب اليني ف �ف
ي قد تنكر الحقوق الأساس
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ح��اتهم الدين�ة والفك��ة..إلخ. هل من السل�م للجماعة اللي�ب ال�ة أن تعرقل الس�طرة 
 الداخل�ة للجماعة المتشددة؟ 
 
ضنا أن الفئة المتشددة �ي جماعة س�اس�ة أو دولة.. هل �مكن للي�ب اليني ف 
إذا اف�ت
ي شؤون الدول غ�ي 
ي مقالة خاصة بذلك  التدخل �ف
اللي�ب ال�ة؟ �ج�ب الف�لسوف مّل �ف
ي أن يتم التعامل معهما ٩٥٨١عام 
م، أن البلدان المتح�ف ة وغ�ي المتح�ف ة ينب�ف
بط��قة مختلفة، فلا حق لل�ب ابرة كأمة.. فطالما أن الأخلاق الدول�ة تبادل�ة فإن 
ومات الحكومات الهمج�ة لا �مكن حسابها ول�س لها حقوق متساو�ة للحك
 مع الروح الإم ب �ال�ة ل ب �طان�ا 
�
ي كان متناغما




الاستعمار�ة آنذاك. ول�ن مّل �عود و�وضح أنه �ع�ت ض ع� تدخ
 دولة أخرى من أجل حما�ة المبادئ اللي�ب ال�ة. 
 
ي اتخاذ قراراتها الخا
 إذا كانت اللي�ب ال�ة تؤمن بحق الجماعات �ف
�
صة، فهل �حق أخلاق�ا
ي 
ي الجماعات غ�ي اللي�ب ال�ة لتتك�ف مع مبادئهم الإ�سان�ة �ف
أن يتدخل اللي�ب اليون �ف
 قد يؤمنون أن 
�
الح �ة والمساواة؟ فكما يؤمن اللي�ب اليون بح��ة الأفراد، فإنهم أ�ضا
ي ارتكاب الأخطاء الإ�سان�ة لإدارة شؤونهم الجماع�ة الخاصة بهم. 
 للجماعات الحق �ف
صادر ح��اتهم داخل مجتمعات معّينة هم أنفسهم قد �ع�ت ضون ع� 
ُ
فالأفراد الذين ت
؛ تام�ي ، ٠٩٩١إقحام مبادئ الح��ة اللي�ب ال�ة أو حيت يت�ف رون منها )مارجال�ت وراز، 
 (. ٣٩٩١
 
ل�ن رولز �عتقد أن اللي�ب اليني ف �جب أن �م�ي ّ ف وا عند التعامل مع الجماعات المتشددة 
ن�ة و�ني ف الخارجة ع� القانون، الأو� �مكن التعا�ش معها ع� عكس بني ف تلك العقلا 
ي تتجاهل 
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حقوق الإ�سان؛ فمثل هذە الدولة قد �حق أن تكون عرضة للعق��ة بالقوة والتدخل 
ي الخار�ب ي . إلا أن رولز ��ّ ع� أن العقلاء 
الذين يرفضون مبادئ الح��ة اللي�ب ال�ة ينب�ف
( وهو مفكر ٣٠٠٢�شج�عهم ول�س إرغامهم ع� تلك المبادئ. أما شاندران كوكا�س )
لي�ب ا�ي كلاس��ي ف�م�ل إ� التسامح ال�امل مع الناس الذين لا يؤمنون بمبادئ الح �ة 
 اللي�ب ال�ة مع تحفظ أن تكون هناك حقوق اع�ت اض. 
 
لعلاقات إ� داخل الدولة اللي�ب ال�ة: إ� أي مدى �حق للجماعات وتمتد أسئلة ا









ي است�عاب الجماعات المتعصبة، ل�ن جلاستون )
( �ط�ح أن ٣٠٠٢تار�ــــخ ط��ل �ف
م الأطفال، فلا �مكن المشكلة ال��ب ى �ي مع الجماعات المتعصبة ا
�
ي تريب ي وتعل
ليت
النظر إليها ع� أنها جماعات تطوع�ة نق�َّ ة لها حق خ�ار رفض متطلبات الدولة 
اللي�ب ال�ة: فهم �مارسون القوة الإ�راه�ة ع� الأطفال، لذا فإن المبادئ اللي�ب ال�ة 
نا سنواجه الأساس�ة حول حما�ة الأب��اء من الإرغام غ�ي العادل ستلعب دورها هنا. وه






 داخل الدولة اللي�ب ال�ة )بما 
�
ي تع�ش محل�ا
�جعل التسامح مع الجماعات المتشددة اليت
اض( يبدو أقل جاذب�ة من التسامح معها ع� النطاق الدو�ي . ورغم 
ي الاع�ت
ف�ه حقها �ف
 أن اللي�ب اليني ف �جب ٦٠٠٢بعض مفكري اللي�ب ال�ة )لوكاس س��ن ذلك ف�ظل 
�
( مقتنعا
أن �ضمنوا شبه س�ادة للجماعات المحل�ة غ�ي اللي�ب ال�ة، �سمح لهم بح �ة الت�ف 
 �شؤونهم ع� حسب ط��قتهم. 
 
ثمة سؤال آخر، إ� أي مدى �سمح للجماعات الرافضة لمبادئ اللي�ب ال�ة أن �شارك 
ي كتابه )اللي�ب ال�ة الس�اس�ة(، �ذكر رولز أن باتخاذ القرارا
ي الدولة اللي�ب ال�ة. �ف
ت �ف
مجتمعاتنا تتصف بأنها جماع�ة عقلان�ة، ومن ثم لا �مكن إرغامها ع� التغي�ي بم�ب ر 
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�ستند ع� أساس إ�مان بأخلاق�ات شمول�ة أو نظم دين�ة. ول�ن بعض اللي�ب اليني ف 
( �طرحون أن مثل هذا ٣٩٩١و��ي ي  ٢٠٠٢المق�ّ�ني ف من الأوساط الدين�ة )إب�ي ل 
ي مواقفهم 
الاع�ت اض هو إقصاء واضح للمتدينني ف . ومرة أخرى يتباعد اللي�ب اليون �ف
 لدرجة أن يتساءل المرء هل ثمة ما يب�ت يوّحد اللي�ب اليني ف ...؟ 
 
 +ytilanoitar fo sopoT-
  noislupmoc fo ycallaf
 fo ycallaf ro sopoT-
  noisulcxe
 fo ycallaf ro sopoT-
   sedutitta larebil fo ecnairav
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 اللي�ب ال�ة: هل �ي ح��ة أو فوض��ة؟
البن�ة العم�قة للثقافة الإسلام�ة تنطوي ع� منظومة ق�م�ة ذات بعد نو�ي مغاير ومن 
ي تراتب�ة الق�م. تلك الق�مة استوحت مرك��تها 
ذلك ق�مة الح��ة ح�ث تتبوأ رتبة سامقة �ف
من النص المقدس الذي رفع سقف الح��ة ا� درجة أنه حظر كل اشتغال يروم الإ�راە 
ي الدين»لأس� ع� اعتناق الد�انة ا
فهل ثمة أبعد من تلك الح �ة؟! حيت « لاإ�راە �ف
إذا لم يتوفرع� مناخات من  -من الناح�ة الت ث �ع�ة  -التكل�ف ذاته ُيرفع عن الإ�سان 
�ي 
لف به ع� جهة الامتثال فحينئذ يرتفع التكل�ف بارتفاع �ث
�
الح �ة تتيح له إ�قاع ما�
لف ع� مال�س بمقدور� له ولذلك فلو تفّوە فاقد القصد والاخت�ار بحسبهما �حملان المك
 لو طال بالإساءة أحد الشخص�ات ذات البعد التقد��ي فلا ُي�� ب 
الح �ة بما �كفرە أوحيت
  .»إلامن أ�رە وقلبه مطمنئ ف بالإ�مان« عل�ه �ث عا كما هو مفاد النص: 
 
ي الوجود  -تلك الحق�قة الناصعة 
ي النص الم�ف ف ل متقدمة �ف
ي أن مادة الح��ة �ف
المتمثلة �ف
ي اللي�ب ال�ة 
ي و�التا�ي الوجود الواق�ي ع� الح��ة �ف
�جري جهلها أوتجاهلها من ِقبل  -الذهيف
ي تتناول ق�مة الح��ة وكأنها منتج لي�ب ا�ي �ف، وكأنها حق ح�ي! 
كث�ي من الأطروحات اليت
ح ق��ي لي�ب ا�ي مذهل ولار�ب أن هذا تحكم س�عي�ه العثور بأي لون من ألوان أو فت
ي ط�ات 
ي ثنا�ا بنود الت ث �ــــع و�ف
ي الأصل مفردة مبثوثة �ف
ي ؛ لأن الح��ة �ف
الت ب �رالمعر�ف
ي و العبارة العم��ة: 
ميت استعبدتم الناس وقد ولدتهم « المقدمات النظ��ة ل�ت اثنا المعر�ف
عنا ببع�د، ثم أ�ضا فإن الح��ة اليت ي يرفع شعارها فلاسفة ل�ست »أمهاتهم أحرارا؟! 
��ي الذي ننت�ي له 
ي تنسجم ومكونات الإطارالت ث
 ل�ست �ي الح �ة اليت
اللي�ب ال�ة الغ��يني ف
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ا�ي مع مفهوم الح��ة ومن هنا لا�س�غ لنا مجتمع فكل تجمع ��ث ي له معاي�ي ە �ف
ي ننبعث 
ي ظل ظروف وملا�سات لاتتناغم والخصوص�ة اليت
ًصور تمت ولادته �ف
َ
استنساخ ت
ي اللي�ب ال�ة 
 -وأ�رر: اللي�ب ال�ة بنسختها الأساس  -ع� ضوء إملاءاتها؛ فمصطلح الح��ة �ف
ي س�اق أو هو  فوض��ةمغ�ب المعالم ُمزهق الحدود عد�م الضوابط ع� نحو �ح�له إ� 
�ف
ي مساق آخر
 .إ� الفوض��ة أقرب �ف
 
ي وحاجة فط��ة لاِمراء، والإ�سان �حتاجها كما 
الح �ة ق�مة أساس�ة، إنها مطلب إ�سايف
ي اللي�ب ال�ة أنه بفعل ه�منة 
الطعام ح�ث لا�ستق�م ح�اته بدونها، ل�ن الإشكال�ة هنا �ف
فثمة توظ�ف مغرض  -مصطلح الح��ة  -خاذال�ف ف عة الانفلات�ة يتم �ش��ه هذا المصطلح الأ 
 .لحيث�اته وعدول به و�حق�قته وم�ل بمدال�له عن الحق�قة الموضوع�ة الثابتة له بالأصل
 
ي محتواە 
رط مع هذا المعيف وطْرد لمادته حيت �دلف �ف
ْ
ي اللي�ب ال�ة �جري اس�ت سال مف
�ف
نه حق�قته الأساس. المصطلح هنا يوسَّ ع حيت ينضم إل
�
�ه من الوقائع الثقاف�ة مايتضاد وك
ي أصل الحكم
ي تتلبس بما �منع إلحاقها �ف
 .!ومن تمظهرات الماِصدق اليت
 
: الجانب الاقتصادي فالح��ة اللي�ب ال�ة ل�س لديها أي تحفظ ع� 
ً
والأمثلة كث�ي ة خذ مث�
مقارفة ج��رة ال��ا فهذا أمرعائد إ� الرغبة الذات�ة فإن شاء الفرد أقدم و�ن شاء أحجم، 
ي ف
ال��ا هنا داخل تحت شعارالح��ة، أما النظام الإسلا�ي فهو مع أنه �ع�ي سقف الح��ة �ف
ي هذا الوجه من التعا�ي المادي، 
هذا المجال ل�نه يبدي قدرا كب�ي ا من التحفظ الملحوظ �ف
ي الس�اق اللي�ب ا�ي مشحون بما �لوث نقاءە ح�ث ثمة توظ�ف 
وهكذا. إذا فمصطلح الح��ة �ف
ي فوضوي متصاعد 
لهذە المفردة ال�ب اقة وهل نتصور من فعال�ات فلسف�ة �شكل فكرها �ف
صِّ �ا بالخ ي �ة 
َ
ي أسسها المفاه�م�ة للنسق العقدي للأمة المنعوتة ن
ظل مناخات مناوئة �ف
 الإطار المفاه��ي 
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ي بعدها  الحا�م لسلوكنا العام؟! هل نتصور أن
ي ينادي بها أولئك تنضبط �ف
الح��ة اليت
ي تحكم طب�عة الو�ي الم�ب مج ع� أول��ة الإذعان 
المفاه��ي بالمقاي�س المع�ار�ة اليت
اللام�ث وط لمعط�ات الرؤ�ة السماو�ة؟! إن الح��ة اللي�ب ال�ة تنطلق من أول��ة ألهنة 
جا من بواعث انطلاق الروح الإ�سان والانكفاء المطلق ع� المادة وتتعا� موقفا متشن
ي السلب؛ لأنها 
ي تحكمها؛ تبدو متخمة بحمولة مولغة �ف
ولذا ف�ي تبدو مفتقرة للق�م اليت
 بالغ 
�
ذكر ب�جمال و�بهام ع� نحو �عكس ُبعدا
ُ
ي ج��رة التعم�م والإطلاق ف�ي ت
تقع �ف





خص�ص أو�التقي�د كضابط تزول به صفة الإطلاق. إنها ح��ة ت
ي أدب�ات الت ث �ــــع وثمة بون شاسع بني ف 
ي �جري تعاطيها �ف
السمات طب�عة الح��ة اليت
الح �تني ف ، فإذا كانت الأو� تتحدث عن الح �ة المطلقة فإن الأخرى تتحدث عن مطلق 
ي أصل الح �ة، وشتان مابني ف الح��تني ف نع
م بينهما قدر من التشابه والاش�ت اك ول�نه �ف
ك مطلق ك�ي والمطلق ال��ي كما 
ي ظاهرالمصطلح، هذاالمش�ت
ي أساس المعيف ، �ف
المفهوم، �ف
ي الماه�ة بل لازمه يوجب المغايرة بحسبها الأصل هنا
 .هو معروف لا�لزم منه التضارع �ف
 
ي مقابلها 
ي الإسلام هناك ح��ة ول�ن �ف
ولن  -لأن الاسلام معناە الاستسلام  - عبود�ة�ف
ي كافة أ�ساق التبع�ة من خلال 
ي أن�ت صورها إلا بالح �ة،أي بتجا�ف
تتحقق تلك العبود�ة �ف
ي علاە
 .التحررالمطلق من كل عبود�ة لسوى المعبود الحق جل �ف
ي اللي�ب ال�ة لامكان فيهالتلك ا
 ج�ي ع� تراجع الح �ة �ف
لعبود�ة، بل هذە العبود�ة تعد مؤ�ث
نهضة الا�سان، أو �ي آ�ة ح �ة ع� المجتمع التقل�دي المحافظ!. الح��ة والعبود�ة 
ي اللي�ب ال�ة 
ي عامة دوائر الح�اة، بينهما انفكاك فلا تتجسد الح �ة �ف
هنا ق�متان متنافيتان و�ف
ي ُمْطبق لسائر مظاهرالعبود�ة وتغي�
ب تام أوشبه تام ل�افة �شكلاتها، الح��ة إلا بن�ف
 أن النظام الإسلا�ي �لح ع� 
ي حني ف
والعبود�ة هنا بمثابة ج��رتني ف منفصلتني ف لاتلتق�ان؛ �ف
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 ءامنلاو رهطلاب درفلا حور �ع ظوحلم لكش�و سكعني وحن �عو ي
ف� ءرملا 
ّت�رت املكو ،
اهل�صافت لكب ةا�حلا ي
ف� ة��هوج ةم�قك ة��حلا ة�لعافل �دأ كلذ ناك املك ة�دوبعلا جرادم. 
 نم اهلوستن اذاملف ي��قلا انماظن ي
ف� يزكرم دعب تاذ ة��حلا تناك اذإ :لوقلا لوصحمو
 ةغا�صلارر�أ !؟لصاحلا ل�صحت نم اذه س�لأ ة�دوجو ةعاضوب سبلتت تائيب
 سلاا �إ راص� اذامل :ة�قطنم ةق��طب ن�لو ة�ماهفتلدبلا -  لكب ف�اح يزاجملا دعبلا
 انه هتفاثك-  دوجو عمهنم لدبملا -  !ه�لع ظفحت ةمث ناك اذإ لاإ-  فانم اذه س�لأ
 .!؟ة�جهنملا ماكحأ تا�ضتقمل 
Freedom in 
‘allibraliah’> 
substitute   
Freedom in Islam> 
substituted  
Claim5: As freedom exists in 
our system of values i.e. 
(Islam), there is no need to 
borrow it from other 
systems e.g. (allibraliah). 
-Topos of advantage of
freedom + Topos of culture.
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 تتبوأ رتبة سامقة �ف
 لك الق�مة استوحت مرك��تها من النص المقدست-
ي اللي�ب ال�ة -
ي و�التا�ي الوجود الواق�ي ع� الح��ة �ف
ي الوجود الذهيف
ي النص الم�ف ف ل متقدمة �ف
 الح��ة �ف
ي  -
ي ط�ات المقدمات النظ��ة ل�ت اثنا المعر�ف
ي ثنا�ا بنود الت ث �ــــع و�ف
 مفردة مبثوثة �ف
 تتحدث عن مطلق الح��ة--
ي مقابلها عبود�ة -
 �ف
ي كافة أ�ساق التبع�ة من خلال ال -
ي علاەبتجا�ف
 .تحررالمطلق من كل عبود�ة لسوى المعبود الحق جل �ف
ي نظامنا الق��ي  --
 ذات بعد مركزي �ف
 
الح��ة اليت ي يرفع شعارها فلاسفة اللي�ب ال�ة الغ��يني ف ل�ست �ي الح��ة اليت ي تنسجم ومكونات  -
��ي الذي ننت�ي له
 الإطارالت ث
ي اللي�ب ال�ة مغ�ب المعالم ُمزهق ال -
 حدود عد�م الضوابط ع� نحو �ح�له إ� فوض��ةفمصطلح الح �ة �ف
 ق�مة أساس�ة -
ي اللي�ب ال�ة  -
فثمة توظ�ف مغرض لحيث�اته وعدول به  -مصطلح الح��ة  -يتم �ش��ه هذا المصطلح الأخاذ�ف
 .و�حق�قته وم�ل بمدال�له عن الحق�قة الموضوع�ة الثابتة له بالأصل
نه  -
�
ي محتواە مايتضاد وك
رط مع هذا المعيف وطْرد لمادته حيت �دلف �ف
ْ
ي اللي�ب ال�ة �جري اس�ت سال مف
�ف
 .حق�قته الأساس
 . فالح��ة اللي�ب ال�ة ل�س لديها أي تحفظ ع� مقارفة ج��رة ال��ا فهذا أمرعائد إ� الرغبة الذات�ة -
ي الس�اق اللي�ب ا�ي مشحون بما �لوث ن -
قاءە ح�ث ثمة توظ�ف فوضوي متصاعد لهذە فمصطلح الح��ة �ف
 المفردة ال�ب اقة



















  اللي�ب ال�ة
 تتعا� موقفا متشنجا من بواعث انطلاق الروح -
 تبدو مفتقرة للق�م اليت ي تحكمها-
ي ج� ت-
ي السلب؛ لأنها تقع �ف
 �رة التعم�م والإطلاق بدو متخمة بحمولة مولغة �ف
 تُ ذكر ب�جمال و�بهام ع� نحو �عكس ُبعدا� بالغ الفوض��ة -
تبدو مفردة لفظ�ة ذات ماه�ة عامة ومطلقة من دون أي إشعار بالتخص�ص أو�التقي�د كضابط تزول به -
 صفة الإطلاق. 
ي -
ي �جري تعاطيها �ف




 أدب�ات الت ث �ــــع إنها ح��ة ت
 تتحدث عن الح��ة المطلقة  -
 لامكان فيهالتلك العبود�ة، بل هذە العبود�ة تعد مؤ�ث ج�ي ع� تراجع نهضة الا�سان -
ي ُمْطبق لسائر مظاهرالعبود�ة -
ي اللي�ب ال�ة إلا بن�ف
 فلا تتجسد الح��ة �ف
 
ي وحاجة فط��ة لاِمراء-
 إنها مطلب إ�سايف
 عام ح�ث لا�ستق�م ح�اته بدونهاوالإ�سان �حتاجها كما الط-
 
نه حق�قته الأساس.  -
�
ي محتواە مايتضاد وك
رط مع هذا المعيف وطْرد لمادته حيت �دلف �ف
ْ
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 لي�ب ال�ة بنكهة سعود�ة
ي الآونة الأخ�ي ة عن اللي�ب ال�ة وأصبحت محل نقاش 
ي المجتمع السعودي �ف
ك�� الحد�ث �ف
ي الح�اة الاجتماع�ة والفك��ة والثقاف�ة ووصل إ� حد أن أحد الباحثني ف والمثقفني ف 
وسجال �ف
ي بلادنا وهو الدكتور عبدالله الغذا�ي �كتب كتابا كاملا جاء تحت عنوان 
البارز�ن �ف
طاش ما »وتناولت إحدى أبرز حلقات المسسل الشعيب ي الشه�ي « �دةاللي�ب ال�ة الجد»
ي المجتمع السعودي بلغة ساخرة وسطح�ة بتهكم�ة مقززة دون « طاش
قض�ة اللي�ب ال�ة �ف
ي كتاب 
ي لمعيف اللي�ب ال�ة وتجل�اتها، �ف
للمفكر « مفهوم الح��ة»عمق ودون فهم حق��ت
بالتوقف والتأمل وفهم مغزى ومعيف  المغريب ي عبدالله العروي ثمة إضاءات مهمة وجديرة
ي 
  .اللي�ب ال�ة والمجتمع المديف
ي س�اقها الخاص والعام بالح �ة، إذ اللي�ب ال�ة 
لا �مكن التحدث عن اللي�ب ال�ة دون ر�طها �ف
ي المعيف الشامل وال�امل والعميق، �قول عبدالله 
ي أسها وأساسها قض�ة الح��ة �ف
تحمل �ف
لمات القاموس الس�ا�ي استعمالا عند عرب اليوم حيت لعل كلمة ح��ة أ��� ك»العروي: 
ي الغالب 
ي الذي�ع كاستقلال، ود�موقراط�ة، وتنم�ة �ستعمل �ف
ي تنافسها �ف
ال�لمات اليت
  .مرادفة لها بح�ث لانكاد نجدها إلا ملتصقة بها وموضحة لها
ي وجه زوجها »و�ض�ف: 
والطفل إزاء أب�ه يرفع الفرد شعار الح��ة داخل أ�ته والمرأة �ف
ي الشعار أهدافا متباينة أشد 
ي مصارعة أعدائها، و�خ�ف
ي وجه الأغلب�ة والأمة �ف
والأقل�ة �ف
و�فصل  .»التباين، �فهم الفرد من الح��ة الانفلات من العادات والمرأة والاستقلال بآرائها
ي �قوم عليها مفهوم الح �ة المرتبطة جذر�ا وعمق�ا 
.. بمفهوم العروي الق�م ال�ب�ي ة اليت
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ي السنوات الأخ�ي ة إ� بلادنا مثلها مثل كل منجز فكري وس�ا�ي 
إن اللي�ب ال�ة جاءت �ف
لنا معها كما لو أنها حالة استهلا��ة أخرى لم يتم التعامل معها بوصفها واقتصادي وتعام
ي 
ي الس�اق الاجتما�ي والتار��ف
حالة فك��ة ترتبط بقض�ة الفرد والمجتمع فلا تتم قراءاتها �ف
ي الغرب ول�ن يتم التعامل معها برؤ�ة مسطحة وفهم قا� تماما كما 
الذي ظهرت ف�ه �ف
مفهوم شامل وحضاري ول�ن بجزئ�ة صغ�ي ة ور�طها بالدين تم التعامل مع الحداثة لا ك
 .بط��قة مبت�ة وموجزة
من أغرب الأمور صع��ة أن تجد أن هناك من �لوكون كلمة اللي�ب ال�ة و�رددونها �شكل  
متواصل ومتصل دون أن �ع�ش هؤلاء قض�ة إشكال�ة معا�شة وسلوكا، إذ ك�ف �مكن أن 
ي�ب ال�ة ك�ف �مكن أن تكون متخلقا بكل ق�م الحداثة تكون لي�ب ال�ا دون أن تع�ش ح�اة ل
ي حني ف أنت تع�ش داخل سجن ذاتك القد�مة وما زلت 
واللي�ب ال�ة والح��ة قراءة وفهما �ف
ي الحا�ف 
ي أ��� مما تع�ش �ف
ي الما�ف
ي العمق تع�ش �ف
أس�ي ثقافة القب�لة ولا تزال �ف
ولا �مكن أن تكون لي�ب ال�ا  والمستقبل، لا �مكن أن تكون حداث�ا وأنت تع�ش ح�اة قد�مة
  .وتدعو إ� الح��ة وأنت تقف ضد ح �ة الآخ��ن
المفاه�م فهم وممارسة، ومفهوم اللي�ب ال�ة ومفهوم الح �ة والحداثة قضا�ا من الأهم�ة 
بح�ث لا يتم التعامل معها بخفة واستخفاف، إذا كنا ن��د أن نكون حداثيني ف ولي�ب اليني ف 
ي �جب أن نكون أبناء الع� و 
 أبناء المستقبل لا أبناء القب�لة وأبناء الما�ف
 sah ’hailarbillA‘ :3mialC
 yllaicifrepus htiw tlaed neeb




fo( elpmaxe fo sopoT-
 )ahtadaH
yrrehc( ecnarongi fo ycallaF-
 )ycallaf gnikcip
fo ycallaf ro sopoT-
 noitinifed
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 أصبحت محل نقاش وسجال في الحیاة الاجتماعیة والفكریة والثقافیة- اللیبرالیة
 تحمل في أسھا وأساسھا قضیة الحریة في المعنى الشامل والكامل والعمیق -
تضيء في أفكارھا ومعانیھا قضایا تتداخل وتتشابك مع مفھوم الدولة ومفھوم المؤسسة والحریة السیاسیة  -
 والاقتصاد 
 تتصل اتصالا مباشرا بحریة الفرد-
منجز فكري وسیاسي واقتصادي وتعاملنا معھا كما جاءت في السنوات الأخیرة إلى بلادنا مثلھا مثل كل  -
 لو أنھا حالة استھلاكیة أخرى
 لم یتم التعامل معھا بوصفھا حالة فكریة ترتبط بقضیة الفرد والمجتمع  -
 فلا تتم قراءاتھا في السیاق الاجتماعي والتاریخي الذي ظھرت فیھ في الغرب  -
 یتم التعامل معھا برؤیة مسطحة وفھم قاصر تماما كما تم التعامل مع الحداثة -
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 الح��ة واللي�ب ال�ةفض الاشتباك بني ف 
ي مع عدد 
ي الشفه�ة مع مثقفني ف و�علاميني ف حول )اللي�ب ال�ة(، أو خلال مناقشايت
ي حوارايت
�ف
ي مواقع التواصل الاجتما�ي عنها؛ لاحظت أنهم �ضعون اللي�ب ال�ة متلازمة 
من المغردين �ف
التعب�ي للح �ة، حيت انهم يتجاوزون تقارب الدلالة اللغ��ة إ� تطابق المضمون الفكري، و 
 .الواق�ي 
ي الواقع المعاش. فكل موقف تتج� ف�ه 
بمعيف أنهم يرون اللي�ب ال�ة ُمع�بّ ة عن الح��ة �ف
الح �ة هو موقف لي�ب ا�ي ، وكل ممارسة تتسم بالح��ة �ي صورة من صور اللي�ب ال�ة، أو أحد 
الاشتباك بني ف تطب�قات ق�مها. وهذا خلل فكري من عدة وجوە، الأمر الذي يتطلب فض 
ي عقول أولئك المثقفني ف والإعلاميني ف والمغردين، أو من يرى رأيهم و�تبيف 
الح �ة واللي�ب ال�ة �ف
 .وجهة نظرهم
ي أصلها، ف�ي ترجمة لل�لمة 
أول وجوە ذلك الخلل؛ أن كلمة )اللي�ب ال�ة( غ�ي ع ��ة �ف
، YTREBIL جل ي ف �ة، ومعناها )التحرر�ة(، المشتقة من ال�لمة الإنMSILAREBIL الإنجل ي ف �ة
ي �ي )الح��ة(، من هنا جاء الارتباط اللغوي بني ف مفهوم اللي�ب ال�ة وكلمة الح��ة عند 
اليت
، وتعيف ي طبقة الرجال REBIL أصلها لاتييف ي هو YTREBIL البعض، مع مراعاة أن كلمة
ي لدى من �جعل الح��ة 




 أن �عززە البعد التار��ف
َّ
�ي اللي�ب ال�ة أو العكس. وهذا خطأ منه�ب ي ، لأن هذا التقارب لا ُبد
للي�ب ال�ة، و�صادق عل�ه مضمونها الفكري، والتطبيق الواق�ي لق�مها. فهل تار�ــــخ اللي�ب ال�ة 

















 si modeerf htiw ’hailarbilla‘
 .tluaf lautcelletni na
 eslaf( noitinifed fo ycallaF-
  )ecnelaviuqe
 noitinifed fo ycallaF -
 ycallaf citenegohcysp -
 )menimoh da mutnemugra(
 
 




 fo ycallaf ro sopoT-
 +ytilaer fo sopoT + noitinifed
 ycallaf( ecnarongi fo ycallaF
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لا؛ بدلالة أنه لا توجد لي�ب ال�ة واحدة �مكن أن �ُقاس ع� مدى اتفاقها مع الح��ة، إنما 
 .هناك نماذج لي�ب ال�ة مختلفة، فهناك الإنجل ي ف �ة، والفر�س�ة، والأم��ك�ة، والألمان�ة وغ�ي ها
ي الثقافات، 
ي الوجوە؛ أن الح��ة ق�مة ِإ�سان�ة سابقة للي�ب ال�ة، وهذە الق�مة موجودة �ف
ثايف
وقررتها الأد�ان، وعرفتها الحضارات قبل ظهور اللي�ب ال�ة خلال عصور النهضة الأورو��ة 
كما �قول الدكتور   -)من القرن الخامس ع�ث وحيت التاسع ع�ث الم�لادي(، ول�ن الفارق 
ي حوار بصح�فة )الج��رة( خالد الدخ
أن الغرب وضع  -�ّل أستاذ علم الاجتماع الس�ا�ي �ف
ي أن اللي�ب ال�ة و�ن 
ي إطار نظ��ة س�اس�ة واقتصاد�ة ُعرفت باللي�ب ال�ة. وهذا �عيف
الح �ة �ف
ي الح��ة، أو تجسدها لدى اِلإ�سان الغريب ي ؛ إلا أنها مرتبطة بتج��ة الغرب 
كانت تعيف
لتار�خ�ة، ومدى رؤ�ته للمع�ار الحضاري، الذي �ق�س ف�ه هذە الحضار�ة خلال مس�ي ته ا
اللي�ب ال�ة لتحقق الح��ة كق�مة ِإ�سان�ة، فهذا جون لوك الذي �عد الف�لسوف الأول 
 !!للي�ب ال�ة كان تاجر رقيق
ثالث الوجوە؛ مفهوم اللي�ب ال�ة ملتبس لدى كث�ي من الباحثني ف والمفك �ن بحكم تعددە، ما 
ي وجود لفظني ف عن اللي�ب ال�ة ودلالتها، وهما الفرد�ة أدَّ ى إ� 
�شوء إشكال�ة تتمحور �ف
)الفردان�ة( والح��ة )التحرر�ة(. فإذا كانت الح��ة واضحة الأبعاد لا تحتمل أ��� من معيف 
ي 
ي الأساس الفلس�ف
 الفرد�ة �ي أساس الإشكال�ة، فهل الفرد�ة المقصودة �ف
َّ
أو تفس�ي ؛ فإن
ي ذات الس�اق للي�ب ال�ة �ي : )الف
رد�ة( مقابل )الجماع�ة(، أم �ي )الأنا( مقابل )الغ�ي (، �ف
ي كتابه: )اللي�ب ال�ة إشكال�ة مفهوم(: 
 المعيف اللغوي للفرد�ة»�قول الدكتور �ا� قنصوە �ف






 .»حة الذات�ة أساسا
رابع الوجوە؛ هو ما يتعلق بالتجارب التار�خ�ة للي�ب ال�ة، وتطب�قاتها الواقع�ة المشاهدة 
ي ب �طان�ا 
 أن الاستعمار الغريب ي استعرت نارە بعد ظهور اللي�ب ال�ة �ف
�
حول العالم، فل�س خاف�ا
، م، و�ي ذات اللي�ب ا٨٨٦١مع ثورتها الدستور�ة العام 
ي منحت اليهود فلسطني ف
ل�ة اليت
ووقفت خلف مجازرهم المروعة، ولازالت تدعم دولة إ�ائ�ل بالمال والسلاح. كما أن 
 fo sopoT + yrotsih fo sopoT-
  rebmun fo sopoT +ytilaer
 + msinairatinamuh fo sopoT-
 dna yrotsih fo sopoT
  modeerf fo ecnedecetna
 fo ytirohtua fo sopoT-
  egdelwonk
 nretsew( erutluc fo sopoT-
 )erutluc
 ycallaF + elpmaxe fo sopoT-
 .)noitubirtta( noitinifed fo
 fo ytiugibma fo sopoT-
 fo sopoT + ’hailarbilla‘
  .rebmun
 noitacoviuqE fo ycallaF-
 fo ytirohtua fo sopoT-
   egdelwonk
 fo noitinifed fo sopoT -
 msilaudividni
 fo yrotsih fo sopoT-
 esuba fo sopoT +’hailarbilla‘




































































ي القرن الثامن ع�ث الم�لادي، شاركت �ف
اللي�ب ال�ة الأم��ك�ة بعد إعلان الاستقلال �ف
الثورة الفر�س�ة  الهنود الحمر، واحتلت الفلبني ف منتصف القرن التاسع ع�ث الم�لادي، أما 
ي تبا�ي بها اللي�ب ال�ة الغ ��ة فقد أهدت العالم نابليون بونابرت بغزواته المدمرة وحملاته 
اليت
 .الصليب�ة ع� البلاد الع ��ة
أما الشواهد الواقع�ة ع� أزمة اللي�ب ال�ة مع ق�مة الح��ة ف�ي عد�دة، أبرزها مسألة )الح��ة 
ي الدول الغ���ة، فقد زادت وت�ي ة )إسلام الدين�ة(، بالنسبة الجال�ات المسل
مة ال�ب�ي ة �ف
ف���ا(، وك�� ت القضا�ا والمواقف المتطرفة ضد الإسلام، فمن ين� قض�ة )الرسوم 
المسيئة( المتكررة، ومحار�ة الحجاب، ورفض المآذن، ومحاولة حرق القرآن، ومعارضة 
ي ظل لي�ب ال�ة غ �




ي فلسفتها، فالح��ة الدين�ة لديها ناقصة العدالة وانتقائ�ة الممارسة، 
و�ن كانت مثال�ة �ف
ي ء، 
ي ذات الوقت ومع ذات ال�ث
فاللي�ب ال�ة تحقق )التسامح( وتمنح ممارسة )ال�راه�ة( �ف
نون ضد أد�انهم وح�اتهم، تنادي باستقلال�ة الأفراد وحما�ة ح��اتهم وتمارس انتقائ�ة القا
ي أ�دت إقرار قانون )معادة السام�ة(، ورفضت 
وأ�سط مثال موقف اللي�ب ال�ة الأم �ك�ة، اليت
ي موقف اللي�ب ال�ة اليوم من 
إصدار قانون �جرم الإساءة للأد�ان، وقس ع� ذلك كث�ي ، و�ك�ف
ح وتدم�ي الثورة السور�ة، وك�ف سكتت هذە الأنظمة اللي�ب ال�ة ع� ما �جري من ذب







 fo sopoT + ytilaer fo sopoT-
 modeerf fo ycallaF +rebmun
  ecitsuj fo ycallaf +
 
 sopoT + ecnarelot fo sopoT-
 )etah( esuba fo ycallaF ro
 ycallaf + modeerf fo ycallaF
  ecitsuj fo
  elpmaxe fo sopoT-
























  seigetarts noitaciderP



















�ضعون اللي�ب ال�ة متلازمة للح��ة، حيت انهم يتجاوزون تقارب الدلالة اللغ��ة إ� تطابق المضمون -
 .والتعب�ي الواق�ي الفكري، 
ي الواقع المعاش -
 .يرون اللي�ب ال�ة ُمع�بّ ة عن الح��ة �ف
 
ي أصلها -
 غ�ي ع���ة �ف
 ومعناها )التحرر�ة(، المشتقة من ال�لمة الإنجل ي ف �ة MSILAREBIL ف�ي ترجمة لل�لمة الإنجل ي ف �ة -
، وتعيف ي طبقة الرجال REBIL أصلها لاتييف ي هو YTREBIL ، اليت ي �ي )الح �ة( مع مراعاة أن كلمةYTREBIL
 )الأحرار(. 
 .الحضار�ة خلال مس�ي ته التار�خ�ة مرتبطة بتج��ة الغرب -
 .مفهوم اللي�ب ال�ة ملتبس لدى كث�ي من الباحثني ف والمفك �ن بحكم تعددە -
ي ذات الوقت تحقق )التسامح( وتمنح ممارسة )ال�را  -
 ه�ة( �ف
 تنادي باستقلال�ة الأفراد وحما�ة ح��اتهم وتمارس انتقائ�ة القانون ضد أد�انهم وح�اتهم -
 
 ق�مة ِإ�سان�ة سابقة للي�ب ال�ة -
ي الثقافات، وقررتها الأد�ان، وعرفتها الحضارات قبل ظهور اللي�ب ال�ة -
 .موجودة �ف
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 الح��ة اللي�ب ال�ة و�ساءة الفهم التقل�دي
ي 
ي المقالني ف السابقني ف إ�ضاح معالم رؤ�يت
 حاولت �ف
�
للتحرر اللي�ب ا�ي ، وجاء ال�لام فيهما اشتبا�ا
ي �شغل أذهان المهتمني ف بهذا المجال الحيوي المتجدد 





 �ُح�ل إ� أفكار ومفاه�م ومصطلحات �عرفها الق
�





 قل��ً -المح�ت فون، بينما �ستغلق ع� غ�ي هم 
�
 .-أو كث�ي ا




/ جماه ي �ا
�
ي هذا المقال أن �كون ال�لام عاما
وسأحاول �ف
ي المراجع العلم�ة المتخصصة "غ�ي 
الموض�ع؛ لأن أولئك الذين �قرأون عن اللي�ب ال�ة �ف
ي 
ي ناقشناها وسنناقشها �ف
المؤدلجة"، لا �حتاجون إ� إ�ضاح مثل هذە الأبجد�ات اليت
لأولئك  -ببعض الأمثلة-الح��ة اللي�ب ال�ة. لهذا، سأحاول إ�ضاح الواضح  مسألة حدود 
، وقراءاتهم إن ُوجدت 
ً
ي  -ع� قلتها-الذين لا �قرأون، أو لا �قرأون إلا قل��
تب�ت محصورة �ف





لفاضح، والتناقضات الصارخة، والتدل�س الغيب ي ، والهجاء فتكون متخمة بالجهل ا
 .الإ�ديولو�ب ي المشحون بالتضل�ل والتفسيق، ور�ما التكف�ي 
؛ لأن الط �ق إ� 
�
لا �ُخاطب ُوّعاظ التقل�د�ة جماه�ي هم البا�سة إلا بما ُيه�ّجهم عاطف�ا
، لا �مكن أن �كون إلا من خلال عاطفته الدين�ة والاجتماع�ة 
�
عقل "العا�ي " البل�د معرف�ا
ي تعالم مخادع: صحيح أن اللي�ب ال�ات 
المتأججة. �قول الُوّعاظ التقل�ديون لجماه ي �ــهم �ف
ي كل
طلق للح��ة عنانها بال�امل، ول�ن، لا �ستطيع أي لي�ب ا�ي أن ينكر أن  �ف
ُ
دول العالم لا ت
ي �دعو إليها. و�التا�ي 
وفق ط�ح –"الح��ة المطلقة" �ي أصل "الح��ة اللي�ب ال�ة" اليت
 التدل��ي 
فكل اللي�ب ال�ات �س� إ� الح��ة المطلقة؛ لأنها �ي الأصل الذي  –التقل�ديني ف






















 raelc si ’hailarbilla‘ :1mialC
 llits tub sredaer lacitirc rof
 eht yb dootsrednusim
 esohw cilbup dezigoloedi
 no desab si egdelwonk
  .seigoloedi ’stsilanoitidart
 yb egdelwonk fo sopoT-
  sredaer lacitirc
 eht fo ecnarongi fo sopoT-
  cilbup
 yb esuba fo ycallaf ro sopoT-
  seigoloedi ’stsilanoitidart
 
 ton si ’hailarbilla‘ :2mialC
 detcirtsernu no desab
 eht sa modeerf
 ycallaf- .mialc stsilanoitidart
 ’hailarbilla‘ fo noitinifed fo




































































لا ر�ب أن كلام الوعاظ هنا، أوله صحيح، وآخرە كذب  �ــــح، أو جهل فاضح. إن 
ي عل�ه. نعم، 
التقل�ديني ف �ستغلون الصحيح ف�ه؛ ل�ت ك�ب الجهل الفاضح، أو الهجاء الُبهتايف
ي الح��ة اللي�ب ال�ة 
د؛ أنها ح��ة مطلقة بلا حدو  -الأصل الذي تت�ث عن به نظ��ا� -الأصل �ف
ي الطب�عة–لأن الإ�سان ُوجد 
/ �ف
�





ي الح �ة الوحش�ة، �ي تأ�ل الح �ة
، لأن الح �ة الطب�ع�ة تعيف
ً
بل ولا أن هذا ممكن أص�




د اللي�ب ال�ة ع� الح��ة المطلقة؛ كنقطة انطلاق وللتوضيح أ��� ؛ أقول: لا غرابة �ف
: الح �ة المطلقة. عند الأصوليني ف 
�
نظ��ة، فالإسلام يؤكد ع� هذە القاعدة المبدئ�ة نظ��ا
ي �كررها علينا 
"أصول الفقه، لا الحركات الأصول�ة"، نجد تلك القاعدة الأصول�ة اليت
ي ء الإباح
ي كل �ث
عيون باستمرار، و�ي أن الأصل �ف
ة، مؤكدين أن "المباح" لا �حتاج إ� ال�ث
دل�ل؛ لأنه هو الأصل، بينما "الُمحّرم" هو الذي �حتاج إ� دل�ل؛ لأنه خروج عن الأصل: 
ي ء؛ لأن 
ع الإسلا�ي ُيبيح كل �ث
الإباحة العامة. وهنا، هل �جوز لأي أحد أن �قول إن ال�ث
، لا �قول بهذا أحد، فال�ل �علم
�
أن التأ��د ع� أصل الإباحة  الأصل ف�ه الإباحة ؟!. طبعا
ي 
 .مبدأ نظري فقط؛ لضبط أصول التح �م الاستثنايئ
؛ ف�قولون: صحيح أن الح��ة اللي�ب ال�ة ُمق�ّدة، ول�نها -م�ت اجعني ف قل��ً -هنا، �عود الُوّعاظ 
مق�دة فقط بما لا �َ�ف ُ ّ بالآخ �ن، أي أن الإ�سان حر أن �فعل ما �شاء؛ ما دام لا ��ف 






الإ�ف ار بالآخ��ن؟. كلنا ندرك أنها ل�ست مجرد حدود الاعتداء المبا�ث ، المادي أو 
 .المعنوي، بل �ي أوسع من ذلك بكث�ي 
ي كل زمان ومكان، بل �ي إشكال�ة
 �ف
ً
، من ح�ث إن حدود الإ�ف ار بالآخ��ن غ�ي محددة أص�
�ي �سب�ة وظرف�ة؛ لأنها حدود ثقاف�ة، أي تصنع الثقافة "بما فيها الدين" معالمها وآفاقها، 
ي 
ي دين ثابت، بق�ت ثابتة، و�ن كانت ِخلاف�ة، أو �ف
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ل فوق مقتض�ات الحال، الحال الإ�سايف
ّ
ي التَّ حّول والتَّ بد
دين متحول؛ أخذت �ف
 .الواق�ي 
ي التوضيح والتبس�ط بالأمثلة، 
ي سأمعن �ف
أظن أن هذا واضح. ل�ن، مع أنه واضح، إلا أنيف
؛ ل�درك العا�ي البس�ط ملامح الصورة. �قول التقل�ديون: إن 
�
بل و�الصور الساذجة أح�انا
 ع� الح �ة إلا حدود الإ�ف ار بالآخ��ن. والحق�قة أن الثقافة 
�
�ي اللي�ب اليني ف لا �ضعون ق�دا
 
ً
ي تصنع رؤ�تنا لمفهوم ال�ف ر. فمث�
وسأختار من الأمثلة ما �ُشك� ل هاجس الإ�سان -اليت




 اختار بح��ته أن �م�ث
�
، لو أن إ�سانا
ي المطار أو ركب الطائرة...إلخ، 
 �ف
�
هل س�ُسمح له بذلك، لو وقف هذا الإ�سان العاري تماما
�مارس ح��ته الشخص�ة اليت ي  –من ح�ث المبدأ التقل�دي–هل س�ُسمح له بذلك، مع أنه 
ي 
، جم�عنا �علم أن المجتمعات اللي�ب ال�ة لا �سمح بذلك، وترى �ف
�
لا ت�ف بالآخ��ن؟. طبعا
 ع� الفضاء العام الذي هو حق للجميع. ومن ثم، فهذا 
�
هذا السلوك اعتداء صارخا
ي الفضا 
ع� الجميع، عدوان  -ول�ن غ�ي مبا�ث -ء العام هو عدوان  �ــــح السلوك/ التعري �ف
ي 
�عاقب عل�ه القانون، لاخ�ت اقه الآداب العامة الصادرة عن المواضعات الثقاف�ة اليت
و�ي مواضعات ثقاف�ة �شكلت بفعل عوامل كث�ي ة، ل�س الدين المس��ي -ارتضاها الجميع 
 . ما �عيف ي أن مثل هذا السلوك ل�س خ-بمعزل عنها
�










ي �شك�ل الرؤ�ة الثقاف�ة. مث�
إذا جئنا إ� المجتمع المسلم، نجد أن الإسلام حا�ف بقوة �ف
. ل�ن 
�
/ ُم�ث ّ عا
�
ي مجتمع مسلم قانون نظام ُيبيح الزيف ، و�جعله م�ث وعا
لا �مكن أن �َصدر �ف
ي التفص�لات–
هناك فرق بني ف تج��م الزيف ، و�ني ف فرض  –الثقاف�ة، فالقانون�ة وهنا تأيت
ي تكون 
 مراقبة اجتهاد�ة تد�ي الوصا�ة ع� السلوك�ات العامة اليت
من ح�ث –قوانني ف
مباحة؛ بدعوى سد الذرائع. فالأنظمة اليت ي تحاول ضبط الاختلاط، أو ضبط  –الأصل
ل�ست من الأصول القطع�ة، كما  حدود وظروف الخلوة...إلخ، كلها اجتهاد�ة، بمعيف أنها 
. و�التا�ي ، فمثل هذە الأنظمة الاجتهاد�ة تخضع للتنازع 
ي تح��م الزيف
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ي تمنح الإ�سان الفرد ح��ة مسؤولة، 
المستمر بني ف أصحاب الرؤ�ة اللي�ب ال�ة، تلك الرؤ�ة اليت
ي ترى أن تفاص�ل ت� 
فات الأفراد، �جب أن و�ني ف أصحاب الرؤ�ة المحافظة ال�ت ف مت�ّة اليت
ي 
ي �شكل ه��ة المجتمع الوصايئ
 .تب�ت تحت رقابتها الصارمة اليت
ي كل 
، �ُجاِدل/ �ُشاِغب التقل�ديون ع� اللي�ب ال�ة بزعمهم أن الح��ة موجودة �ف
�
أ�ضا
ي الإسلام، فلماذا تد�ي 
ي معظم المذاهب، ومن باب أو�، �ي موجودة �ف
المذاهب، أو �ف
ظ�ي للح��ة، ولماذا تد�ي اللي�ب ال�ة أن التأ��د ع� الح��ة هو ما �م�ي ف ها اللي�ب ال�ة احتكار التن
عن غ�ي ها؟. والحق�قة أن ل�ل مذهب أو توّجه بوصلة اهتمام أساس�ة، تم�ي ف ە عن غ�ي ە، 
ي هذا أنها لا توجد عند الآخ �ن. 
فالح��ة الفرد�ة �ي بوصلة الاهتمام اللي�ب ا�ي . ول�ن، لا �عيف
ي اللي�ب ال�ة أول��ة، وعند الآخ �ن مفردة  –بقدر ما-إنها موجودة 
عند كل ت�ار فكري، ول�نها �ف
 .من مفردات الخطاب
إن تمحور الأطروحة اللي�ب ال�ة حول "الح��ة الفرد�ة" هو ما �م�ي ف ها، كما أن "العدالة 
عانق 
ُ
ي الاش�ت ا��ة نجد إرادة تحرر، ت
. ف�ف
ً




التحرر الفردي، ول�نها تع�ت ف أن هذا التحرر الفردي ل�س هو محور  –كما تد
ي ء، ل�س هو محور اهتمام 
اهتمامها. ومن هنا، تم�ي ف ت الاش�ت ا��ة بالتمحور حول �ث
 .اللي�ب ال�ة، والعكس صحيح، ومن هنا تمايزتا
ي معظم ولم��د من توضيح الواضح نقول: إن التأ��د ع� الح��ة الفرد�ة مو 
جود �ف
المذاهب والت�ارات والأد�ان، ول�ن اللي�ب ال�ة تجعل من هذە الح��ة الفرد�ة بؤرة اهتمامها، 
م �ش�ي إ� أن "الح��ة اللي�ب ال�ة" �سب�ة، وظرف�ة، 
ّ




ي أن حدود الح �ة اللي�ب ال�ة ل�ست محددة سلفا
، س�خ�ج الواعظ ومتحولة، فهذا �عيف
ي أن اللي�ب ال�ة 







م، أو �ي ط�ح لا ه��ة له، بح�ث لا �عرف أصحابه ما ي��دون أص�
ْ
 .ل�ست أ��� من َوه
"، و�التا�ي لنفهم اللي�ب ال�ة لابد أن ندرك أنها "توّجه عام"، �ي "حالة"، �ي "نزعة تحرر�ة
ي الغرب: الت�ار اللي�ب ا�ي المس��ي . و�عنون بهذا: الت�ار 
، �ُقال �ف
ً
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الذي يتما� مع الق�م المس�ح�ة، ول�ن بروح تحرر�ة تع�ي من ق�مة الفرد. كذلك �ف
 
�
 له عن إسلام الإسلا�ي ، �قال: الإسلام اللي�ب ا�ي ، أو الت�ار اللي�ب ا�ي الإسلا�ي ، تمي�ي ف ا
 له عن لي�ب ال�ة مستغ��ة بال�امل، تحاول 
�




المتشددين، أو إسلام ال�
 .القطع مع واقعها، والبدا�ة من درجة الصفر كما تد�ي ، وهذا هو عني ف المستح�ل
ي أنها توجد 
ي   -بنسبة ما–و�ذا كانت اللي�ب ال�ة "حالة"، "ظرف�ة"، "�سب�ة"، فهذا �عيف
كل �ف
، نجد أن 
ً
ي إيران مث�
المجتمعات، و�ن لم تفصح عن نفسها �احة، ور�ما لا ت�ي نفسها. �ف
اله�منة الس�اس�ة والاجتماع�ة �ي لرجال الدين. ومحمد خات�ي ، الرئ�س الأسبق، �لبس 
ي أنه من رجال الدين. ل�ن خات�ي يوصف 
ي إيران وخارجها-العمامة الدين�ة، ما �عيف
بأنه  -�ف
ي الغرب، لمجرد ح�ازته لي�ب ا�ي ، ف
 �ف
�
ي هذا أنه يتبيف رؤ�ة أشد الت�ارات اللي�ب ال�ة تحررا
هل �عيف
 لا. ومن هنا، فوصف خات�ي بأنه لي�ب ا�ي هو وصف �سيب ي ، أي 
�
هذە الصفة: لي�ب ا�ي ؟. طبعا








أنه استحق هذا الوصف ل�ونه �ُمث





 .تفاص�ل الرؤ�ة دون تغي�ي ؛ ل�ان �مين�ا
إن اللي�ب ا�ي الوا�ي لا �خ�ت ق المواضعات الثقاف�ة/ الاجتماع�ة بال�امل. إنه �ُْعِمُل رؤ�ته من 
، لو تم تك��ن لجنة من ع�ث ة أشخاص، لل
ً




، �ستقل الفرد �ف
�
.  ٨١السفر فيها للخارج دون إذن أحد/ و�ي أمر/ و�ي . عالم�ا
�
تق��با
ي السفر بعمر 
لو كانت اللجنة أمام الخ�ارات المطروحة ع� النحو التا�ي : �أخذ ح��ته �ف
جع�ة الثقاف�ة ، سنجد أعضاء اللجنة �ختلفون وفقا� لطب�عة المر ٢٢/١٢/٠٢ / ٩١ / ٨١
ي تحدد رؤ�تهم للأش�اء. اللي�ب ا�ي ، ومن باب تأ��دە ع� الح��ة الفرد�ة المسؤولة، 
اليت
ي ؛ يتحمل مسؤول�ة نفسه ٨١س�ختار عمر 
، و�ؤكد أن الفرد بمجرد بلوغه السن القانويف
بح��ة تامة. وهو إذ يؤكد هذا الخ�ار، لا تغ�ب عنه الأخطار، ول�نه يرى أن الح �ة أهم، 
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ي المقابل، س�ختار الإ�سان المحافظ سن 
، ولو ٢٢هكذا س�كون اخت�ار اللي�ب ا�ي . ول�ن، �ف
كان هناك سن أع� لاختارە؛ لأنه يؤمن ب�ف ورة ضبط سلوك�ات الأفراد، و�ؤمن أن الح��ة 
ي كث�ي من الدول ال�� ل�ان�ة  المتاحة
ومعظمها دول -لهم ستفسدهم بال�ف ورة. ولهذا رأينا �ف
، تجعل من عدم السفر أص�ً ، ومن السفر استثناء. ولهذا، من -شيوعي�ة/ اش�ت ا��ة التوجه
ي عمر 
فعل�ه أن �أخذ ت �حا� خاصا�  ٠٤، أو ٠٣ي �د السفر من مواطنيها للخارج ولو كان �ف




 .ح إلا للقل�ل النادرُمعق
مثال آخر: لو تم تك��ن لجنة للإ�ث اف ع� "معرض كتاب". هنا، ستجد أن عضو اللجنة 
ي المقابل، ستجد المحافظ 
. و�ف
�
، ور�ما لا �منع شيئا
�
اللي�ب ا�ي لا �منع إلا القل�ل النادر جدا
ي 
ي المعرض �حمل ت �حا�  الوصايئ
ي��د أن �جعل المنع هو الأصل، وأن �كون كل كتاب �ف






ي المنتصف. و�دي�ي أن اللي�ب ا�ي عندما يؤكد ع� 
المحافظ ذي النفس اللي�ب ال�ة �قعون �ف
ي �ف ورة السماح بكل ال�
ي أنه يوافق ع� مضامني ف كل ما �ُعرض �ف
تب إلا ما ندر، لا �عيف
ي فقط، أنه �منح الأفراد ح��ة مسؤولة، بح�ث �ُقرّرون بأنفسهم الضار 
المعرض، بل �عيف










 الأمثلة السابقة أن اللي�ب ال�ة لم تط�ح ما يناقض أص�
، ل�ن، س�كون 
ً
ي أصل وجوب الزكاة مث�
عل�ه من جميع علماء الإسلام. لن يناقش أحدهم �ف
ي تفاص�ل خطوات الإلزام بها؛ إذا تقرر الإلزام. والمقصود 
ي ط��قة أدائها، و�ف
ثمة نقاش �ف






ي حدود الممكن دين�ا
ة، �طرحون آراءهم �ف
ي العام، فمن الطب��ي أن تكون 
ي �سيب ي . و�ما أن الأمر مرتبط بالس�اق الثقا�ف
وهو ممكن ظر�ف
ة، ومن الطب��ي أن �ختار اللي�ب ا�ي أق��ــها إ� الح �ة الفرد�ة؛ حيت 
بعض الآراء الفقه�ة حا�ف
 لبعض الفقهاء
�
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 �جعل الاحتكار 
ً
، وأنها تمتلك فضاء تأو��
ً





 cimalsI fo ytivitaler fo sopoT-
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  seigetarts noitaciderP
























ي الح��ة اللي�ب ال�ة  -




ول�ن، هذا لا �عيف ي أن اللي�ب ال�ة �س� لذلك، بل ولا أن هذا ممكن أص�ً ، لأن ُحّرا� .  -طب�ع�ا




ي الح��ة الوحش�ة، �ي تأ�ل الح��ة
 .الح �ة الطب�ع�ة تعيف
 لح��ة الفرد�ة �ي بوصلة الاهتمام اللي�ب ا�ي . ا -
 . ل "الح��ة الفرد�ة" هو ما �م�ي ف ها إن تمحور الأطروحة اللي�ب ال�ة حو -
 . اللي�ب ال�ة تجعل من هذە الح��ة الفرد�ة بؤرة اهتمامها، بل ه��تها اليت ي تم�ي ف ها  -
 . لابد أن ندرك أنها "توّجه عام"، �ي "حالة"، �ي "نزعة تحرر�ة"، و�التا�ي ف�ي �سب�ة بال�ف ورة -
ي كل المجتمعات، و�ن لم تفصح عن نفسها �احة، ور�ما لا ت�ي نفسها -بنسبة ما–أنها توجد  -
 .�ف
 .اللي�ب ال�ة لم تط�ح ما يناقض أص�ً دين�ا� ُمجمعا� عل�ه من جميع علماء الإسلام -
 
ي معظم المذاه�جادل -
ي كل المذاهب، أو �ف
ب، ومن التقل�ديون ع� اللي�ب ال�ة بزعمهم أن الح��ة موجودة �ف
ي الإسلام، فلماذا تد�ي اللي�ب ال�ة احتكار التنظ�ي للح��ة
 .باب أو�، �ي موجودة �ف
طلق للح �ة عنانها بال�امل، ول�ن، لا �ستطيع أي لي�ب ا�ي أن ينكر أن  -
ُ
ي كل دول العالم لا ت
اللي�ب ال�ات �ف
ي �دعو إليها. 
 "الح��ة المطلقة" �ي أصل "الح �ة اللي�ب ال�ة" اليت
 .لي�ب ال�ات �س� إ� الح��ة المطلقة؛ لأنها �ي الأصل الذي تصدر عنه تفاص�ل النظ �ة اللي�ب ال�ةفكل ال - 
�قولون: صحيح أن الح��ة اللي�ب ال�ة ُمق�ّدة، ول�نها مق�دة فقط بما لا �َ�ف ُ ّ بالآخ��ن، أي أن الإ�سان حر  -
 أن �فعل ما �شاء؛ ما دام لا ��ف بالآخر. 
 . للي�ب اليني ف لا �ضعون ق�دا� ع� الح��ة إلا حدود الإ�ف ار بالآخ��ن�قول التقل�ديون: إن ا -
م، أو �ي ط�ح لا ه��ة )الح��ة( يزعم أن عدم القدرة ع� التحد�د  -
ْ




 .له، بح�ث لا �عرف أصحابه ما ي��دون أص�
Appendix (C) : Translation certificate 
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Text Discursive Strategies (Reisigl and Wodak 2001) 







The Islamisation of ‘allibraliah’ 
In the 80’s, a great debate had been occurred among intellectual 
circles over the concept of “Islamic literature”, where some rejected 
Islamization which has no relevance to literature as it is a human 
product. On the other hand, some others were supporters for it as 
being representing a special type of literature that commits to the 
Islamic values, calls for them and stands in the way of each literary 
creation that violates the sanctities or push for shamelessness.   
That debate has not ceased, but has subsided as another debate 
emerge inside a circle wider than the intellectual circle and more 
attached to the public, related to the concept of the (Islamic media) 
especially after the spread of the culture of (the Islamic cassette) and 
the press of (the Islamic magazines) among the social circles since the 
80s and until the era of the satellite TV, so the justifications of the 
religious trend in relation to literature have recurred with this media, 
with no conviction of that held by other trends especially secularism, 
that That emphasizes on separating religion from all the aspects of 
life, so what is for Allah is Allah’s and what is for Caesar is Caesar’s, 
but a large number of Islamists did not care about that secular 
objections, continuing the project of Islamization  in various life 





Claim 1: Islamisation has 
been used for different 
cultural, social, and 
intellectual fields (Topos 






































domains, so several forms of Islamization  have appeared such as the 
so-called (Islamic loans), (Islamic marriages) and (Islamic tourism). 
But what is noticeable is that this (Islamization ) has not stopped at 
the (physical product) e.g. the Islamic cassette nor the (human 
creation) e.g. the Islamic media or the (social traditions) e.g. Islamic 
marriage or (life reality) e.g. The Islamic world, but it has entered into 
forms of (human intellect), and stained by them to make it easier to 
accept among ‘Umma’ that leans toward its religion and what relates 
to it, so the (Islamic left), or the (Islamic socialism) appeared that they 
claimed it has a historical root connected to the great companion Abu 
Dhar al-Ghafari may Allah be pleased with him.    
 
And because ‘Liberalism’ idea is still new to the public, especially 
after the recession of the secular tide and its catastrophic failure 
based on the reality of many of the Arab regimes that have adopted 
this thought within their systems, the Saudi liberal writers and 
intellectuals have sought to the Islamization  of this soft idea to be 
palatable for the public, so we heard a new concept that is (Islamic 
liberalism) which is merely a hybrid concept that attempts to 
combine Islam and ‘Liberalism’, or rather forming ‘Liberalism’ 
according to the Islamic values, under the claim that ‘Liberalism’ is a 
mean and not a religion or a thought, thus it does not contradict the 




























-Topos or fallacy of abuse 
and misuse of Islam   
-Fallacy of history  
 
Claim2: Islamisation of 
‘allibraliah’ is improper and 
unacceptable (fallacy of 
Islamisation) 
-Topos or fallacy of abuse 
(manipulating the public 
through the Islamisation of 
‘allibraliah’ new idea) 
-Topos of reality of failure of 









































































norms, so since the spread of ‘Liberalism’ term in our cultural forums 
and repeating it in the media fields, and then its effective reflection 
on the social circles between acceptance and rejection and 
neutrality, ‘Liberalism’ is still a subject to a lot of analytical writings 
that discuss the position of Islam from it, in an intellectual attempt to 
find a cultural relationship between them, and also the critical 
articles that have dealt with the philosophical side of ‘Liberalism’ 
while addressing the points of similarities and differences between 
the liberal thought and the Islamic thought, so several writings 
emerged that mainly focused on ‘Liberalism’ as a human concept that 
represents a (variable mean) invented by the (scientific) human mind 
to manage the conflict with the dictatorial priestly mind peacefully, 
to achieve a (solid goal) which is the assurance of the individual 
freedom and then looking forward to establishing an integral system 
of a total social justice, thus ‘Liberalism’  is a (mean) that does not 
contradict with the core of Islam and its primary objectives. 
 
From that, the issue of the (Islamization  of Liberalism’) was born, and 
here is where the overturned understanding, because what 
determines the relationship between Islam and ‘Liberalism’ is not the 
life purposes or human values (freedom, justice, equality etc.), which 
we find that both sides agree upon, but what determines this 
relationship is the (cultural source), which is fixed in both Islamic and 







Fallacy of cultural flexibility 
of ‘allibraliah’. 








-Topos or fallacy of relation 
(between ‘allibraliah’ and 
Islam) 









































































liberal thoughts, as for ‘Liberalism’ is represented in the (human 
mind), according to the statement of the original Enlightenment 
philosophers and callers : (that there is no authority over the mind, 
but only the mind), until the human primarily remains soul-free, an 
owner of himself, his mind and his freedom in behaviour and belief, 
against all who want to take it from him, whether this authority is 
religious, feudal, dictatorial or sectarian, the human mind formulates 
the (positive law) and legislate them to protect the individuality of 
the human and his freedom. However, in Islam the cultural source is 
(religious) represented in prophecy (Quran and Sunna), through the 
texts and the legislation that include restrictive rules for the human 
behaviour though free for the human belief.  
 
Therefore, ‘Liberalism’ is not a (variable sense) to adjust it to the 
needs of a particular society. Rather, it is an idea that has a 
philosophical side which is (achieving the individual freedom), that 
can only be achieved in parallel with a cultural side which is (assigning 
the mind as a positivist source), and any misuse of one of the sides 
means the absence of ‘Liberalism’, while adopting both together 
simply means the exclusion of Islam, so if the mind rejects the 
(Islamization  of science), based on the logic that science is a general 
human heritage that all human beings share including Muslims and 
others, then it also rejects the Islamization  of ideas and beliefs that 













-Topos or Fallacy of 
definition of  ‘allibraliah’. 
-Fallacy of flexibility of 
‘allibraliah’ 
-Topos of danger (of 
replacing Islam with 
‘allibraliah) 
- fallacy of Islamisation of 
‘allibraliah’)  













































have philosophical roots and cultural sources that excludes the 
religious texts, and therefore the (Islamization  of Liberalism) is 
rejected due to the intellectual speciality of Islam and ‘Liberalism’ 





Predication strategies  
Predications Main social actors 
and practices  
-That emphasizes on separating religion from all the aspects of 
life, so what is for Allah is Allah’s and what is for Caesar is 
Caesar’s   
-  recession of the secular tide and its catastrophic failure    
- leans toward its religion and what relates to it 
-That is still new in the public awareness  
- It is not a variable mean to adjust it to the needs of a particular 
society. 
-It is an idea that has a philosophical side which is (achieving 
the individual freedom), that can only be achieved in parallel 
with a cultural side which is (assigning the mind as a positivist 
reference)   
-is merely a hybrid thought that attempts to combine between 
Islam and ‘allibraliah’ 
-or rather forming ‘allibraliah’ according to the Islamic values, 
under the claim that ‘allibraliah’ is a mean and not a religion or 
a thought, thus it does not contradict the religion of the society, 
that can adjust it according to its values and norms. 
-They seek to the Islamisation of this soft idea to be easy for 
the public to like.    


















Saudi liberal writers 
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The Extremists... The Smartest at Adversity 
At each security incident, the ‘liberal’ voice rises to its maximum, 
while the extremist Islamic goes down until the storm subsided, and 
then the ‘allibralion’ fall back a little, so the extremist Islamists return 
to the point of ignition. 
This is exactly what is happening in Saudi Arabia, since the assault 
incident on his highness the assistant of the minister of interior. The 
‘liberal’ voices are in their highest through the websites and satellite 
channels, while the Islamists occupy themselves with side issues, and 
they increase their focus on “Tash”, so it appears to you that ‘Nasir 
Alqasabi’ or ‘Abdullah Alsadhan’ are more dangerous than the suicide 
bomber ‘Abdullah Asiri’. 
It is just a few days, and the ‘allibralion’ will calm down, and then we 
will see the extremists go out of their trenches with spears that they 
throw towards their opponents with full force, incitement and 
betrayal, and so on until another news comes; arresting a cell, 
registering a new security incident, Allah forbid, so then they return 
to their silence. 
A review over 75 month, reinforce this vision, without any obvious 
change in the two parties conflict, to achieve their goals. 
The question is: why does the extremist voice go down these days, 
and return aggressive later?   
The answer of the question starts from the Friday sermon preacher 
with and does not end at the school teacher. As between the 
announcement of the assassination attempt and the Friday prayer in 
the kingdom a distance that does not exceed 8 hours I think it is 
enough for any preacher to replace the topic of his talk. But how 
many preacher have done this? Each reader should question, and 
recall the topic of the Friday talk in the mosque of his neighbourhood. 































Claim 1: Unlike liberals, the 
Islamists voice go down at 
the time of a terrorist attack 
and raise after that.    
-Topos of time+ Topos or 
fallacy of consequences. 
 
-Topos of reality  
 
-Topos or Fallacy of neglect 
of main issues    
 
 
Topos of time+ Topos or 
fallacy of consequences. 
-Topos or Fallacy of threat 
or danger of Islamists  
 
-Topos of history 
 
 
-Topos of responsibility  
 
 




















































































However, in the same case, how many preacher have talked about 
Ramadan drama series, one of which the “Tash” episode about 
education?  Perhaps the answer will seem like a national disaster, if 
it is obvious for us that the mosques that spoke about the series are 
more in number than the mosques that their orator decided to 
replace the topic of their talk to the suicidal bombing incident. And 
what more painful is to have a Friday sermon preacher that speaks 
about “Tash” episode after 12 hours of recording the most dangerous 
terrorist attackin the country. 
The obvious in the conflict between the Islamists and the ‘liberals’ 
around terrorism in the country, is that the extremist Islamists are 
smarter than their ‘liberal’ opponents. They know when to speak and 
when to remain silent. And the march of 75 months indicates that 
they did not lose much as was expected. And with their extremism 
they are present with full strength. And what we have to do is to wait 

















-Topos or fallacy of danger 




Claim 2: extremist Islamists 
are smarter than their 
liberal opponents. 
-Topos of history 
-Topos of danger  
-Topos of time 
Involvement 
























phrase ‘with full 
strength’ 
  
Predication strategies  














- occupy themselves with side issues 
- go out of their trenches with spears that they throw towards their 
opponents with full force, incitement and betrayal 
- are smarter than their ‘liberal’ opponents. 
- They know when to speak and when to remain silent. 
- they did not lose much as was expected. 
- with their extremism, they are present with full strength 
- turning the table on ‘allibraleen’ 
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‘Allibraliah’ is an extension to ‘Hadatha’ 
In the past, the most prominent problems and obstacles of 
‘Hadatha’ was defining it and determining its meaning, and the 
battle around ‘Hadatha’ was a battle around the term specifically 
and not around its meanings, and therefore Alghathami was 
concerned with naming the conflict over ‘Hadatha’ as a discussion 
for the absence of the rule of argumentation of the obligation to a 
specific definition that they can discuss.. and because the 
argumentation rule requires the critic to not oblige the one 
criticised with a definition he does not approve, Alghathami -aware 
or not- jumps this rule so he criticises harshly ‘allibralyeen’ (liberals)- 
but not ‘allibraliah’- and he obliges them with his definitions and 
terms without hearing from them a single definition of ‘allibraliah’ 
though they show in many of their writings and articles and they 
were closer to agreement on the definition of ‘allibraliah’ and 
setting their goals unlike ‘alhadatheen’ (the modernists).  
And in terms of the logic and real experience, the concept -any 
concept- cannot by represented completely by any individual, so he 
is the concept and the concept is him, but the logic and experience 





















Claim1: similar to 
‘hadathah’, liberals are 
criticised on the definition of 
‘allibraliah’ though they 
agree upon its definition and 
aims. 
-Topos of history 
-Topos or fallacy of 
definition 







Claim2: groups e.g. ‘liberals’ 
cannot completely 
represent concepts they 




































































he labels himself with or belongs to, and all the criticism to 
‘allibralyeen’ was not logical as it is based on the assumption of 
uniformity and conformity between ‘allibraliah’ and ‘allibralyeen’ 
and this stems from the assumption of the Infallibility of  
‘allibralyeen’ from error and from transgressing the concept, and if 
this is the case then the denial of the existence of Muslims, Jews or 
Christians on earth is the priority to the rule as heavenly religions 
set the ideal theory for living and call the individual to approach 
them as much as possible with the impossibility of matching them, 
and this has not been said since the dawn of the mankind.  
From here, I say to all criticisers you are wrong by thinking that 
‘allibralyeen’ are infallible as they are human beings like you that 
make mistakes and corrections and their mistakes in their practices 
or practical application of ‘allibraliah’ do not mean they do not exist 
as a thought and a culture; so ‘allibraliah’ is a great principle that 
each human being should call for, adopt and has the honor for 
belonging to it, and ‘allibraliah’ in sum and simply as the liberal 
thinker Dr. Abdulrahman Alrashid said: 
“it is a simple human concept that believes only in freedom of 
choice, and this freedom is narrowed or widened according to the 
vision of every individual”.so if the majority chose to be 
conservative, then this is their right and choice, and if it prefers the 
























human beings are not 
infallible.  
-Topos of logic + topos of 
experience  
-Topos or fallacy of 
definition  
-Topos or fallacy of human 
fallibility  








Claim3: ‘allibraliah’ is a great 
humane concept that is 
based on freedom of choice   
-Topos of definition 
-Topos of right of freedom 








































































weeds, while British police arrest who deal with it. So the freedom 
of individuals is limited by the choice of the group, so if the majority 
of the society is conservative then its choice is the one that prevails, 
thus ‘allibralyon’, theoretically, are the closest people to all, as they 
are supposedly believing in the rights of Islamists, communists, 
nationalists and social conservatives” 
Unfortunately, the reality of the discussion -if it is so called- 
between Islamists and ‘allibralyeen’ is still primarily on the 
relationship between ‘allibraliah’ and Islam, and there is still much 
debate between them though the fact that the issue of the 
relationship remains at the forefront of the debate indicates that 
the discussion between them did not develop and did not progress 
at all..which indicates a strong opposition to the liberal thought in 
the kingdom, this opposition in my opinion is based on a jump in 
discussion from the level of the apparent and declares to the level 
of the hidden and implicit, which means that all this opposition and 
resistance is based on assumption and expectations taken seriously 
so we become in front of the judgment of the intentions and what 
the chest hide.  
And despite all of that, there are huge mistakes that the Islamist 
trend make without knowing, which lies in its continuous attempts 
to undermine ‘allibraliah’ and limit its spread, and he uses in that 































Claim4: the debate between 
Islamists and liberals has not 
evolved indicating the 
strong resistance against 
‘allibraliah’ 
-Topos of reality (of debate) 
+topos of consequence  




Claim5: Islamists are 
attempting to eliminate 
‘allibraliah’ through various 
means of suppression.   






































































against ‘ allibralyeen’ that they aim to destroy the religion and 
spread the moral corruption in the society. And although there is no 
evidence on these accusations other than a number of writings for 
anonymous writers -that could be traitors working for Islamists-  the 
Islamic trend insists on these accusations, and I saw many discussion 
and seminars around ‘allibraliah’ and I found that the evidences 
have not changed for a long time, even the texts that the opponents 
cite have not changed at all, which indicates the weakness or the 
evidences they rely on or the lack of evidence at best.             
I think the emergence of the ‘librali’ trend in the kingdom -with its 
single purpose that is freedom- is mainly due to that the dominant 
existent group does not support freedom -as a cultural and 
intellectual value- and therefore some Islamists criticize the liberal 
trend for this matter so they say: what is the benefit of ‘allibraliah’ 
if it agrees with Islam..?! and the truth is that ‘allibraliah’ has no 
relation with Islam or with any other religion as it is an independent 
concept that does not intersect with Islam in terms of that it is a 
religion that supports freedom and gives the other the right to 
believe in others’, but it does not either accept coercion in religion 
and the Islam of the compelled as the necessary condition to the 
validity of Islam is the freedom to enter it and  to accept it as a 
religion of man.. Thus the disagreement was not for Islam as a 
























-Topos or fallacy of 
accusation+ Topos of time+ 






Claim6: the emergence of 
‘allibraliah’ is due to the 
existence of the dominant 
Islamic group that does not 
support freedom.    
-Topos of culture  
-Fallacy of ignoring the 
counter-argument 
-Topos or fallacy of 
relationship between Islam 
and ‘allibraliah’ (differences) 
 -Topos of definition of Islam 
-Topos of right of freedom 
of expression 
-repetition of 






































































the existence of the ‘librali’ trend and its insistence to emerge and 
call for its freedom to express his views and ideas can be understood 
and justified, but the obstacle to ‘allibraliah’ in the kingdom is that 
its figures call for the respect of freedom of expression at the time 
they are standing in front of a group that does not believe in this 
freedom and it attempts to suppress and exclude them and uses all 
available means most powerful of which is takfir and treason -that 
make all the spectrums of the society an enemy to them- which is 
the weapon that no one use except the extremist groups that do 
not believe in the intellectual and cultural pluralism, and the 
obstacle hits ‘allibraliah’ in its heart and motive base -which is 
freedom- as you cannot call for freedom and tolerance with a party 
that attempts to exclude and dismiss you, so while the liberal 
believe in the Islamist right of expression, the Islamist confiscates 
his freedom and his right of expression, and the equation is 
supposed to be equal (give me my freedom I give you yours)!.. 
But -with a historical review- the opposition that liberal trend 
encounter today was encountered before by the Hadatha trend that 
was able to pass that stage with minimal losses, with the difference 
that the liberal trend is attempting to make change at the 
intellectual and social level and this what made its mission much 
harder and very difficult, as it needs longer time to overcome all the 















-Topos or Fallacy of abuse 
(suppression and 













Claim7: ‘allibraliah’ is an 
extension to ‘hadatha’ as 
they have the same project.  
-Topos of historical 
comparison.  
-Topos of difficulty of 






















































In my personal opinion, if we take Hadatha as a form of specialised 
literary criticism then ‘allibraliah’ is the intellectual and cultural 
form of Hadatha, and from here ‘allibraliah’ is the extension to 
Hadatha in the kingdom and complementary to it with a difference 
in the figures and characters, but the project is undoubtedly one.     
 
- Topos of similarties and 
differences between 
‘Hadatha’ and ‘allibraliah’   
Involvement 
-personal deictic 
‘in my personal 





Predication strategies  


































- is a great principle that each human being should call for, adopt and has the 
honour for belonging to it 
-it is a simple human concept that believes only in freedom of choice, and this 
freedom is narrowed or widened according to the vision of every individual 
- its figures call for the respect of freedom of expression at the time they are 
standing in front of a group that does not believe in this freedom. 
- hit in its heart and motive base- which is freedom- 
- is the intellectual and cultural form of Hadatha 
- the extension to Hadatha in the kingdom and complementary to it 
 
 
-are human beings like you that make mistakes and corrections  
-their mistakes in their practices or practical application of ‘allibraliah’ do not 
mean they do not exist as a thought and a culture 
-the closest people to all 
- are believing in the rights of Islamists, communists, nationalists and social 
conservatives 
-its single purpose that is freedom  
- believe in the Islamist right of expression 
- is attempting to make change at the intellectual and social level 
-it needs longer time to overcome all the obstacles in front of it and come out 
with the most possible gains.. 
 
-a religion that supports freedom  
-gives the other the right to believe in others’,  
- it does not accept coercion in religion and the Islam of the compelled  
 
 






















-and he uses in that various means of repression, notably the repeated 
accusations against ‘ allibralyeen’ that they aim to destroy the religion and 
spread the moral corruption in the society. 
- does not support freedom -as a cultural and intellectual value- 
-a group led by many figures  
-does not believe in this freedom  
-it attempts to suppress and exclude them and uses all available means most 
powerful of which is takfir and treason 
-do not believe in the intellectual and cultural pluralism  
-attempts to exclude and dismiss you  
-confiscates his (liberal) freedom and his right of expression  
 
 
-a form of specialised literary criticism  
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Who is the Islamist-liberal 
The previous article discussed the changes of the Arab cultural public 
opinion in the last century in terms of that they were of modernist 
tendencies with a liberal national and Islamic revival nature that 
dominated the political scene, then in the middle of the century the 
scene turned into nationalism, and in its end, it leaned towards the 
political Islam movements. 
So what is the future of this scene? There is a state of a fusion of the 
political opposites; between ‘allibraliah’ and Islamism; so can they 
unite in one political vision, as in Hagel dialectical way of interpreting 
the intellectual conflicts over history by the conflict of the opposites 
and their unity? I.e. the emergence of an idea that carries its 
opposite inside it through an idea that negate it, then a third idea is 
produced that negate the second and unite the opposites in a new 
idea; so the chain of ideas returns by re-establishing itself until the 
end of history. But is there really an Islamist ‘liberaliah’? and what is 
it? And how its advocates and the others see it?  
What we see of the Islamist political parties taking the lead in the 
elections as in Tunisia (Nahda party), Morocco (Justice and 
development party), and Egypt (Freedom and justice party), means 
Claim1: The future of Arab 
cultural scene indicates a 
state of fusion of political 
opposites; between 
‘allibraliah’ and Islam      
-Topos of history
-Topos of authority of
knowledge











of assertion  







that they accepted the liberal democratic and the multi-party 
system and the peaceful transition of power; so what remains of 
their fundamentalism? It can be said that they are politically 
converting to ‘allibraliah’ but they conserve their cultural and social 
heritage; which means that they are in the process of transition to 
become civil conservative parties similar to the justice and 
development part in Turkey.   
And now there are fundamental sectors of Islamists that are 
oriented towards the political ‘allibraliah’ and some have even 
entered into a political partnership with left-wing movements like in 
Tunisia. And there are pro-Muslim Brotherhood parties that are 
classified as liberal parties such as Al-wasat party in Egypt. On the 
other hand, there is the Moroccan liberal party which declares that 
it rejects and eliminate any position contrary to Islamic teachings. 
Thus, there is a political integration that forms in the Islamist 
‘allibraliah’. 
So, what is the Islamist ‘allibraliah’? though it is not one trend but 
different spectra and movements and various intellectuals, their 
basic premises can be placed. After the religious premise which is 
the belief in the basic principles of Islam such as the Islamic creed 
and the pillars of Islam; that movements view that Islam adopts the 
general values of ‘allibraliah’ such as freedom (of expression and 
belief), independence of the individual, equality and human rights; 
-Topos of example
Claim2: ‘Allibraliah 
alislamiah’ (liberal Islam) is 
based on that Islam 
conforms with ‘allibraliah’ 
as it adopts the general 
values of ‘allibraliah’. 
-Topos of definition
-Topos of human rights
(humanitarianism) + topos
of authority (religious texts)













focusing on their interpretation of religious texts on these values. 
And it calls for the distinction between the views of Faqih and Islam, 
and for the reinterpretation of the religious texts according to the 
circumstances of time and place and not to be restricted to the old 
interpretations. And their difference from the fundamentalists is in 
the interpretation of the basic Islamic values for the modern life in 
general and for politics in particular.  
So, in politics, some see that there are no specific texts in Islamic 
jurisprudence that deal with political issues except the principle of 
consultation, and since ‘allibraliah’ conforms with the essence of 
Islam then it is desirable to build the state. Some see that 
establishing liberal political institutions (such as parliament, 
elections and civil rights) and social care policies do not contradict 
any religious texts, but can be considered an application of some of 
the Islamic principles that set forth in some Qur'anic texts, and that 
can also be drawn from the conduct of caliphs (Mr. Yassin, quoting 
the book "Islamic Liberalism" by Leonard Binder). 
And in this sense, it does not separate religion from the state, but it 
views that the Islamic religion has not dealt with the details of 
politics or the process of building the state as Islam set the general 
moral principles and left the details for the human jurisprudence. 
The Islamist liberals sees in that a return of the Islamic main 
principles that are free of the authority of the politicized clerics, of 
texts to suit the current 
time and place)  
-Topos of disadvantage (of
lack of religious texts
dealing with politics)+
Topos of advantage of
‘allibraliah’ in politics.
-Topos of rights
- topos of authority
(religious texts)































the deviations accumulated over the centuries and of the 
jurisprudence that was appropriate in its time, but is no longer the 
case at present.    
And this is not new, as this emerged before in the so-called 
Renaissance era that had Islamic thinkers that put forward such 
general ideas, such as: Kawakibi, Afghani, Mohammed Abdo, 
Khairuddin Tunisian, Ibn Badis, Ali Abdul Razek, Malik bin Nabi; 
However, these ideas were in the realm of thought and not in the 
political application. The new thing is that these ideas start to see 
the light on the ground. 
Opponents of the Islamist ‘allibraliah’ are many. First, there is a 
conceptual rejection on the integration of ‘liberali’ and Islamist 
terms in politics. So liberals emphasize on the distinction between 
the concepts: “Muslim” and “Islamist”, as a Muslim is the one who 
believes in the religion of Islam and most liberals in the Islamic world 
are Muslims, while Islamist is a modern political concept which 
means the one that belongs to fundamental political movements; so 
how can the fundamentalist meet with the liberal in one political 
vision? Hence, the concept should be ‘Muslim liberal’ rather than 
‘Islamist liberal’.   
The Islamists, in turn, object to the Islamist ‘allibraliah’ legitimately 
summarized by the Islamic writer Tamer Bakr in three points. The 



























-Topos of history (of the 
concept)  





Claim3: The opposition 
against  liberal Islam cannot 
eliminate ‘Allibraliah 
Alislamiah’    
-Topos of resistance  
-Fallacy of definition by 
liberals (of combining 
Islamist and liberal 
concepts)    
-Fallacy of Islamic law by 
Islamists (‘Allibraliah 
Alislamiah’ violates the 





















































abolition of the consensus on the grounds that it is impossible to 
achieve it, and as the abolition of the Qiyas on logical basis rather 
than fundamentalist jurisprudence one, and also the division of 
legislation into general and temporary, resulting in the principle of 
the historicity of Hadith e.i. the affairs of politics and management 
came in the time of the prophet for its appropriateness in that time. 
The second is to consider any dispute between Islamic jurists as an 
indication of the absence of a specific jurisprudential rule on the 
disputed issue, which makes it easier to adopt a composed method 
in the sharia laws and to claim that this approach is the method of 
moderation. The third is to replace the system of Islamic values with 
the universal system of values, that is, to achieve the universal 
values of Islam, not the supreme values of Islam. 
These objections of negation cannot eliminate the existence of the 
Islamist ‘allibraliah’ in the arena, but they have caused confusion and 
ambiguity in defining the concept and its followers. The majority of 
those who belong to Islamist ‘allibraliah’ avoid to be classified to 
avoid being accused of the political fluidity or political opportunism 
by both Islamists and liberals. The fundamentalists do not only 
criticised the Islamist liberals legitimately, but also accuse their 
vicious westernised intentions. Liberals, in turn, suspect that Islamist 
liberals use liberal democracy as a provisional tactic to seize power 
and then blow up all democratic values. 
-Fallacy of resistance
against ‘Allibraliah


















But the accusation of intentions is difficult to prove before the 
appearance of its features, and it is apparent in the discourse of 
Islamist liberals that they adopt Islamic jurisprudence that are 
adapted to modern life and able to build modern society without 
relying on traditional jurisprudence that they find very conservative 
or strict or regressive. In the field of politics, they believe that Islam 
has left Muslims free in deciding upon their systems according to 










Claim4: Islamist liberals 
adopts the modern Islamic 
law rather than the 
traditional one.  
-Topos of modernisation   
- Topos of rights 





by means of 
impersonalisation  
















Predication strategies  































 - it is not one trend but different spectra and movements and various 
intellectuals 
-view that Islam adopts the general values of ‘allibraliah’ such as freedom 
(of expression and belief), independence of the individual, equality and 
human rights; focusing on their interpretation of religious texts on these 
value.  
- it calls for the distinction between the views of Faqih and Islam, and for 
the reinterpretation of the religious texts according to the circumstances 
of time and place and not to be restricted to the old interpretations. 
- their difference from the fundamentalists is in the interpretation of the 
basic Islamic values for the modern life in general and for politics in 
particular. 
-it is desirable to build the state.  
-it does not separate religion from the state 
-it views that the Islamic religion has not dealt with the details of politics or 
the process of building the state. 
- they adopt Islamic jurisprudence that are adapted to modern life and 
able to build modern society without relying on traditional jurisprudence 
that they find very conservative or strict or regressive. 
- In the field of politics, they believe that Islam has left Muslims free in 








- suspect that Islamist liberals use liberal democracy as a provisional tactic
to seize power and then blow up all democratic values.
-, object to the Islamist ‘allibraliah’ legitimately 
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“Human Rights”: between Man and Political Employment 
The 12thcentury is considered the century wherein the human 
movement began to manifest itself in Europe, as a general cultural 
movement whose questions are being asked for real mobility through 
the intellectual-literary mobility. This movement and that evolved 
through combination to create the so-called Renaissance, the era 
that established the first building blocks of the contemporary 
Western / global civilization, after which, relatively, the themes of 
concern and attention shifted from the transcendental / 
metaphysical to the human.    
The human has been the subject of clear interest throughout the 
Renaissance, even if he has not had a clear vision of what human 
rights are. This interest has kept up his vision in an attempt to push 
injustice against the human, at least in what seemed clear -then - that 
injustice violates the natural right of the human. 
With the overriding of the human concern and its extension to the 
whole of the knowledge fields, and then the social / political spaces, 
a set of general human principles emerged as a reference to the 
rights controversy that was not isolated from theological 
perceptions; even though it did not correspond with them at the level 
of direct ideas (as that the rational / natural theses at the time are 
based on theological conceptions in the underlying indirect 
subconscious). 
 These general principles have reached their most obvious form - and 
I do not say the most complete one - in the Declaration of the French 
Revolution of Rights, which marked the beginning of a new age for 
  
Claim1: The concept of 
Human rights has been 
developed in the west. 
-Topos of history 
- Topos of culture (western 
culture) 
 
-Topos of humanitarianism 
 




-Topos of right (human 
rights) 
 
-Topos of history of relation 
between human rights and 

















































the human. In the light of the universality of these rights and their 
commonality, the intellectual paths and the practical processes that 
are important to human beings work to create a new world that 
guarantees the basic human rights for all, linked to the origin of 
human assets, that all people are born free and equal.  
The space of human rights debates has expanded since the French 
Revolution and its liberal / humanist slogans till today. Apart from the 
setbacks, hindrances and even disappointments, the bet - the 
apparent and the implied - has been available to the extent that a 
natural integrated system (based on the principle of the natural one 
origin) of human rights can be based on the general human 
commonality. The bet continued, and in tandem with the undeniable 
success of a semi-integrated system; in which the chances of success 
increased through the rise of the colonial domination of the Western 
civilization, which has - or has tried to - globalized its civilizational and 
humanitarian vision, especially after the establishment of 
international organizations that sponsors the sovereign rights, and 
aspires to the peaceful resolution of all forms of conflict by peaceful 
means, or by force that aims for the general peace. 
However, the greatest success of the globalization of these rights is 
linked to the development of means of transport, which contributed 
to human and cultural communication, and to the development of 
the means of media communication, as well as the general globalized 
effects that accompany the globalization of technology and the 
market economy. This has resulted in the widespread of the Western 
vision of human rights and its globalization because the modern 
world - with its international organizations, knowledge, science and 
economics powers, as well as military hegemony - is still largely 
Western. 
-Topos of history of human
rights + Topos of advantage
of human rights + Topos of





- Topos of universality
-Topos of power (western
power) + Topos of culture +
Topos of rights (human
rights)
-Topos of advantage (of
globalisation)
Claim3: The western vision
of human rights is not
absolute but relative.















































As far as the universality of human rights has been in the past 
decades of success; the more questions that have been posed to 
them in succession. The Enlightenment philosophers, as well as 
philosophers of the post-Enlightenment, have often questioned the 
legitimacy of general natural / human principles; for everyone 
everywhere / environment, and at all times (referring to the debate 
about it in terms of transcending history). They also raised questions 
about their details that go beyond the general human commonality, 
as well as the general principles in terms of the details that are more 
and more related to time and spatial variables.  
This means that this human rights system, which seems to have been 
completed as a general reference, was -in many of its themes- a 
subject of dispute inside the Western civilization that produced it. 
Many of its details (those details that cannot be applied in practice 
without them) are still - and will remain - the subject of great 
controversy, sometimes reaching the base of the general principles. 
And the issue of its transcendence (its absoluteness in terms of its 
validity for all times and places) is still a subject of dispute as well;  as 
the era of enlightenment that produced it, and the subsequent eras 
in which they have been completed, are not isolated from critical 
reviews; in addition to the fact that the idea of progress on which the 
Enlightenment era is based Requires that the evolution of the idea is 
necessarily  according to the variables of reality; from the fact that 
the reality changed by changing the course of ideas. In other words, 
in the end, human rights visions must be developed/changing; and 
ultimately, they must be relative in time. If it is confirmed as relative 
in time, it is inevitable that it will be relative in place. 
Of course, temporal and spatial relativity (which is the most 
important data of contemporary anthropological studies) does not 
mean that there is no universal human reference, which is in 
 
 
-Topos of advantage of 
western human rights + 




-Fallacy of absoluteness + 
Topos of relativity and 











-Topos of universality of 















































































agreement, and must be provided, to provide freedom and justice to 
the human, even within the limits availability to the human. The work 
on humanity is all on relativity, and the fact that it is relative, does 
not mean emptying it of its contents, and then neglecting it; as far as 
it is necessary to engage in it; with awareness of its relativity and 
exploiting what this relativity offer in order to achieve maximum 
situational harmonization that aims for absoluteness through 
adapting with relativeness.   
Here comes the non-western world, in terms of being a spatial 
situation / environment, not only to raise the problem of the 
confrontation between the absoluteness of human rights and its 
relativity, but also to raise the problem of applying the agreed-upon 
limit of relativity in a different reality/ the reality of non-Western. The 
general humanitarian principles that exist at a level of absoluteness, 
and thus a high level of global consensus, do not descend on a neutral 
physical reality, does not descend on white pages, but rather 
descends upon a living human reality that is saturated with all kinds 
of human uniqueness and difference, that does not result in difficulty 
in the application of these common general principles, but rather 
results -initially- in the difficulty of understanding and interpreting 
these principles, and then an agreement on this understanding and 
this interpretation. 
Let us take one of the most important principles of human rights: 
freedom, for example. Freedom in terms of human principle has 
become one of the Axioms of the human commonality. But, in terms 
of its concepts and applications, it swims in the midst of controversial 
paths in the west before the east. And even the agreed upon in the 
west and east, its application in reality turn to an intellectual 
dilemma, before becoming a real dilemma. If you have always talked 
about ‘allibraliah’ and demanded that it to be activated in practice, in 
-Topos of humanitarianism 
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Claim4: The adoption of 
human rights principles 
including ‘allibraliah’ should 
be relative (by accounting 















































































terms of that it is the broader philosophy of freedom (and we are in 
most need for freedom), I argue with the  illiberal who claim that 
what is wrong with ‘allibraliah’ lies in the inclusion of the unlimited 
freedom, by emphasising  the diversity of their intellectual and 
practical representations, as it varies according to the recipient, and 
the cultural factor, and I in all of this refer to the diversity and variety 
of applications from place to place in the West itself, the West which 
agree upon its common principles, while differs - the most different 
– in the details and the conditions of applying it in reality. 
As I said in my arguments on ‘allibraliah’, I say today about the system 
of the General Human Rights: The consensus on the general 
principles does not mean the reproduction of an experience - 
however successful in its environment - and its cultivation in another 
environment. ‘allibraliah’, freedom, or perceptions of justice (such as 
the Amartya Sen thesis that makes justice wider than an ideal theory 
= in his response to Rawls' thesis…etc) are no longer absolute 
principles, although they must be emphasized in their general 
principles. As we call for ‘allibraliah’ and freedom we realize - at the 
same time - that our ‘allibraliah’ will not be that in France, which in 
France will not be that in Sweden, which in Sweden will not be that 
in America. Even within the Arab / Islamic framework, our ‘allibraliah’ 
will not be the ‘allibraliah’ of Tunisia, and the ‘allibraliah’ of Tunisia 
will not be the ‘allibraliah’ of Egypt, and so forth. On the day that 
‘allibraliah’ is a static ‘allibraliah’ on a unified experience, that will not 
be allibraliah’ in any case,and the paths of liberation will be strangled 
in the straits of coercion and thus will be in contradiction with many 
of the rights of choice. These rights are linked on the one hand to the 
development of the individual in terms of being an individual and a 
member in a society, as it is linked, on the other hand, to society in 
terms of being a consensual space that involves many options, and in 
rather than copying others’ 
experience)   





-Topos of relativity of 
‘allibraliah’ + Topos of 
definition of ‘allibraliah’ + 
Fallacy of absoluteness of 
freedom in ‘allibraliah’.       
- Topos of variance in 
application of ‘allibraliah’ 
principles.    
 -Topos of comparison 
(similarity) 
-Topos of universality of 
principles + Topos of 
relativity + fallacy of 
absoluteness of principles 
-Topos of culture and 















































































terms of being a specific framework for consciousness that imposes 
much of the path of perceptions. 
From this specific point of view, there is a need to take into 
consideration the circumstances of cultural differences, as every 
environment has its own cultural law, which cannot be skipped; even 
with the will to change it, as changing it cannot be achieved without 
working on it from the inside and not the outside. Thus, the critique 
directed to our societies and systems as being out of the standards 
of universal human rights is a critique of a transcendental standard 
that claims absoluteness, and does not foresee the fact that it was 
created in a different circumstance that is far from our cultural / 
social circumstance. 
As we reject and condemn the external interference (as is currently 
the case of Sweden) that tries to impose its vision on our reality 
without being aware of the nature of this complex reality and its 
complex problems. We do not reject and condemn for the claim that 
we have reached our aspiration for freedom, justice and rights, but 
motivated by the awareness that we are working to develop our 
positives, and eliminate our negatives, which we do not deny, but we 
deny the use of them against us for purposes beyond the details to 
the public position against us. Hence, our rejection of these 
interventions stems from our awareness that political wills are 
behind the human rights banners deliberately aiming for crowding 
and raiding, not to modify or reform the legal / rights process here or 
there.Rather, to impose political options on the sovereignty of the 
nation, whose sovereignty remains a fundamental principle that 
cannot be debated by the parties. 
Before these accusations directed by these to us, we have entered 
into a public debate about much of what the Western media is talking 
about us, and not long ago. We are not silent societies, as is the 
-Topos of authority of 
knowledge  
-Topos or fallacy of 
definition of ‘allibraliah’+ 
Topos of negative 
consequences + Topos of 
advantage of human rights. 
-Topos of culture and 
cultural differences  
-Topos of responsibility for 
cultural change     
-Fallacy of abusive attack 
-Fallacy of attacking others 
(interference)   
- Topos of culture and 
cultural difference  
- Topos of responsibility (for 
cultural change and 
adopting human rights)     
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stereotype of us there, we are not blind to the mistakes that 
permeate our experience as any human action exposed to many 
mistakes. For example, our judiciary has been in development for 
years, a development that stems from our awareness of the need for 
development, not because there are those who curse it in the West 
or the East. As the judiciary is under development, it is exposed in our 
local media to criticism that touches on some of its shortcomings; for 
further reform. 
Also women's issues, we have never assumed that the status of 
women is at a satisfactory level, we did not keep silent about the 
shortcomings, We have not stayed in our position as being optimal, 
but our media - of all kinds – have an extensive discussions on our 
women's issues, No newspaper, nor a magazine, a satellite channel, 
as well as websites and social media are free from an open and strong 
debate about the negatives of our feminist reality. We are aware of 
the extent of our negatives, whatever its field, and we try to reform 
it ourselves while we refuse that others impose on us their solutions 
that if spared from political employment, have not escaped the 
ignorance of the complexities of our societies and then the ignorance 
of the issues considered in the course of development. 
We emphasize, and will continue to emphasize, that we are investing 
- consciously - in the cultural and systematic establishment of human 
rights, not under pressure from here or there, but because we must 
be at the human level appropriate to us. We are committed to human 
rights and are committed to the development of the human rights 
system itself, we are, and we will continue to do so; they said or did 
not, cursed or did not, because our primary commitment to human 
rights stems from our perceptions of our sincere desire to be always 
the best; without ignoring the positive, even in the critical positions 
-Fallacy of abusive attack  
-Fallacy of hasty 
generalisation 
- Topos of responsibility (for 
cultural change and 
adopting human rights)     
-Topos of example (justice 
field) 

















































of some humanly honest, those who differ from politicized people 
who use human rights criticism for political employment. 
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- a human principle
- has become one of the Axioms of the human commonality
-it swims in the midst of controversial paths in the west before the east
- it is the broader philosophy of freedom
- it varies according to the recipient, and the cultural factor
-will not be that in France, which in France will not be that in Sweden, which in
Sweden will not be that in America.
-our ‘allibraliah’ will not be the ‘allibraliah’ of Tunisia, and the ‘allibraliah’ of Tunisia
will not be the ‘allibraliah’ of Egypt, and so forth - 
-are in most need for freedom 
-call for ‘allibraliah’ and freedom
- have entered into a public debate about much of what the Western media is
talking about us
-are not silent societies, as is the stereotype of us there
-are not blind to the mistakes that permeate our experience as any human action
exposed to many mistakes.
-our awareness of the need for development
-emphasize, and will continue to emphasize, that we are investing - consciously - in
the cultural and systematic establishment of human rights
-must be at the human level appropriate to us.
-are committed to human rights and are committed to the development of the
human rights system itself
-our primary commitment to human rights stems from our perceptions of our
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‘Allibraliah’ or Post-Ideologies 
The title of this article decided to introduce ‘allibraliah’ as a 
transcendent alternative to all competing ideologies on socio-
political capital. In this way, it seems –initially–as it dismisses that 
‘allibraliah’is an ideology; however, it is only a trend/ideological 
doctrine that seeks to change by persuading through a package of 
mutually reinforcing ideas that are constantly being mobilized. So, is 
‘allibraliah’ - as a justification for offering it as an alternative option - 
is the opposite to ideologization ; therefore, it is not ideological in 
terms of its basic nature, or ideological but it is an ideology of non-
ideology, and then it can therefore be presented as an option to get 
out of this conflict raging between the totalitarian trends in the two 
worlds : Arab and Islamic? 
If ideology essentially means a system of ideas that tries to be 
consistent, to express a vision that dictates the interpretation of 
reality, to justify it or to change it, it is then in the common / negative 
sense presented as opposed to scientific and rational thinking: false 
consciousness. In this negative sense, it means more than a system 
of thoughts, so this description in the negative and popular sense 
applies when that the ideas are the ideas with a doctrinal dimension 
‘allibraliah’= 
ideology of the non-
ideology   
Claim1: ‘allibraliah’ is an 
alternative choice to 
totalitarian clashing 
ideologies.    
-Topos of definition of
‘allibraliah’
-Topos of definition of
ideology + Topos od
disadvantage of ideology







































(not necessarily religious), which means they include a level of 
dogmatism that posits itself as part of irresponsible certainty and to 
penetrate the rational or scientific condition (as a condition for 
fortifying the irresponsible certainty), and to contain fictional and 
emotional elements that touch feelings, emotions and instincts 
before minds; as part of the mass mobilization mechanism, and to 
include utopian promises, as a project offering an imagined 
alternative to real or supposed misery / hell. 
Of course, all this cannot come about unless these ideas are 
totalitarian, passing the individual (the individual, not from the 
individual) to the total. That total being bet on as a force capable of 
bringing about change, which is often a short but sharp change, a 
revolutionary change that burns the phases, because all the phases 
with all its necessities, are in the perception of this ideologized are 
included in the rational perception of reality, which is a perception 
not appreciated by the ideologized/ideologiser, moreover, it is 
implicitly rejected, as he sees it a hindrance to the public emotional 
action that he is directing in all cases. 
These are the features of ideology, in terms of being - in the end - 
false consciousness. 
There is no doubt that some forms of ‘allibraliah’ include some of 
these negative features associated with the processes of 
























-Topos or fallacy of abuse of 
emotions by ideologies + 






-Topos of disadvantage of 











-Topos of disadvantage of 
utopianism in ‘allibraliah’ + 




















































utopian ideas that necessarily involve a mass movement, and 
therefore the absence of the imaginary and emotional element is not 
anunrecognized reality in all the tracks of the promotion of the ideas 
of ‘allibraliah’. But no matter how negative these aspects of 
‘allibraliah’ are, it emphasizes, first of all, that all its ideas are not 
complete nor certain; they are ideas that are on the table of criticism 
/ accountability in any case; even the concept of "individual freedom" 
that the liberal vision is based on is being pursued with criticism and 
development within the liberal space; this means that there is no 
dogma that shapes the ideas of the liberals, including the founding 
ideas themselves, as well as others. 
Criticism - as an initial rational condition - is not a luxury in the liberal 
tradition, but an act of liberation that operates within the space of 
the liberal mind on the widest scale. In fact, the work of the liberal 
on the critique of ‘allibraliah’ does not stop at the limits of scientific 
and intellectual availability at a certain point in time. It is a critique 
that goes beyond it, to react seriously with the latest theories of the 
human mind and the scientific research produced in all fields. This, 
no doubt, limits the certainty; even in the results of the sciences that 
are based on (critical circumstance), or in (critical fact), what makes 
(certainty) here, circumstantial / relative in all cases, as well as the 
fact that this dynamic interaction with the scientific and cognitive 
development limits the two dimensions: the emotional and the 
individual’s freedom   + 
Topos of advantage of lack 
of dogmatism. 
-Topos of advantage of self-
criticism in ‘allibraliah’ +
Topos of relativity of
certainty
-Topos of rationality in












imaginary, which are so high in all totalitarian ideologies that they 
constitute, by their negativity, the essence of discourse. 
What most important in all this detail is that Liberalism or ‘allibraliah’, 
in essence, includes what limits its being an ideology in the negative 
sense. It is, if it is ideological, the ideology of the individual, in terms 
of being in basis: the ideology of individual freedom. 
And it is not secret that for Ideology to contain all those negative 
features that eventually turn it into a false consciousness; it must be 
totalitarian, working on effects that can only be achieved through a 
totalitarian framing of individuals. It is a framing that can only be 
achieved by violating individualism, as well as by violating many 
determinants of rationality. 
‘Allibraliah’, in terms of its initial bias towards the free independent 
individual, rebels against any framing that detracts from individual 
independence. This is what makes it against the action of 
ideologization in terms of being a collective behaviour. 
‘‘Allibraliah’ cannot be ideologized, in terms of its impossibility to be 
totalitarian, that totalitarianism through which only ideologization 
can be achieved. If ‘allibraliah’ must be characterized as an ideology, 
it is precisely the ideology of liberation/ individual independence, 
that is, the ideology of liberation from the ideologies that include 
totalitarianism. Therefore, it is not only the different opposite to 
thesetotalitarianisms, but also the antagonist to the principle of 
-Topos of advantage of
individuality in ‘allibraliah’
-Topos or fallacy of abuse by
collective ideologies to
individuals.




































totality, which must take from the self-assured real account of 
individuals, in favour of the imagined account of the imagined group; 
the group (with the exception of a few of its individuals) which ends 
into a human failure at all levels; so it moves from misery to misery, 
and solace can only be found in a few slogans that are ultimately not 
more than illusions. 
Totalitarianisms of all kinds are mere slogans, begin with illusionsand 
end up with illusions on the level of the reality of individuals. They 
Cannot be launched from the collective to reach the singles, while the 
individual is absent from the origin of the equation. Here, nothing is 
achieved, that if you want a collective ideology to achieve something 
positive in the world of the individual, which is the real world. On the 
contrary, every positive achievement in the world of the individual is 
a real and actual achievement, as well as necessarily - an addition to 
the sum. 
And it does not miss us in this context that while ‘allibraliah’ is limiting 
the tyranny of the principle of totalitarianism, it also limits the 
tyranny of the individual principle as it requires the freeing of the 
individual by universal and governing human principles that 
guarantee the individual right of all individuals, which means that 
there is a balance between the individuals’ freedoms in favour of the 































-Topos of negative 
consequences of 
collectivism. 
-Fallacy of ignorance of 
individuals by collective 




- Topos of negative 
consequences of 
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Arabs and Muslims live a world of conflict with themselves and with 
others, as a result of the domination of totalitarian ideologies on the 
march of development, and the march of liberation as well. These 
totalitarianisms are - necessarily - fundamentalism, or - at least - 
contain elements of fundamentalist degree, whether religious or 
national. This means that the conflict action is not an emergency 
case. Rather, it is an essential component in itself, so that its 
legitimacy can be achieved only through a conflict or a call to conflict, 
whether it is an internal conflict with the components of the self, or 
was a struggle with the other, or was a struggle at the level of ideas, 
perceptions and arguments of the accusation. 
It is clear that it is not possible to get out of those overlapping tunnels 
that drain the mental, spiritual and material energies, except by being 
aligned to the human in his individual existence, the existence that is 
devoid of the totalitarian frameworks, that is the real existence that 
is devoid of the totalitarian ideologies: religious and national. And 
there is nothing other than ‘allibraliah’ with its aligned principles to 
the individual - regardless of his previous identities–that can 
guarantee such freedom from the illusion to the real; to move the 
individual from the state of conflict with the other / others (self-
destructive conflict to the other); to struggle to himself and his 
conditional worlds, his presence, his conflict with the horizons of 




















-Topos of example of 
negative consequences of 
collective ideologies    
 
 
-Topos of advantage of 
individuality + Topos of 



































regard are a positive addition to him by originality, and a positive 
addition to the human type, as he does not work himself in a vacuum, 
but in a human space that is no more than an addition;whatever  he 
enjoys - or believed to enjoy - of independence. 
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-it is only a trend/ideological doctrine that seeks to change by persuading through 
a package of mutually reinforcing ideas that are constantly being mobilized.  
-  it emphasizes, first of all, that all its ideas are not complete nor certain; they are 
ideas that are on the table of criticism / accountability in any case. 
-includes, in essence, what limits its being an ideology in the negative sense.  
- if it is ideological, the ideology of the individual, in terms of being in basis: the 
ideology of individual freedom. 
-rebels against any framing that detracts from individual independence  
-against the action of ideologization in terms of being a collective behaviour  
-cannot be ideologized, in terms of its impossibility to be totalitarian 
 - it is precisely the ideology of liberation/ individual independence 
- is, the ideology of liberation from the ideologies that include totalitarianism 
- it is not only the different opposite to these totalitarianisms, but also the 
antagonist to the principle of totality  
- is limiting the tyranny of the principle of totalitarianism, it also limits the tyranny 
of the individual principle  
-it requires the freeing of the individual by universal and governing human 
principles  
-means a system of ideas that try to be consistent 
 -express a vision that dictates the interpretation of reality, to justify it or to change 
it. 
 -it is then in the common / passive sense presented as opposed to scientific and 
rational thinking: false consciousness. 
-it means more than a system of thoughts. 
 - this description in the negative and popular sense applies when that the ideas 
are the ideas with a doctrinal dimension. 
-to contain all those negative features that eventually turn it into a false 
consciousness; it must be totalitarian, working on effects that can only be achieved 
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‘Allibraliah’ and the Deceived and Oppressed ‘Liberal Figures’ 
In order to avoid mistrust, our colleague Mr. Ayed Abdul Karim began 
his article with stressing that he does not care about ‘allibraliah’/ 
Liberalism (Al Watan 10-15) but even he inferred to that with an 
evidence that can split a rock if exposed to it which is that he did not 
watch the popular episode of ‘Tash ma Tash’ about ‘Allibralyeen’. 
And I swear that this evidence has been missed out by all scholars. 
Then, the gentle writer has sympathized with our situation; we who 
are plagued with caring about ‘allibraliah’ and looking for it, 
especially after the fall of the stock market and then the rise of 
groceries prices, so he compensate us for all of that with a brief 
explanation of ‘allibraliah’ that he has never care about, so he told us 
that its origin is “liber” and that it is Latin means the free, and that 
“liberalism” means freedom (or means freedom as stated in the text 
of the article- and Allah knows which is correct). 
So, May Allah reward the writer for these great benefits that the 
readers of the newspaper and the intellectuals were thirsty for, and 
what a thirst! He also told us, may Allah increase his benefits, that 
freedom is a charming word and that the call for it astonished a lot of 





















Claim1: the argument that 
‘allibraliah’ means freedom 
is useless. 
-Fallacy of neglect of 
‘allibraliah’ 
 
-Fallacy of definition of 








-Topos of uselessness. 
 







































































from oppression, so they went for it the way a kid went for an ember 
thinking it is a colorful candy. And it is obvious to the reader that Mr. 
Ayed has reached in this master analysis to an explanation that has 
never been reached before by any of the west and east philosophers 
in the past and the present, and therefore it can be registered as a 
reference view that can be taken by the philosophers and researchers 
when they talk about ‘allibraliah’ and the secrets of the peoples’ 
fascination with its charm, though a lot of scholars reject Freud's well-
known theory in psychoanalysis that focus on the sexual motive for 
the human actions and tendencies.  
And Mr. Ayed did not forget to remind us -May Allah reward him- 
that the Saudi researchers and the political science professors 
together with other intellectuals, who have access to Western 
philosophy and might also wrote about ‘allibraliah’ or “Liberalism”, 
do not understand ‘allibraliah’ or “Liberalism”; and probably even do 
not understand its meaning, and thus he affords us – May Allah honor 
him- that the origin of ‘allibraliah’ or “Liberalism” is derived from a 
Greek word “liber” means the free and that ‘allibraliah’ or 
“Liberalism” means freedom as we stated above. 
Thanks to Allah as he awards me and the other political science 
students with reading the article of Mr. Ayed, so we knew after many 
years we wasted in studying, researching and writing that the origin 


































Claim2: The argument that 
Saudi intellectuals do not 
understand what ‘allibraliah’ 
means is false.  
-Fallacy of knowledge 















































































‘liberalism’ means freedom. And perhaps Mr. Ayed would allow us to 
add the free woman as well, especially the western women and those 
who look like them of our semi-women. So we can -if the Mr. may 
allow- say to one woman ‘ya liberh’ corresponding to ‘ya hurma’ 
which we say to our decent women who have not been deceived by 
‘allibraliah’ and its troubles. And we say to the deceived man by the 
west and its tricks “ya liber” corresponding to “ya walad” which some 
of us say to the boys when getting angry. 
And the benefits of Mr. Ayed’s article does not end there, as he 
exploits the occasion to tell us also that the principles of freedom, 
brotherhood and equality are deceptive slogans that intellectual and 
political figures got fascinated by and fell into the trap of 
Freemasonry. And I swear that this discovery is greater than the 
previous one, as I thought before Mr. Ayed’s article that the politician 
and the intellectual do not get easily deceived or fascinated by 
glamorous speech but they argue every idea before adopting it.   But 
I figured out to the lack of my knowledge and my unawareness, as 
the intellectuals and the politicians, even the shrewd ones, get easily 
deceived, maybe easier than the fishmongers in Qatif market. 
Because I have never heard that anybody has ever succeeded in 
deceiving these sellers, so thanks Allah that we knew before it is too 



















Claim3: The argument that 
the principles of freedom, 
brotherhood and equality 
are deceiving slogans is a 
false argument. 
 -Topos of uselessness. 
-Fallacy of danger or threat. 
 
 
-Topos of humanitarianism 
 























































when it comes to the highest human values, such as the freedom, 
equality and brotherhood. 
And we do not have to mention ‘allibraliah’ again as Mr. Ayed has 
told us earlier that ‘liberalism’ means freedom, and it appears from 
the article that that freedom is the same freedom that the shrewd 
politicians and intellectuals got deceived by and because of it they 
fell in the traps of freemasonry and the like.  
The truth is that the benefits of Mr. Ayed’s Article are uncountable 
and might need volumes to explain, especially his identification of the 
meaning of “alliber” and “alliberalism”, then the questions he asked 
(which probably nobody has ever questioned before nor answered), 
and then his assertion that the answers will not come from 
‘liberaleena’ (he wrote in the text of the article from ‘libralyona’ and 
he probably meant a person or a place or other people than 
‘libraleena’ that we know, or maybe another thing than the Arabic 
plural pf the world ‘liber-liberali’ that was stated above). 
And to sum up, Mr. Ayed has scored the goal of the season in this 
article which I see that it should be republished and distributed to the 
intellectuals, professors and writers, so they understand the meaning 
of ‘alliber’ and ‘Liberalism’ and how freedom and equality lead to the 
slipping into the trap of Free Masonry.         
-Fallacy of threat of freedom
-Topos of uselessness (of
definition).
-Topos of uselessness
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Is ‘allibraliah’ Suitable to All Societies? 
Despite the large number of seminars, debates and articles on 
‘allibraliah’/Liberalism, the question is still worrying in our Arab 
world: what is ‘allibraliah’/Liberalism? and what does it want? 
Well, the general principles of ‘allibraliah’/Liberalism are 
freedom, equality and participation in the decision-making, and 
after that the ‘allibraliah’/Liberalism trends disperse towards the 
right and the left, and vary a lot especially in economy. 
What is the benefit of this loose clarification as long as the 
majority of the modern social systems believe in these principles 
in their general form… so what meaning has remined for the term 
of ‘allibraliah’? Actually, it still has a lot of meanings, because any 
concept is not clear from its general definition but from its 
descriptions, applications and the attitudes of those convinced by 
it.. The questions around ‘allibraliah’ are various, and I have 
discussed some of them before. Here is an attempt for the 
understanding through the relation of the political 
‘allibraliah’/Liberalism with others, I translated it from Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Politics (2007) with adaptation and with some 
illustrative additions that do not affect the content.  
Claim 1: The general 
principles of ‘allibraliah’ are 
freedom, equality and 
participation in decision 
making and it specifically 
varies in application  
-Topos of number
- Topos of definition
-topos of number
-topos of definition
























Let’s start with the initial question that worries all political 
doctrines: is the political ‘allibraliah’ appropriate to all political 
groups and countries in the world? No! John Rawls answers, one 
of the most important contemporary liberal thinkers, proposing 
his bold idea in his book (The law of people) in 1999, that there 
can be a rational hierarchical society that is not based on 
‘allibraliah’ principles that states that all individuals are free and 
equal, and instead the individuals become responsible and 
collaborative within their communities, but they are not equal. 
The overall ‘liberali’ concept of justice cannot be constructed 
from the outside without the intellectual participation of people 
inside that hierarchical society, despite the fact that the main 
human rights apply to all human beings. However, intellectuals 
such as Thomas Pogge and Martha Nussbaum (2002) refuse Rawls 
view against the universality of ‘allibraliah’ principles of freedom 
and equality, and they see that the human principles of 
‘allibraliah’ apply to all countries. 
The pervious question should not be mixed with another 
question: is ‘allibraliah’ a notion to a particular country or at least 
an ideal universal political notion for all human communities?The 
philosopher Kant (1795) believes that all countries should respect 
the dignity of their citizens as free and equal individuals, but he 
denies that humanity is formed in a single political style; and 
Claim 2: the political 
liberalism is not suitable for 
all countries    
-Topos of authority of
knowledge
-Topos of definition
-Topos or fallacy of
humanitarianism
-Fallacy of suitability
Claim 3: ‘allibraliah’ cannot 
be unified as one system 
shared globally  
-Topos of authority of
knowledge





























object the idea of unifying ‘allibraliah’ in a universal group that 
share constitutions tacitly and unite as states in a confederation 
to ensure peace. 
With regards to the classical ‘allibraliah’, it is not important to 
distinguish between the world of the ‘liberal’ societies and the 
universal ‘liberal’ society, because the aim of the government in 
the society is ensuring the essential rights of freedom and 
proprietorship to its citizens, so the international borders would 
not become of major importance (Lomasky 2007). While modern 
‘allibraliah’ insist on the principles of the distribution of wealth to 
achieve social justice, no matter that those principles apply within 
certain communities or be achieved universally. So, the 
disagreement between the contemporary ‘allibraliah’ thinkers 
remained considerable in terms of the necessity of the application 
of ‘allibraliah’ principles inside the ‘liberal’ countries or they 
should be applied worldwide as they are universal human gains 
(Rawls, Pogge, Peetz) 
And the conflict between ‘allibralyeen’/Liberal Figures extends to 
the way to deal with the extremist communities and groups that 
may deny the essential rights to some of their members or 
practice their guardianship on them or confiscate their religious 
or intellectual freedom…etc. is it proper for the ‘liberali’ group to 








-Topos of authority of 
knowledge 


















Claim 4: liberal countries or 
groups should not interfere 
in the affairs of the non-













































































If we assume that the extremist group is a political group or a 
state... is it possible for the ‘allibralyeen’ to interfere in the affairs 
of the non-‘allibraliah’ states? The philosopher Mill answers in a 
special article about that in 1859, that the civilized states and the 
non-civilized states should be dealt with deficiently, as there is no 
right for the barbarians as a nation… As long as the international 
ethics are mutual, then the barbarian governments cannot be 
accounted for and do not have equal rights with the civilized 
governments. This arbitrary logic was appropriate with the 
imperialism spirit of the colonial Britain at that time. But Mill 
come back to explain that he objects the interference of a state 
in the affairs of another state in order to protect the principles of 
‘allibraliah’. 
If ‘allibraliah’ believes in the rights of the groups in making their 
own decisions, are ‘allibrlaion’ morally entitled to intervene with 
non-‘allibraliah’ groups to adapt with their human principles of 
freedom and equality? As ‘allibralaion’ believe in the freedom of 
individuals, they might also believe in that groups have the right 
to commit human mistakes to manage their own collective affairs. 
So the individuals who their freedom is confiscated inside 
particular societies, they themselves might object to intercalate 
‘allibraliah’ principles or even get harmed by them (Margalit 
1990; Tamir 1993).  
-Topos of authority of
knowledge
-Fallacy of justice
-Topos or fallacy of rights











However, Rawls believes that ‘allibralyeen’ have to distinguish 
when dealing with the extremist groups between that rationality 
and the one outside the law, the first can be coexisted with unlike 
the second, as the rational societies do not tolerate the states 
that ignore human rights; as such states could be subject to 
penalty by force and foreign intervention. However, Rawls insists 
that the rational who object the principles of the freedom of 
‘allibraliah’ should be encouraged and not forced on those 
principles. Concerning Chandran Kukathas (2003) who is a 
classical ‘liberali’ intellectual, he tends to a full tolerance with 
people who do not believe in the principles of the freedom of 
‘allibraliah’with the reservation that there would be an objection 
rights. 
And the questions of relations extend to inside ‘allibraliah’ states: 
to what extent is the right for the bigoted groups religiously, 
culturally, and politically to be exempted from state 
requirements? ‘allibraliah’ state has a long story in 
accommodating bigoted groups, but Glaston (2003) states that 
the biggest problem is with the bigoted groups that raise and 
teach children, so it cannot be looked at as pure voluntary groups 
that have the right to reject the requirement of ‘allibraliah’ states: 
as they practice the coercive force on children, thus the basic 
principles of ‘allibraliah’ on protecting the innocent from the 
-Topos of authority of
knowledge
-Topos or fallacy of law+ -
Topos or fallacy of
humanitarianism
-Topos of encouragement +
fallacy of compulsion




-Topos of authority of
knowledge
































unjust coercion will play a role here. Here, we will face a severe 
clash between the bigoted parental authority and the rights of 
children in accordance with the ‘iberali’ understanding. This will 
make the tolerance with the extremist groups that live inside 
‘allibraliah’ states (including the right to object) seems less 
attractive than tolerance with them on the international level. 
And despite of that, some of ‘allibraliah’ thinkers (Lucas 2006) still 
believe that ‘allibralyyen’ should ensure the quasi-sovereignty for 
the non-‘allibraliah’ local communities, allowing them to act 
freely in their own way. 
Another question is to what extent are extremist groups 
permitted to participate in decision making in ‘allibraliah’ state.  
In his book (the political ‘allibraliah’), Rawls mentions that our 
societies are described as collectively rational, and thus cannot be 
forced to change with the justification based on the basis of 
believe in totalitarian morals or religious systems. But some of 
‘allibralyeen’ who are close to the religious circles (ebirl 2002 and 
Perry 1993) pose that such an objection is a clear exclusion to the 
religious. And once again, ‘allibralyon’ diverge in their attitudes to 
the level a one question whether there are still what unite 
‘allibralyeen’?      
 
 















Claim 5: non-liberal groups 
should participate in 
decision making in the 
liberal countries  
-Topos of authority of 
knowledge 
-Topos of rationality+ 
fallacy of compulsion  
-Topos or fallacy of 
exclusion  
-Topos or fallacy of 
variance of liberal attitudes   
 












































Predication strategies  














-the general principles of ‘allibraliah’ are freedom, equality and 
participation in the decision making 
-‘allibraliah’ trends disperse towards the right and the left, and vary a 
lot especially in economy. 
- it still has a lot of meanings 
- is the political ‘allibraliah’ appropriate to all political groups and 
countries in the world? No! 
- states all individuals are free and equal. 
- apply to all countries. 
- the distribution of wealth to achieve social justice. 
- has a long history in accommodating bigoted groups 
 
- have to distinguish when dealing with the extremist groups between 
that rational one and the one outside the law 
- should ensure the quasi-sovereignty for the non-‘allibraliah’ local 
communities, allowing them to act freely in their own way. 








Text Discursive Strategies (Reisigl and Wodak 2001) 






















‘Allibralaih’: Freedom or Chaos 
The deep structure of Islamic culture involves a value system of 
distinct quality, one of which is the value of freedom it occupies a 
high rank in the hierarchy of values. That value got its positon from 
the sacred text which raised the ceiling of freedom to the extent that 
it prohibited all acts of coercion to convert to the supreme religion 
"no compulsion in religion". Is there any more freedom than that! 
Even the commission itself is not required from the person -in 
Legislation terms- if it is not available in an atmosphere of freedom 
that allows him to commit what he is assigned for so then the 
commission is lifted with the lift of the intent and choice conditions 
as they burden the committed with what he unable to do and 
therefore if the person who lost freedom utters with what could 
makes him infidel or even abuses any of the holy figures, then he is 
not sinful as what the text says “except for one who is forced while 
his heart is secure in faith”. 
That spotless truth – represented in that freedom in the sacred text 
is precedent in the mental existence and thus the real existence than 
the freedom in ‘allibraliah’- is being ignored by many writings that 






















Claim1: Freedom is a high 
Islamic value.   
 
-Topos of authority (Quran 
text) 
 









Claim2: Freedom in Islam 
precedes the existence of 




































































exclusive right! or an astonishing liberal triumph and undoubtedly 
this is a control that cannot be justified on the basis of knowledge; 
because freedom is originally a spread concept in the folds of the 
provisions of legislation and in the folds of the theoretical premises 
of our knowledge heritage and Omar’s phrase “when did you enslave 
people when they were born free?!”  is not far from us, then also the 
freedom that its slogan is raised by the western liberal philosopher is 
not the same freedom that conforms to the components of the 
legislative framework that we belong to and we are obedient to and 
this is normal for the different manifestations of the cultural 
composition of each society so every human group has its standards 
in dealing with the concept of freedom and hence we cannot 
reproduce a concept that was born under the circumstances that do 
not conform to our speciality; as freedom concept in ‘allibraliah’ – 
and I repeat ‘allibraliah’ in its original form- is blurred and has no 
standards to an extent that it becomes a chaos in one context or to 
become the chaos in another context. 
Freedom is an essential value, it is undoubtedly a human demand and 
an innate need, and the human being needs it as he needs food as his 
life cannot stand without it, but the problem here in ‘allibraliah’ is 
that due to the dominance of the unrestrained tendency, this 
awesome concept -freedom concept- is distorted as there is a 
























thus the latter should not be 
adopted.  
-Topos of reality  
-Topos or fallacy of 
ignorance 
-Fallacy of exclusiveness of 
freedom to ‘allibraliah’    
-Topos of culture  
-Topos of authority  
-Topos of differences  
- Topos or fallacy of chaos 
+implicit topos or fallacy of 





Claim3: Freedom is an 
essential human value 
distorted and exploited in 
‘allibraliah’ to mean 
‘unlimited’ and 








‘us’, ‘we’  
-repetition       






























































significations that diverge from the objective factual original 
meaning. 
In ‘allibraliah’, there is an excessive expand on this meaning and an 
examination of its substance until enters its meaning what contradict 
its basic entity. The concept is expanded here until cultural events 
and contradictory manifestations to the original concept join it. 
There are many examples, take for example the economic side as the 
liberal freedom has no reservation in committing the crime of usury 
as this is a will of individual, so usury here is under the slogan of 
freedom, however, though the Islamic system raise the ceiling of 
freedom in this field but shows a great deal of reservation in this 
aspect of economic deals, and so on. Thus, freedom concept in liberal 
context is fraught with what contaminates its purity as there is a 
rising chaotic employment of this glamorous term, so can we imagine 
that such philosophies that are constituted in environments different 
in their principles from the ones of Ummah that is attributed to 
textually as the ideal, shall we wait from these models to coin for us 
concepts that conforms with the conceptual framework that our 
general behaviour! can we imagine that the freedom that those call 
for adjusts with nature of conscious that prioritize the unconditional 
obedience to the commands of ALLAH! The freedom of ‘allibraliah’ is 
based on the priority of making the human a God and the absolute 
























- Topos of humanitarianism+ 
Topos of right 
-Topos or fallacy of abuse of 
freedom concept by 
‘allibraliah’   
-Topos of example 
-Topos of difference 
(comparison btw Islam and 
allibraliah’ 
- Topos of definition of 
freedom in ‘allibraliah’ + 
Topos or fallacy of abuse of 
freedom concept + Topos or 
fallacy of chaos  
-Topos of cultural threat of 
‘allibraliah’  
-Topos of authority (Quran).  
-Topos of cultural threat of 
‘allibraliah’  
-Topos or fallacy of 
unrestricted freedom (Topos 









































































motives and thus it seems to lack the values that rule it, seems to be 
overflowing with the negatives; because it falls in the sin of 
generalization and unrestrictedness so it is mentioned generally and 
vaguely in a way that reflects a highly chaotic dimension where it 
appears as a term of general and unrestricted meaning. It is a 
freedom that its features contrast the nature of freedom in the laws 
of legislation and there is a vast difference between the two 
freedoms, so if the first speaks about the unrestricted freedom the 
second speaks about the absolute freedom, and what a vast 
difference between the two, yes there is a similarity between the two 
but in the origin of the concept, in the basis of meaning, in the 
appearance of the term, this similarity is total absoluteness and the 
total absoluteness as it is known does not require to match in the 
essence but requires to contrast according to its origin. 
In Islam, there is freedom but in its opposition, there is obedience -
as Islam means submission- and that obedience will not be achieved 
in the most pure form except with freedom, which means by leaving 
all forms of dependency through absolute freedom from all 
obedience but to Allah only.   
Freedom in ‘allibraliah’ has no place for that obedience, but this 
obedience is a clear indication of regression of human civilisation, or 
it is an exclusive sign to the traditional conservative society! Freedom 




















Freedom in Islam> 
(worship + loyalty)   
 
 
-Topos of differences and 
similarities btw Islam and 












-claim4: Freedom in Islam is 
based on absolute freedom   


























































between them so the freedom in ‘allibraliah’ is constituted only 
through a complete negation to all the forms of obedience, freedom 
and obedience here are like two separated islands that do not meet; 
whereas the Islamic system insists that they are inseparable values 
and hence it integrates them so it employs them in an upmost 
objective manner and in a way that reflects notably in the spirit of 
individual with purification and improvement, and the more the one 
rise in the scale of obedience the more the freedom is effective as an 
essential value in life in all its details. 
And the summary is: if freedom has a central dimension in our value 
system then why do we acquire it from low existential environments, 
is not this a redundancy?! I repeat the interrogative formulation but 
in a logical way: why to go for the substitution -the metaphorical 
dimension is present in all its intensity here- with the existence of the 
substituted -unless there is a reservation to it!- is not this 
contradictory to the rules of logic?!  
Freedom in 
‘allibraliah’> 
substitute   
Freedom in Islam> 
substituted  
Claim5: As freedom exists in 
our system of values i.e. 
(Islam), there is no need to 
borrow it from other 
systems e.g. (allibraliah). 
-Topos of advantage of
freedom + Topos of culture.


















Predication strategies  































-It occupies a high rank in the hierarchy of values  
-got its positon from the sacred text  
-is precedent in the mental existence and thus the real existence than the 
freedom in ‘allibraliah’ 
-a spread concept in the folds of the provisions of legislation and in the folds 
of the theoretical premises of our knowledge heritage  
-speaks about the absolute freedom  
-in its opposition there is obedience  
- achieved by leaving all forms of dependency through absolute freedom 
from all obedience but to Allah only.   
 
-has a central dimension in our value system. 
  
-not the same freedom that conforms to the components of the legislative 
framework that we belong to  
-is blurred and has no standards to an extent that it becomes a chaos in one 
context or to become the chaos in another context  
-is distorted as there is a tendentious employment of it and a subjective 
modification of its significations that diverge from the objective factual 
original meaning.    
- there is an excessive expand on this meaning and an examination of its 
substance until enters its meaning what contradict its basic entity 
- has no reservation in committing the crime of usury as this is a will of 



























-is fraught with what contaminates its purity as there is a rising chaotic 
employment of this glamorous term 
-is based on the priority of making the human a God and the absolute 
interest in materia 
-it has an agitated attitude towards spiritual motives 
-it seems to lack the values that rule it 
-to be overflowing with the negatives 
-it falls in the sin of generalisation and unrestrictedness 
- it is mentioned generally and vaguely in a way that reflects a highly chaotic 
dimension 
 -it appears as a term of general and unrestricted meaning.  
-it is a freedom that its features contrast the nature of freedom in the laws 
of legislation 
 - speaks about the unrestricted freedom 
- has no place for that obedience 
- is constituted only through a complete negation to all the forms of 
obedience 
 
-  a human demand and an innate need, 









Text Discursive Strategies (Reisigl and Wodak 2001) 






















Liberalism with Saudi character 
Recently, there is much talk in the Saudi society about liberalism, as 
it has become a subject of debate and controversy in the social, 
intellectual and cultural life. Debate further reached to the extent 
that one of the researchers and intellectuals prominent in our 
country, Dr. Abdullah Alghathami has written a whole book under the 
title of «the new ‘allibraliah’» and that one of the most famous folk 
series «Tash Ma Tash» has dealt in one of its episodes with 
‘allibraliah’ issue in Saudi society in a revolting sarcastic and shallow 
language without depth and without a real understanding of the 
meaning of ‘allibraliah’ and its manifestations. In the book «the 
concept of freedom» for the Moroccan thinker Abdullah Alarawi, 
there are important and worthy illuminations to stop at and to reflect 
and understand the significance and the meaning of ‘allibraliah’ and 
the civil society. 
It is impossible to talk about ‘allibraliah’ without linking it in its 
particular and general context to freedom, as ‘allibraliah’ holds in its 
basis and foundation the issue of freedom in the comprehensive, 
complete and profound sense. Abdullah Alarawi says: “Perhaps the 












Claim1: There is a major 
debate around ‘allibraliah’ in 
Saudi society. 
-Topos of number 
-Topos of authority  
- Fallacy of ignorance  
-Fallacy of definition of 







Claim2: ‘allibraliah’ is mainly 
associated with the concept 
of freedom  
-Topos of authority of 

















































by Arabs today, even the words that they compete in the field such 
as independence, democracy, and development are often used as 
synonymous with it, so that we can only find them adhered to and 
explained to it. 
He adds "The individual raises the slogan of freedom within his family 
and the woman in the face of her husband and the child against his 
father and the minority in the face of the majority and the nation in 
the fight of its enemies, and the slogan conceals different objectives, 
the most divergent, the individual understands freedom as 
dislocation of habits, and women and independence with their views. 
Al-Arawi details the great values that underlie the concept of 
freedom, which is fundamentally and profoundly connected with the 
concept of ‘allibraliah’ which illuminates in its ideas and meanings 
issues that overlap with the concept of state and the concept of 
institution, political freedom and economy, which are directly 
connected to the freedom of individual. 
In recent years, ‘allibraliah’ has come to our country, like every 
intellectual, political and economic achievement, and we treat it as if 
it were another consumption situation that has not been dealt with 
as an intellectual state linked to the issue of the individual and the 
society. It has not been read in the social and historical context in 
which it appeared in the West but dealt with in a superficial vision 
and in a very limited understanding as the ‘Hadatha’ was treated not 
-Topos of definition of
‘allibraliah’
-Topos or fallacy of freedom
Claim3: ‘Allibraliah’ has 
been dealt with superficially 


































as a comprehensive and civilized concept, but as a small part linked 
to religion in a concise manner. 
One of the strangest things to find is that there are those who chew 
the word ‘allibraliah’ and repeat it continuously and endlessly 
without having to deal with it as an issue of life and behaviour. So, 
how can you be a liberal without living a liberal life, how to be able 
to adopt all the values of ‘Hadatha’, ‘allibraliah’ and freedom while 
you live inside your old prison and still captive to the culture of the 
tribe and living in the past more than living in the present and future 
, you cannot be ‘hadathi’ while you live an old life and you cannot be 
liberal and call for freedom while you stand against the freedom of 
others. 
Concepts are comprehension and practice, the concept of ‘allibraliah’ 
and the concept of freedom and ‘hadatha’ are issues of importance 
so that they are not dealt with lightly and superficially. If we want to 
be ‘hadatheen’ and ‘liberaleen’, we must be the sons of the present 
and the sons of the future, not the sons of the tribe and the sons of 
the past. 
 
-Topos of example (of 
Hadatha) 
-Fallacy of ignorance (cherry 
picking fallacy) 
 
-Topos or fallacy of 
definition  
 






























  Predication strategies  






- has become a subject of debate and controversy in the social, intellectual and 
cultural life. 
- holds in its basis and foundation the issue of freedom in the comprehensive, 
complete and profound sense. 
-  illuminates in its ideas and meanings issues that overlap with the concept of state 
and the concept of institution, political freedom and economy, which are directly 
connected to the freedom of individual. 
- has come to our country, like every intellectual, political and economic 
achievement, and we treat it as if it were another consumption situation. 
- has not been dealt with as an intellectual state linked to the issue of the individual 
and the society 
- It has not been read in the social and historical context it appeared in the West. 
-dealt with in a superficial vision and a very limited understanding as the ‘Hadatha’ 
was treated.  





Text Discursive Strategies (Reisigl and Wodak 2001) 






Breaking the Engagement between Freedom and ‘allibraliah’ 
In my oral conversations with intellectuals and journalists around 
(allibraliah), or through my discussions with a number of twitter users 
around it; I noticed that they set ‘allibraliah’ as intertwined with 
freedom, and that they even transcend the closeness in the linguistic 
connotation to the agreement in the intellectual sense and in the real 
expression.  
In other words, they view ‘allibraliah’ as an expression of freedom in 
real life. So each position in which freedom is manifested is liberal, 
and every free practice is a form of ’allibraliah’, or an application of 
its values. And this is an intellectual flaw in many facets; an issue that 
requires to break up the engagement between freedom and 
‘allibraliah’ in the minds of those intellectuals, journalists, social 
media users and who see their opinion and adopt their point of view. 
The first aspect of that flaw is the word Liberalism “allibraliah”. It is 
not originally stemmed from Arabic language. Rather, it is a 
translation of the English word ‘Liberalism’, which means 
(altahroriah), derived from the English word ‘Liberty’, which is 
(Alhurriah), from here the linguistic link between ‘allibraliah’ concept 
and the word ‘Alhurriah’ came for some, taking into account that the 
Intellectuals and 
journalists and 
twitter users > 
liberals  
Claim1: Associating 
‘allibraliah’ with freedom is 
an intellectual fault. 
-Fallacy of definition (false
equivalence)
- Fallacy of definition
- psychogenetic fallacy
(argumentum ad hominem)
-Topos of definition 
(etymology)
-Topos or fallacy of







































word ‘liberty’ is of Latin origin which is ‘liber’ meaning the class of 
free men. So, it is this linguistic convergence that has created the 
cognitive problem for those who define freedom as ‘allibraliah’ or 
vice versa. And this is a methodical flaw, because this convergence 
must be reinforced by the historical dimension of ‘allibraliah’ and 
endorsed by its intellectual content, and the real application of its 
values. Does the history of ‘allibraliah’ confirm that it really embodies 
freedom? and does its intellectual content achieve this? And are the 
values applied today to liberal states and regimes prove that they are 
indeed achieving freedom? Absolutely not; since there is no 
liberalism that can be measured in terms of its agreement with 
freedom, instead there are different liberal models: English, French, 
American, German and others. 
The second aspect is that freedom is a human value that precedes 
‘allibraliah’.This value can be traced in many cultures; approved by 
religions and known by civilizations prior to emergence of ‘allibraliah’ 
during the European Renaissance (from the 15thto the 19thcentury). 
However, the difference – as quoted by Dr. Khalid al-Dakhil, professor 
of political sociology in an interview held with Al-Jazeera newspaper, 
is that the west has put freedom under a political and economic 
theoretical framework known as ‘allibraliah’. This means that even if 
‘allibraliah’ means freedom for the western man, this means that it is 
related to the cultural experience of the West during its history, and 
 
-Fallacy of ignorance (fallacy 
of relevance)  
-Topos of history + Topos of 









-Topos of humanitarianism + 
Topos of history and 
antecedence of freedom  
-Topos of authority of 
knowledge  












































































to the degree of its view of the civilization criterion that measures 
with it ‘allibraliah’ to achieve freedom as a human value. So this is 
John Locke, the first philosopher of ‘allibraliah’ was a slave trader!!   
The third aspect is that ‘allibraliah’ concept is ambiguous to many 
researchers and intellectuals for its variety. This has led to the 
emergence of a problem consists of having two terms that signify the 
meaning of ‘allibraliah’ which are individualism (alfardaniah) and 
freedom (altahroriah). So, if the word freedom is clear that cannot 
bear more than one meaning or interpretation; the word 
individualism is the basis of the problem. So, is the intended 
individualism in the philosophical basis of ‘allibraliah’ to be the 
(individualism) against the (collective) or the (self) against the 
(other)? In the same context, Dr. Yasser Qansouh says in his book, 
"Liberalism is a problematic concept": "The linguistic meaning of 
(individualism) is the self-dependent individual act, whereas the 
linguistic meaning of the self (selfishness) means self-interest as the 
basis of moral behaviour."   
The fourth aspect isrelated to the historical experiences of 
‘allibraliah’, and its real applications seen around the world. It is no 
secret that It is no secret that Western colonialism came to light after 
the emergence of ‘allibraliah’ in Britain with its constitutional 
revolution of 1688, which was the same ‘allibraliah’ that gave the 
Jews Palestine and stood behind their horrific massacres, and still 
-Topos of example + Fallacy 
of definition (attribution). 
 
-Topos of ambiguity of 
‘allibraliah’ + Topos of 
number.  
-Fallacy of Equivocation 
-Topos of authority of 
knowledge   








-Topos of history of 
‘allibraliah’+ Topos of abuse 











































































supplying Israel with money and weapons. Also, the American 
‘allibraliah’, after the declaration of independence in the 18th 
century, took part in the extermination of the American Indians and 
occupied the Philippines in the middle of the 19th century. The 
French revolution that Western ‘allibraliah’ brag about, however, had 
gifted the world Napoleon Bonaparte with his destructive conquests 
and crusades against the Arab countries.  
And the real evidences of the crisis of ‘allibraliah’ with the value of 
freedom are many; of much significance is the issue of (religious 
freedom) for the large Muslim communities in western countries, 
Islamophobia has raised and extremist issues and attitudes against 
Islam have increased, so who forgot the repeated issue of the 
(offensive prophet cartoons), the rejection of hijab, the refusal of 
minarets, the attempts burn Quran, the rejection to build mosques 
and the list is increasable under the existence of the western 
‘allibraliah’ that is basically (contradictory) in its reality, although 
ideal in its philosophy, So, it lacks the religious freedom and it is 
selective in its practices, as ‘allibraliah’ achieves (tolerance) and 
grants the practice of (hatred) at the same time and calls for the 
independence of individuals, the protection of their freedoms at the 
time it practices selectivity of the law against their religions and their 
lives. The simplest example of that is the position of the American 








-Topos of reality + Topos of 
number+ Fallacy of freedom 





-Topos of tolerance + Topos 
or Fallacy of abuse (hate) 
Fallacy of freedom + fallacy 
of justice  
-Topos of example  





























the enactment of a law the criminalize the abuse of religions and so 
on.  And the position of ‘allibraliah’ today with the Syrian revolution 
proves enough how these liberal regimes have kept silent on the 
slaughter and destruction of the Syrian people for their regional and 
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-they set ‘allibraliah’ as intertwined with freedom, and that they even transcend 
the closeness in the linguistic connotation to the agreement in the intellectual 
sense and in the real expression.  
-In other words, they view ‘allibraliah’ as an expression of freedom in real life.  
 
-  the word (allibraliah) is not originally Arabic 
 -it is a translation of the English word ‘Liberalism’, which means (altahroriah), 
derived from the English word ‘Liberty’, which is (Alhurriah), taking into account 
that the word ‘liberty’ is of Latin origin which is ‘liber’ meaning the class of free 
men 
-it is related the cultural experience of the West during its history 
 - is ambiguous to many researchers and intellectuals for its variety. 
  achieves (tolerance) and grants the practice of (hatred) at the same time  
- calls for the independence of individuals, the protection of their freedoms at 
the time it practices selectivity of the law against their religions and their lives 
 
-is a human value that precedes ‘allibraliah’ 
-this value is existent in many cultures, approved by religions and known by 
civilisations before the emergence of ‘allibraliah’  
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Freedom of ‘Allibraliah’ and the Conventional Misunderstanding 
In the previous two articles, I attempted to clarify my vision of the 
liberal freedom. The words were an engagement of knowledge with 
the theories that occupy the minds of those interested in this vital 
field that is always renewed. That is the reason why the speech came 
into being a theorisation, referring to ideas, concepts and terms that 
professional readers know, while difficult to understand by others - a 
little or a lot. 
In this article, I will try to make the speech general / public / populist, 
as far as the subject can bear; as for those who read about ‘allibraliah’ 
in the "non-ideologized" scholarly literature do not need to clarify 
such bases that we discussed and will discuss on the limits of the 
freedom of ‘allibraliah’. For this reason, I will try to clarify the obvious 
–with some examples - for those who do not read or read little, and
their readings, if any, remain limited to traditional ideological
clashing articles / summaries / leaflets / pamphlets with ‘allibraliah’;
so they are immersed with blatant ignorance, overt contrasts, Stupid





Claim1: ‘allibraliah’ is clear 
for critical readers but still 
misunderstood by the 
ideologized public whose 
knowledge is based on 
traditionalists’ ideologies.  
-Topos of knowledge by
critical readers
-Topos of ignorance of the
public



































The traditionalist preachers do not address their miserable crowds 
except with what emotionally agitate them; because the way to the 
mindless "layman" mind is only through his raging religious and social 
passion. The traditionalist preachers say to their masses in a deceitful 
superiority: it is true that ‘allibraliah’ in all the countries of the world 
do not let freedom unlimited entirely, but no liberal can deny that 
"absolute freedom" is the origin of the "freedom of ‘allibraliah’" he 
calls for. Thus, according to the deceitful view of the traditionalists, 
all ‘allibraliah’ seek absolute freedom, because it is the origin of the 
liberal theory. 
There is no doubt that the words of the preachers here are at the first 
true, and at the last lie or blatant ignorance. The traditionalists 
exploit the truth in it; to connect it to the blatant ignorance, or the 
falsehood. Yes, the origin the freedom of ‘allibraliah’- the origin of 
which is theoretically anchored - is that it is an absolute freedom 
without limits; because a man found - natural / in nature - free. 
However, this does not mean that ‘allibraliah’ seeks that, and this is 
not possible at all, because natural freedom means cruel freedom, 
freedom here eats freedom; this results in total natural captivity. 
To be more obvious, I would say: It is no wonder that ‘allibraliah’ 
affirms absolute freedom; as a theoretical starting point, Islam too 
confirms this principle rule in theory: absolute freedom. For the 

























Claim2: ‘allibraliah’ is not 
based on unrestricted 
freedom as the 
traditionalists claim. -fallacy 
of definition of ‘allibraliah’ 





-Topos or fallacy of abuse by 
traditionalists. 
 
-Topos of definition of 
‘allibraliah’ + topos or fallacy 
of freedom in ‘allibraliah’. 
 
-Topos of comparison 
(similarity between 






















































fundamentalist movements-, we find the fundamental rule that the 
legalists repeat consistently, that the origin of everything is 
permissibility, asserting that the "permissible" does not require 
evidence, because it is the origin, while the "forbidden" is what needs 
an evidence because it gets out of the original: general permissibility. 
Here, is it permissible for anyone to say that Islamic law permits 
everything, because its origin is permissibility? Of course, no one 
would say this, everyone knows that the emphasis on the origin of 
permissibility is a theoretical principle only; to control the assets of 
the exceptional prohibition. 
Here, the preachers go back a little - they claim, the freedom of 
‘allibraliah’ is indeed restricted, but it is restricted only to the 
detriment of others, that is, a person is free to do whatever he 
pleases; as far as he does not harm others. This is also true in 
principle. However, the most important question remains, the 
problematic question: What are the limits of harming others? We are 
all aware that they are not just the limits of direct aggression, physical 
or moral, but are much wider. 
The limits of harm to others are not defined at all times and places, 
but they are issues in terms of their relative and circumstantial 
nature, because they are cultural boundaries, i.e., the culture, 
including religion, creates its features and horizons. If they are based 
on a collective basis in a fixed religion, they remained fixed albeit 
Claim3: freedom in 
‘allibraliah’ is relative based 
on cultural factors but not 
based on not harming others 
as traditionalists claim.  
- fallacy of definition of
freedom.
-topos of relativity of
































controversial, or in a renewed religion; they keep transforming 
according to the requirements of the situation, the humanitarian 
situation and the real situation. 
I think this is clear. Nevertheless, although it is clear, I will try to clarify 
and simplify the examples, and even with naive images sometimes; 
for the layman to recognize the simple general features of the image. 
Traditionalists say that liberals do not impose a restriction on 
freedom except on the limits of harming others. Indeed, it is a culture 
that creates our vision of the concept of harm. For example, I would 
choose from the examples what constitutes the traditional human 
obsession. If a man chose to walk naked on the streets of London, 
Paris or New York, would he be permitted to do so, if this man stood 
completely naked at the airport or boarded the plane, etc.? Will he 
be allowed to do so, although in the traditional principle he practices 
his personal freedom that does not harm others? Of course, we all 
know that liberal societies do not allow this, and they see in this 
behaviour a blatant attack on the public space, which is the right of 
all. Thus, this behaviour / nakedness in public space is an explicit, but 
indirect, aggression against all, an aggression that is punishable by 
law, for violating the public morals emanating from the cultural 
practices that everyone has accepted -they are cultural practices 


























- fallacy of definition of 
freedom in ‘allibraliah’ by 
the traditionalists. 
 
-topos of culture. 






















































































means that such behaviour is not an individual choice, although it is 
not a "direct aggression" from a person to another. 
If we come to the Muslim community, we find that Islam is strongly 
present in shaping the cultural vision. For example, in a Muslim 
community, it cannot be possible to issue a law that allows for 
adultery and makes it legitimate. But -here come the cultural legal 
details- there is a difference between the criminalization of adultery, 
and the imposition of laws of discretionary control alleging 
guardianship of public behaviours that are - in terms of origin - 
permissible; Under the pretext of blocking excuses. The systems that 
try to control gender mixing, or adjust the limits and circumstances 
of this mixing ... etc., are all based on judgments, in the sense that 
they are not fundamental assets, as is the absolute basis for the 
prohibition of adultery. Thus, such judgmental systems are subject to 
constant conflict between those with a liberal vision, a vision that 
grants the individual a responsible freedom, and those who maintain 
a conservative vision that sees details of individual actions must 
remain under the strict control that forms the identity of the tutelary 
society. 
Also, traditionalists argue about ‘allibraliah’ by claiming that freedom 
exists in all sects, or in most sects, and, more importantly, it exists in 
Islam so why does ‘allibraliah’ claim an exclusive possession of 











































Claim4: individual freedom 
is central in ‘allibraliah’ but 





















































is what distinguishes it from others? . In fact, each doctrine or trend 
has a compass of a central interest, distinguishing it from others. 
Individual freedom is the compass of liberal interest. However, this 
does not mean it do not exist in others’. It exists - to an extent - in 
every intellectual trend, but in ‘allibraliah’ it is a priority, and in others 
it is one of the elements of discourse. 
The centrality of ‘allibraliah’ idea around the "individual freedom" is 
what distinguishes it, as "social justice" is what distinguishes 
socialism, for example. In socialism, we find a will to liberate, 
embracing - in the end, as theoretically claiming - individual freedom, 
but it admits that this individual freedom is not the centre of interest. 
Hence, socialism was characterized by a focus on something, not the 
same focus of ‘allibraliah’, and vice versa, hence, they are 
distinguished. 
To be more obvious, we say, the emphasis on individual freedom 
exists in most sects, trends and religions, but ‘allibraliah’ makes this 
individual freedom its focus, and even its identity that distinguishes 
it. If all this suggests that "the freedom of allibraliah" is relative, 
circumstantial, and transient, it means that the limits of liberal 
freedom are not predetermined. Here, the traditional preacher will 
come out with us denouncing and arguing that the inability to define 
the limits means that ‘allibraliah’ is nothing more than an illusion, or 
-fallacy of comparison btw
‘allibraliah’ and other
concepts.
-Topos of difference (of
‘allibraliah’ from other
concepts) + Topos of
advantage of freedom in
‘allibraliah’.
-Topos of example
-Topos of existence of
freedom in most concepts +





























that it is an idea with no identity, so that its proponents do not know 
what they want at all. 
To understand ‘allibraliah’, we must recognize that it is a "general 
trend", a "circumstance", a "freeing tendency," and therefore it is 
necessarily relative. For example, it is said in the West: the Christian 
liberal trend, which refers to the trend that conforms to Christian 
values, but in a spirit of liberation that raises the value of the 
individual. Also, in the Muslim world, liberal Islam, or the liberal 
Islamic trend, is also a distinction from extremist Islam, or the Islam 
of the totalitarians, on the one hand, and its distinction from an 
entirely odd ‘libraliah’, that try to break with its reality and starting 
from the zero as it claims, which is impossible. 
If ‘allibraliah’ is a "circumstantial", "relative", "state", it means that it 
exists - in some way - in all societies, although it does not explicitly 
express itself, and may not be aware of it. In Iran, for example, we 
find that political and social dominance is for the clergy. Mohammad 
Khatami, the former president, wears the religious turban, which 
means he is a clergyman. But Khatami is described - in Iran and 
abroad - as a liberal, does this mean that he adopts the vision of the 
most liberal trends in the West, just because he possesses this 
feature: liberal? Of course not. Hence, Khatami described as a liberal, 
a relative description, that is deserved because he represents an 


























Claim5: relativeness of 
freedom in ‘allibraliah’ does 
not mean that ‘allibraliah’ is 
a myth as the traditionalists 
claim. 
-Topos of definition of 
‘allibraliah’+ Topos of 
relativity.  
-Topos of example 
 
 
-Topos of existence of 
‘allibraliah’ in all societies + 
Topos of ignorance of this 
existence. 
 
-Topos of example.    
























































moved to one of the capitals of the West with the same thought and 
details of the vision without change, he would have been a 
conservative right. 
Mindful liberal does not penetrate the entire socio-cultural practices. 
He works his vision through them. For example, if a committee of ten 
persons is formed, to look at the age at which a person may travel 
abroad without the permission of a guardian. Globally, an individual 
becomes independent at about 18 years old. If the Committee had 
the following options: Freedom of travel is at 18/19/20/22, we will 
find the members of the Committee will differ according to the 
nature of the cultural reference that determines their vision of things. 
The liberal, in asserting responsible individual freedom, will choose 
the age of 18, and affirms that the individual as soon as he is of legal 
age assumes full responsibility for himself. While emphasizing this 
option, he does not miss the dangers, but believes that freedom is 
more important and has priority, and that the negatives resulting 
from it are dealt with from other entrances, which do not go beyond 
the limits of those negatives. 
This would be the liberal choice. On the other hand, a conservative 
man will choose age 22, if there is a higher age to choose, he would 
chose it; because he believes in the need to control the behaviour of 
individuals, and believes that the freedom available to them will 
































totalitarian countries- mostly communist / socialist-oriented 
countries - that make no travel, and travel is an exception. Therefore, 
those who want to travel from their citizens abroad, even at the age 
of 30 or 40, have to take a special complex permit, which is available 
only to few. 
Another example: If a committee is set up to supervise the Book Fair. 
Here, you will find that the member of the Liberal Committee does 
not prevent books except very little, and perhaps does not prevent 
anything at all. On the other hand, you will find the conservative 
tutelary wants to make the ban is the origin, and that each book in 
the exhibition holds a special permit. Of course, between this and 
that, for the relativity of the liberal trend, you will find the 
conservative liberal, and you will find the liberal conservative in the 
middle. It is obvious that the liberal, when he emphasizes the need 
to allow all books except few, does not mean that he agrees with the 
contents of everything presented in the exhibition. It merely means 
that he grants individuals responsible freedom so that they decide 
themselves what is harmful and useful, and also they have the right 
to take the experience with all its dangers so they are ultimately 
responsible by their choices. 
In the above examples, you can note that ‘allibraliah’ did not raise a 
contradiction to a religious principle that is agreed upon by all Islamic 

































Claim6: ‘allibraliah’ does not 
contradict the main 































































for example, but there will be a discussion about the way it is 
performed and the details of the steps to be complied with; If the 
obligation is determined. What is intended is that the members of 
the imagined committees present their views within the possible 
religious, cultural and social context, which is relatively 
circumstantial. As it is related to the general cultural context, it is 
ordinary that some jurisprudential views are present and it is natural 
for a liberal to choose the closest to individual freedom; even if it is 
the view of some jurists as opposed to the opinion of the majority of 
jurists, the existence of the dispute necessarily means that the matter 
is not a fundamental origin, and it has a space of interpretation that 




the relative application of 
these principles on the basis 
of the cultural factors that 
support the freedom of 
individuals. 
-Topos of culture. 
-Topos of relativity of Islamic 
law.        
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-the origin the freedom of ‘allibraliah’- the origin of which is theoretically 
anchored - is that it is an absolute freedom without limits; because a man found - 
natural / in nature - free. However, this does not mean that ‘allibraliah’ seeks 
that, and this is not possible at all, because natural freedom means cruel 
freedom, freedom here eats freedom; this results in total natural captivity. 
- Individual freedom is the compass of liberal interest 
-"individual freedom" is what distinguishes it 
- but ‘allibraliah’ makes this individual freedom its focus, and even its identity 
that distinguishes it 
- it is a "general trend", a "circumstance", a "freeing tendency," and therefore it 
is necessarily relative. 
-it exists - in some way - in all societies, although it does not explicitly express 
itself, and may not be aware of it. –  
- did not raise a contradiction to a religious principle that is agreed upon by all 
Islamic scholars. 
 
- argue about ‘allibraliah’ by claiming that freedom exists in all sects, or in most 
sects, and, more importantly, it exists in Islam so why does ‘allibraliah’ claim an 
exclusive possession of theorizing of freedom? 
-‘allibraliah’ in all the countries of the world do not let freedom unlimited entirely, 
but no liberal can deny that "absolute freedom" is the origin of the "freedom of 
‘allibraliah’" he calls for.  
-all ‘allibraliah’ seek absolute freedom, because it is the origin of the liberal theory. 
- the freedom of ‘allibraliah’ is indeed restricted, but it is restricted only to the 
detriment of others, that is, a person is free to do whatever he pleases; as far as 
he does not harm others 
- Traditionalists say that liberals do not impose a restriction on freedom except 
on the limits of harming others. 
- argue that the inability to define the limits means that ‘allibraliah’ is nothing 
more than an illusion, or that it is an idea with no identity. 
